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INTRODUCTION 
SACRAMENTALITY, GIFT, AND LANGUAGE 
 
 At the chaotic height of the 2016 election campaign several articles appeared in 
prominent publications, most notably The New Yorker and The Point, addressing what they 
called a collapse or a crisis of our shared language. Nathan Heller perhaps summed up the crisis 
best in a single phrase: “the language of common values has lost common meaning.”1 Heller was 
addressing the student protests on college campuses that had arisen during the concomitant 
ascendance of then presidential candidate Donald Trump. The problem, however, extended far 
beyond various confrontations over “safe spaces” or “political correctness run amok.” As the 
Black Lives Matter movement had already shown, the problem was not necessarily that there 
was no longer a broad share of agreement on political issues, it was that there no longer seemed 
to be an accepted common vocabulary by which we might adjudicate political conflict. Either 
side seemed quite literally to be speaking a different language. The Point even went so far as to 
create an entire project devoted to translating the language of political values into common 
definitions so that either opposing side might better speak the other, an attempt, to put it in 
Heller’s terms, to make language of common value once again have common meaning amongst 
divergent political actors.  
The results of such efforts within the sphere of public discourse are yet to be seen, but 
their very existence seems to portend the return of an all too human cataclysm: the Babel-like 
confusing of a language once shared by all. More importantly, the deeper truth that such 
watershed moments relate is that language and action are not entirely distinct from one another. 
                                                
1 Nathan Heller, “Trump, the University of Chicago, and the Collapse of Public Language,” The 
New Yorker, Sept. 1st, 2016. 
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To speak in common terms is to be able to share in common action, and it is only by being 
initiated into such a shared vision of the world that one can claim to belong in any meaningful 
way to a community. In other words, if we are to create a more just communal life with and for 
one another, the first job to be done is to learn once again how to speak to one another. 
 Phrasing the problem in this way immediately brings to mind similar concerns within the 
ecclesial context. Obviously the Church was not immune to the shared consternation over the 
rapidly changing character of political discourse that the 2016 campaign brought about with such 
unique force. If anything, the problem was more pronounced among believers who worshipped 
in the same space but planned to mark different names on the ballot. Whatever the exact lines of 
conflict, the resulting malaise seemed to concern a similar ultimate difficulty—namely, that 
Christians no longer meant the same thing when they began to speak of their inherently Christian 
values. The language of common Christian value had lost common Christian meaning.  
Despite the fact that the year 2016 felt like a moment unlike any other that had come 
before, the problems of a shared discourse were not new to the ecumenical or 
interdenominational conversation. Although he was writing about weapons of mass destruction, 
Rowan Williams outlines in the early 2000’s the particular set of deep questions that arises when 
Christians find themselves in moral disagreement over issues that one takes as not only settled, 
but abhorrent to the Christian “grammar of obedience.” 
I believe it is impossible for a Christian to tolerate, let alone bless or even defend, 
the manufacture and retention of weapons of mass destruction by any political 
authority. And having said that I believe it is impossible, I at once have to 
recognize that Christians do it; not thoughtless, shallow, uninstructed Christians, 
but precisely those who make themselves accountable to the central truths of our 
faith…I cannot at times believe that we are reading the same bible; I cannot 
understand what it is that could conceivably speak of the nature of the Body of 
Christ in any defense of such strategy. But these are the people I meet at the 
Lord’s table; I know they hear the scriptures I hear, and I am aware that they offer 
their discernment as a gift to the Body…. So I am left in perplexity. I cannot grasp 
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how this reading of the Bible is possible; I want to go on arguing against it with 
all my powers, and I believe that Christian witness in the world is weakened by 
our failure to speak with one voice in this matter. Yet it seems I am forced to ask 
what there is in this position that I might recognize as a gift, as a showing of 
Christ.2 
 
Such I’m sure was also the feeling of a great many believers as they approached the Lord’s table 
alongside those who supported a candidate or a political party that they found in fundamental 
conflict with the God whose body and blood they were now invited to share. One could easily 
imagine similar feelings from believers of the past over a variety of political and moral concerns. 
Yet, the matter that they share in common, the fundamental question that we must address in 
seeking to reconcile such divergent perspectives or keep them bound in the unity of Christ that 
supposedly runs deeper than the unity found in “the world,” is one of language. I think language 
will shows itself as the root of this problem if we try and name what it would mean to fail in such 
an effort. Williams once again casts this in terms of risk: “[T]here are times when the risky 
decision called for is to recognize that we are no longer speaking the same language at all, no 
longer seeking to mean the same things, to symbolize or communicate the same vision of who 
God is.”3 To fail in our efforts to act as one Christian community is bound together with whether 
or not we speak the same language—i.e. share the common terms of value that we would seek to 
“symbolize” through our actions in the world.  
 What could it mean to claim that such a problem can be combated, indeed can only be 
combated, sacramentally, and specifically through the primary sacrament of the Eucharist? In 
other words, how might the Eucharist provide the Church with a baseline of shared meaning? I 
am going to argue that to do so we must inquire into how it is that the Eucharist is both an 
                                                
2 Rowan Williams, “Making Moral Decisions,” The Cambridge Companion to Christian Ethics, 
ed. Robin Gil (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 9-10. 
3 Williams, “Making Moral Decisions,” 13. 
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ontological4 and political scandal. Perhaps the best way to say what it is I intend when I say the 
Eucharist is both an ontological and political scandal is to say first what I do not intend to say. I 
will do so by offering two “extremes.” The two extremes are seeming caricatures of High Church 
and Low Church perspectives but, despite their excessive nature, such pictures heuristically serve 
to elucidate the borders of an adequate theology of the Eucharist. The first extreme, of the 
decidedly High Church variety, would be an account of the Eucharist that veers dangerously 
close to attributing to the ritual some form of magic. The emphasis in this imagined extreme 
would be on reading the Eucharist as primarily an ontological scandal and only secondarily as a 
political one. To quote Williams again, the presence of Christ’s flesh and blood as a means of 
grace can ultimately feel like an “arbitrary” instantiation of “God’s unconditional power.”5 That 
arbitrary power, however, is necessary for our salvation since receiving the Eucharistic elements 
imbues our mortal flesh with the very body and blood of Christ.6 These spiritual substances 
                                                
4 This term perhaps merits further definition. I take “ontology” or “ontological” to mean, as 
Donald Mackinnon defined it, something like that sort of necessary discourse “where the 
concepts which we employ, and on which we must reflect, are those of the highest possible level 
of generality, such that we say we encounter them in discourse concerning any subject-matter 
whatsoever.” So in saying that the Eucharist is an ontological scandal I mean that it is a scandal 
precisely at this level of generality, i.e. that things behave differently within the rite and 
subsequently force us to rethink our conception of the general parameters of reality as a whole. 
This definition is obviously contestable, and the figures to be examined will, in some ways, 
counter it. One of the key insights yielded by my analysis of Chauvet and Milbank will be the 
ways in which their accounts of the ethical ramifications of the Eucharist are affected by the 
different ways in which they conceptualize the nature of ontology. Donald Mackinnon, 
“Prolegomena to Christology,” The Journal of Theological Studies 33, no. 1 (1982): 149. 
5 Rowan Williams, On Christian Theology (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 97. 
6 This is a position not without parallel in the early Church Fathers. In particular, this notion that 
ingesting the Eucharistic elements secured an ontological transformation of our souls was 
notably the perspective of Cyril of Jerusalem in the Mystagogical Lectures: “In the figure of 
Bread is given to thee His Body, and in the figure of Wine His Blood; that thou by partaking of 
the Body and Blood of Christ mightiest be made of the same body and the same blood with Him. 
For thus we come to bear Christ in us, His Body and His Blood being distributed to our 
members,” in A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, ed. 
Philip Schaff and Henry Wace, 2nd series, vol. 7 (Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, 1996), 151. 
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slowly work out a profound transformation of our character through their ingestion such that an 
ontological change in the elements begets a similar change in our very souls.  
The second extreme, predominantly associated with the Low Church, reverses the first by 
focusing on the political scandal of the Eucharistic community but does so at the expense of any 
genuine ontological scandal in the phrase “This is the body of Christ.” Under this frame we 
might imagine that what is really transformative about partaking of the Eucharist is not the 
presence of Christ in the elements, however one might conceptualize that presence. The 
transformative presence is rather the presence of Christ in the gathered community. I am 
transformed not so much by taking the elements but rather by participating in and being adopted 
into a radically inclusive community. A sense of arbitrariness will haunt even this perspective, 
for the question soon becomes why it is that we need the rite of the Eucharist to experience this 
sort of communal belonging? Why, in other words, do we have to perform this action to receive 
this result? A purely political scandal, thus, seems to require still a recourse to an ontological 
one—the rite of the Eucharist must accomplish something ontological that makes its continual 
performance necessary.  
 Again, these two horns of a hypothetical dilemma do not have any advocates within the 
mainstream of Christian sacramental theology. Most sacramental theologians of High and Low 
Church seek a combination of the two—a theology of the sacraments that appreciates the 
legitimate challenge of the sacraments to a fully materialist ontology but one that also does not 
shy away from the political implications of Christian worship. As such, this essay situates itself 
as a participant in that discourse now called Sacramental theology, particularly as it relates to the 
concept of “sacramentality.” Indeed it is this concept of “sacramentality,” a view of reality as 
somehow the site of encounter with and transformation by God’s grace, that attempts to 
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negotiate the complex interplay between ontology and politics I’ve noted above. In an era called 
by many, either with elation or consternation, “postmodern” the concept of sacramentality has 
proved a particularly helpful tool in grounding a liberative praxis in an ontology that takes 
seriously the philosophical critiques that have so constituted our contemporary intellectual and 
cultural landscape.7  
In this essay I am offering my own contribution to the notion of sacramentality, 
particularly as it relates to the primary sacrament of the Church, the Eucharist. Thus, I intend to 
argue for the notion of the Eucharist as the gift of political language. But why imagine the 
Eucharist in this way, first, as a gift and more specifically as the gift of language? In what 
follows I hope to show that the most effective responses to postmodern critiques of theology 
have attempted to give an account of Christian theology from the guiding principle of 
sacramentality—a return to both the presence of the living God within the external “sign” of the 
created order and of the mystery that this presence reveals. Attaching notions of gift and 
language to the Eucharist is the only way, I shall hope to show in what follows, to avoid the 
cosmological pitfalls into which such attempts inevitably seem to run. This way of conceiving of 
the Eucharist and, more importantly, of practicing the Eucharist as the Church prevents, I shall 
argue, the Eucharist from silently lapsing into an over-emphasis on either ontology or politics. 
While it might be stereotypically Anglican, arguing for the Eucharist as the gift of political 
                                                
7 I use the term “postmodern” in this essay simply as a heuristic device to indicate the particular 
historical moment with which theology is currently faced and, in particular, I use it to indicate 
the period of time that our current theological period is often trying to move beyond or to 
circumvent. I am aware, however, of the criticisms of the use of this term including but certainly 
not limited to the criticisms proffered by one of this essay’s principle interlocutors, Jacques 
Derrida, who in an exchange with David Tracy said: “I am not sure what this word means and I 
am not sure that it is useful to understand what is going on today,” in God, the Gift and 
Postmodernity, ed. John D. Caputo and Michael Scanlon (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1999), 182.  
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language charts a middle way through the divide between two idolatrous manners of imagining 
the ritual that founds and grounds the Church as the Body of Christ.  
The two characteristic attempts of defending Christian theology against the attacks of 
postmodernity I shall examine in this essay are the works of French sacramental theologian 
Louis-Marie Chauvet and Anglican philosophical theologian John Milbank. I have chosen these 
two thinkers because they offer uniquely protean responses to the problem within their own 
fields: Chauvet within sacramental theology and Milbank within philosophical theology. More 
importantly, however, their responses to postmodernity share one foundational commonality and 
one absolute divergence. What these two thinkers share in common is the notion that it is 
modernity and not postmodernity that is the real culprit of the problems that face Christian 
theology. Rather than adopting a pugilistic stance towards the radical critiques of metaphysics 
and theology we shall examine below, these two thinkers embrace them and consequently argue 
that it is inherently orthodox to do so. Christianity is not only capable of withstanding the 
postmodern turn but is actually at home in such a whirlwind. Where these two thinkers diverge 
however and in the strongest possible terms is in their evaluation of the usefulness of philosophy 
within the theological enterprise. Chauvet chooses largely to appropriate the resources of 
postmodern philosophy, particularly of Heidegger and Derrida, for his sacramental 
reinterpretation of Christian existence. Milbank, on the other hand, chooses to cut a far more 
pugilistic path by casting aside such resources as inherently tainted by the ontological violence 
which grounds the groundless nihilism of philosophies of difference. What I shall hope to show 
in both of these thinkers, however, is that sacramentality plays a pivotal role in both this 
commonality and divergence. In other words, these thinkers cannot be properly read and 
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understood without grasping the centrality of sacramentality for their theological and 
ethical/political projects.  
However, it will be impossible to appreciate the dialogue between these two perspectives 
without at least a basic primer on the postmodern context that motivates their responses. As such, 
Chapter One of this essay will seeks to elucidate precisely this context by showing the inherent 
connection between the concept of sacramentality as it is used in theology proper and the 
radically postmodern project of overcoming metaphysics and ontotheology. The figures I shall 
spend the most time upon are Heidegger and Derrida with a brief foray into Kant’s legacy within 
the critical tradition to which they are indebted. My hope in this chapter is to show how the 
project of overcoming metaphysics has an obvious parallel to the turn to sacramentality in that it 
is argued in both veins of thought that the return to the ordinary will save us from the inevitable 
category mistakes involved in abstracting our thinking from the finite order. More importantly 
for my purposes, however, will be to show the way in which the concepts of language and gift 
become inextricably linked together beginning with Heidegger and culminating in Derrida. In 
short, it is no surprise that this discourse grounded in language and gift presents a unique 
theological opportunity for the Church shaped by Word and Sacrament. 
 Chapters Two and Three will attempt to systematize the thought of Chauvet under the 
paradigm of the Eucharist as the gift of political language. This will mean, first, presenting the 
Chauvet’s unique interpretation of the categories of language and gift as presented within his 
magnum opus Symbol and Sacrament. The aim of Chapter Two is thus to present Chauvet’s 
unique interpretation of the relationship between theology and philosophy—in this case, an 
embrace of the Heideggerian project of overcoming metaphysics as expressing a “homology of 
attitude” with Christian theology. This relationship between theology and philosophy shapes 
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Chauvet’s unique account of how categories of language and gift resist the critique of theology 
as ontotheology and redeem the devotional life of the Church from ills of modernity that now 
beset it. Chapter Three looks to the peak of that devotional life—the Eucharist—and the ways in 
which Chauvet conceives of the Eucharist as an ontological and political scandal.   
 Chapters Four and Five will examine the founder of Radical Orthodoxy, John Milbank, 
and his attempt to articulate a properly Christian ontology over against the rising tide of 
secularity. Chapter Four will have a parallel structure to my synthesis of Chauvet’s work. I shall 
focus first on Milbank’s particularly pugilistic conception of theology’s relationship to 
philosophy, how this relationship affects his attempt to understand the way in which language is 
constitutive for thought, and, finally, how he attempts to purify the concept of gift exchange 
contra Derrida. Chapter Five will relate Milbank’s critical project to his theology of the 
Eucharist. I shall show that while mentions of the Eucharist are quite sparse in Milbank’s 
theological project, his emphasis on gift, language, and theurgy link his project directly to the 
doctrine of transubstantiation. The work of Catherine Pickstock, which demonstrates the 
potential of an explicitly Eucharistic theology that draws on Milbank’s work, will be drawn upon 
to lend further credence to this claim. Finally, I shall show that the political scandal of the 
Eucharist, for Milbank, actually has two separate iterations. The first iteration, based in 
Milbank’s earlier work, sees the political scandal of the Eucharist as a culture whose aesthetic 
shaping of the world shares a substantial affinity with the shape of the life of Christ. The second 
iteration, however, is to be found in Milbank’s more recent work and is riddled with 
controversial political claims, particularly an argument that Christianity inherently advocates for 
a return of Christendom. I shall show that this recent push for a form of sovereign rule within the 
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Church is the result of an overemphasis within Milbank’s theology on the Incarnation, an 
overemphasis that Chauvet can help correct.  
 In Chapter Six I am left with three fundamental conflicts to reconcile via our dialogue 
with Chauvet and Milbank. While it is no panacea for theology, I do believe that the key to 
resolving the three conflicts to be enumerated hereafter is the apophatic discipline that has been 
the watchword of Christian living since the Early Church. Thus, the first conflict to be addressed 
is just how it is that the Eucharist discloses a fundamental theology rooted in sacramentality. In 
my terms, this means elucidating the Eucharist as The Gift. Second, I must resolve how this 
proper understanding of sacramentality relates to the theories of language that were so influential 
upon Chauvet and Milbank. This means elucidating the Eucharist as the Gift of Language. 
Finally, I must resolve the conflict of a political scandal that never seems to arrive. After all, 
Christians have been partaking of the Eucharist for thousands of years and the Kingdom of God 
has not been established on earth. Reconciling this conflict means elucidating the nature of the 
Eucharist as the Gift of Political Language.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
SACRAMENTALITY AND THE GIFT OF POSTMODERNITY 
 
Introduction 
John Calvin famously introduced his Institutes of the Christian Religion with the claim 
that all of our wisdom that was to be counted true and sound consisted of two types: knowledge 
of God and knowledge of self.1 Contemporary theology and philosophy can count neither areas 
of knowledge as secure in its decidedly “postmodern” context. It will be the goal of this chapter 
to trace why that is the case. In particular, it will be the goal of this chapter to show how 
language and “the gift” come to play a decisive role in this radical critique of the traditional 
foundations of metaphysics and theology. Describing the origins of the postmodern context for 
theology immediately raises the difficulty of beginning at all, something that a variety of 
postmodern discourses have problematized in any manner of ways. This essay makes no claim to 
expertise when it comes to the historical beginning point of such a tectonic shift in the human 
sciences. What I am after here is not a comprehensive history of ideas but rather an orientation to 
a particular current within a much larger tide. If postmodernity is the breaking of a wave onto 
shore then perhaps it is modernity and in particular the Enlightenment that began the undulation 
in the first place. 
With that in mind, I shall begin with the Enlightenment philosopher of modernity par 
excellence, Immanuel Kant. Kant’s theoretical work sowed the seeds of metaphysical critique 
that Martin Heidegger and Jacques Derrida would later harvest to great yield. Kant’s legacy in 
this case is an intertwined pair of claims: first, that empirical knowledge of a metaphysical God 
                                                
1 John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. John T. McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles 
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960), 35. 
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is impossible, and second, that metaphysical knowledge’s proper object is not an external, 
spiritual being but rather the structures of the thinking subject’s rational faculties. While Kant 
actually coined the term “ontotheology,” his use of the term in the Critique of Pure Reason is 
quite unlike the purpose to which Heidegger put the neologism.2 Kant does not, therefore, 
engage fully in a critique of what I shall mean in this essay by the term “ontotheology,” but his 
critique of metaphysical knowledge of God proves vital for Heidegger’s continuation of this 
alteration, even destruction of metaphysics as it was traditionally constituted. Hence, after Kant I 
shall proceed to Heidegger’s critique of onto-theology, attending specifically to the way that this 
metaphysical critique ushers in a new manner of thinking about the essence of language. Once 
we see language as the house of being the relationship between ontology and politics necessarily 
takes a sharp turn.  
It is at this point that the great anthropologist Marcel Mauss will enter the discussion with 
his talk of “the gift”—what he thought was an anthropological observation with drastic political 
consequences.  Mauss is important not just because he introduces talk of “the gift” into the 
philosophical lexicon but because his theory of the gift inaugurates a new manner of thinking 
about both ontology and politics. Mauss’ gift to the discourse—to employ a pun used by a 
plethora of later commentators—is to show the manner in which gift-giving informs discourses 
beyond structural anthropology, to the point that the gift might become a transcendental principle 
from which all manners of human belonging have their origin. The gift leads to the question of 
the Gift, if you will. 
Precisely this question—just what to make of the theory of gift-giving as more than just 
an ethnographic observation—begins our section on Jacques Derrida. I shall devote more time to 
                                                
2 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998) A632/B660, p. 584. 
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treating Derrida because it is his philosophical project that brings together all of the facets of 
postmodernity we have only to this point in the argument treated singularly under a larger 
umbrella—namely, the critique of metaphysics as ontotheology, the turn to language as 
constituting the shape of human knowledge, and the theory of the gift. I will join several 
commentators of Derrida’s in seeing deconstruction as a project that is, at root, a political 
option.3 So to speak of Derrida’s philosophical work on metaphysics, language, and 
anthropology is at the same time, I will argue, to allow Derrida’s later political turn to shine 
through. To put that in Derridian terms, our analysis of Derrida on the gift and language will be 
haunted by the democracy to come. The great gift of Derrida to this project will be his insertion 
of messianism or, better, apophaticism into any adequate discourse on the gift and, hence, any 
adequate analysis of how language constitutes human beings as human. For the time being, we 
turn to the work of Immanuel Kant. 
 
The Unknowable God: Kant’s Critique of Metaphysics 
Prompted by a rude awakening from his famous “dogmatic slumber” at the hands of 
David Hume, Kant set about defending how one might make judgments involving metaphysical 
entities with any legitimacy, that is, how can we claim to have adequate knowledge of any object 
that we do not and in principle cannot encounter within our experience? The awakening that 
Hume had gifted Kant in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion was to bring into focus the 
great problem facing metaphysics, a problem of just what it was we were saying when we 
claimed knowledge of objects beyond the limits of finite experience—things like the soul or 
                                                
3 See James K.A. Smith, Jacques Derrida: Live Theory (New York: Continuum, 2005); Simon 
Critchley, Ethics, Politics, and Subjectivity: Essays on Derrida, Levinas, and Contemporary 
French Thought (New York: Verso, 1997); John Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques 
Derrida: Religion Without Religion (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997). 
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God, obviously, but also of something as basic as a thing in itself.4 Kant’s defense was, 
ultimately, to bring out a key technical distinction that Hume had passed over—the possibility of 
a synthetic a priori judgment. In his Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics Kant gave an 
account of two types of judgments: synthetic and analytic.5 Analytic judgments do nothing more 
than identify something that was already inherent within a particular concept. They could be, like 
all judgments, either a priori or a posteriori, prior to experience or based solely in experience. 
Synthetic judgments, on the other hand, bring out something new that the concept itself didn’t 
necessarily entail. Hume had held that both synthetic and analytic judgments could be leveled 
against things a posteriori: we could analyze and discover new truths within our experience. But 
a synthetic a priori judgment, a judgment that added truth to a concept prior to any experience of 
that object within the immanent horizon, was impossible.6 The implications of this claim led to 
Hume’s radical critique of not only the traditional attributes of God but also causality itself as 
being necessary a priori (rather than an inference made a posteriori). 
It was this denial of a certain type of judgment’s possibility that Kant rose to dispute so 
vigorously in order to give metaphysics a second hearing. He did this, oddly enough, through 
mathematics and the natural sciences, two entities we do not typically think of as prior to our 
experience of the world. Kant’s contention is that mathematical and scientific judgments are not, 
in fact, analytic—doing nothing more than naming what is already inherent within a concept—
but that they are rather synthetic—bringing to light something new that is not inherent within the 
concept as it stands. Up to this point Hume might agree with Kant since, after all, one can 
                                                
4 David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (Indianapolis: Hackett Press, 1998). 
5 Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic, 2nd edition, trans. James W. Ellington 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Press, 2001), 15. 
6 Kant lays this charge at Hume’s feet in Kant, Prolegomena, 4-6. Hume’s position on the matter 
is found stated most powerfully in Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, 3-43. 
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imagine how natural sciences might reach a synthetic judgment a posteriori through a variety of 
experiments. The path of science would begin with our idea of a concept, perform experiments, 
and then as a result of this experience come to a judgment we know to be true, a judgment that 
the original concept did not contain within itself. But where Kant diverged from Hume was in his 
contention that synthetic judgments could be prior to any sense data, i.e., that synthetic 
judgments could be a priori. Take, for example, two phrases from mathematics and the natural 
sciences respectively: “5+10 = 15” and “Every event has a cause.” Both of these statements, 
Kant argues, are synthetic judgments in that they add to our knowledge something that the 
original concepts themselves did not say. There is nothing, as it were, in the concept of “15” that 
entails that “5+10 = 15,” much less the algebraic and geometric equations in which we also 
might apply the concept of “15.” Even more importantly for Kant is the claim that this truth does 
not need to be confirmed by experience. Rather, the truth of “5+10 = 15” presses itself upon us as 
necessary prior to an experience of, say, adding five apples to a basket already containing ten.  
Hence, synthetic a priori judgments are possible, opening a way to save the legitimacy of 
metaphysical knowledge. However, metaphysical knowledge will not be of immaterial objects to 
which our experience has no access—like God or the soul—but rather of the very structures of 
the human-reasoning capacity. Such knowledge is rightly called metaphysical because its object 
is removed from the physical world. In fact, Kant’s argument is that such structures are not the 
passive receptors for physical sense-data but instead actively give shape to that sense-data in the 
first place.  
In this way Kant inaugurates his “Copernican turn” by insisting that the transcendental 
makeup of human subjectivity constitutes the world as a realm of knowable objects far before we 
experience the world at all:  
 16 
Hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects. But 
all attempts to extend our knowledge of objects by establishing something in 
regard to them a priori, by means of concepts, have, on this assumption, ended in 
failure. We must therefore make trial whether we may not have more success in 
the tasks of metaphysics, if we suppose that objects must conform to our 
knowledge. This would agree better with what is desired, namely, that it should be 
possible to have knowledge of objects a priori, determining something in regard 
to them prior to their being given.7  
 
For Kant, synthetic a priori judgments are possible not because they express fundamental 
truths about the world but rather because these judgments reveal fundamental truths about the 
workings of human reason. What makes synthetic a priori judgments possible is not a certain 
structure of the world that is “out there” for us to discover, rather, synthetic a priori judgments 
are made possible by the structure of our reason and the way it forms the data of our senses into a 
cognizable entity we call “experience.” Rather than observing the world from afar, our mind 
comes to the world and takes an active role in giving shape to the truth of our experience, like a 
TV shapes into a viewable picture the raw signal it receives.  
This radical transformation of what we mean by “metaphysical knowledge” has profound 
implications for those objects which have been the traditional concern of what was called 
metaphysics before Kant’s revolution. He summarizes the problem masterfully in the first words 
of the Preface to the First Edition: “Human reason has this peculiar fate that in one species of its 
knowledge it is burdened by questions which, as prescribed by the very nature of reason itself, it 
is not able to ignore, but which, as transcending all its powers, it is also not able to answer.”8 
What Kant’s Copernican turn does, in effect, is to destroy the traditional enterprise of 
metaphysics as it was known to him. Immaterial objects to which we have no experiential access 
like God, the human soul, and what he would come to call the “noumenal” realm behind the 
                                                
7 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Bxvi, p. 22. 
8 Ibid., A7, p. 7.  
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“phenomenal” appearances of things, those things are no longer proper objects of metaphysical 
knowledge. These ideas still play a profound role in Kant’s philosophy as postulates of practical 
reason. As one commentator puts it, Kant never intended to dispel with “metaphysical beliefs” 
only to reform the proper object of metaphysical knowledge.9 For our purposes, however, one 
must attend to the fact that what became the proper object of metaphysics was the transcendental 
makeup of human subjectivity. The structure of our rational capacities were now an open way to 
find a universal basis upon which to build a scientific discourse concerned with immaterial 
phenomena. While knowledge of God in the traditional sense was lost, knowledge of ourselves 
was found in a new and decisive manner. 
In sum, Immanuel Kant’s critique of metaphysics sets the stage for postmodernity by 
achieving two remarkable philosophical feats. The first was Kant’s radical bracketing of the 
questions of God and the immortal soul such that there could no longer be a “rational” account of 
these objects, save one that held them to be the limits of reason’s capacity rather than an object 
available for reason’s analysis. The second might appear to be a mere procedural quibble, but it 
will prove decisive in laying the groundwork for the turn to postmodernity: Kant rescued the 
possibility of a future metaphysics by turning the structures of the rational capacity of the human 
subject into the proper object of metaphysical knowledge. While Kant later has a great deal of 
use for traditional metaphysical topics like God and the immortal soul (Kant affirms the 
existence of both), the foundation upon which to build adequate knowledge not only of a future 
metaphysics but of a whole range of philosophical sub-disciplines was the transcendental 
makeup of human subjectivity.  
 
                                                
9 W.H. Walsh, Kant’s Criticism of Metaphysics (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1975), 
5. 
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The God of Being: Heidegger and the Problem of Onto-theo-logy 
Kant’s placing the subject at the center of his quest for adequate knowledge was also 
decisive for the rise of phenomenology as a philosophical discipline. In keeping with Kant’s 
noumenal and phenomenal split, the father of modern phenomenology, Edmund Husserl, 
“bracketed” the external world from his study of the experience of phenomena.10 Though that 
may sound counter-intuitive on the surface (how does one give an account of phenomena without 
the external world?), the phenomena with which Husserl chose to deal were the conditions for 
the possibility of knowledge within the structure of human consciousness. In other words, 
Husserl’s target phenomenon was the experience of consciousness itself, as opposed to Kant’s 
more static investigation of pure reason. Still, Husserl’s transcendental idealism, which still 
placed human subjectivity itself as the object of phenomenology, did not satisfy Husserl’s young 
assistant, Martin Heidegger. It is to Heidegger that we now turn because Heidegger’s response to 
Kant, and even to Western philosophy as a whole, was to claim that metaphysics did not need 
saving but was rather alive and well in all of philosophy. Indeed, the only way forward for 
philosophy was to recognize that it was trapped in metaphysics and then to begin the process of 
“overcoming” the metaphysics it always already had been.  
Heidegger’s break with Kant’s thought came from being haunted by a simple question: 
what is Being? It was Heidegger’s contention that philosophy had yet to think the truth of Being 
adequately, for in trying to explain Being philosophers always seemed to glide past the question 
and into other areas of research dependent upon a presumed agreement on this first principle. 
Philosophical endeavors might begin with the question of the truth of Being, but then, almost 
                                                
10 Edmund Husserl, Ideas: Introduction to a General Phenomenology, trans. W.R. Boyce Gibson 
(New York: Macmillan, 1931), § 31. 
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unconsciously, would slip into talk of epistemology, natural science, or aesthetics. But still the 
question of what Being itself is remains unanswered and even unthought.11 
The problem of this philosophical task is inherent in the objects of inquiry themselves: 
being and time. As Heidegger put it, “Being—a matter, but not a being. Time—a matter, but 
nothing temporal.”12 The difficulty Heidegger found in even attempting to move away from Kant 
and post-Kantian perspectives was a foundational one: how can we think Being itself without 
thinking of it as a being? Similarly, how can we adequately think time given that all of our 
thinking thinks within temporality? These questions set the stage for the great problem that 
Heidegger saw within all metaphysical thinking, what he called “onto-theo-logic.” 
Central to this project of “overcoming” metaphysics was Heidegger’s contention that all 
metaphysis (and, thus, most of philosophy) was constituted by “onto-theo-logic.” Heidegger’s 
explication of the term begins with a more foundational question for philosophy and, along with 
it, theology: what is the object of thought? Heidegger’s answer is that the object of thought is 
difference, particularly the difference between Being and Existence—thus, the ontological 
difference. He contrasts this devastatingly simple answer with Hegel’s system of thought 
wherein the object of thought is thought itself. Why such an esoteric beginning? The answer lies 
in another line from the great German Idealist: because the object of thought—thought thinking 
itself as Absolute Thought—is the beginning of all science. Heidegger’s contention is that this 
notion of the object of thought being that which determines the beginning of science is also that 
which essentially constitutes the science of thinking itself. So for Hegel to say that thought 
thinking itself is the beginning of science means that his particular dialectical process, worked 
                                                
11 See Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: SUNY Press, 
2010), 1-13. 
12 Martin Heidegger, On Time and Being, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 
1977), 4. 
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out throughout the history of philosophy, is actually the primary concern of all science. What is 
even more intriguing and troubling, in fact, for Heidegger is that Hegel holds that the beginning 
of all science is God.  
 This Hegelian move redirects Heidegger’s argument. For, at first, it appeared to 
Heidegger as if the conflict between Hegel and himself would center around mistaking or 
absolutizing the ontological difference between Being and Existence, which Heidegger 
elsewhere holds that Hegel does. But now Heidegger’s question becomes more specific: how did 
God suddenly get into a conversation about thought? This moves Heidegger beyond a historical 
quibble with Hegel and squarely into a discussion of the character of metaphysics as a whole. 
Heidegger contends that Hegel is the apex of a trend latent in all metaphysics, namely that 
metaphysics has an onto-theological constitution. What does he mean by this phrase? As 
Heidegger tells it, Being—the object of metaphysics—comes to be equated almost immediately 
in the history of metaphysical thought with the “productive ground” of Being. In other words, 
Being comes to be equated with its Creator or Source. Metaphysics, therefore, is an onto-theo-
logic. Onto because it concerns that which is most real, that which really is. Theo because that 
which really and ultimately is is the name of the productive ground for everything else, a god or 
God. To put it bluntly, for metaphysics Being becomes God and God becomes Being. The two 
elide into one another such that metaphysics is a theo-logic because it is an onto-logic and vice 
versa. A unique aspect of Heidegger’s analysis is that even the staunchest critics of metaphysics, 
such as Marx and Nietzsche, find themselves preserving this onto-theo-logic in their adamant 
reversal of the metaphysical project. Hence, in seeking to empty philosophical discourse of the 
divine, to divest metaphysics of some of its damning ties to Christianity, their critiques cannot 
escape the problems of metaphysics because they have not truly gotten “outside” of the discourse 
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of ontotheology. The death of God only reinscribes the presence of a theos. Not only that, but 
ontotheology poses an extreme problem for theology as well. Heidegger captures this problem in 
his famous remark, that human beings “can neither pray nor sacrifice to this god.”13 If we honor 
the separation of Being and beings we either end up making God into a being, which is 
idolatrous, or we equate God with Being itself, which is to rob Being of its truth. Ultimately the 
unthought framework of metaphysics has kept us, up until now in the history of Being, from 
worshipping and philosophizing aright.  
 But how can we avoid this problem if it imbues so much of the way we think not just 
about God but also about existence itself? How might it become possible for thought to avoid 
turning Being into a ground and thereby a god? Is it possible to think past metaphysics or must 
we seek an entirely new path altogether? For Heidegger, the absolute erasure of the problem 
itself is an impossibility. Since all thinking is rooted in a tradition and a history there is no 
purifying the philosophical enterprise of ontotheology in its entirety. In fact, we do not really 
want to do this. Instead, ontotheology has brought us into a unique situation in what Heidegger 
continues to call the “history” or “destiny” of Being—namely, ontotheology has brought us right 
up to the precipice of the truth of Being which manifests itself in the ontological difference 
between Being and beings. Yet, the supreme difficulty is that ontotheology also conceals this 
profound truth by its very operation. Ontotheology is the slippage of our thought back into 
thinking of Being as the Ultimate Ground and thus we begin to think of Being as the self-caused 
Cause rather than just as Being. This slippage, however, is an essential step on the way to the 
truth of Being. We can use ontotheology, in other words, to open up a new path of thinking, or 
                                                
13 Martin Heidegger, Identity and Difference, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 
1969), 72. 
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what really amounts to a return for Heidegger to the original intent of thinking prior to Plato and 
Aristotle.  
In this way, the onto-theo-logic of metaphysics will always be with us, since it was a 
moment in the history of Being that has afforded us the opportunity to begin thinking anew. This 
demonstrates Heidegger’s radical commitment to the historicity of all thinking: metaphysics will 
always be a part of our thought, regardless of our attempts to push it aside, since it is a part of the 
tradition in which we have come to be. Hence, Heidegger suggests a different way of phrasing 
the goal. We should not seek to solve the problem of metaphysics, only to “overcome” 
metaphysics. Essential for our purposes, this project of overcoming depends upon a recovery of 
the true essence of language. 
Why turn to language in order to overcome metaphysics? Perhaps it is best to begin by 
saying just how it is that ontotheology corrupts the true nature of language. As John Caputo has 
noted in his study on Heidegger and Aquinas, under the schema of metaphysics language’s 
essence becomes entirely dualistic. Language does not constitute the meaning of anything but is 
rather the “external sign” of a meaning that has been “constituted interiorly, in the mind.”14 
Language communicates or expresses meanings that have already been decided by the thinking 
subject’s intellect. Heidegger’s contention, however, is that language does constitute the 
meanings of things by being “the way in which things emerge into presence.”15 Hence, one can 
understand Heidegger’s interest in a line of poetry from Stefan George, “Where word breaks off 
no thing may be.”16 Without language we are not just unable to express meanings that we hold 
                                                
14 John Caputo, Heidegger and Aquinas: An Essay on Overcoming Metaphysics (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 1982), 159. 
15 Caputo, Heidegger and Aquinas, 159. 
16 As quoted by Heidegger in Martin Heidegger, On the Way to Language, trans. Peter Hertz 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 60. 
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within ourselves, rather without language there can be no “meanings” at all. For how could such 
interiorized meanings even come to be without language? One has to imagine thinking of things 
without using language—imagine for example thinking about what to make for dinner with no 
interior monologue at all—which ultimately shows itself to be impossible. We do not have 
language, as Heidegger is fond of saying, but we are claimed by language itself.  
In this sense, language begins to have a life of its own, so to speak. We do not require 
language as a tool to communicate but rather are always already immersed in language, like a 
fish in water. To quote Caputo again, “Speaking is not man’s [sic] representation of Being; 
rather, language is Being’s own way of coming to words in human speech.”17 For Heidegger, it 
is not humans who use language to speak but rather language which speaks the truth of Being 
through that being which asks the question of its own being, Dasein. This is why on multiple 
occasions Heidegger calls language the “house of Being.” Language is quite literally the place or 
the abode in which we have access to Being.  
But what is this truth of Being that language is able to manifest through human speech? 
Importantly, it is at this point that we see the beginnings of the connection between language and 
the Gift within postmodernity. This is also one of the many moments that the later Heidegger 
begins to sound slightly mystical in his approach to the question of Being. For what language 
brings to manifestation is not just the ontological difference between beings and Being but also 
the Dif-ference that gives this difference in the first place. Put simply, Heidegger claims that 
language’s intimacy with Being allows language to bring forth the way in which Being gives 
itself to beings such that beings have Being. This is obviously a rather sticky patch of 
philosophical bramble that we will eschew for the sake of time, but what is important to note 
                                                
17 Caputo, Heidegger and Aquinas, 159. 
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from this claim by Heidegger is that the “it gives [es gibt]” now begins to function as a 
transcendental category. Being gives itself to beings through language, and so for much of 
postmodern thought moving beyond Heidegger and joining him in his task of overcoming 
metaphysics the category of the Gift or of phenomenological “givenness” became absolutely 
central to their philosophical enterprise.  
 Even more importantly for my purposes, Heidegger reveals that this connection—that 
language manifests the givenness of Being or that Being gives itself in language—is only to be 
found by a “step-back” or a “descent” into that which is nearest to us. In other words, the gift of 
Being’s truth is to be found in taking a deeper look at the ordinary and everyday existence of 
human beings, not by theorizing such a concept in a manner abstracted from the world. As 
Heidegger puts it,  “Thinking overcomes metaphysics by climbing back down into the nearness 
of the nearest.”18 The problems of metaphysics are overcome, then, not by engaging in a “pure” 
critique of the transcendental structures of the mind, but rather in returning to that which is so 
near to us that is ever-forgotten—the question of Being as it lets itself be seen in and through 
language. In short, Heidegger’s project of overcoming metaphysics turns on the recovery of the 
ordinary as the arrival of a gift (Being showing itself), which can only be appropriated and 
understood by embracing a new essence of language. This move, I shall argue later, has its 
parallel in theology’s turn to sacramentality as a response to the critiques of postmodernity. 
Before doing so, however, it is necessary to discuss the seminal work that put the gift on the 
theological and philosophical map, so to speak—Marcel Mauss’ anthropological study, The Gift. 
 
 
                                                
18 Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism,” Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (San 
Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1993), 254. 
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Marcel Mauss: The Beginning of a New Theory 
 If Heidegger had laid the foundation for postmodern thinking’s reliance upon a new 
essence of language and of giving, Marcel Mauss’ 1950 monograph The Gift brought giving full 
circle, making the gift a veritable obsession within postmodern philosophy. The flashpoint that 
Mauss created is one of the animating features of this essay since the gift brought back a vital 
energy to the debate on the relationship between ontology and ethics, particularly as both 
categories came to be seen as foundationless. It should be said that this relationship between 
ontology and ethics had been a concern of Heidegger’s in his later work. Heidegger had 
succeeded for many in offering a revolution in just what was meant by ontology, hence the 
question rightly came to be asked whether there must be a consequent effect upon the way we 
live in the light of such an ontological revolution. This was a question posed to him in the “Letter 
on Humanism,” but he used it as a means to clarify his already-given perspective rather than 
attempting a new argument. For him, the terms “ethics” and “ontology” are terms that only come 
into play after one has truly thought through the truth of fundamental ontology. The thinking that 
Heidegger is advocating, therefore, is “recollection of Being and nothing else.” Meaning that his 
insight into ontology “has no result” and “has no effect.”19 All that Heidegger’s work can offer is 
the freedom to let Being be. Marcel Mauss’ work offered a dramatic new way of conceiving of 
the relationship between “ontology” and “ethics.” Despite the fact that his work is, at its base, 
nothing more than anthropological study on the forms of gift-giving within North American and 
Melanisian tribes, it came to launch a way of thinking about gift-giving as a transcendental 
structure of reality, a sort of practical ontology that tempted one to accomplish what Heidegger 
had eschewed in his later analysis.  
                                                
19 Heidegger, Basic Writings, 259. 
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 Mauss’ ethnographic study begins with a central problem, namely, that all gift-giving, 
though it appears free and gratuitous, is actually obligatory and self-interested. This insight 
provokes the two key questions that form the basis of his investigation: “What rule of legality 
and self-interest, in societies of a backward or archaic type, compels the gift that has been 
received to be obligatorily reciprocated? What power resides in the object given that causes its 
recipient to pay it back?”20 Obviously, Mauss undertakes this analysis of societies of a 
“backward” type not just out of curiosity but in order to show how the principles that organized 
their political and social institutions are the bedrock of the tradition from which our 
contemporary institutions are made. They have, in other words, had a “bearing” on our 
contemporary systems of “law and economy” that is essential for understanding adequately the 
present moment. 
 Recounting the extent and shortcomings of Mauss’ observations is beyond the scope of 
this chapter, but I should like to point out two decisive conclusions Mauss reached based on 
those observations of the potlatch ritual.21 The first is Mauss’ answer to the central riddle of his 
investigation: Why does a gift obligate a return-gift? Mauss claims that it is not merely a social 
convention or cultural norm that motivates such reciprocation but, rather, it is a force within the 
thing given that motivates the receiver to give a gift in return. This force within the thing is 
nothing less than the personhood or subjectivity or soul of the giver. The thing given is not just a 
                                                
20 Marcel Mauss, The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies, trans. W. D. 
Halls (New York: W.W. Norton, 1990), 3. Italics original. 
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passive object abstracted from the reality of the community; rather, it “possesses a soul, is of the 
soul” of the one who gives.  
In this system of ideas one clearly and logically realizes that one must give back 
to another person what is really part and parcel of his nature and substance, 
because to accept something from somebody is to accept some part of his spiritual 
essence, of his soul. To retain that thing would be dangerous and mortal, not only 
because it would be against law and morality, but also because that thing …exerts 
a magical or religious hold over you.22 
 
Things and persons, thus, are never entirely separate under this form of thought, rather, they are 
intermingled together such that to give a gift is to give a part of your self that demands of the 
recipient the reciprocation in kind. For our purposes it is essential to note that this leads from the 
language of value to the language of symbol. The exchange cease to be based on value and 
becomes purely “symbolic” once we have understood that what is being given and what 
obligates the gift in return is not the worth of the object itself. Gift-exchange that has passed into 
the symbolic realm judges the merits of exchange beyond the logic of value. 
 The second conclusion has thus been named: If gift-giving functions on the basis of an 
active intermingling of subject and object, then gift-giving and the principles that govern it 
extend far beyond the economic sphere of “value.” If someone gives of their very selves when 
they exchange an object with another person, and if that object, endowed with the force of the 
giver’s very soul, elicits a return-gift, then what we are talking about when we talk about gifts is 
much more than economic principles. To transpose such an exchange into the mode of “value” 
and “price” is fundamentally to misunderstand what is happening during the potlatch. More 
importantly, however, for Mauss, such a misunderstanding occludes the vital truth that the 
principles of gift-giving undergird social and political practices far beyond the potlatch. The gift, 
therefore, is not simply a ritual curiosity but what he calls a “total social fact,” meaning that gift-
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giving can account for the functioning of the society as a whole since it is “at the same time 
juridical, economic, religious, and even aesthetic and morphological.”23 Gift-giving is, thus, not 
just an effect of society but rather the structural feature that determines most, if not all, of its 
economic and political makeup. 
 One can easily see, then, how the concept of gift-giving as a positive fact for sociological 
analysis might have come to be thought of as a transcendental structure of reality itself. The 
philosopher of religion, in particular, could engage in such a transcendentalizing of gift-giving 
by seeing all of the finite order as the gift of a Divine Creator. Yet, the more ready application of 
Mauss’ observations, which he himself saw, were the political ramifications inherent in calling 
for a return to a gift economy over and against the current, market economy. Mauss’ treatment of 
these “moral conclusions,” as he calls them, is infamous.24 As Mary Douglas notes in her 
foreword to the English translation, “Taking the theory straight from its context in full-blown gift 
economies to a modern political issue was really jumping the gun.”25 Mauss’ attempt was to 
show that the theory of the gift could be a foundation for “social democracy,” that redistributions 
of wealth through social programs might come to enact the same cycle of gift-exchange that 
Mauss had seen in his anthropological research. But, as Douglas avers, his attempts at making 
this jump never really succeeded. What did succeed, however, were such later projects, like 
Mary Douglas’ own in fact, taking Mauss’ insights about the gift and applying them to practices 
in contemporary contexts presumed not to have anything to do with giving. It was Mauss’ theory 
and its use in this manner that caused Jacques Derrida to devote an entire series of lectures to 
thinking about the Gift. What Derrida concluded comprises the starkest critique of the logic of 
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gift-giving yet produced, and one with which any theology that attempts to use God’s gift of 
Eucharist as a site for theological reflection must grapple. 
 
Jacques Derrida: The Impossible Gift 
 In the monograph Given Time, Derrida identifies an aporia at the very heart of the gift. 
Derrida addresses his critique specifically to Mauss by beginning his inquiry with one Mauss’ 
key conclusions, namely, that the gift should transcend the logic of value.  
If there is gift, the given of the gift (that which one gives, that which is given, the 
gift as given thing or as act of donation) must not come back to the giving [one]. 
It must not circulate, it must not be exchanged, it must not in any case be 
exhausted as a gift, by the process of exchange….[T]he gift must remain 
aneconomic.26 
 
For the gift to remain a “pure” gift or even a gift at all it must steer clear of the circle of the 
economic, wherein a thing is given to another person in exchange for something of value such 
that the thing arrives back to the giver in another form. The gift cannot become caught up in this 
logic of contract, value, and exchange, but it cannot remain utterly removed from it either. For 
how could one still recognize the gift as an interruption of such logic—as something 
aneconomic—if the gift did not maintain some sort of relationship to this circularity? As Derrida 
notes, “Not that [the gift] remains foreign to the circle, but it must keep a relation of foreignness 
to the circle, a relation without relation of familiar foreignness.”27 It is in this sense that the gift 
cannot remain free of the economy. The gift is involved in economy even in defining itself as 
fundamentally opposed to it.  
                                                
26 Jacques Derrida, Given Time I: Counterfeit Money, trans. Peggy Kamuf (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1992), 7. 
27 Derrida, Given Time, 7. 
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Thus, the difficulty in giving, for Derrida, is that the gift cannot appear. What Derrida 
means by this is that as soon as I recognize an object offered to me as a “gift” I immediately 
become indebted to the person who gave me the object in the first place. As soon as the gift 
becomes visible to me it loses its status as gift because it places me in debt. I am under contract, 
as it were, to pay back this debt in good time. Just by showing itself as a finite phenomenon the 
gift seems inevitably to slip out of the “pure” realm of charity and into the logic of economy. 
This slippage produced by the appearance and recognition of the gift as gift produces quite the 
bind for would-be givers or recipients. 
For there to be a gift, it is necessary that the donee not give back, amortize, 
reimburse, acquit himself, enter into contract, and that he never contracted a debt. 
[ ... ]  It is thus necessary, at the limit, that he not recognize the gift as gift. If he 
recognizes it as gift, if the gift appears to him as such, if the present is present to 
him as present, this simple recognition suffices to annul the gift. Why? Because it 
gives back, in the place, let us say, of the thing itself, a symbolic equivalent. [. . .] 
If the other perceives or receives it, if he or she keeps it as a gift, the gift is 
annulled. But the one who gives it must not see it or know it either, otherwise he 
begins at the threshold, as soon as he intends to give, to pay himself with a 
symbolic recognition, to praise himself, to approve of himself, to gratify himself 
to congratulate himself, to give back to himself symbolically the value of what he 
thinks he has given.28 
 
Here then is the deep aporia at the heart of the gift and, it should be noted, such an aporia 
presents itself not in contradistinction to Mauss’ conclusions but as their radical outcomes. The 
gift does obligate reciprocation, but in so doing it annuls its very nature. The gift really does 
have a force within the given object that compels this reciprocation, but it is this very force that 
annihilates the gift and produces the very economic valuation that Mauss so heavily critiqued. 
Moreover, we are no better off removing a tangible object from the equation, no better off giving 
symbolic or immaterial things like authority, love, or gratitude in an exchange. For these 
symbolic realities also compel exchange rather than excess, and even if we remove the recipient 
                                                
28 Ibid., 13-14 
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entirely, we still find ourselves “exchanging” or “investing” the given object in order to get back 
praise for ourselves. No matter what alterations we make in the phenomenal realm, the naming 
of an object as “gift” only succeeds in ensuring that it will be nothing of the sort. In light of this, 
Derrida makes an essential claim: “The gift is the impossible.”29 
 Now I want to say first, and with the greatest emphasis, that Derrida is not claiming that 
the gift is impossible. Given the profound impact Derrida’s critique might have on traditional 
dogma, particularly in sacramental theology where the object of our analysis is often construed 
precisely as the gift of God, it is no surprise that response to Derrida’s work has been vigorous.30 
Indeed, interpreting Derrida’s argument poses a sort of impasse for sacramental theologians. On 
the one hand, Derrida can be read as a vital resource for thinking naming the difficulties of gift-
exchange in relation to the sacramental economy. On the other hand, Derrida can easily be cast 
as a foil wherein the “impossibility” of the gift must be denied and the possibility of sacramental 
grace must be rescued.31 The danger, in other words, is reading the reflections of Derrida on 
impossibility as a devastating critique of sacramental theology from the outset. What Derrida 
actually offers is not a preemptive strike on the resources of sacramental theology but rather an 
opening to begin afresh. As Derrida himself writes, “Not impossible but the impossible. The very 
figure of the impossible. It announces itself, gives itself to be thought as the impossible” and 
                                                
29 Ibid., 10. 
30 See in particular Kevin Seasoltz, God’s Gift Giving: In Christ and Through the Spirit (New 
York: Continuum, 2007); Kimberly Hope Belcher, Efficacious Engagement: Sacramental 
Participation in Trinitarian Mystery (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 2011); Benjamin Durheim, 
Christ’s Gift, Our Response: Martin Luther and Louis-Marie Chauvet on the Connection 
between Sacraments and Ethics (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 2015) 
31 From the sources cited in the previous footnote, Seasoltz, in particular, seems to fall into this 
trap. Durheim and Belcher provide much more productive engagements of Derrida on the gift in 
terms of sacramental grace (Belcher) and sacramental ethics (Durheim).  
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then, even more importantly, “It is proposed that we begin by this.”32 We begin by the 
impossible. The impossible is the starting-point of our reflections on the gift and its impossible 
possibility. Hence, Derrida does not dismiss the gift, rather he theorizes its impossibility as a sort 
of cognitive limit that undergirds our very attempts to think anything at all. 
 The gift, then, is not a self-contradictory impossibility but much more (and perhaps more 
only in the sense that is profoundly “less”). The gift is the very figure of the impossible itself—
the presence of an absence, if you will, meaning something that by its very nature “could never 
admit of subjective experience.”33 And yet, as obtuse as this might seem, such an absence is the 
point of departure for thinking about the gift. In other words, the gift is more than just a 
conceptual fool’s errand or an easily dismissed contradiction. The gift, in its very contradiction, 
is a vital beginning point for a project that will not prove or defend the gift’s existence, to be 
sure, but said project will depend upon the concept of the gift as its precondition. In this sense it 
is false to say that Derrida rules gift-giving to be impossible and thus dismisses it as such. The 
gift is an example of precisely the sort of groundless ground that Derrida takes it his theoretical 
and political duty to think. 
Still, there could be good reason to cast Derrida as a foil for sacramental theology. After 
all, if Derrida is correct, then the moment a priest presiding over Holy Eucharist proclaims, 
“These are the gifts of God for the people of God!” the priest has annulled the giftedness of the 
elements. The gifts of God, once they appear, are anything but. Indeed, the prayer said after 
Eucharist in the Anglican Communion only seems to confirm Derrida’s suspicion of the pure gift 
by imploring God, “send us out to do the work you have given us to do, to love and serve you as 
                                                
32 Derrida, Given Time, 10. 
33 Gerald Moore, Politics of the Gift: Exchanges in Poststructuralism (Edinburgh: University of 
Edinburgh Press, 2011) 8. 
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faithful witnesses of Christ our Lord.”34 Even the gift of God, it would seem, is not immune to 
the poison of exchange, in that the gift of God succeeds in indebting us to pay the return-gift of 
love and service. As good as those things are, the difficulty is still to find a way that God might 
give anything, since it is not only the Eucharist but the Son of God, our Savior Jesus Christ, that 
is said to have been given. If the gift ends in aporia then it is difficult to see how theology itself 
will not end there as well. 
One could, as have many, make the same point about the God of ontotheology. How 
could such a God be present in the elements of the Eucharist? How could such a God give 
anything without becoming another being among beings and, therefore, not God? The gift and 
the project of overcoming metaphysics are more closely related than they might seem. But how 
does thinking the gift as the impossible aid the project of overcoming metaphysics? Derrida all 
but links the aporia of the Gift to the project of overcoming metaphysics when he writes, “The 
structure of this impossible gift is also that of Being—that gives itself to be thought on the 
condition of being nothing—and of time which, even in what is called its “vulgar” 
determination,…is always defined in the paradox or rather the aporia of what is without being, of 
what is never present or what is only scarcely and dimly.”35 Thinking the truth of Being and 
beginning by the impossibility of the gift seem to be one and the same—a step-back that will 
take us outside of the logic of metaphysics and into a different kind of discourse. The gift, then, 
functions analogously to Kant’s transcendental ideas of God or the immortal soul discussed 
above: They serve as a limit between the relations of the noumenal and phenomenal world. We 
can never experience them, but they irrevocably shape our knowledge all the same. It is in this 
                                                
34 Episcopal Church, The Book Of Common Prayer and Administration of the Sacraments and 
Other Rites and Ceremonies of the Church: Together with the Psalter or Psalms of David 
According to the Use of the Episcopal Church. (New York: Seabury Press, 1979), 366. 
35 Derrida, Given Time, 27. 
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way that, for Derrida, the impossible is more than just a dismissal of the gift. What Derrida is 
claiming is that while the gift cannot become present, its very impossibility is the groundless 
ground of our thinking.   
As we saw with Heidegger’s turn to the centrality of language for thought, Derrida’s turn 
to the gift is also a trenchant critique of the “subject.” For the problem of recognition and of 
appearance are not the fault of the economy but of the economic reasoning that enters into 
thought through a metaphysical view of subjectivity. As Gerald Moore writes, a true gift “would 
have to take place in the absence of the subject, in the absence of any supposedly self-identical 
giver or receiver who might recognize obligation or benefit in the giving or receipt of a gift.”36 
Submitting to the impossibility of the gift renders possible an overcoming of the metaphysics 
latent in the subjectivity by which the gift is defined. The gift decenters the logic of subjectivity 
by disrupting the problematic logic at the root of gift-giving, wherein a donor causes an effect in 
the recipient by means of an object. Mauss’ theory of the gift held that the given object was 
endowed with a sort of force that was really nothing more than the subjectivity or soul of the 
donee, but under Derrida’s critique one must ask if it is not rather the other way around. Is it not 
the subject (without capitalization) who is irrevocably formed by the object to be given, by the 
economy of signification within which the object presents itself to us, and by the language within 
which the subject is always already immersed? In short, the theory of the gift seems to 
presuppose an account of the subject commensurate with traditional metaphysics, and if our 
critique of the theory of the gift undermines that latent subjectivity then it also participates in the 
project of overcoming metaphysics.  
                                                
36 Moore, Politics of the Gift, 8. 
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I have been recounting Derrida’s account of the gift as the impossible, but it now remains 
to show how this theory of the impossibility of the gift is intrinsically linked to Derrida’s work 
on language and Derrida’s supposedly later “turn” to politics. There is little of Derrida’s work 
that is not influenced by or a direct implication of his work on language, but it will be of 
particular importance to show the way in which the aporia of the gift relates to Derrida’s later 
political work. For Derrida is the first thinker we have encountered who completes the trajectory 
I have been outlining thus far, i.e., Derrida “travels”, so to speak, from a critique of metaphysics 
and the god of ontotheology to a deep engagement with language and gift only to arrive at a 
renewed engagement with politics. Chauvet and Milbank, I shall argue below, follow this precise 
trajectory in their attempts to craft a renewed Christian theology for postmodernity. They, 
however, complete this pilgrimage, if you will, in and through theologies of sacramentality 
whose particular nexus is the Eucharist. This is their decisive breaking point from Derrida. Yet, a 
key convergence point that they share with Derrida, and one to which my constructive proposal 
will return in the concluding chapter of this work, will be all three’s relationship with apophasis. 
With that in mind, there is a third point to establish vis-à-vis Derrida—namely, the influence of 
negative or apophatic theology on Derrida’s thought. For what we shall see below is that the tie 
that binds Derrida’s work on language and the gift together with his work on politics is the 
fundamentally apophatic disposition at the heart of deconstruction. What we shall see in my 
treatment of Chauvet and Milbank below is that their binding together of gift and language often 
entails a seeming opposition to apophasis as unhelpful or downright ontotheological. 
 
 
 
 36 
Derrida on Language: This is the Writing of God for the People of God  
 Like Heidegger, Derrida finds that once one begins to interrogate what it is to speak or, in 
Derrida’s particular case, to write, one is caught up in a larger form of questioning. In other 
words, there is something about humanity’s having language or, better, being claimed by 
language that raises ontological rather than merely semantic questions. As Derrida put it, asking 
“what it is ‘to write’?...can disturb the very question ‘what is’?”37 Hence, from the beginning of 
Derrida’s illustrious career until his death, the problems of language continued to direct (and 
perhaps haunt) his work. 
 Derrida’s notion of writing, which will prove critical to my interpretation of Chauvet and 
Milbank, has proven both original and generative. By “writing,” Derrida quite literally means 
any secondary mode of signification that uses an embodied medium to communicate ideas, but 
the concept does not rest in that simple definition. In fact, it is precisely by interrogating the 
“secondariness” of writing to thought that Derrida arrives at some of his deepest and 
deconstructive critiques of traditional philosophy. Since Plato, Derrida argues, language and 
writing have been denigrated by philosophy as belonging to, in Plato’s case again, the 
tempestuous and untrustworthy realm of finitude. Truth, however, was to be found in the realm 
of “ideas” or “Forms,” securely located in a realm beyond the finite disorder. For Plato, this 
place of truth was the realm of Being and the decidedly un-solid ground of finitude was the 
realm of Becoming. Writing belonged to the latter, while the truth, set forth in speech, belonged 
to the former.  
 Derrida, however, found Plato’s account lacking and not confined solely to the thought of 
Plato. Not only did later philosophers carry forward this denigration of writing, it was also 
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lurking, according to Derrida, within and behind the characteristic discourse of contemporary 
sciences—particularly the “structuralism” that characterized most of the anthropological studies 
in Derrida’s context. The critical insight animating Derrida’s position is as follows: The 
denigration of writing in favor of the pure, unmediated access to truth, supposedly given in 
speech and ideas, is a falsehood. In other words, there is no objectivity or truth that is free of 
temporal, mediated embodiment—in fact, objectivity itself depends upon this becoming-
embodied for its very existence. As Derrida notes in his famous Introduction to Husserl’s Origin 
of Geometry, “The possibility or necessity of being incarnated in a graphic sign is no longer 
simply extrinsic and factual in comparison with ideal Objectivity: it is the sine qua non condition 
of Objectivity’s internal completion.”38 The secret of ideas, it turns out, was that they needed 
writing and language—material, temporal, located forms of embodiment—to become real for 
human beings at all.39  
 Derrida holds that the necessary mediation of writing for the expression of ideas applies 
to language as well. This might seem rather obvious. After all, we need to speak with physical 
tongues, make use of air, and have what is said fall upon listening ears in order to be understood 
at all. Speech, in other words, is not, as was assumed by such thinkers as Plato, Husserl, and 
Levi-Strauss, the venue for an immediate and secure self-presence free from embodied 
mediation. Rather, speech is just as subject to what Derrida calls “supplementarity” as physical 
                                                
38 Jacques Derrida, Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry: An Introduction, trans. John P. 
Leavey, Jr. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1962), 89. 
39 This is why Derrida used Husserl’s own argument in the Logical Investigations against him in 
Speech and Phenomena. The argument I’m referring to is Husserl’s contention that there are free 
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writing is. For our speech is not a one-to-one translation of thoughts in our mind, but is rather a 
signifier of the signifier—i.e. a translation of thought that is already itself immersed in a 
particular language. To give an example, one might ponder a coffee mug for a moment—its 
color, size, odor, its position in space, etc. Our experience of these aspects of the mug might, 
after a time, reach a sense of certitude. Yet, when one attempts to think of this coffee mug 
without language Derrida’s problem arises with a particular urgency. There appears something 
like an abyss between our most basic experience of the mug and the means of expressing any of 
that experience. Our words about the mug, after the fact, are not the pure expression of the truth 
of our thoughts but are, rather, a secondary sign, a translation of the original. In a famous 
passage from Of Grammatology Derrida shows this when he writes, “The secondarity that it 
seemed possible to ascribe to writing alone affects all signifieds in general, affects them always 
already, the moment they enter the game. There is not a single signified that escapes, even if 
recaptured, the play of signifying references that constitute language.”40 All human attempts at 
expressing meaning through speech then are beset by this original mediation or what Derrida 
calls “arche-writing.” This explains how Derrida can claim that writing precedes speech, for it is 
this mediation at the origin of thought itself, this arche-writing that haunts all of our attempts at 
knowledge, that is the condition for the possibility of any speech at all. After all, what would 
there be to say without the mediation of embodiment? Derrida can thereby claim, “Language is 
not merely a sort of writing, but a species of writing.”41 Language, therefore, is made possible by 
writing, not the other way around. 
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41 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 52. 
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  Talk of writing thus yields a key implication for Derrida: The original mediation at the 
heart of all language shows that identity is not self-grounding but is rather constituted by alterity. 
Language is only made possible by the mediation of “writing,” consciousness is only made 
possible by the “others” of space and time (the not-here and not-now), and my subjectivity is 
only made possible by the alterity inherent in a deeply constitutive interrelationality. This is not 
to launch this essay headlong into Derrida’s analysis of semiotics any further than we have 
already have, but rather to show that Derrida’s emphasis on alterity and difference is vital for a 
proper understanding of why gift and language both carry with them such profound ethical and 
political ramifications. The arrogant assurance that language is of a greater value to truth than 
writing—Derrida’s primary concern in Of Grammatology—will make of ethics a particularly 
dangerous idol. As Derrida writes, “There is no ethics without the presence of the other but also, 
and consequently, without absence, dissimulation, detour, difference, writing.”42 Alterity, 
difference, and absence are necessary prerequisites to begin to talk about our being-together. 
More importantly, to proceed without such an understanding of our interrelatedness would be to 
fail at the very outset. For what sort of ethics would we be attempting if we began from a 
description of the human condition that vastly mischaracterized it? One can understand, then, 
why Derrida so strongly resisted even the appearance of a pure, aneconomic gift in our 
experience of the world. Such a gift would be more than just an aberration, it would be 
something akin to an eschatological inbreaking—the very presence of mystery. In other words, it 
would require Other Words (capitalization very much intentional), words not available to us in 
this realm of experience. It would be the impossible, which cannot, by definition, be. 
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 Here we run up against the integral connection between Derrida’s thought on politics and 
apophaticism, namely, that there is something inherent in deconstruction as a project or mode of 
philosophizing that dictates certain ways of belonging together (politics) on account of the 
alterity and difference that makes possible all speech to begin with (apophaticism).43 To be clear, 
Derrida does not equate deconstruction and negative theology at any point in his work. Hence, 
Derrida’s politics are not, one might try to argue, the equivalent of an apophatic political 
theology. While such a political theology might be a much needed work (indeed, this dissertation 
is an attempt at such theology), it is not an accurate description of what Derrida is doing as it 
relates to the aporia of the gift or to the arche-writing that makes language possible. Hence, we 
must take stock of Derrida’s attempt to “save” the apophatic, for it is only through this lens that 
his politics of hospitality for the other comes into focus. 
 
The Other to Come: Derrida on Apophaticism and Politics 
 “However highly it is esteemed, différance is not God.”44 Derrida has often been accused 
of and/or celebrated as a purveyor of negative theology.45 The project of deconstruction as 
attending to radical difference and the attempt to speak about that which escapes words has an 
obvious analogy to those ancient Christian discourses that sought to speak of the God who is 
beyond human language. But Derrida’s work of deconstruction—his passion for uncovering that 
                                                
43 I should note here that “deconstruction” is quite the contested term, even contested to a certain 
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which prevents all human meaning from full closure, i.e. différance—is not to be equated with 
negative theology. Différance, arche-writing, khora, none of these are names for God, even for 
the God whom Marion famously described as without being.46 Showing why this equation fails is 
essential for two reasons: first, to show how it is that gift and language are inextricably caught up 
in apophatic discourses and, secondly, to show how this general penchant towards apophaticism 
in Derrida’s work grounds deconstruction as a political orientation. 
In The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida, John Caputo elucidates why equating 
différance with the God of negative theology fails to do justice to either. Différance refers to that 
which is “neither a word nor a concept” but is itself the condition for the possibility of all words 
and concepts.47 Différance is, if you will, that mediation to which the term arche-writing refers. 
In other words, différance is the unnameable that makes the infinite play of names possible, the 
white page that makes the marks of writing legible, the alterity that gives way to identity. Hence, 
Caputo will call différance a “quasi-transcendental,” something that does not quite exist but 
allows for the creation of all of our language about existence. 
At this point the mistaken tendency to refer to this thing that is not quite a thing, this 
referent that cannot be named, as the God of negative theology is understandable. Yet, despite 
their similar spirit, if you will, différance levels quite the critique against negative theology, 
while at the same time not declaring it subject to the “death of God.” The God of negative 
theology is often said to be beyond being or essence. Negative theology employs the discourse of 
                                                
46 Jacques Derrida, On the Name, ed. Thomas Dutoit, trans. David Wood, John P. Leavey, Jr., 
and Ian McLeod (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995). 
47 Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomenon: and Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory of Signs, 
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hyper, wherein God is said to be beyond or above being, essence, speech, and name.48 
Différance, however, reveals that this embrace of the hyper is simply another way of resisting the 
mediation at the heart of what Derrida calls writing. As Caputo puts it, when the negative 
theologian “sighs that she cannot name or say a thing about God,” this is not the whole story. 
This mystic knows in secret that she has an answer—that while God is beyond all predicates of 
human language there is still a “deep and powerful” experience that assures her that the object of 
her faith is present.49 It is precisely this assuredness that deconstruction disrupts. Caputo 
elaborates: 
As a hyperousiology, negative theology drops anchor, hits bottom, lodges itself 
securely in pure presence and the transcendental signified, every bit as much as 
any positive onto-theo-logy, and in a certain sense more so. Its difference from 
kataphatic or onto-theology, from “metaphysics,” lies in claiming to touch bottom 
not by means of representational thinking, of concepts and discursive reasoning, 
but by leaving all such representational paraphernalia and parerga in the vestibule 
and entering into a wordless, imageless, timeless inner sanctum of the temple, into 
a still point of unity in the very heart of God, a point where God’s ground and the 
soul’s ground are one.50  
 
It is in this sense, then, that deconstruction may resist the God of negative theology. God, even 
shrouded in this darkness, would be a “transcendental condition,” that is, a “sufficient and 
enabling condition” that secures things within a horizon of intelligibility. On the other hand, 
différance is a “quasi-transcendental condition” which does precisely the opposite. It allows 
languages to settle but also slip loose from their assigned places.51 In short, différance is the 
“possibility and impossibility of a language that addresses God, of positive, onto-theological 
                                                
48 The most significant instance of this is perhaps the work of Pseudo-Dionysius. See Pseudo-
Dionysius: The Complete Works, trans. Colm Luibheid (New York: Paulist Press, 1987). 
49 Caputo, Prayers and Tears, 10-11. 
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languages…and the extraordinary languages of mystical theologians,”52 that which both brings 
forth such events within language and forces them to reckon with the fact that they are not as 
self-assured or grounded as they might seem (even those that claim to be groundless!). 
 Derrida’s deconstruction is not merely a critique of religious language. It is also, as James 
K.A. Smith has argued, a “political option.” The first is to say that Derrida’s project of 
deconstruction was always already a political option. How so? In Of Grammatology when 
Derrida names the problem to which he shall address his arguments, he labels “logocentrism” as 
the perspective that would denigrate and shun writing as an unnecessary fall away from truth. Far 
from just revealing a theoretical misstep, however, Derrida pushes further: Logocentrism 
actually discloses “the most original and powerful ethnocentrism.”53 The impulse that draws 
away from writing in favor of speech is not merely a neutral argument but is rather a political 
preference for one sort of ethnic identity over another. Logocentrism, therefore, is not merely a 
problem confined to thought. In deconstructing logocentrism Derrida is placing himself 
politically in opposition to an ethnocentrism implicit within the self-assuredness of logocentrism. 
Hence, at its very origin the project of deconstruction fashions itself as a political option. 
 More importantly, deconstruction’s emphatic insistence on the problem of translatability 
has deep political consequences. Translatability here is borrowed from Caputo’s argument that 
“the thesis of translatability does not say that everything can be translated but that translation 
cannot be stopped, that it is both necessary and impossible, necessary because impossible, and 
something we deeply love just because it is impossible.”54 Here we return, to use a phrase 
common to Derrida, to the gift and its economy. What deconstruction reveals is that the 
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foundations of political systems are subject to the problem of translatability and that the 
“impossible,”—both the impossible as instanced in the name of God and the impossible as it 
appears in the gift—is precisely what reveals this contingency to us. While entities like the State 
or the Market can impose themselves upon us as if they were eternal and unchanging, the 
commitment to translatability reveals such political realities’ utter contingency. Deconstruction 
as a political option, therefore, looks with suspicion upon current political realities, and this 
suspicion is in itself a form of political action as critique. 
 What might be the relationship between this ontology, or better, this grammatology and 
our modes of human belonging together? What is the political response, in other words, to 
beginning by the impossible? It would be incorrect to say that Derrida does not know. It is more 
accurate to say that Derrida cannot say. This is because any political system that Derrida could 
fully articulate would be subject again to the problem of the gift’s aporia—anything able to 
manifest itself in the finite order is subject to the problem of translatability, of an economy of 
linguistic exchanges. The “democracy to come” is Derrida’s chosen phrase to refer to the 
political order that will always remain “to come” but must color our political actions now.55 
Fully explicating Derrida’s justification of this move, however, is beyond our focus. The key 
point is that the democracy to come is the political outcome of an ontological critique. Once the 
problem of economy and translation come to the forefront—the abyssal opening of writing and 
différance—our politics inevitably change. Alterity, in other words, remains the gadfly of 
                                                
55 Derrida’s initial evocations of this concept occur in Jacques Derrida, Spectres of Marx: The 
State of Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International, trans. Peggy Kamuf (New 
York: Routledge, 1994) and in Jacques Derrida, Politics of Friendship, trans. George Collins 
(New York: Verso Books, 1997). Derrida gives his fullest treatment of the “democracy to come,” 
however in Jacques Derrida, Rogues: Two Essays on Reason, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and 
Michael Naas (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005). 
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ontological and political self-assuredness, and the project of overcoming metaphysics can and 
must have a political correlate. 
 
Conclusion: The Sacramental Horizon 
 This chapter’s task has been to orient the reader to the project of overcoming metaphysics 
and its integral connection to the concepts of gift and language. To that end, the basic waypoints 
of this trajectory are as follows: Immanuel Kant dramatically problematizes metaphysical 
knowledge of God through his critical project, but Kant “saves” metaphysics, so to speak, by 
enshrining the human subject as a transcendental. God and the human soul will not be recovered 
until practical reason comes into the picture, but the particular damage that Kant’s first critique 
does is to execute a philosophical gambit of sorts: Kant exchanges the controversy of God as an 
object of metaphysics for the supposedly secure foundation of a self-apparent subjectivity. The 
proper object of metaphysical knowledge, a knowledge beyond the a posteriori horizon, is 
nothing other than the structures that make up the reasoning capacities of the human being.  
Martin Heidegger destructures this subjectivity through his audacious critique of all 
philosophy via the question of Being. The transcendental idealism of Kant and Husserl has 
things the wrong way round, as it were. It is not the external world that is questioned but the 
subject who asks the question of the meaning of one’s own Being. What is peculiar to this being 
is precisely that it seems thrown into Being, claimed by Being through that which is truly unique 
to Dasein: speech. A human being does not have a language but is possessed by language, 
Heidegger argues, and this profoundly unsettles much of what had been taken for granted, with 
metaphysics having proven the prime example of this. Heidegger’s critique of ontotheology 
inaugurates a new trajectory in the history of philosophy: overcoming metaphysics. Overcoming 
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metaphysics requires attending to language and, even more importantly, attending to the ways in 
which Being arrives to us as given.  
Derrida brought this line of thought to its apex. The aporia of the gift and the unending 
translation revealed by arche-writing and différance show that the project of overcoming 
metaphysics crashes onto the shore of something like but not equivalent to negative theology. 
Not only that, but this orientation towards the Other is in itself a political option or, at the very 
least, a revolutionizing of our ability to think and speak about our being-together. This new 
manner of thinking ushers in what might be called the properly postmodern: The time in which 
the transcendental structures of subjectivity that Kant and others saw as a secure beginning point 
for knowledge have irrevocably collapsed.  Derrida joins the project of overcoming metaphysics 
by insisting upon the necessary mediation at the root of all human meaning, and it is this 
insistence that reveals both an ontological commitment (however slim) and a political 
commitment. Derrida demonstrated how the problem of “the gift” and the postmodern emphasis 
on the constitutive nature of language join together into a philosophical disposition that is both 
an ontological and political commitment at the same time.  
Yet, should the theologian be satisfied at this point? Is all gift-giving, as Derrida claims, 
always already subject to the logic of exchange, already fallen under the spell of economy? It 
seems that theology has always had at its disposal (or perhaps theology has always been at its 
disposal) a site of ritual action that claims both an insight into the constitutive nature of language 
(Heidegger’s claim) and a gift that escapes the aporia of economy while also appearing 
(Derrida’s “impossible”). I refer here to the Eucharist. Thus, it is no accident that in the wake of 
the postmodern project of overcoming metaphysics theologians have turned or perhaps returned 
to the Eucharist as the privileged site of theological reflection. I shall examine two theologies of 
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this type in what follows—the “sacramental reinterpretation of human being” proffered by 
Louis-Marie Chauvet and the radical orthodoxy of John Milbank. What is distinctive about these 
responses, however, and why they warrant such considerable reckoning, is that they respond to 
the project of overcoming metaphysics in such a way that enables them still to insist upon the 
integral connection between the ontological and political scandal of the Eucharist. In other 
words, Chauvet and Milbank are not spurred on by a conviction that Christian theology can 
recover the presence of genuine spiritual mystery in the finite order of things. They both hold 
this conviction, to be sure, but they hold another consequent tenet: The recovery of Christian 
orthodoxy’s sacramental view of reality, grounded in the Eucharist, is at the same time a 
recovery of a particularly Christian way of thinking about human belonging together. I turn first 
to Chauvet’s theology. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
CHAUVET ON GIFT AND LANGUAGE:  
OVERCOMING METAPHYSICS AS A SACRAMENTAL PROJECT 
 
Introduction 
 Most studies of Louis-Marie Chauvet rightly center upon his seminal work Symbol and 
Sacrament: A Sacramental Reinterpretation of Christian Existence. The controversial nature of 
much of Chauvet’s work stems from his insistence upon joining his theology through what he 
calls a “homology of attitude” to the Heideggerian project of overcoming metaphysics I 
discussed in Chapter One.1 To that end, theologians working to explicate the nature of Chauvet’s 
work tend to narrate his argument beginning from one of three points. There are those who focus 
predominantly on the narrative that Chauvet himself follows in his work moving from Chauvet’s 
initial critique of Scholastic theology as infected by ontotheological presuppositions to his 
placing sacramental theology into dialogue with the dramatic rethinking of the doctrine of the 
Trinity in the 20th century.2 Second, there are those whose primary goal is to explicate Chauvet’s 
unique structure of Christian identity as the interrelation between Scripture, Sacrament, and 
Ethics, and so these scholars begin with Chauvet’s account of that structure and only then move 
on to treat extraneous questions of ontology or Trinity.3 Finally, Chauvet is often the target of a 
great deal of criticism for his unique account of Eucharistic change and so another group of 
                                                
1 Louis-Marie Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament: A Sacramental Reinterpretation of Christian 
Existence, translated by Patrick Madigan and Madeleine Beaumont (Collegeville: Liturgical 
Press, 1995), 74-76. 
2 See Glenn Ambrose’s definitive treatment of Chauvet’s theology in Glenn Ambrose, The 
Theology of Louis-Marie Chauvet: Overcoming Onto-theology with the Sacramental Tradition 
(Burlington: Ashgate, 2012). 
3 See Timothy Brunk, Liturgy and Life: The Unity of Sacrament and Ethics in the Theology of 
Louis-Marie Chauvet (New York: Peter Lang, 2007). 
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scholars only engage Chauvet’s argument for Eucharistic change as both a “revealer” and 
“operator,” delving into Chauvet’s other philosophical or theological commitments only as they 
help explain this particular argument.4  
 It is not my intention to declare any of these foci inadequate in themselves. So far as I can 
tell, none of these approaches leads inevitably to a dramatic misreading of Chauvet. Moreover, 
the scholars who take up these argumentative positions share the common concern of providing 
for their readers, whether academic colleagues or lay Christians, the best description of the vital 
boon that Chauvet offers for their work in Church or academy. In my reading of Chauvet, 
however, I shall take a different path that I think will aid the reader in avoiding a few critical 
misunderstandings of the French theologian’s argument. I shall begin with the latter part of 
Chauvet’s magnum opus, particularly the way in which he sees Trinitarian Christology as 
consistent with, even giving shape to the manner in which the Eucharist functions within his 
aforementioned structure of Christian identity. Chauvet himself stated that his “foundational 
theology of sacramentality” had to be articulated along two axes: first, the axis of language and 
symbol and, second, the axis of the Logos of the Cross. To my knowledge, most explications of 
Chauvet begin from the first axis, as Chauvet himself does, articulating the way in which 
theories of language and the fundamental ontology of Martin Heidegger leads to the unique 
structure of Christian identity proffered by Chauvet. Only after this long path has been taken to 
its end do most engagements of Chauvet enter into the ways in which Chauvet applies such 
philosophical commitments to doctrinal matters. 
 I want to begin with Chauvet’s latter axis—the Logos of the Cross—because I believe it 
will lend greater understanding to some of Chauvet’s more obscure philosophical leitmotifs that 
                                                
4 See Joseph Mudd, Eucharist as Meaning: Critical Metaphysics and Contemporary 
Sacramental Theology (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 2014).  
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appear throughout Symbol and Sacrament. Concepts like the “presence of absence,” 
“ontotheology,” “ and “the way” are, to be sure, mostly appropriated from Heideggerian 
philosophy. However, if we take Chauvet at his word that he is not seeking in Symbol and 
Sacrament merely to “baptize” Heidegger’s thought, perhaps the best place to start is not with an 
analysis of Heidegger’s influence but with Chauvet’s doctrinal commitment to the Triune God. 
Thus, the subsequent analysis of Chauvet’s theological system will begin from a place that 
already recognizes the limited nature of his appropriation of Heidegger and, more importantly, 
the profound influence that 20th century attempts at overcoming ontotheology have on his 
system. This will better show, I shall argue, how decisively all of Chauvet’s argument turns on 
the Pasch of Christ, understood as itself the proper starting point for any account of the life of 
God.5 Thus, the sacraments in which we encounter this God, the ontology of the world in which 
we live, and the politics that must guide our belonging together in so far as we belong to God 
stand or fall with our account of the Pasch of Christ. It is, therefore, to such radical reimaginings 
of the doctrine of God in light of the Pasch of Christ, particularly the theology of Eberhard 
Jüngel, to which we now turn.6 
                                                
5 As will be shown below, what Chauvet intends to highlight in utilizing this dichotomy as a 
heuristic is the tendency to source the effectiveness of sacramental grace solely to the hypostatic 
union. Chauvet proposes in the latter axis that the real source of sacramental grace’s 
effectiveness must be the whole of the Paschal Mystery, meaning sacramental grace is not just a 
result of the joining of a human hypostasis to the divine hypostasis but is rather the result 
Christ’s Life, Death, Resurrection, and Ascension. Thus, for Chauvet, sacramental grace is 
dependent upon a more holistic view of Christ’s presence in the economy of salvation and less in 
the singular moment of the Incarnation. For an interpretation of this emphasis as it concerns the 
Eucharist see Bruce T. Morrill, Encountering Christ in the Eucharist: The Paschal Mystery in 
People, Word, and Sacrament (New York: Paulist Press, 2012). 
6 This emphasis on Chauvet’s relationship to Reformed theologies of the Cross is also addressed 
in a dissertation by Tom Trinidad. Therein he examines the fraught relationship between Chauvet 
and Barth, arguing that there is far more compatibility between the two than first might appear. 
See Tom M. Trinidad, The Word of God in Ecclesial Rites and the Formation of Christian 
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After Ontotheology: The Humanity of the Triune God 
 What shape must the doctrine of God take after ontotheology? Or, to put it another way, 
what must we say of that which is most foundational for our ontology if God is not pure Being, 
pure ontos? As noted above, Chauvet sought to orient his sacramental theology as a direct 
address to this problem, and he did so for two reasons: first, because traditional sacramental 
theology has been instrumental in preserving ontotheological presuppositions within the Church 
(more on this below) and second, because any theology that will be tenable within postmodernity 
must take Heidegger at his word that no parishioner can “fall to [their] knees in awe nor can 
[they] play music and dance” before the god of ontotheology.7 The concern is therefore both 
theoretical and pastoral in keeping with Chauvet’s decided philosophical rigor and his ultimate 
commitment to the Church he serves as priest. Both sacramental theology and the doctrine of 
God must be fundamentally transformed after ontotheology through an in-depth analysis of 
theories of language and symbol and a complementary engagement with Trinitarian Christology. 
An account of Chauvet’s theology could begin with either concern, but I have chosen to begin 
with the latter on account of significant interpretive benefits that shall be delineated below. 
Hence, I turn now to Chauvet’s engagement with what he calls “Trinitarian Christology.”  
 Chauvet’s foray into Trinitarian Christology begins with a presupposition that there is 
indeed communication between God and humanity in the sacraments and it is this 
communication which we call “grace.” However, we can only understand the true nature of this 
communication via “the bursting forth of the simple notion of God, a bursting forth into a Trinity 
                                                                                                                                                       
Identity: A Comparison of Karl Barth and Louis-Marie Chauvet (South Bend: Notre Dame, 
2007). 
7 Martin Heidegger, Identity and Difference, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 
1969), 72.  
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that can be adequately conceived only from the perspective of the Logos of the cross.”8 For it is 
in the Cross that God most emphatically cannot be identified as the god of ontotheology since the 
Cross insists that our a priori presuppositions about the nature of divinity do not apply to the 
God whose very Being is said to be wholly contained in Christ crucified. So the beginning of any 
adequate sacramental theology, it would seem, must lie at the precise point where the myth of 
ontotheology most decidedly ends—namely, the crucifixion of Jesus of Nazareth.  
 But how to begin all theology at the Cross? The foundational claim of Trinitarian 
Christology, a claim that Chauvet directly appropriates for his sacramental theology, is 
something like the following: the Crucifixion is not just a profound moment in salvation history 
but is a decisive ontological event in the being of the Triune God. This has been a matter of 
dispute in German theology for quite some time, being most popularly expressed in Jürgen 
Moltmann’s The Crucified God but going as far back as Hegel.9 Yet, in this instance Chauvet is 
most influenced by the work of Eberhard Jüngel and his comparably difficult yet masterful tome 
God as the Mystery of the World. In that work, Jüngel echoes the central question to which 
Chauvet’s final chapter continually returns: If it really is the case that the life, death, and 
resurrection of Jesus Christ as a single history is the decisive revelation of the being of God, then 
what kind of God must we mean?10 In essence, this is the same as Chauvet’s continual probing of 
just what sort of God can be said is present in the sacraments, in human rites born entirely of 
material elements and human history. What must we mean by the word “God” if we 
                                                
8 Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 492. Unless otherwise noted, all italics in subsequent 
quotations of Chauvet are original to the text. 
9 See Jürgen Moltmann, The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the Foundation and 
Criticism of Christian Theology (New York: Harper & Row, 1974); G.W.F. Hegel, 
Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977). 
10 See Eberhard Jüngel, God as the Mystery of the World: On the Foundation of the Theology of 
the Crucified One in the Dispute Between Theism and Atheism, trans. Darrell L. Guder (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1983), 3-43. 
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subsequently point to the Cross or a piece of broken bread as our primary reference? Beginning 
at the cross with no hidden presuppositions leads to a radical reimagining of our doctrine of God.  
For Jüngel this transformation of the doctrine of God revolved around two key claims 
that proved markedly influential on Chauvet’s work. The first is the odd-sounding claim that 
God’s divinity is actual as God’s humanity.11 Chauvet uses this phrase several times during his 
two major works but perhaps this quote from his smaller work on the sacraments is the most 
paradigmatic: “[T]he claim that encounter of and communication with the living God are done 
through…[the] sacraments does not hold good unless, the very being of God can in some way be 
conceived of as “human” in its very divinity.”12 The second, and a consequent to the first, is the 
downright paradoxical claim that God’s presence is as the “absent One.”13 Hence Chauvet can 
write, “Thus, the Eucharist seems to us the paradigmatic figure of this presence-of-the-absence 
of God outside of which the faith would no longer be faith.”14 Unpacking these Jüngelian claims 
all too briefly will clear the way for Chauvet’s unique sacramental turn on Trinitarian 
Christology. 
As to the first, Chauvet joins Jüngel’s reinterpretation of Barth’s Trinitarian theology in 
insisting that the particular history and life of Jesus is itself the narration of the very being of 
God. In other words, there is no God for Godself that is not also God for us. The story of God for 
us in the life of Jesus is the nature of God for Godself. This leads to the difficult claim that is also 
                                                
11 John Webster Eberhard Jüngel: An Introduction to his Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986), 63. 
12 Louis-Marie Chauvet, Sacraments: The Word of God at the Mercy of the Body (Collegeville: 
Liturgical Press, 2001), 155. 
13 I should note that “present as the absent one” is the way in which Webster typically renders 
this motif as found in John Webster, Eberhard Jüngel, 67. Guder’s translation, however, runs as 
follows: “The presence and absence of God are no longer to be thought of as alternative in the 
word of God. Rather, God is present as the one absent in the word.” Jüngel, God as the Mystery 
of the World, 166. See also Ibid., 182, 300, & 349. 
14 Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 405. 
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the title of Jüngel’s major work on Trinitarian theology, Gottes Sein ist im Werden—God’s being 
is in becoming.15 Now, at first blush this might sound as if Jüngel is committing a blatant 
theological faux pas by equating the Being of the Eternal God with the becoming of the finite 
realm. But Jüngel is insistent upon the validity of his language here precisely because it is God’s 
becoming and not a creature’s manner of becoming about which we are speaking. In other 
words, what is decisive about the being of God is the “manner in which God chooses to be 
[Godself],” such that God can be said to become in a manner that is appropriate for God and 
does not compromise the divine being.16  
 Yet, it must be made clear that Jüngel is not allowing philosophical presuppositions about 
the nature of the Divine being to determine what a compromise of the divine being would be. 
Instead, speaking of God’s becoming, of the manner in which God chooses to be Godself, is 
necessary because of Christological rather than ontological concerns. If it is true, as the tradition 
of orthodox theology declares, that God’s being is most fully demonstrated on the cross of 
Christ, then becoming must in some way be proper to God’s Being. The radical correlate of this 
thesis, and the implication that Chauvet most forcefully embraces, is that God’s divinity must be 
expressed in God’s humanity. Hence, we can say that for Jüngel God’s divinity is actual as God’s 
humanity in the person of Jesus of Nazareth.17  
 The second of Jüngel’s claims that Chauvet takes up follows from this idea of God’s 
divinity being actual as God’s humanity. What Jüngel has effectively done in his embrace of the 
scandal of the Cross as constitutive of Christian thought is avoid the typical picture of God that 
seems to be required of us based on the claims of what we might pejoratively call “rationalist” 
                                                
15 Eberhard Jüngel, God’s Being is in Becoming: The Trinitarian Being of God in the Theology 
of Karl Barth, trans. John Webster (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2001). 
16 Webster, Eberhard Jüngel, 20. 
17 Ibid., 63. 
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theology. Under those demands we would presume the typical attributes associated with that 
being we call “God”—i.e., omnipotence, omnipresence, omniscience, etc.—and then essentially 
adjudicate how the God who possesses these attributes could reasonably be identified with the 
Crucified One. This is not satisfactory to Jüngel, as we have already mentioned, so the new 
picture he proposes is one in which we do not begin with a presumed picture of God drawn from 
a priori philosophical propositions. Pasting such attributes onto God before looking to the Cross 
leads inexorably to ontotheology as Heidegger described it and to the current crisis in the 
“thinkability” of God according to Jüngel.18  
So what was necessary for Jüngel was to stay faithful to making the Cross central in any 
doctrine of God. The problem, however, is how to go on speaking about God in the ways that 
have heretofore been typical of believers. The most important of these ordinary expressions for 
Jüngel was how to speak of God as being present. For how can it be that the Highest Being was 
truly present on the Cross? Not only that, but how is it that God was present in the one who died 
on the same Cross? For him, once it is accepted that God’s divinity is actual as God’s humanity 
then it must follow that God’s “presence” is rethought according to the withdrawal of God’s 
presence in the Cross, even to the point of the oblivion of death itself. This is the genesis of 
Jüngel’s notion that God is present as the “absent One.”19 In the very death of God on the Cross, 
the utter withdrawal of God’s presence in Jesus’ cry of dereliction, this horrific absence itself 
discloses the presence of God as one standing in death in order to render it powerless. Such is the 
particular being and presence of the God whose very being is disclosed in Jesus. Hence, God is 
not present in the sense of “being somewhere,” rather presence and absence work in tandem with 
                                                
18 Jüngel, God as the Mystery of the World, 105-111. 
19 Ibid., 166. 
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one another such that God’s presence can be identified with the event of the Cross. Therefore, 
God’s presence must be thought of as being present as the Absent One. 
As I have hoped to show, this notion of God avoided the typical bind that theology can 
fall into by allowing presuppositions about the nature of divinity rather than the Pasch of Christ 
to determine how it speaks of God. It is this particular story that tells the nature of the being of 
God and only does so as a concrete history, not as a set of abstract propositions based on 
predetermined ontological categories (omnipotence, omniscience, etc.). Now, Chauvet found 
these doctrinal insights appealing for two reasons unique to his sacramental theology: 1.) his 
emphasis on the constitutive rather than instrumental nature of language for human subjects and 
2.) his embrace of the Heideggerian notion of truth as a “way” rather than as correspondence. 
The first was a profound influence on Chauvet because of a simple insight, namely, if it is the 
case that theology speaks of a God whose divinity is actual as God’s humanity then must we not 
insist on the fact that the Church encounters this God not in the most heterotopic and 
transcendent places but in those places that are most decidedly human? The place of the most 
human wherein we encounter the most divine is for Chauvet nothing other than language. Jüngel 
set the stage for Chauvet in that his concern to articulate the speakability of God had little to do 
with saving religious language from the derision of its cultured despisers. Instead, throughout his 
work Jüngel’s concern had been to articulate the way in which religious language succeeds in 
bringing “God to speech.”20 In other words, the speakability of God is about the possibility of the 
advent of God’s presence in the very language that makes us human subjects in the first place.21 
As we will see, Chauvet takes this insight and applies it to the sacramental system to great effect. 
                                                
20 Ibid., 254. 
21 Ibid., 285.
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Jüngel’s linking the problem of the doctrine of God specifically to the possibilities of God’s 
advent within human language is a vital cog in Chauvet’s argumentative machine. 
As to the second, if it is the case that God’s being is in God’s coming and that God’s 
presence is as the absent One then the purpose of thinking can no longer be to produce a full and 
final representation of our object. Rather, the purpose of thinking God (or any object, for that 
matter) must be to be guided by the object itself into encounter. For Jüngel, as for Chauvet, it is 
precisely in language that this encounter or, more accurately, this “address” occurs. Yet, even 
more importantly, such a declaration reveals a profound wisdom in centering theology on the 
liturgical act of celebrating the Eucharist. By beginning with the event of the Eucharist we 
submit ourselves, as it were, to a particular narrative. We submit ourselves, in other words, to the 
“way” of the God which consequently sets us on the way. Theology begins with the liturgical act 
of Eucharist, according to Chauvet, because it is there that we receive the gift of God’s address 
in the form of a concrete history (the life and death of Jesus of Nazareth) and are set on the way 
of returning it. These are the decisive theological commitments Chauvet takes from Jüngel. What 
remains now is to explicate Chauvet’s unique appropriation of theories of language and symbol 
in order to see anew the advent of God in those places that are most human. We turn, then, to the 
second axis of Chauvet’s sacramental theology: the axis of language and symbol. 
 
The Conversation We Are: Chauvet on Language, Symbol, and the Sacraments 
 At the time of Symbol and Sacrament’s publishing, Chauvet declared that “we see today 
an increasing interest” in the topic of “sacramentality,” evidenced by the growth of conferences, 
articles, and burgeoning interest from laypeople of all types on the subject.22 This situation of 
                                                
22 Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 1. 
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growing interest has certainly not changed some thirty years later. If anything, interest in the 
topic of sacramentality has only grown, eliciting further conferences and articles, not to mention 
entire volumes devoted to the topic.23 This deluge of scholarship has led, inevitably it would 
seem, to an evolution of the proper meaning behind the term “sacramentality” itself. Examining 
this dissemination fully is beyond the scope of this essay, but it must be made clear here 
precisely what Chauvet means by the term and why he finds it such an essential matter as to 
make it the topic of his magnum opus.  
 As is often the case, perhaps it is best to begin by stating what Chauvet is not saying with 
regards to sacramentality. In discussion on the topic there can be a tendency to treat 
sacramentality as if it referred to a mechanism or structure of the created order that imbued all of 
creation with the presence of God. While the instinct behind this position is a good one—the 
desire to restore the proper awe and wonder a disciple of Christ should possess towards all 
Creation—the theoretical result is often what Chauvet would call the “blur of a ‘general 
sacramentality.’”24 In short, if everything becomes sacred then there seems little cause to say 
precisely how it is that these particular rites are more grace-filled than, say, taking a hike or 
tending a garden. Hence, when Chauvet speaks of sacramentality he does not mean to speak of 
some general principle which lies behind and supersedes the seven particular rites themselves. 
The diversity of the rites, in fact, is one of the primary values of the sacramental system. 
                                                
23 See for example: Lizette Larson-Miller, Sacramentality Renewed: Contemporary 
Conversations in Sacramental Theology (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 2017); Hans Gustafson, 
Finding All Things in God: Pansacramentalism and Doing Theology Interreligiously (Eugene: 
Pickwick Publications, 2016); And, in particular, the three-volume series by David Brown on 
sacramentality in ordinary life: David Brown, God and the Enchantment of Place: Reclaiming 
Human Experience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); David Brown, God and Grace of 
Body: Sacrament in Ordinary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); David Brown, God and 
Mystery in Words: Experience Through Metaphor and Drama (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008). 
24 Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 1. 
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Whatever sacramentality is, it must be not be something we can have access to without these 
seven particular rites or, as Chauvet importantly calls them, symbols.  
 What Chauvet means by sacramentality then is a hermeneutic principle which attempts to 
place the sacraments properly within the structure of Christian identity and then, from there, use 
them as a foundational means of reinterpreting human existence itself. This is why Chauvet says 
that the real intent behind the interest in sacramentality is not something like a panentheism or a 
blur of general sacramentality but rather “a theology of the sacramental…that is, a theology 
which opens up a sacramental reinterpretation, initially modest but ultimately global in its 
potential extension, of what it means to lead a Christian life. A foundational theology of 
sacramentality – that precisely is what we are proposing to elaborate here.”25 Thus, what 
Chauvet is after is not the hidden presence of God in all of the created order, but rather an 
elaboration of the particular nature of the sacraments as constitutive of what it means to live as a 
disciple of Christ. From the outset, therefore, Chauvet’s elaboration of this foundational theology 
of sacramentality will refuse a distinction between the theoretical and the practical within an 
account of what it means to lead a Christian life.  
 Chauvet secures the union between the theoretical and the practical in the opening part of 
Symbol and Sacrament by setting forth his axis of language and symbol. I have already shown 
the deep influence of Trinitarian Christology on Chauvet’s doctrine of God, but the explanation 
that now follows is the philosophical position—a philosophical anthropology to be more 
precise—that seems to both support Chauvet’s theology and follow from it. For his part, Chauvet 
believes that once our picture of the human being changes, so our picture of the God whose 
divinity is made actual as God’s humanity must change as well. Although I have not done so, 
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one can see why Chauvet is entirely comfortable spending the entire first part speaking only of 
the human subject as constituted by language and as always already enmeshed in what he calls 
the “symbolic order.” If the being of God is understood only in light of the concrete life of Jesus 
of Nazareth then plumbing the depths of philosophical anthropology, of our best wisdom as to 
what it means to be a human being, will only benefit our theology of this God whose divinity is 
actual as God’s humanity. It is when we decide to take the opposite course—to speak of God 
based upon a picture of God decided beforehand by philosophical a priori’s—that our theology 
often goes awry. Hence, my next step in explicating Chauvet’s system is to confront directly his 
work on language and symbol as the foundation for any adequate sacramental theology. By 
investigating the sites wherein the human subject comes to be as human, we open a way to 
understand the divinity of the human God as communicated to us in the sacraments.  
Chauvet’s time as a priest and professor had led to his being confronted by a deep 
problem within contemporary Catholic life. As Chauvet saw it, there was a deep problem in the 
way treatises on the sacraments and even priests or laypeople within the Church explain how the 
sacraments work. This decidedly pastoral concern might surprise new readers of Chauvet given 
the daunting philosophical rigor of the text under examination. Despite deep engagements with 
figures like Heidegger, Lacan, and a host of structural anthropologists, the driving force behind 
Chauvet’s theology is the pastoral question, already mentioned above, of what it means to “lead 
a Christian life.”26 Wrapped up in that question for all Catholics was the long-held claim that the 
sacraments and grace were related to one another in an essential way. In particular, it was 
traditionally held by Thomas and a slew of other theologians that the sacraments caused grace in 
the believer who received them in faith. Precisely this sort of language, however, leads 
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inexorably, so Chauvet argues, back to the god of ontotheology and, therefore, to a crisis of faith. 
For the ontotheology that Chauvet believes has infected the way that the Church speaks of the 
sacraments has become untenable in the postmodern age. The stakes could not be higher, then, 
for Chauvet, the priest from the Parisian suburbs—the viability of faith itself is at risk.  
 In seeking to illustrate the danger of this snare for contemporary believers, Chauvet 
begins his section on language and symbol with a critique of Scholastic sacramental theology. 
The purpose here is not so much to hang the label “ontotheologian” around Thomas Aquinas’ 
neck, rather, I think the purpose of Chauvet’s critique of Thomas, for which Chauvet himself has 
received strong criticism, is to illustrate the deep divide between Chauvet and Thomas’ 
philosophical outlook which forms the base of any subsequent theological edifice.27 What we 
encounter when we engage the sacramental theology of the Scholastics, Chauvet argues, is a 
“different epistemological terrain” altogether than the terrain from which Chauvet believes 
sacramental theology must work. Hence, in showing the limits of the Scholastic system, in 
submitting their system to “destruction,” as Heidegger would say, we open up a new way not just 
of speaking about the sacraments but of being transformed by them. Such is the purpose, as I see 
it, of Chauvet’s engagement with Aquinas. 
 The simple question Chauvet uses to reveals this profound epistemological divide is this: 
Why it is that Aquinas chose to think of the efficacy of the sacraments in terms of cause? Put a 
bit simpler, why is it that Aquinas came to think that the sacraments cause something in the first 
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place? Why this metaphor and not another? More importantly, why is it that Thomas’s account 
of the sacraments begins with the explicit statement that he wishes to avoid speaking of the 
sacraments under the order of cause only to later slip back into such language? After all, Aquinas 
begins his account with Augustine’s classic definition of sacrament as the “sign of a sacred 
thing,” but then almost immediately begins speaking of sacraments not as signs but as causes.28 
“It cannot be denied: the sacraments of the New Covenant in some fashion cause grace,”29 he 
emphatically states in question sixty two. It seems, so Chauvet argues, that despite Thomas’ best 
attempts to speak of the sacraments, in keeping with Augustine’s definition, only as “signs of a 
sacred thing” he simply has no other words to describe what happens when we receive the 
sacrament than that of “cause.”  
Thomas is imprisoned, as it were, in what Chauvet calls the “productionist scheme of 
representation.”30 Such a scheme reveals itself precisely in Thomas’ constant use of technical or 
economic analogies in describing the way the sacraments communicate grace. The sacraments 
cause grace or perform a work or make something occur. This is of the utmost significance for 
Chauvet because it portends two subsequent claims. First, it is appropriate to speak in this way of 
the sacraments because the God whom we encounter in the sacraments, according to the 
productionist scheme, is the Highest Cause. Hence, despite a continual reminder that Aquinas is 
only speaking in analogies, Chauvet still feels that treating the sacraments as if God causes 
something by them leads back inexorably to the ontotheological presuppositions we saw so 
heavily critiqued in Chapter One, above. Second, Chauvet holds that Thomas’ inability to speak 
of the modality by which the sacraments communicate grace as something other than cause 
                                                
28 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, III, q. 60, a. 2. 
29 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, III, q. 62, a. 1 
30 Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 21. 
 63 
reveals an alignment with the metaphysical tradition’s view of language as an instrument. This 
latter tenet is critical, for it is this moving beyond the view of language as a tool or an instrument 
that Heidegger thought held the path to overcoming the stranglehold metaphysics had on 
philosophy. For Chauvet’s purpose, the path opened up by a new account of language and the 
human subject who comes into presence through it, is nothing short of the path to genuine 
encounter with the Triune God revealed in the Crucified Jesus. Thomas’ sacramental theology, 
while innovative in its own right, must be pushed aside in favor of a sacramental theology that 
can resist falling prey to the trap of ontotheology. 
So what must be laid out here is the “philosophical outlook” that undergirds Chauvet’s 
project, particularly the way in which Trinitarian Christology and overcoming metaphysics come 
together to move us beyond the difficulties of Scholastic sacramental theology. It should be 
noted from the outset and with great attention that the relationship between theology and 
philosophy will be a key arena of disagreement between the two theologians I have chosen to 
make interlocutors. Hence, elucidating what Chauvet means when he says that this philosophical 
outlook and the Logos of the Cross come together through an “homology of attitude” must be 
made clear as well. Milbank will vigorously disagree with Chauvet on this account, but more on 
that in the pages to come. 
 
Chauvet’s Philosophical Outlook: Heidegger and the Shadow of the Cross 
Chauvet’s elucidation of the philosophical outlook that undergirds his theological project 
begins with the Platonic dialogue Philebus. Therein, Socrates is attempting to show how wisdom 
is superior to pleasure since it participates more fully in the Form of the Good. What draws 
Chauvet to this dialogue is the distinction Socrates makes between the proper realm of pleasure 
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versus the proper realm of wisdom. Pleasure belongs to the realm of “genesis” or “perpetual 
becoming” whereas wisdom belongs to the realm of ousia or “existence,” a realm outside of 
process and the realm for the sake of which processes exist in the first place.31 I spoke of this 
distinction at length in Chapter One. Chauvet, however, is troubled by a detail that I did not bring 
up above, that is, the particular set of analogies Socrates must use to prove the validity of this 
distinction and his favoring of wisdom. The one Chauvet particularly notes is Socrates’ choice of 
comparing the relationship of a lover and their beloved to the relationship between a ship-builder 
and their ship. The point to which Socrates is driving is that process and becoming exists for the 
sake of existence and Being. Both the lover and the ship-builder don’t love or build just for the 
sake of the process themselves but for the being of the beloved or the ship. Hence, things that 
belong to the realm of becoming are inferior to those that belong to the realm of being, one of 
which is wisdom. Yet, Chauvet is troubled by the implied equivalence between these two 
analogies, and he thinks that even the ability to equate the two reveals a profound problem that 
has troubled philosophy for generations. Here is the difficulty as Chauvet sees it: ship-building 
has a finished product—boats, obviously—“it builds them, that is all there is to it.”32 Love, 
however, is of an entirely different order. This insight is obvious on its face, but Chauvet points 
out a particularly fecund contradiction. While ship-building culminates in the existence of a 
finished product, the lover-beloved relationship is never finished. In fact, just the opposite: “The 
boat is a finished product; but the beloved is precisely a product that is not finished — and is this 
‘infinite’ in the sense of ‘indefinite,’ always in process; which is as much to say that the beloved 
is not a ‘product’ at all. Because the beloved is a ‘subject,’ this person can never be simply 
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reduced to an ‘achievement,’ but is always process, development – even a development without 
end.”33  
Ultimately, the thought of something as exemplary as the love between a lover and one’s 
beloved belonging to the state of perpetual process was unthinkable for Plato, and this reveals the 
true “metaphysical bent” of our Western tradition, namely that “a permanent state of 
incompleteness defies any logic.”34 The truest realization of the Form of the Good would amount 
to the extermination of any “interminable becoming.” This is why, according to Chauvet, the 
subordination of becoming to Being finds its foundation in the concept of causality. This is vital 
to remember since we have just finished discussing the difficulties Chauvet has with Thomas’ 
account of the sacraments as causing grace. For Plato the entire world is grounded on an original 
cause that brought it into being as a finished product (the ship-builder to ship relation is used 
here as well), and this cause is thus also the source of all cause-effect relations in this plane of 
becoming. This subordination, thus, betrays a “fundamental desire to eliminate as far as possible 
whatever pertains to a becoming without end, in favor of the Good described as achieved 
perfection.”35 Plato is, therefore, the precursor to the ontotheologic we have been describing 
above. Yet, here Chauvet makes an essential objection. His objection is that the lover-beloved 
relation cannot be reduced to the sort of productionist scheme that Plato utilizes. Rather, the 
lover-beloved analogy reveals to us the existence and truth of another epistemological order 
entirely. Quoting one of his mentors, Guy Lafon, Chauvet declares that the lover-beloved 
example reveals that there are “happenings, such as love, and joy, and pleasure, which do not 
produce existence or come to an end in the sense of a distinct term. There are many other 
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realities of this nature and these all attest in one way or another to the presence of a symbolic 
order.”36  
To understand Chauvet’s use of the phrase “symbolic order” we must first make 
preliminary inroads into his particular account of the philosophical and theological import of 
language as constitutive of human subjects. I have above already explicated Heidegger’s critique 
of ontotheology and, in particular, the paltry view of language it engenders.37 Under an 
ontotheological perspective language ceases to be seen as that which gives Being to or 
constitutes the subjectivity of human persons. Rather, language comes to be seen as an 
instrument to be used by human beings in their pursuit of truth. As Chauvet puts it, “They use 
language as a necessary tool for the translation of their mental representations to themselves 
(thought) or to others (voice)…But…although an instrument of translation, language is 
simultaneously – alas! – an instrument of betrayal.”38 When conceived as purely an instrument 
for human use language constantly betrays its supposed masters because, as we saw with 
Derrida, in Chapter One above, it can never give an exhaustive account of that which presents 
itself to us. When taken as a tool for the translation of meaning, language finds its task ever 
unfulfilled. For Chauvet this gives rise to the impossible ideal to “dispense with language” since, 
despite the beauty it engenders, language remains an “obstacle for human self-realization.”39 
Language seems not only to fail in its purported instrumental use but actually to occlude the very 
means to truth which it was believed to have offered in the first place. 
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Chauvet turns, yet again, to Jüngel in his analysis, and asserts that the difficulty with this 
view of language, apart from the difficulties already described, is that it presupposes the 
ontological priority of thought over language.40 In other words, the picture of the human person 
that emerges from such a representation of the world is one in which the human being must 
engage in some form of thinking prior to speaking. Whatever words we speak, arguments we 
form, or even art we create, the picture of the word grounded in an instrumental view of 
language takes it that all such emanations of human beings stem from some form of cognitive 
activity that took place prior to their creation. However, the wisdom that Chauvet draws from 
Heidegger and Jüngel is that this is simply not the place language occupies. The reverse is in fact 
true. Language has ontological priority over thought since, as Chauvet puts it quoting Jüngel, 
“every thought is ‘always already language.’”41 This point might best be illustrated by thinking 
back to my example of the coffee mug in Chapter One. If one were to think deeply about a coffee 
mug set on a table before them our thoughts seem to give to speech a plethora of things to say 
about the mug. Yet, if we try to think of the mug without language we come face to face with the 
point Chauvet is trying to make. All of our thinking is itself always already language, meaning 
that rather than thought giving to language things to say, language gives to thought the target of 
its inquiry.  
This insight gives to Chauvet a new conception of theology as a critical project. For 
Thomas, the “critical thrust” of theology, according to Chauvet, was to prevent overreach in our 
claim to knowledge of God via the unknowability of God. This is part of the reason that analogy 
is so critical a safeguard in his theology. At this point, however, Chauvet believes that the 
ontological priority of language forces a new critical thrust on theology. Rather than focusing its 
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efforts on setting aright theological propositions by testing it against the unknowable God, 
Chauvet eschews what he believes to be an ontotheology masking itself as Christian 
apophaticism. Instead of disciplining theological propositions through the theology of an 
unknowable God who just so happens to be the Highest Being, Chauvet proposes that theological 
propositions must be tested against the truth of the believing subjects themselves.42  
While this might sound like an embrace of theological relativism, Chauvet means 
something quite objective about it. Given what we have already seen about language, theology 
can rightly be called “a discourse from which the believing subject is inseparable,” meaning 
regardless of how much distance we might attempt to set up between our “language, culture, and 
desire” and our selves, our theology is still decidedly our theology. The embodied mediations 
that so define who we are play a vital role also in giving shape to our theology. Rather than 
preemptively surrendering the truth of theology to the vicissitudes of power or fashion, however, 
this provides an impetus for theology to purify its concepts based on the “attitude, idolatrous or 
not, they elicit from us.”43 Far from granting a permission to turn Christian orthodoxy into a 
choose-your-adventure novel, the ontological priority of language places a more stringent 
demand upon theology—namely, to transpose us from one attitude to another within our 
embodied existence. Hence, we find this statement from Chauvet that nearly sums up his entire 
project: 
The critical thrust in Christian theology is precisely this in our opinion: to show 
the conditions which render possible a passage – a passage which must be 
continually undertaken – from the attitude of a slave toward a Master imagined as 
all-powerful, clothed in the traditional panoply of the attributes of esse, to the 
attitude of a child towards a God represented far differently because this God is 
                                                
42 Ibid.  
43 Ibid., 43. 
 69 
seen always in the shadow of the cross, and thus to the attitude of a brother or a 
sister toward others.44  
 
Whatever conditions may render such a passage possible, the wisdom of philosophy that Chauvet 
is appropriating for theology’s use is that such a passage will have to do with language, since 
language is where human subjects come to be not only human subjects but ethical subjects as 
well.   
 A question might present itself at this point: Why bother with theology if the existential 
philosophy of Heidegger or the deconstruction of Derrida can get us beyond metaphysics and 
ontotheology? Should not theology be defending itself against the seeming annexation of its 
traditional territory by philosophy? Here, then, Chauvet must justify his appropriation of late 
Heideggerian philosophy as the essential foundations that undergird the sacramental project yet 
to take place. He does so by claiming that the existential philosophy of language we have been 
examining and the sacramental system of the Church share a “homology of attitude.” Perhaps we 
can clarify this odd phrase by again saying what it does not mean to say. The first difference 
between the sacramental system of the Church and the project of overcoming metaphysics is 
their respective objects. For Chauvet’s sacramental system the object is, as we have seen above, 
the God revealed through the Logos of the Cross—the God whose presence is as absence and 
whose divinity is actual in God’s humanity. For Heidegger, the object of overcoming 
metaphysics was to figure out how to think properly and then, more importantly, how to think 
Being, or even just to let Being be. A habit that Heidegger formed in his later work to help this 
along was to “cross out” the word Being in his writing. This was a physical sign that was meant 
to keep the reader, and Heidegger himself one would think, from slipping into the ontological 
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forgetfulness that would think of Being as a thing or being. Chauvet is thus decisive when he 
says that the God of the Cross is not crossed out Being.45 The two quests share different objects.  
 Chauvet’s contention, however, is that they share a common attitude or approach toward 
thinking their respective objects, and, moreover, that this homology undermines any argument, 
even Heidegger’s own contention, that philosophical and theological thinking are entirely 
distinct from one another. For Chauvet, what bridges this divide between philosophy and 
theology is nothing more than that which most clearly separates the two: the Logos of the Cross 
and the “folly” of thinking involved in articulating it in theology.46 The attitude of the theologian 
when faced with the Crucified God is the same, so Chauvet argues, as the attitude of the 
philosopher when confronted with the possibility of truly thinking the forgotten ontological 
difference. Hence, Chauvet writes, “If theology cannot express the message of the cross, it must 
nevertheless begin its thinking with that message.”47 This sounds remarkably close to what 
Heidegger often said about trying to think Being, and it lead him to transform radically what he 
meant even by the term “thinking.”48 For to think Being one could not make out of Being an 
object, otherwise one had already failed in the task. Instead, it seemed that the thinking which 
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could truly think being was not a thinking best described as representing an object and analyzing 
but more something like a “way” to be followed but never completed, almost like a spiritual 
discipline.49 In that case, Chauvet says, the sort of thinking that we are after is not a discourse 
separable from us; rather, the way we are after involves ourselves, our whole being, “in our 
corporality.”50 One can hear an obvious echo of Jüngel’s notion of thinking already discussed 
above. Still, the respective approaches of a theology and a philosophy who see themselves as 
based in a work or a way that transforms not just propositions within our head but the whole of 
our very being certainly seem homologous. As Chauvet writes,  
This is a labor that involves not only the eidos and its representations but also the 
eros and its desire to extend its control over all that is. This amounts to the slow 
work of apprenticeship in the art of “un-mastery,” a permanent work of mourning 
where, free of resentment, a “serene” consent to the “presence of the absence” 
takes place in us, little by little. In gospel terms, this is a work of conversion to the 
presence of the absence of a God who “crosses himself out” in the crushed 
humanity of this crucified One whom humans have reduced to less than nothing 
and yet where, in a paradoxical light, faith confesses the glory of God.”51 
 
It worth saying again, therefore, that far from being merely a baptism of late Heideggerian 
philosophy, Chauvet’s embrace of the constitutive nature of language and symbol is thoroughly 
grounded in a theology of the Cross. 
 
Back to the Body: Language and the Symbolic Order 
 The “folly” of the theology of the Cross we have just been describing forces us to accept 
the death of “the illusion that we can somehow pull ourselves out of the necessary mediation of 
symbols, situate ourselves outside of discourse, and apprehend reality directly, without passing 
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through cultural tradition or the history of our own desire.”52 In other words, the site of a 
theology that takes as its starting point the absence of God in the presence of the Crucified One 
must not only recognize the unavoidable mediation of what Chauvet calls the “symbolic order” 
(more on that below) but must embrace such mediation as the proper place of its reflections. For 
Chauvet, it is precisely the sacraments that are the place for such an embrace of mediation, in 
that they “force us to confront mediation –mediation, by way of the senses, of an institution, a 
formula, a gesture, a material thing – as the (eschatological) place of God’s advent.”53 The 
sacraments, therefore, send us “back to the body as the point where God writes God’s self in 
us.”54 Hence, an analysis of the fundamental and embodied mediation which characterizes the 
human subject’s being will be critical to any adequate theology. For the “theos” in our “theo-
logy” is now no longer the distant God of ontotheology but the God who has come near, even to 
the point of becoming a less-than-nothing in the form of a de-humanized and executed human 
being. An analysis of the embodied and mediated ways in which human subjects come to be is, 
so Chauvet argues, a path towards the places where authentic encounter with God Incarnate is 
possible. 
 Where then do we begin to describe that which is most human about us? Chauvet begins 
with our perception of reality. Far from being a separable and distant observer of objective 
phenomena, we never experience reality in such a neutral way. Rather, “reality is never 
presented to us except in a mediated way, which is to say, constructed out of the symbolic 
network of the culture which fashions us.”55 The world in which we live and move and have our 
being never arrives to us as a neutral collection of things that are “out there” for us to investigate, 
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rather our interaction with the world is precisely that, an interaction with something that 
communicates meaning just as much to the seeker as the seeker receives from the world. The 
objects we come into contact with are invested with communicative meanings by the culture, 
desire, and language of the human beings who have either crafted or have been crafted in such a 
way by their own culture as to perceive them as they do. In short, “the perceived object is 
always-already a constructed object.”56  
 This is not to say that the external world has no integrity on its own. Chauvet is not here 
embracing something like the absolute empiricism of Berkeley, for example. If a tree falls in the 
forest it does indeed make a sound, but the point Chauvet is driving at is that this is not the the 
world with which we are concerned here. As Flahault puts it, “Certainly material reality has an 
existence independent of the awareness human subjects have of it; but it is not with that universe 
that infants are initially confronted; it is rather in a world inhabited by other humans that they 
make their way.”57 Human experience of the world, therefore, in so far as it is rightly called 
human experience, is of a world that is always already imbued with signification from top to 
bottom. There is no “neutral” or “natural” object free of this cultural and linguistic trace.  
 Hence, we are able at last to say how it is that Chauvet justifies his refrain that without 
language no human subject comes. Since the world as we encounter it is always already seeped 
in human signification, there is no real way for anyone to become a subject without engaging this 
signification. As Chauvet puts it, there is just no possible path to becoming a human subject 
without “subjugation” to the “law” of the “symbolic order.”58 Yet, this process is obviously a 
two-way street since, in becoming subjects through subjugation to the law of cultural mediation, 
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human beings also further “the conversation which we are,” to borrow a phrase from Hölderlin, 
through their own cultural and linguistic activity.59 The symbolic order, therefore, is just the  
“mediation through which subjects build themselves while building the real into a ‘world’” or, 
put metaphorically, it is the “contact lenses which cannot be seen by the wearers…but through 
which all their vision of the real is filtered.”60 
 The principal mediation of the symbolic order, that place wherein subjects come to be as 
subjects and make the world in which such subjectivation is possible, is language. Language is 
not a thing that human beings use but is rather itself just a “mediation,” such that it is not by 
language that human beings come to be but in it. This process of building our personhood and 
building the world is obviously one that occurs simultaneously. Neither Chauvet nor Heidegger 
have in mind a magical sort of linguistic mysticism here. Rather what is meant, to quote the 
famous linguistic philosopher Emile Benveniste, is something like this: “We never discover 
humans apart from language and we never catch them in the act of inventing it….It is always 
humans speaking that we encounter in the world, always humans speaking to other humans; and 
language gives us the very definition of a human being.”61 The reader may be reminded here, as 
in Chapter One, of Heidegger’s love of that particular line from Stefan George: “Where word 
breaks off no thing may be.”62 The subject comes to be in and through language because the 
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“word precedes us,” as Chauvet says, and is the only manner in which we ever encounter the 
world in the first place.63 
 Even more critical for Chauvet is how this constitutive nature of language changes what 
we mean by the term “expression.” Under the instrumental view of language we might have 
thought of expression as a neutral segment of linguistic utterance meant to communicate a 
particular idea that we could engage with or disregard. Now, however, the term expression takes 
on a new dynamism that is in keeping with the profoundly creative nature of language. For 
Heidegger this was best seen in the poetic expression. Poetry for him was the distinctive 
linguistic activity of humans, meant to answer the call of Being and make that call hearable for 
other human being through poetic expression. Hence, Chauvet says that the task of the poet is to 
“manifest the very essence of language” as an “invitation addressed to entities to come into 
presence while remaining in their absence – the creation of the universe as a ‘world.’”64 The poet 
is the great example of letting language be itself, and in that letting-be, calling others to do the 
same. 
 What does this have to do with “expression?” Well, what philosophers like Heidegger 
have been often troubled by is this: the supposedly “common sense” notion that all expressions 
are the “accidents,” while the content of those expression are the real “substance.” The substance 
or truth of expressions, thus, lies somewhere “behind” the actual and accidental nature of the 
expressions themselves. This is to make our exterior expression, the material and audible things 
we say, to be ontologically inferior to the interior reality of thought. The sense in which 
expression ought to be taken is, according to Chauvet, something more intimate to our 
personhood. To express something is not “to give an exterior covering to a human reality already 
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there interiorly,” rather, to express something is to give it a body.65 Thus, Chauvet eschews the 
exterior-interior view of the human person in favor of a more holistic picture. We are not beings 
with “real” interiors struggling to get them out there into the “mediated” exterior world through 
language. Instead, Chauvet claims that “there is no human reality, however interior or intimate, 
except through the mediation of language or quasi-language that gives it a body by expressing 
it.”66 This idea of “giving a body” to something will be an essential idea for Chauvet because it is 
precisely where he seems to be breaking from Heidegger and the social scientists whose work is 
so influential here. What Chauvet is driving at seems to be a vision of the human reality as most 
real precisely in its embodied and mediated nature. So the real truth of human subjects is not to 
be found in an interior core that is free from the mediation of language and culture but rather is 
to be found precisely in the expressive means by which human subjects live and move and have 
their being in the world they co-create together—what we might call, to borrow a phrase from 
Wittgenstein, the “whole hurly-burly of human actions.”67 To express something, then, whether 
via “verbal, facial, or gestural,” is to give to it a body in order for it to share in the only reality 
there is.  
What Chauvet is being quite careful to do here is to eschew the schema of cause and 
effect that he used to critique Aquinas. An expression, under our new paradigm of language, is 
not an attempt to effect something exterior through an interior cause. The expression is rather 
outside of the realm of cause and effect. The best way to read what is meant by this is not to say 
that expressions do not cause something or have effects. I think there is no way around that 
rather common sense way of thinking about the nature of our expressions. The important thing 
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for Chauvet and Heidegger is that the expression and the result of the expression occur 
simultaneously such that there is no reality that takes precedence over the reality made exterior in 
the expression. I hope the reader can sense the danger involved here. If we take expressions to be 
the effect of an interior cause, as we have explained above, then language becomes nothing more 
than an instrument again. Yet, if we truly come to be in and through language then the cause of 
the expression just is the expression, and the effects of the expression are, once again, just the 
expression. In this way an expression effects what it signifies and effects it solely through 
signification. Cause and effect is not transcended in the expression, rather the two simply occur 
all at once. This is what makes the symbolic order, the order proper to this new conception of 
expression, fundamentally different than what Chauvet pejoratively calls the “metaphysical 
order.”  
 Thus far we have seen that subjects come to be through language, but we have not seen 
how this process occurs according to Chauvet. Here is a pivotal point in Symbol and Sacrament 
because it is where Chauvet quite literally pivots from a philosophical outlook informed by the 
“turn to language” to the social sciences, particularly to linguistics and structuralist 
anthropology. This move is appropriate, according to Chauvet, because while the post-
metaphysical philosophy we have been examining is a manifestation of the “invitation by Being 
(always linked to the Logos) to the human being” the discourses of linguistics and 
psychoanalysis reveal the “concrete process of this invitation.”68 It is a paltry analogy, to be sure, 
but perhaps one could think of the philosophy we have worked through thus far as the “theory” 
and the linguists and analysts yet to be discussed as the “practice.” Either way, it is clear that 
Chauvet feels this “rapid detour” into the social sciences is appropriate because it puts flesh on 
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the philosophical and existential principles we have been concerned with up to this point. I 
highlight this transition here because it is a central point of contention for critics of Chauvet’s 
work. Chauvet’s critics hold that this turn is not a detour but a crash. Rather than plumbing the 
depths of philosophical insight and then applying them to sacramental theology, Chauvet 
attempts to use as concrete examples discourses that are fundamentally incompatible with the 
philosophical perspective he has already taken up. In short, the objects that the social sciences 
and post-metaphysical philosophy seek to understand are just not the same things. As Belcher 
puts it, “Linguistics and psychoanalysis…make no attempt to show the invitation of Being to 
human beings; on the contrary, they are interested in all kinds of language acts (and 
subconscious movements) between human subjects, but only in these.”69  
Is there any defending Chauvet’s making equivalent the objects of post-metaphysical 
philosophy and the social sciences? I believe his move makes sense in light of his use of Jüngel 
and others to reimagine the doctrine of God, particularly the critical claim that God’s divinity is 
actual in Jesus’ humanity. Chauvet’s embrace of reformed doctrine might seem puzzling given 
the Catholic orientation of his project.70 However, what Chauvet is really trying to get at with his 
appropriation of Jüngel and other predominantly Protestant thinkers is the way in which the 
doctrine of Divine Freedom and grace not only are compatible with sacramental theology but 
even require the sacramental system as the symbolic expression of the theology of the Cross. 
This, then, changes the way we ought to perceive what, on its face, does seem a dramatic turn to 
the social sciences. Chauvet is so apt to engage the social sciences not to equate Heidegger’s 
notion of language with, say, the linguistic work on symbol of Edmond Ortigues but, rather, 
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Chauvet is eager to engage the social sciences because they disclose the concrete manifestation 
of that which is most authentically human. If the social sciences do this successfully (and 
Milbank will certainly have a great deal to say contrary to this), then these very sciences also 
disclose places in which God might be made present as the One who has chosen to be thought in 
terms of humanity. Thus, far from betraying the integrity of his theological project, a turn to the 
social sciences as revelatory of the concrete and embodied ways that human beings come to be 
human subjects seems entirely in keeping with Chauvet’s stated purpose. 
What Chauvet hopes to accomplish in this controversial turn is to set up a common frame 
for understanding the innovative ways he is going to talk about two traditional theological 
claims. The first claim is that God and humankind communicate with one another but retain their 
radical difference. The obvious danger for Chauvet is in eliding the radical difference between 
God and humanity he might unwittingly make of God a being among other beings, hence 
committing the same ontotheological mistake he proscribed from the start. The second claim is 
that there is “no truly human life that is not radically crossed by death.”71 Chauvet has to set up 
this latter truth because, again, his sacramental theology will have to deal with the traditional 
notion of sacramental presence. Yet, given what we have seen so far, there is just no way to 
conceive of the notion of “presence” in the same way as before. So the use of the social sciences 
is to show that human lives as fully human come to be lives in that they are crossed by death, 
marked by it from the start. This will help Chauvet further elucidate the difficult but critical 
interrelation between presence and absence, identity and difference, Same and Other. 
Chauvet, thus, launches into a very quick description of Benveniste’s and Ortigues’ 
theories on how human development takes place through language. For both thinkers the word 
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“I” is a unique case for the linguist. Strictly speaking, the word “I” doesn’t accomplish what we 
typically hope to accomplish with our words. We often expect our words to refer to some sort of 
reality whether a mental reality, cultural reality, or material reality. Words like “book” or “Arab 
Spring” or “Liverpool Football Club” have concrete referents that we can point to in order to 
understand their meaning. But the word “I” does not function in that way, nor does its correlate 
“You.” As Benveniste himself states, “The instances of the use of I do not constitute a class of 
reference since there is no ‘object’ definable as I to which these instances can refer in identical 
fashion. Each I has its own reference and correspond each time to a unique being who is set up as 
such.”72 The word “I” cannot refer to myself and someone else in precisely the same way. The 
word “I” has no strict external referent but is, rather, only definable within each given context. In 
other words, what the term “I” actually refers to is the subject who is currently speaking.  
Despite this liminal space that the I seems to inhabit, it is a fact of linguistics that all 
discourse is dependent upon precisely this murky concept. For “consciousness of self is only 
possible if it is experienced by contrast.” The I immediately defines itself in opposition to an 
Other. In fact, the speaker only uses I when speaking to “someone who will be a you in my 
address.” This is not only the birth of the designation “YOU,” a pronoun that shares in the same 
ambiguity of reference as did the “I,” it is also the birth of human subjects themselves. “It is this 
condition of dialogue that is constitutive of person, for it implies that reciprocally I becomes you 
in the address of the one who in his turn designates himself as I.”73  
As of yet, however, this sequence is incomplete. For while the “I” can define itself as 
subject precisely through dialogue with a “YOU,” they are still nothing more than mirror images 
of one another, having no real distinction between the two, without the introduction of a third 
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term. This “third” is the “IT” or the “social and cosmic world.”74 The “I-YOU” relation only 
constitutes genuine human subjectivity through the mediation of the “Neuter” or the non-human 
reality that the “I-YOU” share together. In short, a linguistic analysis of communication and the 
mediation that is fundamental to it, reveals the path to the possibility of the “existential 
subjectivity” Chauvet has heretofore been describing. 
I said above, however, that the point of this is to help Chauvet reinterpret traditional 
theological categories of communication and presence. The linguistic view of human subjectivity 
gives to Chauvet a critical principle for this work in the I-YOU-IT schema. What such a schema 
shows is a radical transformation of what “difference” means. It has been the stalwart doctrine of 
orthodoxy that God and human beings are radically different, but our discoveries from the 
linguistic viewpoint redefine what precisely we mean by difference in general, thus forcing a 
rethinking of the precise way in which God and humans are differ from one another. Under the 
linguistic viewpoint, difference can no longer be conceived of as, what Chauvet dubs “distance-
separation.” Chauvet argues:  
[O]n the axis of contradiction, [the linguistic YOU] occupies the opposition 
opposite the I, from which, as a consequence, it is the most different; but it is also 
the most similar to the I since it designates the interlocutor insofar as he or she is 
capable of taking in his or her turn, and in his or her own name, the same 
linguistic I as the one who is speaking. This paradoxical position is rendered 
possible by the third agent, the IT, the social and universal Other under which 
both the I and the YOU abide and which permits them, spoken as they are by the 
same culture, to understand one another.75 
 
The I-YOU-IT relationship shows that difference and similarity are not fundamentally opposed 
concepts. The I and You’s difference is what allows them to communicate with one another, but 
this very difference is also their most profound similarity. Now, this is not to say that they are not 
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spatially separate things. As Chauvet admits, Kant was correct in saying that space is a 
fundamental part of our human experience of the world.76 However, if we think of difference in 
terms of distance or separation—imagining the I and the You as two fundamentally separate 
things—then we occlude the truth that the I and You are the reversible of one another and only 
come into being through the other. Put another way, thinking of the I and You under the schema 
of separation actually misleads us, since the I and You are not entirely separable in their 
development from one another. As Chauvet puts it, “the anthropological difference should not be 
conceived as a distancing which attenuates or even cuts communication but rather as an 
otherness which makes it possible.”77 Far from being an obstacle to the discovery of truth, then, 
difference functions instead as “the very place where truth is brought about” since it was only 
through the difference of the You that the I came to be in the first place. Hence, when Chauvet 
constantly employs the phrase “symbolic Other,” it is precisely this sort of otherness—a 
difference that reveals rather than stifles truth—that he means. 
 More than declaring the truth of the subject as based in otherness, Chauvet often declares 
that the subject is the product of a “breach” or a “lack.” To explain what he means by this, I must 
explicate Chauvet’s subsequent turn to psychoanalysis. Here Chauvet is reliant on Lacan’s 
account of the “stage of the mirror” in infant development.78 Put plainly, an infant notices its self 
in the mirror but cannot fully come to subjectivity until it sees itself as named by another. This is 
a very useful analogy for Chauvet since the unity of self that the infant receives when it sees 
itself in the mirror as named is a symbolic unity, i.e., it is a unity based on something that comes 
from outside itself. “Thus, it is through a break with the immediate image [the child’s mirror 
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image] that access to true subjectivity begins.”79 In other words, the “breach” or “lack” that 
Chauvet is describing is the break that happens when the infant is named and is no longer one 
with its immediate image in the mirror. The true ascent to subjectivity comes only through the 
mediation of its being represented by a name that is not its own creation. Ultimately, Chauvet 
writes, “The truth of the subject, as we see, depends on its psychic consent to the lack which 
constitutes it and which language opens within it.”80 
 If the truth of the subject begins with consent to the lack that ensues from its being 
represented in language, then there is a greater break that must be consented to if the subject is 
going to live out a full human life, namely, death. The human subject might come to be initially 
through this division into the symbolic order, but it is only as consenting to the radical crossing 
out of death that the human subject fully comes into itself. So just as symbolic otherness through 
language was the law that birthed the subject, so the consent to the presence of death in life is a 
vital process that the subject must undergo. I say process because, in keeping with our emphasis 
on becoming rather than Being, “the subject’s conquest of its liberty and truth…is effected by an 
unending process of costly ‘working through,’”81 what Freud called Durcharbeitung.82 Thus, the 
truth of the subject is not a particular breakthrough point but rather “the path itself,” the 
continual working through of the fact that its life only exists as radically crossed by death. Here, 
again, incommensurables work with one another rather than against one another. Identity and 
otherness, life and death, presence and absence, co-inhere and seem to call forth the truth of one 
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another rather than cancel it out. This is why Chauvet will continue to call the truth of the subject 
the “consent to the presence of absence,” a consent to the continual process of becoming that 
characterizes the subject’s life and the ever-present lack-in-being that constitutes its existence. 
Precisely this way of thinking is what Chauvet means by the symbolic as opposed to the 
metaphysical order—an order of thought grounded in the groundless place of mediation rather 
than in the supposedly solid foundation of identity. 
 
Chauvet on the Gift: Symbolic Exchange  
 I have been describing the way in which Chauvet seeks to use the truths of the social 
sciences—linguistics and anthropology, in particular—to examine the truth of human 
subjectivity. He did this, the reader will recall, not as an attempt to baptize a fundamentally non-
theological discourse but precisely because the Logos of the Cross shows that such examination 
of the human condition is a means of discovering the truth of the God whose divinity is made 
actual as God’s humanity. We could think of these philosophical waypoints as the beginning and 
end of subjectivity—the “beginning” in the symbolic otherness that constitutes our identity by 
our being named, and the “end” of death that is the impetus for the never ending process of 
working through the truth of our existence. The “in-between” of these two waypoints, the “rule” 
or “law” of the life that we live in and amongst other human persons is what Chauvet calls 
“symbolic exchange.”83 The importance of this concept for Chauvet’s work can hardly be 
overstated. In short, the structure of symbolic exchange is the wellspring out of which his unique 
account of the interrelationship between Eucharist, language, gift, and politics flows. To this 
vital piece of the puzzle, therefore, I now turn. 
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  I have shown above that human subjectivity, for Chauvet, is of the symbolic rather than 
metaphysical order, but the foundation of Chauvet’s understanding of symbolic exchange is the 
concept of the symbol. His work is, after all, entitled “Symbol and Sacrament,” and I have 
perhaps come a long way without explicitly naming what Chauvet means by this term. To start, 
Chauvet introduces what he calls a “heuristic” distinction within language between “sign” and 
“symbol.”84 These two linguistic realities will represent two poles within language itself, but, 
again, this distinction is not meant as a hard and fast statement of fact. The distinction helps 
reveal a critical truth about what happens in language-acts that tend towards the epistemological 
schema inherent to sign or symbol respectively. The “sign,” Chauvet argues, represents the use 
of language most focused on communicating information. Under the logic or order of the sign, 
the person attempts to make statements about objects that accurately represent the referent in 
question. Hence, “signs” always point away from themselves towards something else and we 
judge the sign based on its ability to evoke this something else in adequate detail. Therefore, the 
sign is always governed by a logic of value. We judge the value of the sign based on its ability to 
communicate information accurately.85 Signs, in other words, are always already caught up in an 
economy of meaning. 
 The “symbol,” however, is of an entirely different order. Chauvet points back to the 
ancient use of the term symbolon as an example of its vital difference from signs. The ancient 
symbolon was an object used to represent a union or agreement between two groups. It was an 
object cut in two with one part of the object given to each group. When the two groups met 
together the object could be fit together again, literally symbolizing their union or alliance in a 
concrete way. Relying on the French linguist Edmond Ortigues, this shows for Chauvet that 
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symbols “introduce us into an order to which it itself belongs.”86 In other words, the symbol’s 
primary function is not to convey accurate information, but “to join the persons who produce or 
receive it with their cultural world…and so to identify them as subjects in their relations with 
other subjects.”87 The symbol is not just a more complicated version of the sign. Rather, the 
symbol is indicative of an entirely different logic or order within the human milieu. The symbol 
takes priority over the sign because the function just mentioned of joining us to a cultural world 
and identifying us as subjects in this very process is itself the primordial function of language. 
So to tell the story of language as primitive sounds meant only for signs, which then only 
gradually managed to build up to the complexity of symbols, has things the wrong way round. It 
turns out that the smallest phonemes of human language are originally symbolic in that they 
introduce us to the human order by their very utterance.88 
Perhaps the best illustration of this claim that Chauvet offers is the plane crash in the 
Amazon. Chauvet imagines a survivor of a plane crash in the Amazonian jungle hearing, as they 
claw their way through the deadly environs, the word “flower” spoken by a human being. Now, 
taken under the form of sign, the word “flower” evokes a certain piece of information but also 
brings to mind other scientific discourses. Horticulture, biology, and botany are all indicated in 
the mention of the word flower. The sign “flower” points beyond itself to them. But, for the 
survivor of the plane crash this is precisely not what comes to mind. The survivor does not hear 
“flower” spoken in the jungle and think, “Well! Someone is speaking about horticulture; I’ll join 
the conversation.” Instead, they think “Thank God! Another human being! I’m saved!”89 Thus, 
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the mere speech of a human being, from the word “flower” to even a mere phoneme, introduces 
the hearer into the order to which it belongs, namely the linguistic order of human subjects. So 
the survivor of the plane crash hears in the word “flower” not an attempt to communicate 
information but the whole human order to which they desire to return.  
This example also illustrates a critical truth of the dichotomy between symbol and sign, 
namely that the two always interpenetrate one another. After all, the person whom the survivor 
overhears speaking about a flower probably is using this word as a sign, despite the fact that it is 
heard as a symbol by the victim of the crash. The logic of signs is always present in the symbol 
and vice versa. An easy example of this is the “White House.” We could use “the White House” 
as a sign, telling a lost graduate student how to find his way back to his D.C. hotel, but even in 
this use “the White House” still bears the trace of its symbolic use as representing America itself. 
Hence, while the symbol might bear witness to the primordial function of language, it still bears 
the trace of the sign in its expression. There are, therefore, no “pure” symbols.  
Most importantly, however, the symbol eludes the logics of value or calculation that we 
have seen so heavily criticized above. It does this in several ways. First, the symbol’s meaning 
can only be understood in relation. It is only by being joined to the other piece of the hewn 
object that the ancient symbolon functioned. In the same way, the symbol, whether in the 
linguistic plane or beyond it, only functions in its relation to the whole of the symbolic network 
to which it belongs. Moreover, the symbol does not communicate an accurate representation but 
evokes the entire symbolic order to which it belongs. In other words, there is no real way to 
value the symbol apart from being summoned into or challenged by the symbolic order that it 
introduces to us. I think this is what Chauvet means when he continually notes that there is no 
grasping of truth without first being grasped by the truth. The symbol seems to call the human 
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person into the symbolic order to which it belongs and only in consenting to that order does one 
come to understand the symbol’s meaning. Now, if this strikes the reader as remarkably akin to 
the Christian description of faith, that is no accident; for Chauvet calls the symbol a “witness to 
the founding faith of humanity.”90 What he means by this is that the symbol is a witness to the 
“distance” or “otherness” of mediation that constitutes human experience of the real as human 
experience. Thus, the symbol belongs to an entirely different order than that of the sign and the 
logic of value that follows with it. 
What would it mean, then, to exchange symbols or to be a part of an exchange that is 
symbolic? Are we not right back where we started with Derrida’s aporia of the gift if we plunge 
the symbol into any form of exchange? Would this not obliterate the gift and make impossible its 
reception? Chauvet seems to think the answer is “no,” and while he does not answer Derrida 
directly (Given Time was published almost a decade after Symbol and Sacrament), Chauvet 
seems to hold firm in his defense of the logic of obligatory generosity. The dichotomy Chauvet 
has set up between sign and symbol clears the way for this defense of the gift as remaining 
outside of the logic of economy that Derrida held would cancel the gift. “The difference between 
sign and symbol thus appears as homologous to the difference which exists between the principle 
of the value of something as an object, which governs the market-place, and the principle 
‘beyond value’ of the communication between subjects, which controls symbolic exchange.”91 
Understanding symbolic exchange is thus the very foundation for understanding the admirabile 
commercium or “marvelous exchange” of grace between God and human beings.92 
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But what is symbolic exchange and, more importantly given our prior reading of Derrida, 
how is it? Chauvet here gives a telling treatment of Mauss’ Essai sur le don wherein he 
transposes Mauss’ analysis of the gift into his theological and philosophical framework. Chauvet 
emphasizes two important traits of the gift that we have already seen above. First, that the gift is 
a “total social fact,” meaning that it touches on every domain of society and their respective 
exchanges.93 Second, and most importantly, Chauvet sees Mauss as evidence for placing the gift 
as belonging fundamentally to the symbolic order. For, as Mauss says, “it is something different 
from the merely useful that is passed around.” The gift is not valued based on its use. Hence, 
“the principle which regulates general exchange is of a completely different order from that of 
the marketplace or of value.”94 This is further evidenced by the “obligatory generosity” that 
Mauss observed in the gift-exchange of traditional societies. Since the gift is given “for nothing” 
but still communicates an obligation upon the recipient, so the gift must belong to an order 
beyond the realm of utilitarian value. 
Chauvet anticipates in some ways Derrida’s critique of Mauss in that the idea of gift and 
return-gift raises clearly the problem of language and translation. Mauss himself saw this 
problem as well: “The terms which we have used – present, gift – are not in themselves 
completely exact. We find no others; this is the best we can do. These concepts from economics 
and law which we like to oppose to each other – liberty and obligation; liberality, generosity, 
luxury and thrift, interest, utility – need recasting.”95 The reality that for traditional societies 
“every gift received obligates in its turn” needs a linguistic recasting since, as Derrida has rightly 
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shown, to call something a gift which subsequently creates a debt seems to make the gift into 
something like a loan, which is no gift at all. Chauvet seems to be attempting that very recasting 
of language, taking the idea of gift-exchange, in which the very presence of “exchange” cancels 
the reality of the “gift,” and converting it to “symbolic exchange,” in which the inclusion of 
“exchange” does not have the same corrosive effect. 
Chauvet will thus still retain the structure of Gift—Reception—Return-Gift as essential 
to his theological project. In fact, it is this structure that makes up symbolic exchange itself, and 
it is precisely this fundamental structure of human relationships that the ontotheological 
presuppositions of metaphysics so often cover over. As he writes,  
For in our societies, so many centuries of metaphysical tradition, technological 
civilization, and the dominance of business values have passed, enshrining the 
notion of equivalence, that by an almost historic fatality, our languages have 
forgotten the original ambivalence of our vocabulary of exchange. This is why it 
is difficult for us to recognize that the fundamental system of “obligatory 
generosity” and “mandatory gratuitousness,” organized according to a process of 
gift—reception—return-gift, continues to pervade our exchanges. We have 
trouble recognizing that it is nevertheless what allows us to live as subjects and 
structures all our relations in what they contain of the authentically human.96 
 
For what allows us to live as truly human subjects is not reducible to the “order of the useful.” 
That which is authentically human must be beyond this realm of value, and so Chauvet dubs this 
this the “order of…‘graciousness’ or super-abundance.”97  
 But what is actually given in such exchanges? And is it a true gift or is the true gift 
canceled by the fall into economy and value? As to the first question, symbolic exchange is the 
exchange of the subjects themselves, not any one particular object:  
For what is being exchanged through yams, shells, or spears, as through a rose or 
a book offered as gifts in our own culture, is more and other than what they are 
worth on the open market or what they may be useful for. It is more and other 
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than what the objects are in themselves. One is here outside or beyond the regime 
of usefulness and immediacy. Rather, the principle which rules here is one of 
super-abundance. The true objects being exchanged are the subjects themselves.98 
 
An object being used as an intermediary—hence, of no value—provides the means to assert our 
subjectivity and receive recognition of that subjectivity in return, a reception which itself 
constitutes that very subjectivity. At the same time, we perform the same feat for the one with 
whom we exchange our very self. They receive through our recognition that full identity that is 
only got by being given the recognition of a fellow subject. Hence, symbolic exchange is shown 
to be that very same process as language, i.e. that which through a consent to mediation allows 
human persons to come to be as subjects through the mutual recognition of the Other. 
 As to the second question it seems clear that Chauvet does not believe in a pure symbol. 
Thus, while the symbol is “beyond” the realm of value it still bears the trace of the sign. 
Heidegger’s essay on the “Origin of the Work of Art,” an essay for which Chauvet expresses 
great admiration, demonstrates this dynamic particularly well. Therein, Heidegger expresses his 
admiration for the existential power of art to bring forth truth as an “advent” in which we might 
participate through encounter with the work itself.99 Particularly relevant to our current question, 
however, is the simple fact that, despite this wondrous potential of works of art, they still possess 
the character of things. “Works of art are shipped like coal from the Ruhr and logs from the 
Black Forest. During the First World War Hölderlin’s hymns were packed in the soldier’s 
knapsack together with cleaning gear. Beethoven’s quartets lie in the storerooms of the 
                                                
98 Ibid., 106. 
99 I’m taking “advent” from the phrase “advent of truth” as translated by Albert Hofstadter’s in 
Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1971), 81. It should be noted that the translation of this phrase was changed to “propriative 
event,” in Heidegger, Basic Writings, 206, possibly to eschew the theological connotations of 
advent. 
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publishing house like potatoes in a cellar.”100 The “thingly” character of works of art cannot be 
ignored no matter the heights of aesthetic bliss they may call forth in us.101 Yet, it is decidedly 
the case that their essence is something else over and above their thingly nature. So it is with the 
symbol and the sign. All symbols undoubtedly possess a “signly” character, but their essence is 
decidedly more than this. The ancient symbolon, after all, might’ve been nothing more than a pot 
or, to use one of Chauvet’s favorite examples, the torn five-dollar bills that OSS agents carried 
during World War II. The split bill was certainly a half of a five dollar bill, a mere sign, but the 
true essence of the bill was its function as a symbol, identifying the one who carried it as 
occupying a particular role in a system. Chauvet, thus, seems to agree in a certain sense with 
Derrida in that the Gift—Reception—Return-Gift pattern of obligatory generosity will always be 
haunted by the logic of economic value inherent in signs. 
 Yet, Chauvet is insistent that the symbol remains free of the logic of value, or at least that 
its symbolic status cannot be canceled by the presence of value. While the symbol is haunted by 
the sign and always seems to bear the trace of economy and calculation, it is decidedly not bound 
to these entities. In fact, this mutual inherence seems to be the very dynamic which allows the 
symbol to function as symbol in the first place. For as we described above, presence and 
absence, identity and difference, do not cancel one another out. Rather, the one works with rather 
than against the other. Hence, we might think of Chauvet as thinking beyond the aporia of the 
gift not by denying the contradiction, but by claiming that the contradiction itself serves to make 
the gift into a gift in the first place.  
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This is what I think Chauvet means when he says that there is always a place of 
“cognition” in every symbolic expression meant at “recognition.”102 Symbolic expressions 
primarily serve to establish the interrelations of subjects through mutual recognition, but there is 
no symbolic expression free from the role of cognition and information. Chauvet returns to the 
example of Van Gogh’s painting of the peasants shoes from Heidegger’s famous essay to 
illustrate this. It is necessary to have a “minimum knowledge if Van Gogh’s painting of the 
peasant woman’s shoes is to exercise its power of symbolization.”103 We should need to know 
something of Van Gogh’s life, something of the canon of great art to measure the painting 
against, but even more importantly, we must know something of shoes in general and their use in 
life. However, the knowledge of such things does not produce the aesthetic experience in us. 
This means that the “symbolic experience is not sufficient unto itself,” and accounts for the fact 
that “every symbol tends towards a discourse of cognition, a discourse of truth which is the 
ambition of all language.”104 This is the great pragmatism of Chauvet and reveals his decided 
resistance against making the symbol the whole of truth. Far from causing the gift to disappear, 
then, the condition of the truly human mediation at the heart of finitude seems to be the very 
condition that makes the gift possible in the first place, just as effective symbolic expressions 
always bear the trace of calculation and information.  
 One objection might linger, however, and from none other than Thomas Aquinas. How is 
it, so the objection might go, that symbolic exchange is not just another name for cause and 
effect? Do we not cause an effect in the other and receive an effect in ourselves through their 
agency? Despite Chauvet’s continual assertion that symbolic exchange is beyond the 
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productionist scheme of ontotheology are we not producing something in the other and being 
made by them in the process? Indeed, Chauvet will draw upon anthropologists like Victor 
Turner, Claude Levi-Strauss, and Éric de Rosny to describe what he terms “symbolic 
efficacy.”105 What those thinkers meant by such a term is the efficacy of rites within traditional 
societies, how it was that processes of symbolization were actually effective in changing or 
healing the socio-cultural order of a particular society. Chauvet retells several examples from the 
works of those just mentioned—Turner’s “pulled tooth,” Levi-Strauss’ account of the Cunas’ 
birth ritual, etc.—and comes to note one critical insight: if in a ritual of healing, for example, an 
actual physical healing occurs, it does not occur due to some magical cause. Rather, as Bourdieu 
notes, a ritual “acts on the real by acting on the representations of the real.”106 If there is an 
“extra-linguistic perlocutionary effect” of a ritual it only occurs via the “intermediary” of the 
“illocutionary order.”107 In other words, if something physical actually occurs it only does so 
through the mediation of language. This is what Chauvet means by an “intra-linguistic effect.” 
The physical healing brought on by the ritual is not a physical effect but a symbolic effect. The 
power of such rites is therefore performative and based in a “consensus that validates them” 
rather than in a spiritual force that intervenes to produce anomalous physical effects. For this 
reason, Chauvet believes he can claim that symbolic efficacy “cannot be identified with the 
scheme of cause and effect” because “the effect here is a ‘symbolic effect.’”108 
 Yet, does not this emphasis on the symbolic eschew the very embodiment that Chauvet 
had valued so highly? Do we not denigrate embodied physical presence here in favor of the 
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purely linguistic reality of the symbolic?109 Physical effects of rituals, after all, seem subservient 
to their symbolic effects based entirely in an intra-linguistic realm. Critically, Chauvet turns to 
Derrida’s work in this moment to remind us that all language—the means through which 
symbolic effects occur in the first place—is embodied. The Derridian notion of writing, the 
reader will recall from Chapter One, referred to this inescapable trace of the material in all 
thought and speech. So the use of symbolic efficacy in order to escape the schema of cause and 
effect turns out to rely upon rather than eschew embodiment. Chauvet goes further still in 
insisting that the body itself is speech: 
Like language, the body is matter, matter significant from the first, that is, 
culturally instituted as speech. Outside of language, outside of culture, the body 
would be only an object or an instrument – indispensable certainly, in spite of its 
limits – which the soul would make use of to speak itself: humans would have 
bodies the same way they have language. Calling this traditional instrumentalist 
conception of language into question has immediate consequences for our 
understanding of the body. Humans do not ex-sist except as corporality whose 
concrete place is always their own bodies. Corporality is the body’s very 
speech.110  
 
Far from pulling us up into an ethereal linguistic plane meant to be the true site of the real, 
Chauvet’s insistence on symbol and language returns us to the body, as the site where the very 
advent of God is possible. For the body itself is the “primary place of every symbolic joining of 
the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside.’”111 In other words, the body is the primordial symbolon that places 
us as signifying subjects into an always already signified world. Chauvet quotes an instructive 
phrase from Dubarle here: “The living body is indeed… ‘the arch-symbol of the whole symbolic 
                                                
109 It should be noted here that this is quite a modern question that a pre-modern Christian would 
have never imagined asking. 
110 Ibid., 146.  
111 Ibid., 147. 
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order.’”112 Thus, the ontological, and therefore the pastoral payoff for Chauvet is that the most 
ontological is no longer an idealist reality but an embodied one. The symbolic order and the 
embodied flesh that we are have collapsed into one another such that our faith, for Chauvet, is 
nothing less than an embodied reality as well. 
For this reason Chauvet reclaims a particular phrase from a critical passage in 
Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra: 
“Body am I, and soul”—thus speaks the child. And why should one not speak like 
children? 
But the awakened and knowing say: body am I entirely, and nothing else [Leib ich 
bin, ganz und gar, und nichts ausserdem]; and soul is only a word for something 
about the body.113 
 
For Chauvet, I cannot say that “I have a body,” or even that “I am a body,” for this is to place the 
body as an object separate from the first-person subject that is speaking. Rather, “body am I.” 
The human being is an I-body such that the body is the subject of the verb rather than its object. 
The distance that the metaphysical picture of the human being placed between the Body and the I 
is now collapsed under Chauvet’s vision of corporality: “The concept of corporality seeks to 
express this symbolic order which holds that the human being does not have a body, but is 
body.”114 Hence, the picture of the human person inherent in Scholastic theology after Aquinas is 
corrected by insisting that there is no account of subjectivity apart from corporality. 
                                                
112 Dominique Dubarle, “Pratique du symbole et connaissance de Dieu,” Le mythe et le symbole: 
de la connaissance figurative de dieu (Paris: Beauchesne, 1977), 243, as translated by Madigan 
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here, the influence of Karl Rahner’s classic essay “The Theology of the Symbol” seems 
paramount. See Karl Rahner, “The Theology of the Symbol,” in Theological Investigations, vol. 
IV, trans. Kevin Smith (New York: Crossroad, 1982), 221-252. 
113 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra in The Portable Nietzsche, translated by Walter 
Kaufmann (New York: Penguin Books, 1954), 146. 
114 Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 149. 
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 The body as the arch-symbol is thus the joining together of seemingly divergent realities. 
These divergent entities are what Chauvet refers to as the “triple body” of “culture, tradition, and 
nature.” What Chauvet is trying to get at is an adequate description of how it is that our bodies 
are speaking (i.e., the body as speech) and how they are always-already spoken (i.e., we are born 
into a particular language). Culture, tradition, and nature—far from being realities constitutive of 
our interior self, are constitutive as bodies of our very bodies. A person’s body is “spoken” 
therefore by the “symbolic network” of the group to which the person belongs, the “historic 
tradition” of that cultural group, and, finally, the physical universe. These three embodied 
realities are symbolically joined together in each person such that “the I-body exists only as 
woven, inhabited, spoken by this triple body of culture, tradition, and nature.”115  
 Securing this philosophical anthropology is critical for Chauvet precisely because, as we 
have already shown, that which is truly human—the symbolic order revealed in a vital way by 
the arch-symbol of the body—is the very place where the God, whose divinity is made actual as 
God’s humanity, can be encountered. Thus, Chauvet can claim that “the anthropological is the 
place of every possible theological.”116 The “faith” that we now profess, therefore, is no longer a 
purely interior reality, a matter of the “head” or “heart,” but is rather an exterior reality “written” 
in our bodies. Whatever faith is, it is something corporal. This is the necessary consequence, 
Chauvet argues, of the theological transformation of the doctrine of God we saw when the 
scandal of the Cross is placed front and center. Faith can no more escape consent to the 
mediation of embodiment than can our language. Hence, the corporality of faith is the outcome 
of thinking about God as the God whose divinity is made actual as God’s humanity. 
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  To conclude, the necessity of the sacramentality of faith itself now becomes obvious. 
The sacraments are the “unavoidable stumbling block” which prevents every attempt of the 
believer to circumvent the consent to mediation that all faith requires. To become a believer, for 
Chauvet, requires that we “learn to consent, without resentment, to the corporality of faith.” The 
sacraments are themselves the expressions of this “corporality of the faith” in that within the 
rites themselves “the faith is at work within a ritual staging in which each person’s body is the 
place of the symbolic convergence…of the triple body which makes us into believers.” We are 
joined through the sacraments to the “symbolic network” unique to the Church (culture), the 
particular history that makes the rites possible (tradition), and the universe from which the 
sacramental elements are drawn (nature). The sacraments thus bar the way to the false notion of 
a faith free of mediation: 
In their significant materiality, the sacraments thus constitute an unavoidable 
stumbling block which forms a barrier to every imaginary claim to a direct 
connection, individual and interior, with Christ or to a gnostic-like, illuminist 
contact with him. They represent in the feasible mediations, beginning with the 
church, outside of which there is no possible Christian faith. They tell us that the 
faith has a body, that it adheres to our body. More than that, they tell us that to 
become a believer is to learn to consent, without resentment, to the corporality of 
the faith.117  
 
The sacraments are, therefore, the “wise pedagogy” that teaches us to encounter the God in the 
proper place to meet such a God as the God of Jesus of Nazareth, namely in the place that makes 
our human life to be human in the first place. Our faith requires a body. Embodiment is, at its 
root, linguistic. The sacraments are a place—not ‘the’ place, but certainly a place—in which our 
faith is given a body. Chauvet’s reference to Derrida here is quite telling:  
Just as empirical writing is the phenomenal manifestation of an arch-writing that 
constitutes language as the place where the human subject comes into being, so 
the sacraments can be appreciated as the empirical manifestation of the ‘arch-
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sacramentality’ that constitutes the language of faith, which is the place where 
the believing subject comes into being.118 
 
Thus, faith in the God of the Cross, in the One whose presence is as the Absent One, in the God 
whose divinity is made actual as God’s humanity, this faith must be given a body through the 
sacraments. If such is the radical philosophical and theological underpinnings of Chauvet’s 
sacramental theology, then it remains only to analyze how the Eucharist accomplishes this as the 
symbolic figure that constitutes a believing subject through language and transposes them into a 
particular manner of communal, human belonging.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
CHAUVET ON THE EUCHARIST:  
THE POLITICS OF THE PRESENCE OF ABSENCE 
 
Introduction  
 I turn now to Chauvet’s account of the Eucharist and will do so in two broad sections, 
corresponding to the overall purpose of this essay. The first is Chauvet’s account of the 
ontological scandal of the Eucharist, particularly the way in which Christ is said to be present in 
the material elements of the Eucharist. The second is Chauvet’s account of the political scandal 
of the Eucharist, particularly the way in which Chauvet elaborates the return-gift of Christian 
witness. Before that, however, allow me to offer a preliminary word on the way in which I think 
one’s understanding of sacramental grace has to change when confronted with the radical 
theological and philosophical presuppositions that guide Chauvet’s project. 
 Chauvet will combine his two axes—that of language and symbol plus that of the Logos 
of the Cross—and call the sacraments the “symbolic figures of God’s effacement.”1 I take it that 
by “God’s effacement” Chauvet means something in keeping with the insights of Jüngel’s (but 
also Moltmann’s and Kasper’s) radical theology of the cross, which we examined in the previous 
chapter. Chauvet thus, following Jüngel, reads the Crucifixion as an event in the life of God. The 
cry of dereliction is not a put on, in other words, but a decisive event in the manner in which God 
chooses to be Godself. In short, God chooses to efface Godself and identify this self-effacement 
as part of what it means to be God in the first place.  
                                                
1 Louis-Marie Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament: A Sacramental Reinterpretation of Christian 
Existence, trans. Patrick Madigan, S.J. & Madeleine Beaumont (Collegeville: Liturgical Press,  
490. 
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The Eucharist (along with all the other sacraments, to be sure) is a symbolic figure of this 
effacement. Yet, despite the vast amount of territory we have now traversed it might still seem 
odd to suggest that a “symbolic figure” is responsible for an ontological and political scandal. 
We might agree with much of what Chauvet has said but find ourselves still tempted to think of 
the Eucharist as a mechanism that causes something irresistible. For are we not downplaying the 
actual scandal of the Eucharist if the Eucharist is just a symbol? As one author put it, whatever 
the Eucharist is it cannot be just a “mere symbol.”2  
We have already seen why it is only natural to think of symbols in this way. The 
information and sense-data that press themselves upon us in our ordinary experience of the world 
seem to come first. Only later, through a combination of artifice and manipulation do we arrive 
at symbols for this reality, but even given their aesthetic and practical power such symbols are 
not real in the proper sense. The real seems to come before the symbol we make to represent it. 
Calling the Eucharist a symbol seems to distance it from that reality as well, even if we claim 
that the Eucharist enacts a radical scandal of the real itself. Calling the change in the Eucharist 
symbolic seems to belie a stratagem designed to skirt the modern embarrassment brought on by 
the doctrine of transubstantiation. But things are precisely the other way around, according to 
Chauvet. For as we have shown, all reality is not just made into something symbolic after the 
fact, rather reality is encountered as always already saturated by human signification, as always 
already symbolic. Thus, symbols touch on the real to a greater extent than even signs can, since 
our experience of the real is always already saturated with symbolism. So, for Chauvet, to call 
the Eucharist a symbol is not to distance it from reality but to touch reality to the very quick.3 
                                                
2 Lawrence Paul Hemming, “Transubstantiating Our Selves,” Heythrop Journal 44 (2003): 418. 
3 I am reminded here of the wonderful sentiment expressed by G.E.M. Anscombe in her essay on 
transubstantiation: “There is the now old dispute between Catholics and Protestants whether we 
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 It is still a tenet of orthodoxy, however, that the sacraments are in some way involved in 
an economy of grace. Grace is somehow involved in Eucharistic change even if such a change is 
a symbolic rather than substantial change. Given the theoretical schema we have been 
explicating, what are the implications for our conception of sacramental grace? The reader might 
anticipate that Chauvet will try to move sacramental grace into the linguistic plane. Sacramental 
grace, under this schema, is given through communication between God and humankind and is, 
therefore, rescued from a derelict and out-of-fashion theology that would tell of a metaphysical 
change in our soul. We do, in fact, find a perspective like this in Chauvet’s argument. 
Sacramental grace, for him, is the symbolic efficacy at work in the expression that the 
sacraments are. In other words, the sacraments give through their symbolic efficacy a “new 
relation of places between subjects, a relationship of filial and brotherly and sisterly alliance” 
through their very expression.4 As such, the sacramental change brought about in us through 
these expressions works “within the purview of intra-linguistic efficacy.”5 The efficacy of the 
sacraments—sacramental grace—appears to work at the same level as language.  
However, we then discover a rather surprising claim from Chauvet: Sacramental grace, 
he says, “cannot be reduced to this socio-linguistic process: this would be to transform theology 
into nothing more than a peculiar form of anthropology and to diminish the absolute otherness of 
                                                                                                                                                       
eat what only symbolises, or really is, the flesh of the saviour when we eat the bread consecrated 
in the Eucharist; drink his blood only symbolically or really. Because of this dispute it appeared 
as if only the Catholic belief were extravagant—the Protestants having the perfectly reasonable 
procedure of symbolically eating Christ’s flesh and drinking his blood! The staggering 
strangeness of doing such a thing even only symbolically slipped out of notice in the dispute 
about transubstantiation. But let us realize it now.” G.E.M. Anscombe, “On Transubstantiation,” 
in The Collected Philosophical Papers of G.E.M. Anscombe, vol. 3: Ethics, Religion, and 
Politics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981), 110-111. 
4 Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 140. 
5 Ibid. 
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God.”6 Whatever sacramental grace is, it is not “merely” an intra-linguistic change. Sacramental 
grace is an extra-linguistic reality. “What we are proposing here,” Chauvet says, “is in no way a 
reduction of grace to the socio-linguistic mechanism of symbolic efficacy.”7 One might ask at 
this point whether this contradicts most of what Chauvet has already argued. After all, this seems 
to undo the a central claim of Chauvet that the “anthropological is the place of every possible 
theological.” Is not the entirety of Chauvet’s philosophical moorings torn asunder by the radical 
Otherness of the God who gives grace? 
I do not believe Chauvet has gone quite so wrong. In fact, what Chauvet is saying here is 
entirely in keeping with his earlier arguments. More importantly, his resistance to limiting 
sacramental grace to an intra-linguistic effect only seems contradictory if we forget the initial 
theological background that undergirds this move, namely, the Trinitarian Christology of Jüngel 
and others. I think there is something analogous in Chauvet’s statement on sacramental grace to 
Jüngel’s idea that God’s being is in becoming. Recall that for Jüngel there is a becoming that is 
proper to God simply because it is God’s becoming. God’s becoming is the way we speak of 
God’s free choice of becoming who God is for us. God chooses to be the God of the Cross and in 
so doing can be identified with the Crucified One, can stand in death itself and render it 
powerless. Such is the free choice of the God whose presence is as the Absent One. God’s being 
is not diminished by death if such is the being that God chooses to be. I think Chauvet means 
something similar in his account of sacramental grace. Chauvet’s constant refrain has been that 
God meets us at the most human places and this is so precisely because God is the God whose 
divinity is made actual as God’s humanity. The anthropological, therefore, is the location of 
every possible theological not because theology is fundamentally reducible to anthropology, but 
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because God has chosen to reveal Godself in those places. In this way, to say that the 
sacramental grace brought forth by encounter with such a God occurs in the intra-linguistic plane 
is not to reduce God’s grace to a merely symbolic reality. It is not to try, in other words, to skirt a 
deeply philosophical problem by surrendering the radical nature of divine grace, to correlate a 
theological truth to the questions of culture and in so doing evacuate it of its scandal. Rather, the 
claim that sacramental grace occurs within the intra-linguistic plane is grounded, for Chauvet, in 
prior commitments about God, particularly in what constitutes God’s presence as well as God’s 
particular otherness. So to claim that God’s grace, communicated in the sacraments, is an extra-
linguistic reality, despite the fact that it occurs within the intra-linguistic plane, is to affirm the 
freedom of God to become present in precisely this way because God chooses to do so. God’s 
communication occurs on God’s terms, but those terms are such because God is the sort of God 
who chooses communication. The effect is intra-linguistic because God comes to us in language, 
by God’s sovereign choice; the reality is extra-linguistic because it is God who comes. In what 
way, then, does God come to us in the language of the sacraments? Answering this question is to 
give an account of the ontological scandal of the Eucharist, to which we now turn.  
 
The Ontological Scandal of the Eucharist 
Introduction 
Classically, the answer given by the tradition to the ontological scandal of the Eucharist 
was confirmed at the Council of Trent, naming the most appropriate term for such a scandal to be 
“transubstantiation.”8 For in the consecration of the elements, faith believes that there is a 
                                                
8 There is no lack of historical surveys with regards to the doctrine of transubstantiation. Of 
particular note for Chauvet is the influence of de Lubac’s survey of the doctrine in Henri de 
Lubac, Corpus Mysticum: The Eucharist and the Church in the Middle Ages, trans. Gemma 
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conversion of the “whole substance” of both the bread and the wine into the body and blood of 
Christ. Such a doctrine is often caricaturized as the Church’s dirty little secret. We find no 
difficulty with faith if all faith requires is right action or the acceptance of certain intellectual 
propositions, but accepting that bread becomes something other than bread or wine something 
other than wine seems to strike the modern person as akin to the primitive, magical thinking we 
have so blessedly left behind. There is a temptation, then, to read Chauvet’s motivations for re-
imaging the Eucharist as an apologetic desire to make the scandal of the Eucharist more 
palatable to modern ears, but I think this is precisely not what Chauvet is after. Far from it, in 
fact. His hope, as I see it, is not to make the scandal of the Eucharist less so, but to point out how 
the scandal has actually not properly been seen in its full scandalousness. Under Chauvet, the 
scandal is heightened, not ameliorated.  
First, however, a word about the context of this particular discussion within Chauvet’s 
overall work. The discussion on transubstantiation arises in the Third Part of Symbol and 
Sacrament, entitled “The Symbolizing Act of Christian Identity.”9 The overall goal of that part is 
to examine the sacraments specifically, having already elucidated the structure of Christian 
identity of which sacraments are but one element (more on this below). Chauvet wants to show 
just what it is that is original or specific about the sacraments in contrast to the other elements of 
Christian identity, scripture and ethics. This consists of examining the sacraments’ “particular 
mode of expression,” namely “rituality,” which entails another deep dive through the work of a 
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great deal of anthropologists.10 More important than the coherence of the sacramental 
expressions with ritual expressions, however, is the unique aspect of the sacraments as instituting 
and as instituted. In other words, what is most particular about the sacraments, as opposed to 
scripture and ethics, is that they are instituted by Christ and institute us into the Church. A brief 
account of what he means by instituted and instituting will therefore be necessary to set up an 
account of the ontological scandal of the Eucharist. 
According to Chauvet, the presence of Christ in the Eucharist is the “exemplary 
expression: of the instituted character of the sacraments.”11 In short, the Eucharistic presence of 
Christ is the paradigmatic figure of the instituted character of the sacraments because it 
encapsulates in one instance that which all the other sacraments aim at accomplishing, namely, 
“the resistance of God’s mystery to every attempt by the subject to appropriate it.”12 But what 
does this resistance consist in? I think that we shall see in what follows that Chauvet holds the 
Eucharistic presence of Christ to be a truth that eludes our attempts at fully grasping it. The 
presence of Christ remains haunted by, even perhaps best described as, an absence.  
It is important to note, as Chauvet does, that the term “transubstantiation” is only suitable 
aptissime or “in the most appropriate way” to describing what is happening in the Eucharist. 
Chauvet takes this to mean that transubstantiation is not to be treated as an absolute and he joins 
a good company of contemporary Catholic theologians, like Herbert McCabe for example, in 
taking this course. McCabe, for his part, explained the aptissime in this way: “The Council of 
Trent did not decree that Catholics should believe in transubstantiation: it just calls it a most 
                                                
10 Ibid., 323-377. Chauvet’s discussion on “evangelizing” rituality in particular (found on pp. 
353-355) is an excellent parallel to the discussion above on the intra-linguistic effect of 
sacramental grace despite its ultimate essence being an extra-linguistic reality. 
11 Ibid., 383. 
12 Ibid. 
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appropriate (aptissime) way of talking about the Eucharist, presumably leaving it open whether 
there might not be other, perhaps even more appropriate, ways of talking.”13 Chauvet attempts 
just this maneuver, looking for an even more appropriate way of talking about Eucharistic 
change that might better describe the “specificity of Christ’s presence in the Eucharist.”14  
Defining the more appropriate way of talking about the Eucharist first seems to require, 
however, understanding the way of talking that the attendees of the Council of Trent found so 
convincing. This means inquiring after what is meant by “substance,” such that a “substance” 
can be transformed into another substance. Given how critical Chauvet has already been of 
Scholastic theology one might guess he has little sympathy for the Aristotelian definition of 
substance and accident that lead to the blessed neologism of transubstantiation. Chauvet, 
however, is surprisingly conciliatory in his account of the Scholastics on this issue. What the 
Scholastics were trying to do with the concept of transubstantiation, he says, was to find a way 
back from the harsh divide that had been wrought by the controversy over the teaching of 
Berengar of Tours. Opposition to Berengar’s apparent denial of the real presence of Christ in the 
Eucharist led to a seeming overreaction that allowed for the rise of an ultra-realism taking its 
place. A highly “sensualist” notion of the presence of Christ came to rule the day since, as 
Chauvet puts it, there was no “sufficiently refined concept to express the ‘final reality’ of 
entities.”15 In other words, the Church lacked a concept for that which ultimately makes a thing 
the thing it is—so the presence either just wasn't there or was there just like everything else: 
sensually. In the case of bread and wine, since they had no way of speaking about the final 
                                                
13 Herbert McCabe, God Still Matters, ed. Brian Davies (London: Continuum, 2002), 115.; See 
also David N. Power, The Sacrifice We Offer: The Tridentine Dogma and its Reinterpretation 
(New York: Crossroad Publishing, 1987) and Edward J. Kilmartin, The Eucharist in the West: 
History and Theology, ed. Robert Daly (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 2004), 143-153. 
14 Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 383. 
15 Ibid., 384. 
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reality of the bread being changed, the transformation had to be described as if one could sense 
the body and blood of Christ in the elements. Otherwise, what could we really mean to say that 
Christ was really present?  
As a corrective to this, therefore, the Scholastics latched on to the conceptual boon 
afforded them by the Aristotelian notion of “substance.” The distinction between “substance” 
and “accident” could allow for the “final reality” of the bread and wine to change, while not 
requiring the subsequent claim that Christ’s presence could be sensed in the elements 
themselves. Thomas’s account of this is, as one might expect of the great doctor, the most 
sophisticated of his peers, and Chauvet’s appreciation for his innovation is readily apparent: 
As simply the power to exist by means of this actuation through its accidents, the 
substance is first a category of the intelligibility of entities: “it offers no footing,” 
writes Thomas, “to any organ of sense or to the imagination, but only to the 
intelligence, who’s object is the essence of things, as Aristotle says.” By this fact, 
one exorcises every spatial representation of the Eucharistic presence: only the 
sacramental sign, made up of accidents which remain unchanged after 
transubstantiation, can be divided, multiply, moved, and so on. The reality of the 
glorified body of Christ, present through the mode of substance and not through 
the mode of quantity (the first of the accidents) escapes all of that….16 
 
One might recall our earlier discussion of Thomas in which Chauvet expressed a similar 
sympathy for Thomas’ attempt, albeit one he took as a failure, to express the work of 
sacramental grace under the modality of the sign. Thomas’ particular read of transubstantiation 
was obviously a critical part of that attempt to leave behind language of causation and remain 
solely in language of signification. Chauvet ends the passage above with a quote from Thomas 
that could have very well been written by our French theologian himself: “The accidents of bread 
subsist in this sacrament so that it may be in them that one sees the body of Christ and not in its 
                                                
16 Ibid., 385. 
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own aspect.”17 Thus, the grand innovation of the Scholastics, and particularly of Thomas 
Aquinas, was to push the Eucharistic presence of Christ “outside any physicalism.”18 The body 
of Christ is not present in such a way that we could point to it or move it around. This is the great 
help that the Aristotelian concept of substance provided the Scholastics in their time.  
The principal limitation of the Scholastic account, however, was this: By allowing their 
argument to hinge upon the concept of substance, their account of the “how” of the Eucharist 
was then forced to be myopically focused on the elements. The problem of the Eucharist that any 
rational account of the mystery had to solve was how the change of substance in the elements 
could actually take place. The notion of substance won a way of speaking about the Eucharist 
that was more accountable to the claims of reason—believers could, at last, think of the bread 
and wine as really changed without also needing the sensual presence of flesh and blood. But 
then the claims of reason still had to be answered: How, after all, does the substance of this bread 
become the body of Christ at the level of substance? This became the central problem facing 
theologians of the Eucharist.  
Now, since my goal is to give an account of the ontological scandal of the Eucharist one 
might ask why such a focus is a limitation at all. A change in the elements at the level of 
substance certainly seems like the “ontological scandal” of the Eucharist. Shouldn’t this change 
from bread to Body and from wine to Blood be precisely the focus of any account of the 
ontological scandal? The difficulty with the Scholastic account is that while it helped theologians 
figure out how bread changed to Body, the “how” of the Eucharist as I have been calling it, their 
account gave very little account of the “what for” of the Eucharist. The “how” of the Eucharist is 
not just a process involving the substance of the elements. It is also a process constituted by 
                                                
17 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, III, q. 75, a. 6. 
18 Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 385. 
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those for whom such a change is meant. In other words, the explanation of the “how” of the 
Eucharist must in some way take account of “for whom,” of the Eucharist, i.e., the Church.  
Yet, what other way of thinking about the Eucharistic presence is available to us? 
Certainly one would agree that the sacraments are for the Church, but is not this “for” constituted 
by the mysterious presence of Christ, and that presence best described as a change in substance?  
Such thinking is characteristic of what de Lubac has described as the “deadly break” between 
sacramentum and res.19 In other words, such thinking splits the ultimate reality of the Eucharist 
conceived under the mode of substance from those who happen to receive it. The Church, thus, 
becomes entirely extrinsic to the process and end of the Eucharist. The “full realization of the 
Eucharist,” as Chauvet puts it, ends up consisting solely in the “consecration of the matter.” This 
is the esse of the Eucharist under the rule of this deadly dichotomy.  
Yet, for Chauvet this approach misses a critical element of the Eucharist that the Church 
Fathers, most notably Augustine and later Aquinas, never failed to point out—namely that the 
“ultimate reality” of the Eucharist was “the Church as the veritas of the Eucharistic corpus 
mysticum.”20 Whatever the Eucharist is and however the Eucharist is said to occur, these 
answers cannot be so easily separable from the Church, for whom the Eucharist comes to be in 
the first place. Thus, the manual theology of Scholasticism—and here Chauvet does not intend to 
include Aquinas, of course—is beset by a limitation because their philosophical perspective, as 
                                                
19 See Henri de Lubac, Corpus Mysticum: The Eucharist and the Church in the Middle Ages, 
trans. Gemma Simmonds CJ with Richard Price and Christopher Stephens (London: SCM Press, 
2006) 221-247.  
20 Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 388. “Corpus Mysticum” or “mystical body” is a phrase the 
uses of which de Lubac painstakingly chronicled in Corpus Mysticum. The phrase itself 
represents what de Lubac thought was an earlier consensus amongst Christians that the Eucharist 
and the Church were a sort of unity. The theology of the “real presence” only came about after 
something had gone wrong in Christian theology. A sort of Eucharistic ecclesiology ruled the 
day prior to the medieval period and at the heart of that ecclesiology was the idea of the Church 
as the mystical body of Christ, the corpus mysticum, each time it celebrated the Eucharist.  
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helpful as it was to the Church, ultimately leaves out the very body it hoped to build up through 
its theology. Chauvet’s counter-proposal, born of his symbolic approach, is to assert that there 
can be no account of the esse of Christ’s Eucharistic presence—the conversion of substance—
without the notion of Christ’s ad-esse to the Church—the conversion of the Church into the 
ecclesial body of Christ.21 Whatever the ontological scandal of the Eucharist is, therefore, it must 
have something to do with the body of believers for whom the Eucharist exists in the first place. 
Chauvet thinks that there is another way to think of Eucharistic change than that of substance, 
and he couches his approach as an attempt to actually follow through with Thomas’ original 
purpose, i.e. to conceive of the Eucharist solely in genere signi—under the genus of sign.22  
As is his way, Chauvet’s innovation is to widen the scope of what is meant by the 
particular sign that constitutes the Eucharist. While the scholastics had focused on the sign of the 
sacrament itself—in this case, the bread and the wine—Chauvet broadens that umbrella to 
include both the gathered ecclesial body and the gifted body of the Scriptures that announce the 
God who comes into presence. These two “presences” along with the Eucharistic rite itself, when 
form the “one great symbol” that must ultimately be understood in order to give an adequate 
account of Eucharistic change.23 This means that the explication of Eucharistic change does not 
just attempt to understand what happens after the moment of consecration to bread and wine. 
Rather, the goal of an account of Eucharistic change is an explication of the mystery of the whole 
celebration. For the gathered body of believers becoming the members of Christ’s own body is 
just as solemn and inscrutable a mystery as the change in the bread and wine. 
                                                
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid., 390. 
23 Ibid. This echoes the language of Sacrosanctum Concilium, “The two parts which, in a certain 
sense, go to make up the Mass, namely, the liturgy of the word and the eucharistic liturgy are so 
closely connected with each other that they form but one single act of worship.” In Sacrosanctum 
Concilium, 56.  
 112 
In order to further probe this mystery, Chauvet sets out on an analysis of the liturgical 
text of the celebration itself, i.e. the Eucharistic Prayer. The structure of the Eucharistic Prayer, 
he argues, reveals the merits of this wider focus in that the moment of Christ’s Eucharistic 
presence can only be understood in its relation to the “whole of salvation history” and the 
“anticipation of the Church’s future” in the Parousia as remembered in the liturgy.24 Chauvet 
takes this to mean that Christ’s presence is only properly understood “in relation,” meaning that 
Christ’s presence does not occur without the constitutive relations for which it arrives in the first 
place.25 In this sense, then, Christ’s presence is not simply a bare existence. Christ is not simply 
“there” so to speak, rather Christ’s presence is as “being-for” or “ad-esse.” Christ’s presence 
does not just so happen to be for the sanctification of the Church. There is no presence of Christ 
that is not Christ’s presence for us. This is what Chauvet means when he says “the esse” of 
Christ’s Eucharistic presence is “constitutively ad-esse.”26 
However, what of the elements themselves? If we broaden our perspective on Eucharistic 
presence do the elements thereby remain entirely unchanged? Most importantly, the reader will 
recall that my stated goal at the outset of the project was to treat the ontological scandal of the 
Eucharist as concomitantly and constitutively a political scandal. Thus, whether the material 
elements of bread and wine are said to change at all is of great importance to my argument as a 
whole. What, then, does Chauvet say of them? 
The difficulty we are presented with from the very start is that Chauvet’s philosophical 
perspective has taken us into an altogether different epistemological terrain than that upon which 
most sacramental theology takes its place. Concepts like “substance” seem entirely unthinkable 
                                                
24 Ibid., 391. 
25 See in particular Chauvet’s in-depth analysis of the Eucharistic Prayer on Ibid., 268-82. 
26 Ibid., 392.  
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given the vast transformation of what we mean by reality we have already undergone. Given that 
radical shift in perspective, Chauvet holds that we now can speak in an entirely different way of 
what bread and wine really are in themselves. Before we can say what kind of change bread and 
wine undergo in the Eucharist we have to ascertain what we mean by bread and wine prior to any 
such transformation. Hence, Chauvet once again takes a Heideggerian step back and attempts to 
take stock of how bread and wine must be viewed under the symbolic approach.  
Far from being beholden entirely to philosophy, however, Chauvet starts with bread and 
wine’s place in Scripture. Therein, Chauvet finds bread and wine to be preeminently symbolic. 
Bread in Scripture represents “the primordial gift of God” as well as the “whole of the earth and 
human work.”27 What we mean by “bread” in other words is not just a collection of physical and 
chemical properties. We mean quite literally these natural elements and the symbolic place that 
bread occupies in the form of life we live. No less with wine and its “association with messianic 
joy.” The materials of the Eucharist are, when viewed with the utmost care from the Biblical 
perspective, always already caught up in the symbolic rather than merely natural order.  
Chauvet turns yet again to Heidegger for support, in particular to his famous essay 
entitled “The Thing.” At this point in his argument, Chauvet is trying to find a way to 
demonstrate that the ultimate reality of bread and wine are not confined solely to the chemical 
components of their biological makeup or a neutral metaphysical substantia. Both of these 
conceptions are not satisfactory for Chauvet, regardless of the object in question. This was a 
central insight of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology and a central claim of his analysis in “The 
Thing.” The question Heidegger is asking in the essay is quite simply, “What is a thing?” Human 
beings think quite a bit about quite a lot of things, but we rarely think about things as things. 
                                                
27 Ibid., 392. 
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Rather, we all too often think of things under the mode of something else. We think about the 
biology of things, the chemistry of things, the beauty of things, but never just things. As he puts 
it, “the thingly character of the thing does not consist in its being a represented object.”28 
Through phenomenology, Heidegger thus attempts to elucidate how the thing presents itself as 
thing, not as anything else. In other words, “we shall not reach the thing in itself until our 
thinking has first reached the thing as thing,” which requires a phenomenological presentation of 
our experience of the thing as thing.29  
Heidegger’s chosen example, famously, is a pitcher.30 What is the “thingly” character of 
the pitcher? How does the pitcher present itself as a thing? The first answer we might proffer is 
that the thing stands over against us as something other than us, but this is the etymological root 
of the German word for object, Gegenstand, and is thus not satisfactory in Heidegger’s view.31 
The jug can become an object if we think of it as such, as something represented, but this is to 
cover over rather than reveal the thingly nature of the pitcher itself. Heidegger sees this impulse 
in particular as the great downfall of the purely scientific perspective on things. As Heidegger 
trenchantly puts it, “Sciences always encounter only what its kind of representation has admitted 
as an object possible for science.”32 The thingliness of the pitcher is thus something beyond the 
scientific analysis of its properties and of its standing over against us.  
                                                
28 Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, 167. 
29 Ibid., 168. 
30 The translation of Albert Hofstadter with which I am working translates der Krug as “jug.” 
I’ve taken the liberty to use “pitcher” since that is in keeping with Madigan and Beaumont’s 
translation of Chauvet’s text. 
31 Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, 168-169. 
32 Ibid., 170. 
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Heidegger thinks that the thingliness of the pitcher is rooted not in its standing over 
against us but in the emptiness or void that is filled by the liquid poured into it.33 This is an odd 
sounding answer, but it makes a great deal more sense when placed with other examples. Wine is 
not first and foremost liquid. We could describe wine in this way, but it is much more accurate to 
say that wine is wine, first and foremost, and only secondarily a liquid. Our experience of wine 
as wine, in other words, is not first and foremost the analysis of a liquid for chemical properties 
but in the sharing (or not sharing) of a drink, all of the symbolic capital that wine as wine carries 
with it. In the same way, a pitcher is not just sides or a bottom or an emptiness, rather the pitcher 
is its emptiness—an emptiness, in other words, made for a particular purpose. The purpose of the 
emptiness is obviously for holding liquid, and so the sides and the bottom are crafted to allow 
this void to perform its holding. But the nature of the pitcher is not limited to just holding but 
also is defined by the task of pouring out.34 The essence of the pitcher, and it will not be difficult 
to see why Chauvet is so drawn to this argument, is constituted by the giving of pouring-out for 
which its emptiness is meant.35 In short, to try to say what it is we mean when we say “pitcher” 
involves a great deal more than just an analysis of the natural properties of a particular jug. The 
pitcher in its essence as pitcher, as thing, simultaneously connects us to the whole milieu of what 
Heidegger called “world.” So to describe a thing as thing is to describe something implicated in 
the broader economy of being-with and being-for that constitutes the peculiar existence of 
Dasein. All of this is present in the nature of the thing as thing. Our normal everyday experience 
                                                
33 Ibid., 169. “The vessel’s thingness does not lie at all in the material of which it consists, but in 
the void that holds.” 
34 Ibid., 171-172. 
35 Ibid., “The void holds in a twofold manner: taking and keeping…But their unity is determined 
by the outpouring for which the jug is fitted as a jug. The twofold holding of the void rests on the 
outpouring. In the outpouring, the holding is authentically how it is” (my emphasis). 
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is not, therefore, of liquids and solids and gases, but of things. As Heidegger so esoterically puts 
it, “The thing things world.”36 
Obviously the traditional conversation surrounding transubstantiation has little to do with 
questions like these. The Aristotelian notion of substance, at least as used by Scholastic theology, 
has no way of adding this symbolic character into its notion of the final reality of an object. 
Thus, the use to which Chauvet puts Heidegger’s account of the thing, so it seems to me, is to 
show that the Scholastic conversation about transubstantiation works with an incorrect notion of 
what we even mean when we say “bread” or “wine” in the first place. Whatever the ontological 
scandal of the Eucharist is, it must occur at the truly ontological level, which for Chauvet and for 
Heidegger means this deeper level of the symbolic network that constitutes material things as 
part and parcel of our shared world. This, I believe, is part of the purpose for which Chauvet 
calls on Heidegger’s work.  
Now, I cannot pass through Chauvet’s reading of Heidegger’s “path of the pitcher,” if 
you will, without mentioning that peculiar notion of world which the pitcher calls forth in its 
thingness—what Heidegger calls das Geviert or “the fourfold.” It is worth mentioning here 
because Chauvet is among several other prominent sacramental theologians who have called 
upon this Heideggerian notion to provide a means to further legitimate for transubstantiation. 
Chauvet, along with Pickstock and Macquarrie, is heavily criticized in an essay by Hemming for 
it.37 First, what did Heidegger mean by the fourfold? He seems to have meant the interrelation 
between—and this is the best phrase I can muster—the ontological poles of earth, sky, mortals, 
and divinities that are bound together and revealed in the event of Being or the “worlding of the 
                                                
36 Ibid., 181. 
37 See Hemming, “After Heidegger: Transubstantiation,” 170-186. 
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world.”38 The pitcher or any thing as a thing reveals the unity of the four in the event of Being: 
“We have sought the nature of nearness and found the nature of the jug as a thing. But in this 
discovery we also catch sight of the nature of nearness. The thing things. In thinging, it stays 
earth and sky, divinities and mortals. Staying, the thing brings the four, in their remoteness, near 
to one another.”39 As obtuse as Heidegger’s language is here, one can note the emphatic 
insistence that realities typically thought to be static are in fact active. The thing things and the 
world worlds in the event of Being. Moreover, we are not neutral observers of this activity but 
are conditioned by it. In our life as “mortals,” marked uniquely by death, we are conditioned by 
what the thing as thing reveals—our own unity in the event of Being with the earth, sky, and 
divinities.  
For the theologian, obviously, the naming of “divinities” as a part of the fourfold is fertile 
ground. A sacramental theologian, in particular, will be heartily tempted to appropriate the idea 
that material things evoke in their very materiality the presence of Godhood or divinities. Yet, as 
Hemming rightly points out, this is a move that Heidegger specifically precludes. The thing 
“things” as the gathering together of the fourfold into one experience-able world, and, if that is 
the case, then the allusion to Godhood that the thing brings to presence is alluded to in all things, 
making the assertion that the Eucharist or Baptism occupies a special place in the material milieu 
untenable. “This aspect of Heidegger’s das Geviert,” Hemming says, “is intended to show how 
the worlding of world can be saturated with divinity, but not with the Christian God.”40 In other 
words, the point of the divine aspect of the fourfold is not to point out the inherently sacred 
nature of the created order but rather to indicate the way that the world as world seems to reach 
                                                
38 Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, 177-182. 
39 Ibid., 177 
40 Hemming, “After Heidegger: Transubstantiation,” 177. 
 118 
out towards the “divinities” in its very “worlding.” Hence, the problem of sacramental 
theologians invoking the fourfold is not that they would assert the presence of something sacred 
in material elements, but rather the inevitable consequent attempt to specify the nature of that 
presence and delimit the bounds of such presence to a particular location, ritual or otherwise.  
What we can and must say, however, is that this account of the real as world in the 
Heideggerian sense—as the gathering or “staying” of the fourfold—requires a transformation of 
the typical starting point of an argument over transubstantiation. What is most real about the 
bread and wine is not that which would typically present itself to those of us enchanted by the 
power of scientific discourse. That is, bread and wine are not simply composed of “nutritive 
elements.” Bread is a “socially instituted food,” a symbol of food or sustenance itself.41 The 
same is true of wine and the “messianic joy” it foretells symbolically. This true nature of bread 
and wine as material elements often goes unrecognized. For its part, bread comes closer to 
showing its true nature when, like the pitcher meant for the pouring-out, bread is broken and 
shared amongst human beings. This, so Chauvet argues, is what we actually mean—not just a 
collection of chemical properties—when we say the word “bread.” Here the help of Heidegger’s 
notion of the fourfold is explicit: “Bread is never so much bread as in the gesture of thankful 
oblation where it gathers within itself heaven and earth, believers who ‘hold fellowship’ in 
sharing it, and the giver whom they acknowledge to be God.”42 In its most fundamental and basic 
materiality, bread is always already marked by this particular symbolism—it evokes in us the 
gathering together of the sky’s sun that gave it nourishing light, the earth’s soil that allowed its 
wheat to grow, the human hands that prepared it and baked it and broke it, and, finally, the great 
Giver of the universe from which all things spring in the first place. Bread is this evocative 
                                                
41 Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 397 
42 Ibid., 398. 
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symbol first and only later an analyzable or representable object. The symbol takes ontological 
priority over the sign, remember. Chauvet puts it this way: “No bread is first of all a simple ‘real’ 
bread and then only afterwards and under certain circumstances a symbol of this gathering. All 
bread is essentially this symbol even if it is only in the symbolic act of religious oblation that its 
essence as bread unfolds itself.”43 
But just how much is Chauvet agreeing with or endorsing Heidegger’s ideas at this point? 
The answer is not entirely clear. For while Chauvet has made obvious reference to the fourfold in 
some of the passages cited above the concept has clearly been altered. Note the shift of mortals 
to “believers” and the divinities to the singular “Giver.” Yet, Chauvet has decidedly not claimed 
in his reference to the fourfold that this concept has now rescued Eucharistic change from the 
difficulties that it presents. This is why Hemming rightly notes that Chauvet finds himself 
“almost at a loss” and why Chauvet himself states that the symbolic approach to the reality of the 
thing, supported now by the concept of the fourfold is not enough.44 
This symbolic approach is obviously insufficient for expressing the significance of 
the Eucharistic presence. For it does not suffice to say bread is never so much 
bread as in the religious gesture where it is recognized as a gracious gift of God; it 
is necessary to say it is never so much bread as in the religious, and more 
precisely, Christian gesture where, by offering it, the Church recognizes it as the 
gift of God’s very self, as the autocommunication of God’s very self in Christ: 
“The body of Christ – Amen!”45 
 
Chauvet seems to have anticipated the very problem by which Hemming dispenses with other 
post-conciliar attempts at reinstating transubstantiation through das Geviert, namely that the 
potential reading of a thing as being-divine in its nearness—its entangelement with the world by 
which it is rightly called symbolic—is not sufficient to account for the presence of Christ in the 
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44 Hemming, “After Heidegger: Transubstantiation,” 177. 
45 Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 398. 
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Eucharist. The divine potential of the fourfold can grant us an argument for the “blur of general 
sacramentality,” as Chauvet caustically described it in the opening of his work, but it cannot give 
us a specific, located, and transformative presence in a particular thing.46 For what we are after 
in transubstantiation is not the presence of God in material things but the presence of Christ and, 
in that presence, the “autocommunication of God’s very self.”47 Hemming is right to point out 
that such a presence is not suddenly tenable after we have reread the reality of the thing in 
Heideggerian terms. Chauvet must, therefore, intend something quite different by bringing up the 
fourfold in the first place. 
  The point of Chauvet’s invocation of Heidegger is, as has been his way throughout his 
work, to discipline our typical manner of thinking in order to lend greater clarity to the 
epistemological terrain in which proper theological questioning (and perhaps answering) can 
occur. It is, in my view, better described as taking up Heidegger to accomplish a rather 
Wittgensteinian purpose. In short, Chauvet is simply placing the fact that the meaning and 
significance of bread and wine are constituted by our engagement with them before us as a fact 
that requires our attention. Our continual attention, as it were, since Chauvet seems to be 
showing us that such things have to be brought to our attention again and again or we will forget 
them. We must be reminded, in other words, that things are the full sense of what they are only in 
relation to us. This does not mean that we can change a thing just by calling it something 
different, mind you. We cannot make the bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ just 
by treating them as such. We cannot even do this with material things. I am thinking here of 
Charles Davis’s excellent example of using a saucer as an ashtray. Despite the fact that we would 
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47 Ibid., 398. 
 121 
call such a saucer an ashtray we would always be aware that this isn’t really what it is. It is a 
saucer, despite the way we treat it.48  
In the same sense, Chauvet is decidedly not saying that the only real change in the 
Eucharist is the significance it has for human beings and, furthermore, he is decidedly not saying 
that the Eucharist acquires this significance just because we treat it as if it does. If we were to 
object to Chauvet on such grounds we would be forgetting the depth with which Chauvet has 
treated the question of sacramental grace, particularly his insistence that sacramental grace 
cannot be described as solely an “intra-linguistic” affair. Instead, the allusion to Heidegger’s 
account of the thing and the fourfold should be taken as a mechanism for clearing away 
foolhardy presuppositions we might instinctively cling to regarding the theoretical and practical 
“distance” from us, if you will, that the bread and wine occupy in the ritual. For Chauvet, the 
bread and wine are constituted as bread and wine only in relation to us, which means that 
whatever we might say about their change once consecrated, “the mystery of the Eucharistic 
body of the Lord cannot be expressed…unless it carries with it the symbolic richness of bread.”49 
That is as far, for now, as Chauvet’s reference to Heidegger gets us. 
 The most Chauvet can say about Eucharistic change at this point, therefore, is that there 
will not be (and indeed cannot be) a need to determine how the bread changes into something 
that is not bread. “To express all [transubstantiation’s] radicalness, not only can one no longer 
say but one must no longer say, ‘This bread is no longer bread.’”50 This is not to say that the 
question of Eucharistic change is no longer about the being of bread. It certainly must be that if it 
is to be an ontological scandal. What Chauvet is insisting, however, is that what we mean when 
                                                
48 Charles Davis, “The Theology of Transubstantiation,” Sophia 3, no. 1 (1964): 19. 
49 Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 400. 
50 Ibid. 
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we say “the being of bread” has been rebuffed by the consent to mediation that language and 
most importantly the sacraments themselves are. “On the altogether different terrain of 
symbolism,” different than those of metaphysical substance which guided the decrees of the 
Council of Trent, “the verb ‘be’ no longer has the same status it had at its origin because Sein is 
inseparable from the human Da-Sein and thus from language.”51 Therefore, Eucharistic change, 
the sense in which bread can “be” the Body of Christ “requires that one emphasize all the more it 
is indeed still bread, but now essential bread, bread which is never so much bread as it is in this 
mystery.”52 In this way, Chauvet explicitly ties the ontological scandal of Eucharistic change to 
language since “the bread which nourishes human being in this most human dimension of their 
humanity is the bread of the word and this word where bread comes-to-presence in 
communicating itself to others is itself, according to the faith, a mediation where the Word 
                                                
51 Ibid.  
52 Ibid. I should also note here that Hemming equates Chauvet’s assertion that the Eucharistic 
bread is “essential bread” with Pickstock’s claim in After Writing that all bread is “on the way” 
to being the Body of Christ, since the essence of bread itself is to be offered in precisely this 
manner. I don’t believe this is what Chauvet is saying here. In fact, just the opposite. Chauvet 
seems, in my view, to go to great lengths to insist that the Eucharist, while existing well within 
the human milieu of ritual and symbol and language, constitutes a decided breach from those 
“natural” categories, if you will. We call the bread of the Eucharist “essential bread” or “THE 
bread” not because all bread is on the way to becoming the body of Christ but rather because the 
conditions of the world are such that no bread is allowed to reach its full essence save in the 
holy, and dare I say, miraculous moment of Eucharistic offering. The dichotomy between 
Chauvet and Pickstock’s perspectives on how the essence of bread being defined in the Eucharist 
affects our view of all creation – a symbolic sacramentality vs. a participatory sacramentality, 
one might say – is a defining feature of the dialogue between Milbank and Chauvet. In short, a 
participatory ontology that sees all of creation as participating in the very being of God must see 
all bread as on the way to being the Body of Christ since such is its essence. But Chauvet’s 
perspective resists such a infectious sacramentality—the general “blur” as he called it. All bread 
is decidedly not on the way to being the body of Christ, but the bread that becomes the body of 
Christ is essential bread. I will say a great deal more about this below. For now, see Catherine 
Pickstock, After Writing: On the Liturgical Consummation of Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1998), 167-273. 
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delivered by God in Jesus Christ to humanity unto death takes on flesh.”53 The seeming mystery 
of the ontological scandal of the Eucharist is that it occurs within the linguistic milieu that 
constitutes the human dimension of subjectivity but, more importantly, that this same ontological 
scandal is not ultimately reducible to an affair of language. I mentioned above that I thought 
Chauvet was using Heidegger to make a Wittgensteinian move. I think I can say what I meant by 
that now through a quote from Fergus Kerr describing the work of Anscombe on 
transignification: “[T]he ‘odd thing’—‘which is apparently not noticed’—is that ‘what gets 
trans-signified in the Eucharist is not the bread and wine, but the body and blood of the Lord, 
which are trans-signified into food and drink.’ That is ‘the mystery,’ Anscombe concludes.”54 So 
the particular nettle that Chauvet seems to have grasped is not how to describe a change in the 
substance of elements—even if we were to only attempt a change in their “significance”—but 
rather, Chauvet is after how to describe Eucharistic change in keeping with the type of God that 
could undergo such change. This, I think, is Chauvet’s aim in clearing away faulty philosophical 
presuppositions through Heidegger. 
 It is of note that Hemming’s critique of Chauvet stops at this point in his argument, and if 
Chauvet had in fact stopped here then Hemming’s biting critique of his account of 
transubstantiation might be open to the charge that it says nothing that one could even call 
transubstantiation in the first place. Chauvet has nearly “grasped the nettle” that the problem of 
Eucharistic change is the being of bread not just the meaning of bread—as transignification 
seems to contend—but Chauvet hasn’t said anything of consequence in contending that the bread 
of the Eucharist is “essential bread.” The difficulty, it seems, really does come down to some sort 
                                                
53 Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 400.  
54 Fergus Kerr, “Transubstantiation After Wittgenstein,” Modern Theology 15, no. 2 (April 
1999): 121. 
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of substantial change in bread and wine such that something else can be said to be present in the 
bread, even if we contend with enthusiasm that the bread itself never ceases to be present as 
bread. It is unfortunate that Hemming ceased his reading of Chauvet at this point in Symbol and 
Sacrament because Chauvet has a great deal more to say on precisely this point in the sections 
that follow.  
One can perhaps already guess at Chauvet’s counterpoint to the objection: If we worry 
over whether or not Christ is actually present in the bread we have once again lapsed into 
concern over “presence” before having a proper conception of what we mean by presence in the 
first place. Remember, however, that what Chauvet means by presence is laden with not only 
Heideggerian influences but with the profound theological influence of Eberhard Jüngel. The 
presence of Christ in the bread—the change in the being of bread which transubstantiation names 
or in the being of the meaning of bread which transignification means—must be rethought such 
that we begin not only with a proper notion of what bread and wine are but also of what it would 
mean to say that Christ is present in them. Chauvet’s contention, based in what we’ve already 
seen from Jüngel, will be that Christ’s presence in the elements cannot be thought save as 
inevitably marked by absence.  
Chauvet’s unique claim is that Christ must be said to be present in the bread and wine not 
just as marked by absence but as an absence. How can this be so? Recall that in our treatment of 
Jüngel above we saw that by taking the Cross as the starting point of theology Jüngel was forced 
to radically change what we mean when we say that God is present. The presence of God had to 
be intimately connected to, even constituted by, an absence if the Crucified One were rightly to 
be called the image of the Invisible God. If that is the case, then to say that Christ is present in 
the Eucharist cannot quite mean the sort of “substantial” presence that traditional explanations of 
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transubstantiation set as their goal. Rather, Christ’s presence must be rethought as being 
constituted by and forever marked by Christ’s absence. Chauvet puts it this way: “in the 
symbolic order, presence and absence are not two complete realities that would be dialectically 
inseparable, a little like the two sides of a piece of paper – they do not form two countable 
entities. They are not bivalent, but form one ambivalent reality.”55 To find a way to talk about 
this ambivalent reality, Chauvet will return to two significant elements of the whole Eucharist 
celebration: the adesse we have already mentioned and the breaking of the bread. 
“The adesse of a presence is of a different order from the simple esse of a mere thing.”56 
Such has been a continual but necessary reminder from Chauvet: the world around us is not 
something that is passively there but is actively coming-into-presence. That phrase, “coming-
into-presence” is the better way of describing what is happening in transubstantiation for it takes 
into account the absence that makes presence possible in the first place, just as the YOU made 
possible the I and vice versa in our account of the linguistic subject above. The coming-into-
presence “precisely marks the absence with which every presence is constitutively crossed out,” 
so to say that Christ is present is also to say that this presence is constitutively crossed out by 
Christ’s absence.57 Hence, Christ is present in the Eucharist under the mode of presence-as-
absence.  
This can be a profoundly disorienting way of thinking of the Eucharist if one does not 
guard against slipping back into thinking of the reality of the Eucharistic elements as substances 
to be transubstantiated in order for Christ to “appear” in any “real” sense. Or, even more 
importantly, it can be entirely disorienting if we allow ourselves to slip away from the single 
                                                
55 Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 404.  
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid.  
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question that Chauvet continually asks in light of the scandal of the Cross—what kind of God are 
we talking about when we say God is present in the Eucharist? In short, we must keep on our 
guard, so Chauvet argues, not to allow this slippage in either sense. If we remain within the 
symbolic view of things we can think of Christ as being really present only under the very mode 
of presence-as-absence, and the appropriate response to such a presence must be the consent to a 
“mature proximity to the presence of absence” to which Chauvet has been calling his reader 
throughout Symbol and Sacrament.58 Hence, to judge the actuality of Eucharistic presence by the 
standard of full and without absence presence—the sort of presence we often think the things and 
objects around us possess—is both to hold the Eucharist to a false standard and to attribute a 
false notion of presence to things and objects. Even more importantly, however, if we wish to 
say that the Crucified One is present in the bread and wine in any other way than as presence-as-
absence then Chauvet will insist that we have misunderstood the truth about God that the Cross 
reveals. If God is present in the Eucharist then it is certainly as nothing other than as the Absent 
One of Calvary. 
Christ’s presence-as-absence also cannot be adequately characterized as presence without 
taking into account who or what his presence is for, and this is where Chauvet’s earlier remarks 
about taking into account the whole milieu of the celebration of the Eucharist, most importantly 
the assembled community, come to the forefront. The Eucharistic presence of Christ in the bread 
and wine, which Chauvet never avoids, comes from Christ’s presence in and as the assembled 
community. This assertion is not only characteristic of traditional sacramental theology but is 
fundamentally in line with the phenomenological approach Chauvet has taken from the outset.59 
It is thus constitutive of the Eucharistic presence itself that the consecration takes place for the 
                                                
58 Ibid., 58. 
59 See de Lubac, Corpus Mysticum, 221-247. 
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sanctification of the gathered assembly of believers. One cannot demonstrate the presence of 
Christ in the Eucharistic elements without this context. 
It is also worth noting that Chauvet is emphatic that the Eucharistic presence of Christ is 
dependent upon the prior gift of the Scriptures. There is an “architectonics” or a structure that the 
Eucharistic presence depends upon, indeed the Eucharist is itself the “crystallization” of this 
prior structure into one symbolic action.60 To try and put that a bit more simply, the Eucharist 
depends upon the prior gift of a narrative that identifies us as those to whom Christ has promised 
to become present in the Eucharist. Without this context the rite of the Eucharist would be 
meaningless, and the implicit assertion by Chauvet seems to be that without this prior act of the 
Church telling its story through the Liturgy of the Word, the Liturgy of the Table would not 
result in the presence of Christ. The presence of Christ arrives in the bread and wine as the 
“crystallization of the Word in visible form,” requiring the Word of the God of the Cross in order 
to become present for and through the body of Christ.61  
One might wonder, therefore, where exactly Christ is present? For the difficulty of 
transubstantiation was to figure out how it was that Christ became present in the elements, but 
the difficulty for Chauvet seems to be how to get Christ to be “here” in an intense or 
transformative sense in the elements themselves. If Christ’s presence is equally powerful in the 
assembly then do we not then make the Eucharistic rite superfluous? Chauvet’s answer to this is 
to point to the power of the breaking of the bread as the symbol par excellence of Christ’s gift. 
Given what we already know of symbols this is not to afford the breaking of the bread a 
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Sacramental Presence in a Postmodern Context, ed. Lieven Boeve and Lambert Leijssen 
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particularly effective nature to make Christ present for the gathered believers. In one of the 
seminal passages of Symbol and Sacrament, Chauvet brings this idea to its culmination: 
Now, the Eucharistic bread as the “here” of the glorious Lord presents itself as a 
closed, dense reality, without a break. Without a break? But is not this bread 
destined for the most symbolic opening there is since it is here only to be 
broken…So much so that the great sacramentum of Christ’s presence is not the 
bread as such in its unbroken state. Or rather, it is indeed the bread, but in its very 
essence, bread-as-food, bread-as-meal, bread-for-sharing. It is in the breaking of 
the bread that its ultimate reality is manifested, its true essence revealed….For the 
breaking of the bread unites symbolically in one action the aspect of communion 
between the members (but “in the charity of Christ”), expressed by the sign of 
peace, and the aspect of communion with Christ himself (but in brotherly and 
sisterly charity), expressed by the rite of Communion. The breaking of the bread, 
inasmuch as it is a sharing between members for their unity of one body broken 
for all, sacramentally manifests the indissoluble bond with Christ and with others 
which it joins sym-bolically.62 
 
What Chauvet seems to be saying here is that the symbolic action of breaking the bread is the 
most effective manner of symbolically joining Christ to his Body, thus making Christ present in 
the Eucharistic in a real way. Yet Chauvet is careful to note that Christ’s presence in the 
Eucharistic elements is a presence “inscribed, but never circumscribed.” Christ’s presence in the 
elements “comes forward through the mode of being open,” not, in other words, as a presence 
that is merely “here” or “there” or “in” something else.63 Christ’s presence is best shown in the 
breaking of the bread because the void of the bread-as-broken reveals Christ’s presence as a 
presence-as-absence. Christ is here not as a locatable substance but as a the gift of Christ’s 
absence—the gift of Christ’s giving his own life for the life of the world.  
                                                
62 Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 406-407. This is in keeping with the structure of the Roman 
Rite that places the sign of peace prior to the breaking of the bread with communion following 
immediately thereafter. 
63 Ibid., 407. 
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 Chauvet quickly clarifies this convoluted manner of speaking through the classic 
expression of Augustine on the Eucharist: “Be what you see and receive what you are.”64 Since 
the presence of Christ comes about through the gathered assembly as Christ’s body, to receive 
the body of Christ is just to receive what we already are. Yet, the symbol of the broken bread 
joins us symbolically to something that we are not at the moment we receive it—the Body of 
Christ broken for the life of the world. In short, the symbol of the broken bread makes Christ 
present both as a reality which we receive in the mystery of the Eucharist and as a call to a 
particular mode of being in the world. This call, however, grafts us into this mode of being by 
our consent to the rite itself. This is what Chauvet means when he writes:  
It is indeed the risen Christ himself who is received in Communion; but he is 
received for what he is, that is, gift from God’s very self, only when he is joined 
to his ecclesial body. The symbol requires the radical distinction of the two, but it 
also requires their indissoluble intrinsic relation. Is not the res (“ultimate effect”) 
of the Eucharist the Christus totus, Head and members?65  
 
The presence of Christ in the Eucharist is a presence-as-absence that not only skirts the 
difficulties of a metaphysics of substance but, furthermore, entails within its very mode of being-
present a call to a manner of living that would give such a presence a body in the here and now.  
 The leap one might imagine we should take at this point is headlong into the details of 
the practical and political implications of the Eucharist for Chauvet’s theological project. But 
such would be a leap taken too early, and for this reason: it is not entirely clear at this point how 
the Eucharist transforms us and calls us into this form of life, given the radical transformation of 
the concept of Eucharistic presence Chauvet has offered us. How does presence in “the mode of 
being open” communicate to the Church the unique political identity of brotherly and sisterly 
                                                
64 Augustine, Sermon 272 in Augustine, Sermons III, vol. 7: On the Liturgical Seasons, trans. 
Edmund Hill, O.P., ed. John E. Rotelle (Hyde Park: New City Press, 1993), 300. 
65 Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 407. 
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charity? To ask this question is in essence to ask, how is grace given or communicated to us in 
the sacrament? In Chauvet’s terms, we have established that the Eucharist is instituted by 
Christ—it is based on the gift of the Scriptures, given to the assembled community by Christ, and 
only possible via the gathered body of Christ—but we have yet to say precisely how the 
Eucharist is “instituting” us as the body of believers. Chauvet’s argument will be that the 
Eucharist does this not under the modality of cause but under the modality of “revealer” and 
“operator.” 
 
Beyond Causality: Eucharist and the Language-Game of Faith 
I find it to be of great interest that at this point in Chauvet’s argument—the pivotal point 
in which he will at long last detail how it is that sacramental grace (the very presence of Christ’s 
gift of His own life in human rites or material elements) is given to Christians in the 
sacraments—Chauvet’s references to Heidegger fall away almost entirely and references to 
Wittgenstein come to the fore. Indeed, Chauvet, following in the footsteps of Jean Ladrière, goes 
so far as to call the “language of faith” a specific “language-game” that is in itself the expression 
of a particular “form of life,” two concepts essential to the philosophy of the later Wittgenstein.66  
Now, this concept of a language-game can create profound difficulties in any argument on behalf 
of religious belief. Its late introduction in Chauvet’s argument (well into the latter half of the 
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as they relate to theology, see Fergus Kerr, Theology After Wittgenstein (London: SPCK, 1997).  
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Third Part of Symbol and Sacrament) might rightly be criticized as muddying the waters. Let me 
offer the slightest defense of the worth of this concept of “language-game” to Chauvet’s 
argument.  
The main difficulty I imagine one might have in hearing religious belief called a 
language-game has little to do with language and more to do with the idea of belief being 
equated with a sort of “game.” It would seem that we are making out of religious belief an 
insular pursuit amongst initiates that has no relevance to the outside world and no actual 
grounding in reality—like a game played amongst children wherein only they know the rules. 
Indeed, we may balk at the insular nature of this comparison and perhaps even bemoan the 
irrelevance it seems to assign to faith—so faith is just a word game?—but this would be to miss 
the point Chauvet is making. That point, I think, is twofold: The first bit of the point is that 
calling faith a language-game is simply saying that faith is something quintessentially human. 
Faith has the power to transform our very subjectivity precisely because it exists within the 
plurality of language-games that constitutes the essence of human life. It is based in embodiment 
and has no metaphysical foundation, no ultimate Ground outside the “whole hurly-burly” of 
human action, to use a phrase already quoted.67  
This groundlessness might seem to imply that faith is a rather frivolous illusion of those 
who hold to it, but that is certainly not what Chauvet (or Wittgenstein, for that matter) means to 
say with regards to faith. That particular objection, in fact, brings us to the second part of the 
point, and it is a profound assertion on Chauvet’s part. As I see it, what Chauvet has committed 
himself to in saying that the language of faith is a language-game—faith in the God of the Cross, 
remember—is that this language-game is itself a supernatural gift. Here Chauvet has stretched 
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the Wittgensteinian category far, perhaps to the breaking point. Still, let us follow him into the 
borderlands for the moment.  
In claiming that faith is a unique language-game Chauvet seems to be saying that faith 
occurs in a naturally supernatural way. Naturally, in that it is a language-game. Supernaturally, in 
that it is a language-game that, by right, really ought to be impossible. Yet, it persists in the life 
of the Church anyway. The best analogy to this claim I can muster as a means of explanation is 
to the dogmatic notion of the Incarnation. As affirmed by the Council of Chalcedon the life of 
Jesus was itself a fully human life. Yet, the affirmation of the Christian faith is that within that 
human life was a profound and miraculous gift, an inbreaking within the human milieu of a 
divine life, given for the life of the world but which did not cancel out the human life of Jesus.  
Such, so it seems to me, is the sort of point Chauvet is trying to make by calling faith a 
language-game. Chauvet is trying to say that the language-game of faith in the God of the Cross 
is the only way of speaking about faith that is in keeping with the revelation of God in the Pasch 
of Christ—a human life that, by divine gift, radically alters the parameters of the language that 
makes us human.  It seems to me that Chauvet is combining the insights of Trinitarian 
Christology from the likes of Jüngel, Moltmann, and Kasper, with the insights of later 
Wittgensteinian philosophy, in order to take seriously both the radical implications of God’s 
presence in the crucified Jesus and the radical implications involved in taking seriously the 
linguistic constitution of human subjects.68  
We should not be surprised, then, to hear Chauvet claim that the Eucharist is an 
“effective symbolic expression,” meaning that the rite transforms those who submit to it 
according to the linguistic efficacy we have already encountered in Chauvet’s work. The 
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empirical efficacy of religious rites is obtained through this “symbolic efficacy” by “setting up a 
new relation between subjects or between subjects and their socio-cultural ‘world’ or both.”69 In 
short, once we have challenged the way in which Christ is present in the Eucharist according to 
the symbolic perspective, we now see that the manner by which we are transformed by receiving 
said presence in the Eucharist is through precisely this sort of change in our relation to other 
subjects and to our world. This is not, however, a “merely” symbolic or metaphorical change. It 
is a re-location in and through the language that makes us who we are in the first place—an 
inauguration into the language-game of faith.  
Chauvet will claim that the Eucharist enacts this sort of transformation by simultaneously 
functioning as a revealer and an operator. All sacraments, not just the Eucharist, function in this 
way. The sacraments reveal the event of grace already initiated by God and in so doing bring 
about as an operation that which is revealed. Chauvet’s example of this is not, in fact, the 
Eucharist but the sacrament of reconciliation. As the Tradition affirmed, the sinner is pardoned 
by God simply by moving themselves to repent, but the mystery of the sacramental act is that 
expressing this repentance in an embodied way brings the essence of the act to its fulfillment. In 
other words, the holy realities involved (God’s act of pardon, our act of repentance) seem to 
reach out essentially towards taking a body in the form of a sacramental action. The 
transformation by grace is irrevocably tied to its embodied expression in sacrament. 
So what Chauvet is arguing is not that there is no causation when it comes to sacramental 
grace. This is a sticking point both for Blankenhorn and Mudd in their treatments of Chauvet.70 
Their critique seems to rely on a devastatingly simple question put to Chauvet’s argument by 
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Maloney, “Is this not efficient causality under another name?”71 I think Chauvet would readily 
admit now, and does in Symbol and Sacrament, that there is causality involved in his account of 
sacramental grace. What he would resist wholeheartedly, however, is the idea that his account of 
sacramental grace speaks of a causality or an operation that takes place outside of the symbolic 
milieu. His hope in offering this resistance is to avoid the ontotheological entrapment into which 
considering sacramental grace under the modality of cause led. More importantly, Chauvet 
wishes to ensure that a purely subjectivist path is also avoided, wherein the sacraments would 
only serve as the “mere” revelation of something that was already there. Hence, Chauvet writes:  
The sacraments are not instruments for the production of grace since their 
operation, of the symbolic order, is inseparable from the revelation they bring 
about. But no more are they simply instruments for the translation of a grace that 
is already there since the revelation they make of it is inseparable from a symbolic 
of labor, new each time, within the believing subject. The scheme of translation is 
no more valid than the scheme of production.72 
 
Chauvet admits of operation, but only an operation that is inseparable from the symbolic 
revelation that the sacraments themselves are. Moreover, the focus cannot be solely on the 
revelation of a prior truth, since it is only through the path of symbolic labor, to which we must 
continuously return, that such truths come to fruition. Here we see Chauvet’s two principal 
convictions poised in a remarkable balance. The intra-linguistic effectiveness of the rite is 
essential for understanding the true nature of sacramental grace. We have no other means of even 
discussing what grace is outside of this symbolic perspective. Yet, the remarkable revelation of 
the human rites themselves is that there is an extra-linguistic grace at work here that is not 
subject to or dependent upon the structures of ritual, language, and symbol. The anthropological 
is indeed the location of every properly theological, but the Spirit blows where it wills. 
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 To conclude this section, I would like to make a final point about the potential charge of 
insularity. At this point in my telling of Chauvet’s argument, it might seem that there is little 
reason to trouble ourselves as Christians with anything other than the Sacraments. If the 
sacraments are effective symbolic expressions that graft us into the language-game of faith then 
what need have we of anything else? More importantly, doesn't this make the Eucharist solely an 
ontological scandal? Or perhaps better, given how transformative the Eucharist is at the symbolic 
level, does not Chauvet’s account have only a tangential relationship at best to politics? If, as I 
said above, the Eucharist is both an ontological and political scandal for Chauvet, then the 
connection between the Eucharist and politics must be shown to be essential to the nature of the 
Eucharist. The sacramental grace gifted to the Church in the Eucharist, in other words, must be a 
form of graced politics. Chauvet’s answer to this objection will have to do with the need for 
those “spiritual” matters to be “given a body” in order truly to fulfill their essence. Faith, in other 
words, cannot be merely a matter of the heart if it is to truly be faith. The truth of faith is given to 
us in the grace imparted through the body of the sacraments, and this gift impels the Church to 
the return-gift, the making corporal of its faith in the practice of Christian witness. Thus, the very 
faith of the Church is structured sacramentally. It is to this structuring of faith—the very political 
scandal of the Eucharist—to which we now turn. 
 
The Political Scandal of the Eucharist 
Introduction: The Sacramental Structure of Christian Identity 
 Such an assertion has a pleasant ring to it, but what can it mean that faith is structured 
sacramentally? And in what sense is such structuring a political scandal? Are we not with the 
“political,” perhaps, assigning a category to Chauvet’s that Chauvet himself would avoid? In 
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short, I believe Chauvet thinks that the language-game of faith, once consented to, follows the 
same structural pattern. That pattern, it turns out, is the structure of symbolic exchange, which we 
spent a great deal of time explicating above. Hence, Chauvet’s account comes full circle.  
All faith, since it must become corporeal, follows the pattern of Gift-Reception-Return-
Gift. But what aspects of Christian life make up the elements of Gift, Reception, and Return-
Gift? Chauvet proposes that the Christian life is made up of a “tripod” of Scripture-Sacraments-
Ethics that coincides, respectively, with the elements of Gift-Reception-Return-Gift.73 Chauvet 
understands these three traditional doctrinal categories of Scripture, Sacrament, and Ethics in 
unique ways. Under the banner of Scripture, Chauvet means not only the Bible but also 
“everything pertaining to the understanding of revelation.”74 Hence, things like catechesis, the 
theological texts that make up what we normally call the Tradition, and contemporary 
theological sources all fall under the broad category of Scripture.  
The category of Sacrament has a similarly broad application. By Sacrament Chauvet 
means not only the seven sacraments instituted by Christ, but any celebrations that worship God 
through liturgy. This opens the way for treating things like prayer, Eucharistic adoration, and 
pilgrimage as belonging to the category of Sacrament.75 Finally, and most importantly given the 
topic of this section, Chauvet claims a wider application for the category of Ethics than just 
personal piety. Ethics means “every kind of action Christians perform insofar as this is a 
                                                
73 Ibid., 176. 
74 Ibid., 178. 
75 This broadening of the notion of sacrament is largely in keeping with what Metz and 
Schillebeeckx call “the mystical.” See Edward Schillebeeckx, Christ: The Experience of Jesus as 
Lord, trans. John Bowden (New York: Crossroad, 1993); and Johann Baptist Metz, Faith in 
History and Society: Toward a Practical Fundamental Theology, trans. J. Matthew Ashley (New 
York: Crossroad, 2007). 
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testimony given to the gospel of the Crucified-Risen One.”76 Critically, this means that the Ethics 
of Christians are not confined to commands regarding interpersonal relationships but must also 
apply to social praxis. Chauvet does not use the term “politics” here, but it is no stretch to insist 
that under the category of Ethics, the return-gift obligated by the reception of God’s Gift, 
Chauvet has opened up space for an account of the political scandal of the Eucharist. 
What remains to be said, however, is how this theological tripod of Scripture-Sacrament-
Ethics corresponds in any meaningful sense to the logic of the gift. How is it, in other words, that 
Scripture can be taken as a gift? Does this change what we mean when we say of the Eucharistic 
elements that they are the “gifts of God”? Finally, to what extent is the political scandal of the 
Eucharist—the obligatory return-gift of Ethics—haunted by the aporia of the gift as articulated 
by Derrida? For Chauvet, the answer to these questions results in a collapsing of the distinction 
between language and gift-giving. The Gift of God is given in the form of a Word 
communicated. The truth of that Word only reaches its truth when it is made Flesh. This is the 
logic of gift-giving inherent in all three elements of the “tripod” and is the foundation, for 
Chauvet, of any further Christian politics. 
Chauvet devotes full chapters to the elements of Scripture and Ethics in their relation to 
the category of Sacrament, not on their own. This is in keeping, I think, two fundamental truths 
that Chauvet continually emphasizes: first, that no element of the structure of Christian identity 
can function on its own, and, second, that taking the Pasch of Christ as our starting point requires 
thinking of God in terms of corporality. The most spiritual will always take on corporality as the 
fulfillment of its truth. This means that we cannot even think Scripture or Ethics without also 
simultaneously thinking their flight into symbolic, embodied expression, i.e. their flight into the 
                                                
76 Ibid., 179. 
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Sacrament. Hence, to understand the political ramifications of the Eucharist and their basis in the 
logic of gift it will be necessary to understand (1) what Scripture is in relation to Sacrament, 
since this is the Gift given by God to be received in the Eucharist, and, (2) what particular form 
of Ethics the Sacrament obliges us to perform, since this is the obligatory return-gift of Christian 
Witness.  
We have already seen above that Chauvet broadened the definition of Scripture beyond 
the Bible itself. Even more important for our purposes is Chauvet’s continual affirmation that the 
gift of God is not limited to any of these finite forms of embodied knowledge. The true gift of 
God is revelation, but revelation thought under the mode of Word. It is the Logos that is the true 
gift of God. This might sound as if Chauvet has allowed the gift of God to become entirely 
ethereal, but the insistence on not giving the gift of God a single location in any particular book 
or body of knowledge is meant to safeguard the divine sovereignty that making the Pasch of 
Christ the starting point for theology requires. The Word of God is present in the Bible, but the 
Word of God is not limited or exhausted by the words of the Bible. This is what makes the 
analogy to the manna in the wilderness such an appealing one for Chauvet. It is given by God 
afresh each morning, it sustains the community even though it is literally “no-thing,” but can 
never be accumulated in one place. The Word is given by God’s initiative alone, and such free 
giving is proper to the kind of God whose being is in God’s becoming, as we saw above.  
Chauvet has therefore posited a sort of gift whose origins are beyond the hauntings of 
finitude. The gift under discussion here, after all, is ultimately God’s grace or God’s very self. 
Yet, while I believe I am correct to say that Chauvet is positing a supernatural or impossible 
origin for the language-game of faith—that form of life made possible by the Pasch of Christ and 
made actual in the sacraments as “symbolic figures of God’s effacement”—the fact still remains 
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that we have never encountered a pure symbol entirely free of the logic of value and exchange. 
All symbolic expressions, however effective, are haunted by the presence of sign, value, and 
economy. This might seem as if Chauvet has held out what we have been seeking all along only 
to draw it back at the last second. Here is a gift beyond the logic of value, a singular instance that 
confirms the possibility of what Derrida called the “impossible,” the gift of grace itself, only to 
pull back and surrender even such a powerful gift to the vacillations and limits of the finite. I 
think, however, this is move is entirely in keeping with what Chauvet has already made explicit. 
To say that an impossible gift might become fully present in the finite order is to go back on the 
hard work Chauvet has already done regarding the proper meaning of becoming “present” in the 
first place. The faith that believes in the presence of the impossible gift will only be faith if such 
a presence is marked by absence, mediation, and corporality. It is not, therefore, that we are 
surrendering the power of God’s gift of grace to finitude by contending that the symbolic 
expressions of such grace are ever marked by the absence that is characteristic of all actual 
presences. It is rather the precise thing that faith should say, namely, that the gift is for human 
beings. The wisdom of Derrida, unknown to Chauvet at the time, seems to be upheld for the most 
part. For how could we really call grace a true gift if it were not able to become present, to 
appear in order to be received? And if grace appears, it will not be as a pure and unmediated 
presence but as a coming-into-presence. Such is the limits of faith, not because of the chastening 
of secular reason, but because there can be no human faith otherwise. And what is a faith that is 
not a faith for human beings? 
The gift of God, therefore, arrives to us as an event of grace in the effective symbolic 
expression of the sacraments. As we have already seen, all gifts, as soon as they are received, 
obligate us to a return-gift. Now for Derrida this obligation meant nothing less than the presence 
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of debt, eroding the nature of the gift as gift. One received a gift from another and was bound to 
pay it back in some way to the giver, even if that was with nothing but an acknowledgment of 
thanks. A debt of thanks is still a debt, which means that the gift was no gift in the first place. 
Chauvet, however, modifies this structure. For Chauvet the gift does indeed obligate the one who 
receives it, but since the exchange in question is symbolic exchange the structure of indebtedness 
does not apply. Person A gives Person B a gift, but instead of immediately becoming indebted to 
pay back a return-gift to Person A, Person B is instead obligated to give the return-gift to Person 
C. This is not a debt but rather an obligation to further the presence of Person A’s gift. Gift-
giving, thus, is not “purified”—the logic of the market-place will still haunt the furtherance of 
Person A’s gift—but there is an almost prevenient sort of grace buried in the structure of 
symbolic exchange that undercuts the economic logic that Derrida saw as canceling the gift. 
Chauvet sees instead a subtle, even hidden inbreaking of grace at the base of all communication, 
and such a coming-into-presence of grace cannot be canceled or voided by the mere hint of 
economic or market logic. Grace can only be grace for human beings if it is marked by such 
absence from the beginning. 
The form of Ethics obligated as a return-gift by the Church’s reception of the Sacraments 
will be an ethics centered around the logic of symbolic exchange. Yet, we must be careful here 
not to mistake Chauvet as saying that the Ethics of the Church is entirely dependent upon the 
Sacrament for its content. The pegs of the tripod are not statically arranged but are dynamic, 
allowing for a shifting of emphasis as the situation of the Church changes. In this way, Chauvet 
can claim that the Eucharist is a “symbolic practice” that “comes from” and “sends us back to” 
the element of Ethics.77 Here the decisive influence of Chauvet’s fundamental theology of 
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sacramentality comes to fruition, for “it is above all in the everyday that the Risen One is 
encountered. It is corporality itself that is the fundamental mediation for Christian liturgy.”78 
Embodied, everyday existence, in other words, can function eucharistically or sacramentally in 
that it serves as a gift to be received in symbolic action. Our encounters with the oppressed and 
broken of this world do not need the Eucharist to be made prophetically challenging to our 
politics. They already are, precisely because these encounters are encounters with the God whose 
presence is best described by reference to the Crucified One. In other words, the influence of the 
Eucharist on our politics is not a one-way street. Our everyday life and, more importantly, our 
encounters with the memories of the oppressed embodied in history serve to send us back to the 
symbolic figures of God’s own effacement, especially the Eucharist. Hence, for Chauvet the 
Eucharist is a political scandal while, at the same time, our encounters with those who we treat as 
no-thing scandalizes the liturgical life of the Church in a eucharistic manner. 
What seems to make a Christian politics distinct from other forms of religious politics 
(Judaism, for example) or secular politics is the eschatological memory that constitutes it. The 
Eucharist does indeed seek to make present for the Church a past event in the narrative of 
institution, but the memory being evoked in the ritual is a “memory of the future,” i.e. of Jesus’ 
second coming.79 Still, this memory is based in the gift Pasch of Christ such that “the ritual 
memory of Jesus’ death and resurrection is not Christian unless it is veri-fied in an existential 
memory whose place is none other than the believers’ bodies.”80 The political scandal of the 
Eucharist as a rite, therefore, is the making present of the “dangerous memory” of Jesus Christ, 
both his Pasch and his Parousia. Making present this memory of the future in the present is to 
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become nothing less than a living sacrament of a new political community, one that is and yet is 
to come. As Chauvet puts it, “The ritual story at each Eucharist, retelling why Jesus handed over 
his life, sends all Christians back to their own responsibility to take charge of history in his 
name; and so they become his living memory in the world because he himself is ‘sacramentally’ 
engaged in the body of humanity they work at building for him.”81 
If this ethical vision sounds like it lacks accomplishable particulars that is no accident. 
After all, Chauvet has consistently said that the task of becoming a believer, of a life of faith, of 
giving the Word a place in our very bodies through Sacrament and Ethics, is never a fully 
accomplished task.82 We would expect, then, that the political scandal of the Eucharist would 
serve more as a political paradigm than a series of political recommendations. The Eucharist, for 
Chauvet, does not serve as a “text” from which we may read a series of political positions but 
rather serves as a pedagogical tool by which we receive the task of a new manner of human 
belonging. We do not read our task from the Eucharist, but instead the Eucharist reads us, as it 
were, into certain forms of identity fostered by the gift of God’s grace in the memory of Jesus 
Christ. Hence, Chauvet writes:  
The element ‘Sacrament’ is thus the symbolic place of the on-going transition 
between Scripture and Ethics, from the letter to the body. The liturgy is the 
powerful pedagogy where we learn to consent to the presence of the absence of 
God, who obliges us to give him a body in the world, thereby giving the 
sacraments their plenitude in the “liturgy of the neighbor” and giving the ritual 
memory of Jesus Christ its plenitude in our existential memory.83 
 
The political scandal of the Eucharist is not necessarily a particular set of practical commands 
but a type of subjectivity, a communal and institutional subjectivity that is nothing less than a 
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new placement through the symbolic expression of the Eucharist into the language-game of faith, 
whose moral and social outcome is that of “agape between brothers and sisters.”84 
 This is why Chauvet includes the following figure on the nature of the Church:  
 
Scripture, Sacrament, and Ethics are here shown to stand in an equal relation to one another.85 It 
is the continual flow between the three of them that constitutes the identity of the Church. More 
importantly, however, is the dotted line that indicates the porousness and permeability of the 
Church. The agapic community pours out beyond its boundaries and is also influenced from 
beyond its boundaries. Such a community cannot maintain a strict and hard boundary between 
itself and the world. There is, in other words, a certain mode of being open that is constitutive of 
the Eucharist and of the community it creates. The Church’s nature, as the community of the 
Eucharist, is ultimately analogous to the porous and permeable nature of the human subject—in 
that, we are irrevocably formed as an I by a series of exchanges with the other.   
The Eucharist is thus a political scandal not because it contains the criterion for a certain 
mode of human belonging based in agape. The Eucharist is a political scandal because it 
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constitutes such belonging in its very performance. It reveals the presence of such belonging and 
in so doing accomplishes the coming-into-presence of the agapic community of brothers and 
sisters. The political scandal of the Eucharist thus comes about through the schema of revealer 
and operator expounded above. Receiving the Gift of God in the sacraments seems, therefore, to 
be the most scandalous political act the Church can commit. For while our Ethical return-gift is 
of course an essential part of veri-fying the truth of the Gift given in the sacrament, it is the act of 
receiving the sacrament, receiving the very symbolic figure of God’s effacement, that 
accomplishes a mode of human belonging that ought to be impossible within the immanent 
frame. The act of receiving the Eucharist makes the body of believers into the Body of Christ by 
revealing them as such—the sacramental presence on Earth of a manner of human belonging that 
the conditions of finitude seem to necessarily deem un-appearable. Yet, in the act of the 
Eucharist such an eschatological inbreaking occurs, according to Chauvet, albeit an inbreaking 
ever haunted by the absence of the eschatological not-yet. Hence, “Be what you see and receive 
what you are,” is just the same as saying with Chauvet: “[In the Eucharist] it is [the Church’s] 
very identity [that] it acts out here, proclaiming symbolically what it is and what it has yet to 
become. At the level of language, we have here the most expressive unfolding of its essence and 
truth.”86 The political scandal of the Eucharist, for Chauvet, thus turns out to be less about 
explicating a political theology from the liturgical practice of the Eucharist and more about 
insisting that the Eucharist is a symbolic act that constitutes a political community bound by 
agapic love. 
 Yet, Chauvet’s account is limited by his decision to bind the political scandal of the 
Eucharist—along with the very possibility and intelligibility of grace—to the Maussian 
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conception of gift-exchange. As I have attempted to make clear, the great benefit to 
incorporating Mauss, along with the further insights of anthropology and psychoanalysis, was to 
show that the communication of grace was through that very process by which we come to be 
subjects in the first place. However, the grave risk that accompanies this gain is that Chauvet’s 
accounts of the ontological and political scandal of the Eucharist stand or fall based on the 
credibility of Maussian gift-exchange. While Chauvet has rightly noted that the presence of 
grace is not subject to linguistic processes alone, it must be said that our access to grace is 
granted solely through such processes. For that “principle which transforms these elements into a 
Eucharist or which assures the Eucharistic nature of the whole,” is nothing else than symbolic 
exchange.87  
 While the theoretical challenges to Maussian gift-exchange have already been cited 
above, it is worth noting that Susan Ross has challenged Chauvet’s insistence on the necessity of 
mediation from the standpoint of justice. The difficulty of characterizing the Eucharist as a 
symbolic exchange that functions to teach us to consent without resentment to the presence of 
the absence is that it leaves us with little avenue to question or challenge the ways in which such 
symbolic exchange might be compromised by patriarchy or other forms of oppressive ideology.88 
The body is not solely a necessary mediation but also the site of profound ambiguity and 
ambivalence for Ross, particularly for women in their experience of the liturgy.89 Rather than 
forcing women to consent to the presence of absence, Ross insists that the sacraments can 
function to show that God is present in the embodied experience of women, and listening to that 
                                                
87 Ibid., 268. 
88 See in particular her assertion that the practice of the sacraments amongst women at the 
margins of sacramental practice reveals a renewed sacramental theology. Susan Ross, 
Extravagant Affections: A Feminist Sacramental Theology (New York: Continuum, 1998), 209-
29 
89 Ross links this explicitly to Chauvet’s symbolic approach. Ross, Extravagant Affections, 157. 
 146 
embodied experience can provide much needed renewal for sacramental theology. Critically, this 
lends lay women the authority to insist on women’s presence in worship and to critique those 
forms of oppression that utilize the Church’s symbolic network to further patriarchal forms of 
power. The lack of attention to this difficulty by Chauvet, in other words, seriously calls into 
question the validity of symbolic exchange and, thereby, the political scandal that follows from 
it.90 
 Chauvet’s theology is, like all theology, a product of its time. As Lieven Boeve put it in 
an appraisal of Chauvet’s project, “It is the awareness of a theological urgency that drives 
Chauvet to his reconsideration of the sacramental structure of Christian existence.”91 Beyond the 
limitations of what Chauvet counted as theologically urgent, it is also worth asking just to what 
extent Chauvet’s context has faded from view and, along with it, the urgency that characterized 
it. As Boeve again says, “At the same time it remains true that, because of its starting point and 
dialogue partners, Symbol and Sacrament testifies to the theological struggle of a particular 
generation, a struggle with which many of my generation, children of the linguistic turn, are 
hardly still familiar.”92 Chauvet’s hermeneutical project in our time rings as “an excessively 
dangerous and insufficiently reassuring position in a context too easily evaluated as nihilistic and 
relativistic.”93 Chauvet’s project, as protean as it is, risks being co-opted by a context that is no 
longer postmodern but also is post-Christian in its constitution. Chauvet’s location of grace, in 
                                                
90 It is also worth noting that in his “relecture” of Symbol & Sacrament some twenty years later 
Chauvet still did not address this concern in any depth. See Louis-Marie Chauvet, “Une relecture 
de Symbole et sacrement” Questions Liturgiques/Studies in Liturgy 88 (2007): 111-125. 
91 Lieven Boeve, “Theology in a Postmodern Context and the Hermeneutical Project of Louis-
Marie Chauvet,” in Sacraments: Revelation of the Humanity of God—Engaging the Fundamental 
Theology of Louis-Marie Chauvet, ed. Philippe Bordeyne and Bruce Morrill (Collegeville: 
Liturgical Press, 2008), 14. 
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other words, in that which is most human, all too easily loses its “extra-linguistic” efficacy and 
fades into that which Chauvet sought so heartily to avoid—the blur of general sacramentality. I 
turn, then, to another figure who sought to articulate the ontological and political scandal of the 
Eucharist through gift and language, but one who did so with his eye squarely upon the post-
Christianness of our context.  
 
 
 148 
CHAPTER FOUR 
MILBANK ON GIFT AND LANGUAGE:  
THE SACRAMENTAL AGAINST THE SECULAR 
 
Introduction 
  If Chauvet represents one of the great attempts at correlating the theoretical gifts of 
postmodern thought into a theology oriented around the sacraments, then John Milbank, the 
founder of Radical Orthodoxy and pugilistic defender of Christian thought, is surely one of the 
great instantiations of a thinker utterly opposed to the merits of such correlation. As controversial 
as they are protean, Milbank’s genealogy of the secular, his radical re-reading of Thomas 
Aquinas, and his attempt to “purify” gift-exchange beyond Mauss and Derrida all smack of one 
with whom Chauvet’s project would have very little in common. Yet, as if points on a circle 
rather than a line, the seeming distance between the two figures actually belies a telling intimacy. 
The goal of this chapter will be to explicate that nearness-in-distance, so to speak, in order to 
reveal the ways that Milbank’s project and Chauvet’s both culminate in accounts of the Eucharist 
as the gift of political language. Their utterly divergent theological presuppositions yield vital 
truths for future attempts at thinking the political implications of the Eucharist. 
 Before I begin, however, I must note that this chapter is not a chapter on Radical 
Orthodoxy as a whole. I think this is the right course, first, because I do not believe there is a 
coherent and persistent school of thought that might be called “radical orthodoxy.” The edited 
volumes that bear the moniker “radical orthodoxy” certainly share general concerns about the 
legitimacy of modernity and the relationship between theology and philosophy, but there is no 
single, shared worldview to which a discernible group of thinkers subscribe that one might place 
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under that appellation. Those who contributed to the first volume have had varied responses to 
Milbank’s grand polemic against modernity, and even the original editors themselves have not 
all gone in the same direction after the collected volume’s publication.1  
 This chapter’s focus, as one might infer from the title, is on the figure at the center of 
Radical Orthodoxy since its inception—John Milbank—and the one who arguably just is radical 
orthodoxy, if the name is to apply fully to any one thinker. Yet, if one were to read the whole of 
Milbank’s oeuvre one might be surprised at the lack of direct engagement with the theology of 
the Eucharist. In fact, at the times when one might imagine Milbank turning a particular 
argument into an engagement with the Eucharist, something else occurs. Typically, Milbank 
demurs from a direct engagement with the Eucharist and instead gives a decidedly ebullient 
citation of a single theologian—Milbank’s former doctoral student and now a theologian in her 
own right, Catherine Pickstock. For that reason, Pickstock will also appear in this chapter so as 
to bring forward details of just what Milbank might consider a proper theology of the Eucharist.  
 This chapter will thus follow a similar outline to the previous chapter. The key difference 
between the two, however, will be the continual re-emergence of Chauvet as a critical 
interlocutor for understanding Milbank. This chapter will thus commence as an explication-in-
dialogue, weaving the notable moments of agreement or disagreement from our previous 
encounter with Chauvet into our present engagement with Milbank. The chapter shall follow a 
similar structure to the chapter previous—in keeping with the deep alignment of the two thinkers 
on the proper place of the sacraments in relation to theory and practice, ontology and politics.  
                                                
1 Graham Ward’s work in particular has taken a notably different path than Milbank and 
Pickstock’s. Other original contributors to Radical Orthodoxy that have diverged in notable ways 
from Milbank and Pickstock are William Cavanaugh, Lawrence Paul Hemming, and Fergus 
Kerr. For their original essays see Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology, ed. John Milbank, 
Catherine Pickstock, and Graham Ward (London: Routledge, 1999). 
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Hence, I begin with an analysis of Milbank’s critique of “the problem.” While his 
emphasis on ontotheology is not as singular as Chauvet’s, I will show that Milbank’s relationship 
to the Heideggerian project of overcoming metaphysics is a decisive part of his theological 
enterprise. It is precisely his rejection of this project and, hence,  of any subsequent “homology 
of attitude” between overcoming metaphysics and Christian orthodoxy, which will set the course 
for Milbank’s particular account of language and the gift.  
 Once I have articulated the precise relationship between Milbank and ontotheology I will 
have to situate Milbank’s project within the broader historical narrative now subsumed under the 
name “radical orthodoxy.” Like my reading of Chauvet, this will entail an explanation of 
leitmotifs from Milbank’s most famous and often inscrutable work, Theology and Social Theory. 
The most notable of these shall be “ontological violence,” which fuels his opposition to the 
project of overcoming metaphysics and of all currents of thought, theological or otherwise, that 
might be characterized as postmodern. I shall then turn to Milbank’s unique account of language 
and gift-exchange, in that order. I shall show that rather than utilizing postmodernity to elucidate 
resources already latent in the sacramental system for Christian theology, Milbank instead adopts 
a pugilistic attitude towards postmodern thought, contending that theology and theology alone is 
able to properly think the realities of language and gift-exchange. Postmodern accounts of radical 
semiosis and critiques of the pure gift as impossible ultimately end in a form of political and 
ontological nihilism. Christian theology alone is able to reconcile the radical difference in 
language and the seeming aporia at the heart of the gift.  
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Milbank and Vico: The Roots of Milbank’s Doctrine of God 
With Milbank, the great difficulty of any account of his thought is picking a suitable 
beginning. The prolific nature of his writing would be hard enough in this regard if not for the 
fact that his writing covers such a wide-range of topics. Unlike my engagement with Chauvet 
then, where I intentionally reversed the typical telling of Chauvet’s thought, perhaps it is best to 
begin with the very beginning of Milbank’s work. This beginning shall be prior even to the book 
that made him famous, Theology and Social Theory. Indeed, I shall begin with Milbank’s 
doctoral dissertation on the work Giambattista Vico in order to examine what I consider to be the 
key underlying principle to nearly all of Milbank’s theology, whether his conception of a 
properly orthodox ontology or politics. This key is a single sentence from Vico himself—verum 
esse ipsum factum. The truth is itself made, or what Milbank then called the “verum-factum.”2 
 For Milbank, Vico is one of the first in a long and perhaps unending chain of orthodox 
thinkers that were able to resist the gravitational pull of the Enlightenment towards what we now 
call modernity. Part of the reason Vico was able to do so occupied Milbank’s early thought as to 
push the young scholar to devote his dissertation to the religious implications of Vico’s work. 
Milbank would later expand the dissertation into two volumes that attempted to show the deeply 
theological and political implications of the nuances of Vico’s thought that might have given 
academia an alternative vision for modernity. Such a vision, according to Milbank, can only now 
be recovered as a theological corrective to a reified and presumed modern frame of thought that 
is either hopelessly metaphysical or nihilist. The crux of this corrective is what Milbank called 
                                                
2 The connection to Milbank’s work on Vico and a great deal of systematic work in Theology 
and Social Theory, The Word Made Strange, and Being Reconciled has been helpfully 
summarized in an excellent dissertation turned monograph by Peter Samuel Kucer. For that 
argument see Peter Samuel Kucer, Truth and Politics: A Theological Comparison of Joseph 
Ratzinger and John Milbank (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2016).  
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Vico’s “first truth” of metaphysics, Vico’s alternative to the Cartesian cogito, namely, that the 
truth was convertible with the made. 
 What does this seemingly obscure phrase mean? How can that which is true also be that 
which is made? The natural reticence one might have towards the stark claim that proposition 
betrays a series of presuppositions that Milbank sees Vico specifically contradicting. Perhaps 
Descartes will serve as the best example here. For Descartes, the first truth of all philosophy was 
the cogito, “I think therefore I am.”3 The securing of the existence of the self, and within the self 
the infinite idea of God, allowed Descartes to secure knowledge gained through the senses from 
the constant critique to which they seemed irredeemably vulnerable. If God exists and has given 
us our senses to use, whether our reason or our empirical senses, then we can trust their results. 
And yet, what the cogito inevitably seemed to privilege as a result were fields of knowledge that 
focused on laws of a similar transcendental nature as that of the cogito. Mathematics and science, 
whose laws were natural and ordained by God, were favored over history and linguistics, whose 
content was utterly contingent as purely human creations. Vico’s grand innovation was to break 
with Descartes on precisely this point, and through a theological principle for good measure. 
Vico asserted that it was actually the seemingly contingent fields of knowledge—things like 
history, linguistics, civics, etc.—that were the surest forms of knowledge, whilst study of the 
laws of the natural world, through mathematics and science, could not attain full degrees of 
certainty. This was the case because God was the maker of those laws and hence God alone 
knew the full and infinite measure of them. Humans, on the other hand, had not made the cosmos 
and thereby could not know it perfectly. Mathematics and science, as the study of the laws of this 
cosmos, counter-intuitively, are shrouded by the limits of human cognition. But, Vico argues, 
                                                
3 See René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, 3rd ed., trans. Donald A. Cress 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993). 
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human beings can know things of which they themselves were the cause, and those things that 
they have made are the purely human creations of language, culture, and history. As Vico puts it,  
But in the night of thick darkness enveloping the earliest antiquity, so remote 
from ourselves, there shines the eternal and never failing light of a truth beyond 
all question: that the world of civil society has certainly been made by man, and 
that its principles are therefore to be found within the modifications of our own 
human mind. Whoever reflects on this cannot but marvel that the philosophers 
should have bent all their energies to the study of the world of nature, which, 
since God made it, he alone knows; and that they should have neglected the study 
of the world of nations or civil world, which, since man had made it, men could 
hope to know.4 
 
The real truth to be known, in other words, is not the eternal laws beyond the human order but 
precisely the constructed truth human beings have made via their shared world together, and the 
access we have to that truth is in and through language.  
Several scholars of Vico have read his work in this way but have taken no further 
theological import from it.5 Milbank’s unique interpretation of Vico, as first argued in his 
doctoral dissertation, was to read verum-factum not as having oblique or inessential theological 
consequences but rather as stemming directly from a theological and metaphysical principle. 
That principle was the generation of the Second Person of the Trinity by the Father—the Logos, 
the Word, or as Vico was fond of calling the Second Person of the Trinity, the Verum. Again, the 
notion is seen most clearly when contrasted with an opposing idea. Traditionally, Truth was 
convertible with the Good, the Beautiful, and with Being itself. Christians, particularly those 
influenced by Plato, saw God as ultimately convertible with these transcendentals as well. In 
other words, Truth could be predicated to God’s very being, along with the other transcendentals. 
                                                
4 Giambattista Vico, The New Science of Giambattista Vico, trans. Thomas Goddard Bergin 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1948), 1.3.331, p. 85. 
5 Isaiah Berlin’s analysis of Vico is a good example of this, and one that Milbank specifically 
opposes. For Berlin’s account see Isaiah Berlin, Vico and Herder: Two Studies in the History of 
Ideas (London: Hogarth, 1976). 
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Yet, this leads to what Vico thought was a mistaken notion of truth in the life of the Godhead. 
Milbank describes the misread in this way: “[T]here is a prior truth in God, preceding all images 
and works, and human understanding, forced through its material involvement to express itself in 
words and images, participates in the original through a dim recall of the purity of truth.”6 Such a 
conviction renders the relation between created truth and the eternal being of God unclear. In an 
effort to correct this, Vico reverses this formulation:  
For Vico, this picture is precisely reversed: the perfection of divine understanding 
consists in its character as a completed work, a perfect spiritual artifact; the 
imperfection of human understanding consists in its relatively theoretical and less 
perfectly constructive and practical character. Participation is therefore not the 
backwards ascent from images up towards the original, but through the historical 
path of making towards the telos of the infinite factum. Once human images 
imitated divine ideas, now human ideas tend towards divine images; once 
understanding was memory, now it is anticipation.7 
 
Rather than being a truth from the finite order that has its analogue in the life of God, the 
principle of verum-factum is derived from the Trinitarian life of the Godhead, a “perfect spiritual 
artifact” that is not the result of the truth but is itself the truth that God is in Godself.  
 The theological import of verum-factum extends beyond Vico’s linking it, upon 
Milbank’s reading, to the generation of the Son in the Triune life of God. It establishes two 
correlates that are vitally important to Milbank’s later work. First, that God is “primordially 
creative,” meaning God is not first a collection of eternal attributes and then later a Creator by 
virtue of the economy of salvation.8 God is rather always already creative in God’s very being, 
prior to the existence of the world or to God’s relationship as Creator to it. The world only 
subsists in so far as it participates in that creative dynamism that is the life of God, which, in 
                                                
6 John Milbank, The Religious Dimension in the Thought of Giambattista Vico (1688-1774), Part 
I: The Early Metaphysics (New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1991), 113. 
7 Milbank, Religious Dimension I, 113. 
8 Kucer, Truth and Politics, 109. 
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turn, is in keeping with Vico’s hylozoic rather than hylomorphic metaphysics. Matter (hyle) does 
not have its ground in a static and stable form (morphe) but is rather an instantiation of the 
dynamic life (Zoë) of God.  
Second, those acts that we tend to see as being abstractions from the real life or matter of 
the world are, under the light of the verum-factum, now seen as something quite different. Vico’s 
participatory schema, according to Milbank, “denies that the ideas of making, of representation, 
and imaging, are necessarily connected with the corporeal or mind-body world, although for 
human beings this is, contingently, the case. Abstraction from body no longer means abstraction 
from art and from language.”9 The divide between construction or artifice and the properly 
enduring truth of God becomes blurred, on Milbank’s telling. In the time of the “not-yet” that is 
our human world, processes like making or representing are connected with the embodied and 
finite order. This is not always going to be the case, and that is so precisely because it is not 
ultimately or necessarily the case that artifice, abstraction, and creation are fundamentally 
opposed to the pure spirit of the life of God. Since God is primordially creative, the revelation of 
the Trinity in the persons of Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit reveals that the eternal truth of God 
as pure spirit is convertible with the “perfect spiritual artifact” that God Godself is. Since God is 
nothing else other than the socially created reality that is the perichoresis of the Triune God, that 
which is made is not secondary to that which is true. Making is not, therefore, something only 
identifiable in material or corporeal phenomena. Making is essentially spiritual and physical.  
These two theological correlates give critical insight into two key aspects of Milbank’s 
later thought, particularly for our purpose of elucidating an account of the Eucharist as the gift of 
political language in his theological program. First, Milbank’s recovery of the verum-factum as a 
                                                
9 Ibid., 113. 
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metaphysical first-truth shows why Milbank found the terrain of postmodernity particularly 
comfortable and particularly familiar for Christian theology. Comfortable, because postmodern 
thought’s emphasis on flux, difference, and the instability of essences fits well with Vico’s 
insistence that construction is not secondary to truth, not to mention his hylozoistic metaphysics 
that portends Deleuze’s later destabilization of substance.10 Familiar, because Milbank finds 
even Vico’s opinion nothing more than an advancing of earlier meditations of Christian 
theologians on the nature of the Triune God as a communion of love. Had we listened to Vico, 
Milbank might argue, (or Herder, Hamann, Cusa, but especially Aquinas!) we would have 
already arrived at a great many of these so-called “postmodern” conclusions about the nature of 
truth.11 
 Second, and perhaps more importantly, Milbank drew from Vico the idea that 
construction and truth are only now “contingently” related to the human finite order. I think this 
reveals why Milbank is firmly committed to the idea that a Christian polis founded on the 
principle of Christian charity is an accomplishable project in our time.12 For if the truth of such a 
polis were primary and the attempts to construct or make such a polis were ever secondary to 
that truth, then there would be an impossible abyss that stretched between the kingdom of charity 
and the sacred polis the Church seeks to inaugurate here and now. But if the made is convertible 
with the true then there is a sense in which we might create a polis that is analogous to the truth 
of the Kingdom of God and analogous to such an extent as to have not only an evocative 
                                                
10 See Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul R. Patton (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1994). 
11 This sequence is made apparent with particular clarity in Milbank’s work on language in The 
Word Made Strange. See “The Linguistic Turn as a Theological Turn,” in John Milbank, The 
Word Made Strange: Theology, Language, Culture (London: Blackwell Publishers, 1997), 84-
122. 
12 See in particular John Milbank, Beyond Secular Order: The Representation of Being and the 
Representation of People (London: Wiley Blackwell, 2013), 184-269. 
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similarity to but rather a substantial continuity with the reality to which it points. Vico’s 
insistence on the primacy of artifice and construction become, for Milbank, the impetus not only 
to work towards the coming of the Kingdom, but to make the truth of the Kingdom in the here 
and now.  
 Ultimately, Milbank’s reading of Vico in the early days of his career already shows traces 
of one of Milbank’s most controversial theses. In the work of Vico, as I have already mentioned, 
Milbank saw a single instance in a long stream of thought that runs counter to the predominant 
current of modern, secular thought. There is already, in other words, an “us versus them” 
storyline taking shape, in that many of Vico’s positive contributions were accomplished by 
opposing a seemingly irresistible epistemic undertow that characterizes modernity as a whole. 
Vico stands in a long line of thinkers of which Milbank imagines himself a continuation, a line of 
thinkers who resisted the ills of modern thought but did so without overreacting in the manner 
that postmodern thought later comes to do. Hence, I turn now to Milbank’s meta-critical account 
of the formation of the secular and the way in which postmodern thought came to instantiate its 
implicit nihilism.  
 
Ontological Violence: Milbank’s Meta-critical Rescue Mission 
 The most concise telling of secularity’s tale of woe from Milbank comes in one of his 
more recent works, Beyond Secular Order. Therein, not only is the theoretical importance of a 
Christian ontology made apparent but also the case for the connection between ontology and 
politics is rigorously made. There is little speculation forced upon us as to just what it is that 
Milbank thinks on the matter. What then is the story we have to hear so as to think and act in the 
world aright? What conceptual and practical boon awaits us in the retelling of the human fall into 
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secularity? The answer is both the revelation of a problem and the path towards an answer—the 
ontological violence of modern ontology and the possibility of the community of peace called the 
Church. 
 Perhaps it is because of the genealogical nature of Milbank’s argument or the sheer 
audacity of some of his claims, but the “story” I am about to describe often takes on the quality 
of a master myth. In being treated this way, Milbank’s genealogy of the secular can come to be 
equated with other myths to which it has no absolute or essential relation. Particular among these 
is the notion that Milbank conducts his archaeology of the secular in order to call us to return to a 
pre-modern perspective. The Milbankian genealogy actually calls for precisely the opposite 
conclusion and begins from a perspective that disavows even the possibility of such a return. As 
he puts it in the first pages of Theology and Social Theory:  
[T]heology has rightly become aware of the (absolute) degree to which it is a 
contingent historical construct emerging from, and reacting back upon, particular 
social practices conjoined with particular semiotic and figural codings. It is 
important to realize that my entire case is constructed from a complete concession 
as to this state of affairs, and that the book offers no proposed restoration of a pre-
modern Christian position.13 
 
Instead, Milbank wishes to tell the story of the secular’s emerging in order to show that the 
secular arises from a fundamentally theological error. The secular, and the problems that come 
along with it, stem from particular theological innovations whose tragic result was the creation of 
doctrines that became untenable. In other words, the rise of the secular was not an act of 
intellectual aggression against a vibrant and worthy theology. Rather, the creation of the secular 
was the result of decay within theology.   
                                                
13 John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason, 2nd eds. (London: 
Blackwell Publishers, 2006), 1-2. 
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 Milbank’s story begins in the High Middle Ages and at the height of a society that was 
particularly saturated in theology and liturgy. Thomas Aquinas was in his heyday of engaging all 
the wisdom of philosophy from the standpoint of a devoted faith, and society itself was 
structured and organized around an ontology that was rightly and decidedly Christian. What 
happened next was not the rise of an atheistic opposition but rather a dereliction in the very 
theology upon which society and orthodoxy relied. The noted culprit of this theological demise 
was none other than a monk from the British Isles—John Duns Scotus.  
 Before I begin, however, a note of caution is in order. The narrative I am about to recount 
with regards to Scotus has come under severe criticism since Milbank’s major works were 
published. In particular, Daniel Horan has devoted an entire monograph to criticizing what he 
calls the “Scotus story” that Milbank (along with other thinkers associated with Radical 
Orthodoxy) defends throughout his many works.14 Horan finds Milbank’s reading of the “Subtle 
Doctor” to be quite unsatisfactory, and Milbank’s response to Horan in a recent symposium 
hosted by the Syndicate Theology Network did not give any significant evidence that Horan’s 
criticism of Milbank’s “Scotus story” will be constructively or adequately countered.15 I want to 
be clear, therefore, as to the precise use to which I am putting Milbank’s account of Scotus. I 
take it that retelling the genealogical narrative of the secular with Scotus at its center is critical 
for understanding Milbank. Moreover, as I hope to make clear later, I have a great deal of 
sympathy for many of Milbank’s theoretical insights, but many of these insights do not depend 
upon definitively laying the blame for modernity’s ills at the feet of the Subtle Doctor. I present, 
                                                
14 Daniel Horan, Postmodernity and Univocity: A Critical Account of Radical Orthodoxy and 
John Duns Scotus (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2014). 
15 For Milbank’s response to Horan’s text and Horan’s forceful rejoinder to Milbank see John 
Milbank, “Saving the Scotus Story,” and Daniel Horan, “Reply to Milbank,” last modified 
December 25, 2017. https://syndicate.network/symposia/theology/postmodernity-and-univocity/ 
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then, Milbank’s story as he tells it so that the reader may understand how it is that the current 
historical debate arises, but, even more importantly, I present it so that the reader might see the 
theoretical targets that Milbank attacks, while perhaps leaving aside the proper names attributed 
(with far too much certainty) to the origin of those ideas.  
 Scotus, Milbank argues, was instrumental in dismantling several key theological tenets of 
the ontology that guided the High Middle Ages. Most importantly, Scotus in many ways created 
the branch of ontology as a decided non-theological affair. Before Scotus, theology and 
philosophy were two entities that had a relatively compatible relationship. Philosophy has never 
“existed in pure independence from religion or theology.”16 The ancients saw the love of wisdom 
as itself a spiritual exercise.17 Yet, at the same time theology has never been superior to 
philosophy outright. “Truth was seen as one, and revelation as the restoration of a fullness of 
truth” from the Church Fathers to Aquinas.18 It was only when Christian theologians forsook this 
theological tradition—and this will become a very common refrain for Milbank—that this 
complementary yet distinct relationship between theology and philosophy was torn asunder. 
Milbank sums up the irony of this situation: 
So the paradox is that the theoretically secularizing gesture, which permitted the 
arrival of a pure, autonomous philosophy, was entirely a theological gesture, and 
even one which sought to conserve the transcendence of God and the priority of 
the supernatural, by mistakenly insisting on the sheer ‘naturalness’ and self-
sufficiency of human beings without grace, as a backdrop for augmenting grace’s 
sheer gratuity.19 
 
Duns Scotus, along with some predecessors and plenty of successors, were the primary 
guilty party in inaugurating this separation, and they did this through four vital substitutions. As 
                                                
16 Milbank, Beyond Secular Order, 22. 
17 See Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault, 
ed. Arnold Davidson, trans. Michael Chase (London: Blackwell Publishing, 1995). 
18 Milbank, Beyond Secular Order, 22. 
19 Ibid., 28. 
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always, the breadth of Milbank’s historical claims is striking. Those four substitutions are what 
he calls the “four pillars of modern philosophy,” and they are the substitution of: (1) univocity 
for analogy in ontology, (2) mirroring representation for knowledge by identity in gnoseology, 
(3) the primacy of possibility for the primacy of actuality in modal theory, and finally (4) the 
concurrence of created causality with divine causality on the same ontological plane for an 
earlier notion of divine influentia on a different ontological level.20 These substitutions, as has 
already been intimated, were done to bolster rather than undermine the legitimacy of Christian 
orthodoxy. They are thus intellectual tendencies original to the Church, Milbank contends. What 
happened, however, was the creation of a fulcrum by which the whole of the Christian world 
could be moved, not only moved but also overturned, with disastrous theoretical and practical 
effects. 
 The first pillar of modern philosophy—univocity—is perhaps Milbank’s favorite target, 
as he has objected stridently to its presence in theology in just about every major work he has 
published.21 I must, therefore, clarify what Milbank means by univocity and why its substitution 
for analogy was so deleterious to theology according to him. As we saw in Chapters One and 
Two, theology’s predicament in the postmodern age is mostly due to how theology thinks of 
Being. For Milbank it was theology’s great failure to think Being properly that led to the arrival 
of the “secular” and (as we shall see later) the problems of ontotheology that Chauvet sought so 
hard to combat. Duns Scotus figures in this arrival of the secular by being one of the primary 
proponents of what is traditionally called the “univocity of being.” This is to be contrasted with 
the “analogy of being” as Aquinas and many other prominent theologians have defended. The 
                                                
20 Ibid. 
21 Horan’s book is, again, a very helpful resource in cataloging the scope of Milbank’s critical 
engagement with univocity within and beyond Scotus. For that see Horan, Postmodernity and 
Univocity, 15-58. 
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primary difficulty involved in the distinction between univocity and analogy has to do with what 
one can and cannot predicate adequately of God within human language. One major strand of the 
Christian tradition, notably represented by Aquinas, held that all predication of perfection to God 
through the medium of human language had to be done analogously. In other words, God’s 
goodness and human goodness are similar but they are not the same thing. God possesses 
goodness just as we do but in a manner beyond our full comprehension. Thus, we cannot say 
precisely what God is, but we may say things with precision about our finite state (being) and 
apply them, through analogy, to God.  
Duns Scotus, so Milbank tells it, is one of the first instantiations of a tradition that sought 
to defend God from the apparent abyss involved in the analogia entis. We must, so he argued, be 
able to predicate with accuracy something of the Being of God, and we must be able to do so 
naturally, in keeping with our creaturely dignity as made in the image of God. Rather than 
predicating perfections to God in an analogous way, we can predicate perfections of God and 
creatures in the same voice—hence, uni-vocal. This required, fatefully, the establishment of a 
neutral plane of Being that both God and creatures shared. 
Being, [Scotus] argued, could be either finite or infinite, and possessed the same 
simple meaning of existence when applied to either. “Exists,” in the sentence 
“God exists,” has therefore the same fundamental meaning (at a logical and 
ultimately metaphysical level) as in the sentence, “this woman exists.” The same 
thing applies to the usage of transcendental terms convertible with Being; for 
example, “God is good” means that [God] is good in the same sense that we are 
said to be good, however much more of the quality of goodness [God] may be 
thought to possess.22 
 
 While this allowed, so Scotus thought, an increase in our ability to predicate perfection of God, 
Milbank holds that it allowed, for the first time, the tearing asunder of theology as the science of 
God from metaphysics as the science of being. Now there came to be a science of created 
                                                
22 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 305. 
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existence that could be undertaken without any reference to the Creator of that existence. 
Milbank’s description of this event is characteristically severe: 
And here we have reached the absolute crux of this matter, and the turning point 
in the destiny of the West. For insofar as Aquinas appeared to leave some 
ambiguity regarding how it was possible to speak of God by first speaking of 
finite beings, Duns Scotus resolved it in an untraditional direction by affirming 
that this is because one can first understand Being in an unambiguous manner, 
sheerly ‘existential’ sense, as the object of a proposition, without reference to 
God, who is later claimed ‘to be’ in the same univocal manner. Here…arises for 
the first time ontotheological idolatry regarding God, and the placing of God 
within a predefined arena of being…23 
 
The secular and its companion ontotheology were thus largely the result of this first and fateful 
substitution. 
 The second pillar continues the domino effect of early modern theological error into 
epistemology. For with the substitution of univocity for analogy came a change in the account of 
what God was in Godself. The key difference for this second substitution has to do with how 
God’s existence relates to God’s intellect and how this difference is subsequently applied to our 
ability to know things within the finite order. Aquinas, famously, had held that we know God 
best by knowing what God is not, and the first thing we know God cannot be is something 
material. This means, under the epistemological influence of Plato and Aristotle, that God can be 
nothing other than intellection, indeed the pure act of intellection is God’s very substance. This 
means that God’s intellect and God’s being are not different things. As the great doctor puts it, 
“in God to be is the same thing as to understand.”24 
 Duns Scotus disagreed on this point, and his disagreement “encouraged,” though Milbank 
seems to shy away from claiming such disagreement directly led to, a new model of knowledge 
by representation. Scotus’ positing of Being as something that could be apprehended without 
                                                
23 Milbank, Word Made Strange, 44. 
24 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I.14.4. 
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reference to God allowed for the formal distinction between God’s intellect and God’s Being. 
God’s knowledge of something was now no longer seen as the known’s participation in the 
divine being but rather, since Being is something that God and creatures now possess in the same 
way, so their intellects can now be spoken of in the same, univocal way as their existence could. 
As Milbank puts it, for Scotus, God, through God’s “‘objective’ knowledge of things,” now 
“precisely and univocally represents” the objects to be known in the divine intellect.25 Whereas 
for Aquinas the matter is entirely different—God “knows [things] truly by achieving them in 
[Godself] as more than themselves and only knowable in their alien finitude as the participability 
of their infinitely perfect exemplary instance.”26 God’s knowledge of things no longer adds a 
particular dignity to the thing known—“no longer is the stone as known by God ‘nobler’ than the 
stone as it finitely exists.”27 Instead, God perfectly and “efficiently” produces the image or copy 
of the thing in the divine intellect.28  
 When applied to the knowledge of things within the human intellect problems begin to 
arise for Milbank. What guaranteed the accuracy of our knowledge of things under the Thomist 
and Aristotelian notion of knowledge by identity was the “unmediated identity of the abstracted 
form in the mind with the form as it exists when combined with matter in the material substances 
of which we have knowledge.”29 Our minds were joined, in other words, through the matter we 
encountered, to the abstract form of which that matter was an instantiation. Yet, when we replace 
that knowledge by identity with knowledge by representation there arises a drastic problem. All 
our knowledge seems dependent upon “the subjective efficient and discursive production of an 
                                                
25 Milbank, Beyond Secular Order, 31. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., 32. 
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image”—meaning that the accuracy of all knowledge is dependent, first, upon a subject that is 
safe from critique itself so as to produce representations that can be counted accurate.30 Second, 
and more importantly, it means that—“for the first time in history,” Milbank insists—the idea of 
an object comes into being. Knowledge of an object is knowledge that is not identical with the 
thing known as it exists. A dangerous abyss between the knower and the thing known opens up. 
This inevitably produces the state of affairs wherein knowledge of even finite things, but 
especially knowledge of metaphysical realities, comes under threat of constant skepticism. The 
problem, therefore, is one of epistemological skepticism and a derelict doctrine of creation. The 
substitution that opens up a horizon of “doubting any intrinsic connection between names and 
things” is the same that “underrates the nobility of the material creation.”31 
 This denigration of our perception of the created order as possessing a particular (perhaps 
one could even say sacramental) “nobility,” results in the turn to the third pillar of modern 
philosophy—which Milbank dubs “possibilism.”32 Critical for our purposes, this substitution has 
to do with the distinction between reality as “gift” and reality as “given.”33 Possibilism, for 
Milbank, denotes the sort of thinking that rejects a participatory metaphysics with its priority of 
the actual in favor of a ontological framework that sees the created order as one possibility 
amongst others, all of which could have been actualized if God had so willed. The real rub of 
possibilism for Milbank, however, is not merely that it eschews participation in its metaphysics 
but that it sees the actuality of the created order as “synchronically shadowed” by the 
“hypostasized logical possibility” from which it came.34 Put plainly, the logical possibility of 
                                                
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid., 33. 
32 Ibid., 35. 
33 Ibid., 38. 
34 Ibid., 37. 
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contingent reality comes to be the deeper reality than the actualization of that possibility. The 
connection to the distinction between gift and given now comes to the fore: If actuality is given 
ontological priority, then the world can be seen as an arriving gift, but if possibility is given 
ontological priority then the world as actual is nothing more than the material instantiation of a 
preceding and “inert” possibility.35 This irrevocably removes the connection between actuality 
and “an infinite mysterious depth” that the finite creation participates in, further eroding the 
sacramental nobility that the created order possessed under thinkers like Aquinas.36  
 Finally, if the stress of the doctrine of creation is no longer on an emanation in keeping 
with God’s perfect act of intellection and subsequently shifts towards a stress upon God’s 
freedom to choose by fiat from one possibility amongst others, then the negotiation between 
divine and human causality takes on a new intensity. The initial substitution of univocity for 
analogy now has profound consequences for how human and divine freedom can be achieved in 
the world. “[T]he more divine freedom is construed in univocal and so ontotheological terms as 
guaranteed by its power to out-compete and trump created freedom, the more—as an indirect 
paradoxical consequence—created freedom is then also granted an autonomous space outside 
divine causation.”37 Univocity now becomes a double-edged sword that degrades, so Milbank 
argues, both divine and human freedom.  
The degradation comes from placing divine and human freedom on the same ontological 
plane, since existence is now something that God and creatures possess in the same manner. 
Within this shared ontological plane, then, the question becomes how God can act without 
destroying human freedom. Not wanting to deny the dignity of the creature as created with free 
                                                
35 Ibid., 38. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid., 42. 
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will, univocalist thinkers, according to Milbank, proposed the causal model of “concurrence.” 
Under this model human freedom was preserved in that univocity made it “possible to think of 
infinite and finite causes as each contributing distinct if unequal shares to any particular causal 
upshot…”38 Contrary to Aquinas, we could now think of divine and human causal concurrence 
as “two horses pulling a barge,” working to create the same effect in a “complementary” way.39  
Yet, the cost of preserving human freedom in this way was that it created a “zero-sum 
game” in which divine and human causes were inevitably seen as competing with one another. 
The terms of the game could only be that “the more of divine, the less of created causality at 
work, and vice versa.”40 The participatory framework, Milbank contends, allowed for the 
possibility of different ontological levels upon which causes could function independently and 
simultaneously in order to produce the same effect. This was the basic standpoint of a tradition 
within theology heavily influenced by Neoplatonism, what Milbank calls the causal mode of 
divine influentia.  
According to this notion, a higher cause in a chain of causes (for example the heat 
and light of the sun as opposed to the nutritive power of the earth) is not nearly a 
(de-metaphorized) external ‘influence’ upon a cause lower down in a causal 
series, which would therefore act as but one ‘factor,’ albeit predominate one, in 
bringing about a certain effect – like a man pushing along a supermarket trolley, 
but being slightly assisted by his toddler son. Instead, the higher cause is ‘flowing 
into’ the entire lower causal scenario, such that it conditions, at a qualitatively 
higher level, both the lower effect and the lower cause, just as the sun’s heat has 
already determined in large part the shapes taken by the surface of the earth which 
allows plants to grow within it.41 
 
The great benefit of this perspective is twofold. First, this model preserves what Milbank sees as 
a remarkably important relationship between matter and form. Second, this model alone 
                                                
38 Ibid., 45. 
39 Ibid., 46-47. 
40 Ibid., 46. 
41 Ibid., 42. 
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preserves, in a similar way to the matter-form relationship, a sort of exchange between God and 
human beings that will be critical to Milbank’s account of the gift still to come. 
 As to the first, Milbank points out that the hierarchical model of higher and lower causes 
gives us a picture of higher causes working “more powerfully” at all levels of the hierarchy in a 
“covert fashion.”42 Higher causes therefore operate “unilaterally” on their own level while 
influencing lower causes by giving rise to a certain sort of “response” on the lower ontological 
planes. This unilateral work can lead one to wrongly privilege higher causes over lower ones in 
our conception of the matter-form relationship. Yet, the distinctly Christian theological 
underpinning of the hierarchical model of causation, so Milbank argues, does not allow for a 
purely unilateral vision of causation, precisely because of the material nature of the created 
order. A certain “reciprocity” obtains between matter and form, provoked by the unilateral 
nature of higher causes, the highest being the act of creation itself. Form and matter bear this 
reciprocity because “matter is only actualised through form, while in the terrestrial sphere form 
can only be realised and ‘individuated’ through material limitation.”43 Matter, therefore, 
“provides only a mysterious field of passive potentiality that limits and so particularises the 
active potential of form in its abstract essential reach.”44 The causal model of divine influentia 
thus preserves a sense of reciprocity between the material instantiations of higher causes while 
avoiding the inevitable prioritizing of the formal over the material that comes with a model of 
causation by concurrence. 
 Second, and more importantly, preserving this sense of reciprocity and unilateral action 
within the same model of causation avoids the degradation of the gift that inevitably comes 
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through the turn to univocity and concurrence. In a footnote Milbank notes the explicit 
connection between “two different and apparently unrelated monisms,” and the inability to 
reconcile “reciprocal exchange” with the zero-sum game of causation by concurrence.45 Under 
the model of divine influentia “reciprocal exchange is unilaterally given from a higher level,” i.e. 
gift-exchange does occur unilaterally but what is given is the very possibility of reciprocal gift-
exchange itself. On the other hand, an “univocalist metaphysics and a merely unilateralist and 
impossibly purist account of the gift” can only envision reciprocal or unilateral exchange but not 
both. Hence, univocal metaphysics and unilateral gift-exchange are inextricably linked and their 
pairing inevitably results in the contamination of the gift.46 I shall say more on this below, but for 
now I note that Milbank’s historical genealogy of the secular explicitly includes not only an 
accounting of heretical missteps in the field of metaphysics but also a direct link between said 
missteps and the disavowal of the possibility of the gift. 
 If we left Milbank’s genealogy of the secular here then his theology would seem to be no 
more than a quibble over certain historical connections between postmodern philosophy and 
medieval theology. But this is decidedly not the extent of his analysis, nor is it all that he thinks 
such analysis reveals. For at the heart of his genealogy of the secular are two seemingly 
irreconcilable and divergent ontologies (both, in fact, are actually theologies) that undergird two 
irreconcilable visions of the polis—one secular, the other sacred. There is either a secular 
ontology of violence whose ontological presuppositions allow for the positing of the political 
apart from theological reference, or there is a Christian ontology of peace whose metaphysics (in 
the good sense) allows for the reality of the gift and the political possibility of reconciliation. 
Hence, it remains to show how the substitutions of univocity, representation, possibilism, and 
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concurrence, when taken together, lead irrevocably to an ontology that has at its root an original 
violence that colors the conditions of the possibility of the political realm. 
 The grave difficulty with the four pillars, according to Milbank, is that they in turn create 
a God in whom human beings could not put their faith. Heidegger’s appraisal of the God of 
ontotheology is clearly being echoed here. Before the God of the nominalist-univocalist cohort, 
best exemplified by Duns Scotus, humanity could neither offer a prayer nor a sacrifice, could not 
bow down on their knees in awe. The devastating critique of postmodern philosophy—Milbank 
mostly has in mind here Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida, and Deleuze—was an inevitable 
outcome of such disastrous theological moves. Yet such critiques do not get beyond the 
fundamental problem of the four pillars. They do not move beyond it, Milbank contends, because 
they leave the basic ontological problem that afflicted these nominalist-univocalist theologies 
still in place, even as they vehemently critiqued Christian theology. The problem they leave in 
place is an ontology that envisions all difference as ultimately irreconcilable. The reality defined 
by such difference is thereby subject to an interminable series of violent conflicts at both an 
ontological and political level. In trying to move beyond the violence done to the other in 
theologies that postmodern philosophers saw as characteristically ontotheological, such critiques 
only managed to enshrine interminable violence within the very heart of finitude. 
 The rise of the secular, thus, is a rise brought on by theological rather than atheistic 
impulses. Milbank famously opened the first chapter of his magnum opus with the severe 
declaration, “Once there was no ‘secular.’”47 The secular had to be “instituted or imagined” and 
this institution was more than just a subtraction story—more, in other words, than a draining 
away of the sacred things from the realm of the profane. The secular was a positive invention 
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that stemmed not from the fading away of religion but from, so Milbank argues, a particular set 
of religious moves, moves which we have just been describing above. The secular did not come 
to be because something was lost through a particularly Christian impulse to denigrate the 
created order in favor of “things of the Spirit,” but rather it was an intra-Christian conflict that 
resulted in a “completely privatized, spiritualized, and transcendentalized” version of the sacred 
which then led to a subsequent vision of “nature, human action and society as a sphere of 
autonomous, sheerly formal power.”48 This theological move was integral in the invention of a 
new object for science—the “political,” posited as a “field of pure power.”49 This object, 
according to the earliest theorists of it (Grotius, Hobbes, Spinoza), was “natural,” since human 
beings share this primacy of will with their creator. Hence, “self-preserving conatus provides the 
universal hermeneutic key for nature and society.”50 Granting primacy to divine freedom as pure 
will thus produces a picture of the natural order that is in keeping with the God who created it—a 
presumed state of nature wherein Adam’s charge of care for the creation is recast as sovereign 
dominium.   
 Critically, however, this object called “the political” was also artificial. The reader will 
recall that Milbank placed a great deal of emphasis on the artificial in his earlier work on Vico, 
and that earlier argument lies behind a great deal of Milbank’s assertions in the opening chapters 
of Theology and Social Theory. Indeed, he makes the connection explicit when he writes, “The 
new political knowledge could rest on the material foundations of conatus, but from then on, the 
knowledge of power was simply a retracing of the paths of human construction, an analysis of 
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factum (the made).”51 It is easy to see why the connection between the factum and the secular 
was made in the first place. What human beings have constructed under the conditions of 
finitude does seem to lend itself, first and foremost, to the realm of pure contingency. Perhaps 
not conflict per se, but surely the constructions of human culture and history lend themselves to a 
conception of the secular—a sphere of ordinary rather than sacred time, if you will. Yet, it is 
precisely this “obvious” connection between the secular and the factum that Milbank wishes to 
vehemently deny from the outset. It might be tempting to suppose that the realm of the made or 
“the instrumental” is rightly cordoned off from theological matters, but Milbank argues that this 
equivalence is foolhardy—like calling poetry something technological, since both are products of 
human work. To identify the secular with the factum, a theological invention had to be carried 
out so as to institute a new vision of what it meant to be human and a new vision of finitude.  
 The theological moves that make an equivalence between the factum and the secular 
possible are, Milbank argues, twofold. First, such degradation of the factum requires an 
anthropology, wherein human beings “when enjoying unrestricted, unimpeded property rights 
and even more when exercising the rights of a sovereignty that ‘cannot bind itself,’ come closest 
to the imago dei.”52 Second, and more importantly, the abandoning of the participatory 
framework that grounded Aquinas’ metaphysics allows for the primary relationship between God 
and human beings to be seen as a “covenantal bond,” which subsequently allows for inter-human 
relations to become “contractual” in nature.53 Milbank explicitly links both these moves to the 
four pillars of modern philosophy. It is only under a univocal conception of Being, one in which 
“there is an arena of ‘sheer’ human freedom in response to grace,” since God and creatures share 
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existence in the same manner, that creates such a vision of the factum as free from any real 
influence of or participation in God. As Milbank puts it, “This is the space in which there can be 
a ‘secular,’ or secular knowledge of the secular—and it is just as fictional as all other human 
topographies.”54 In sum, it was a political theology, one concerned primarily with crafting a 
vision of creation but which also carried with it a theological anthropology “for which human 
willfulness, in certain circumstances, guarantees divine origin,” that invented the theoretical 
conditions that made the new science of politics possible.55 
 The new study of “political economy” would expand this work, for Milbank, beyond the 
individual will and into the very makeup of society itself. Human collaboration, rather than 
coming to be seen as a natural tendency towards union, was seen rather as a sort of theodicy and 
agonistics: theodicy, because the providence of God directs the continual conflict of the 
economic realm towards the greater good of humankind, thus defending God's goodness from 
charges of complicity in economic evils; and agonistics because what was needed was not a 
toning down of this interminable conflict within the political realm but rather an embrace of 
conflict via Machiavellian political virtu. This argument brings to completion, in a sense, the 
basic analysis of the object of political science. The “political” as a field of pure power now just 
is the various conflicts and collaborations of human society. The primacy of the social—defined 
in an entirely secular way—now comes to be seen as a foundational assumption of all legitimate 
humanistic discourses, including theology. Even more importantly, the ontology at the root of the 
new fields of political science and political economy is a vision of reality that presupposes 
conflict as original to all creation. Milbank can thus paint the entirety of secular thought as 
dependent upon this original or ontological violence for the institution of its theoretical purview.   
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 The early modern thinkers who institute this new space for knowledge called the 
“secular,” Milbank argues, commit two fatal errors, errors that will inevitably lead to the 
devastating critiques of postmodern philosophers. First, they allow the God of univocal being 
(which Milbank thinks is also the god of ontotheology) to ground their justification of the 
secular’s independence. Second, within their supposedly self-contained arguments with regards 
to the political, they presume as a foundation the self-presence of the subject based on the 
defunct theological anthropology of Adam’s dominium. The God of univocal being came under 
harsh scrutiny from a criticism we have already encountered, namely Heidegger’s critique of 
ontotheology. The second came under severe criticism by Derrida, among others, as grounding 
itself in a notion of subjectivity that was untenable.   
 As we saw in Chapter Two, Chauvet largely agrees with their criticisms of ontotheology 
and the self-presence of the Cartesian subject. He joined them in affirming that the God of 
ontotheology is not one in which believers can put their faith. He also joined these critics in their 
contention that what is most true about the human subject is not presence to self but rather a 
symbolic otherness—an identity not in contrast to alterity but rather by means of alterity. 
Sacramental theology and the overcoming of metaphysics, along with, to a certain extent, the 
critique of the subject, were said to be homologous in attitude. Chauvet thus incorporates 
positive aspects of the thought of philosophers like Heidegger and Derrida into his sacramental 
theology so as to construct the “axis of language and symbol” that undergirded his account of the 
Eucharist.56  
 Milbank shares Chauvet’s admiration for the critiques of philosophers like Heidegger, 
Derrida, and others. He takes the demolition of both the god of ontotheology and the self-
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presence of the subject to be necessary critiques of untenable arguments.57 Where he decidedly 
does not share Chauvet’s enthusiasm is on the value of such thinkers’ substantive counter-claims 
for the theological enterprise. Milbank puts the impasse in characteristically stark terms: The 
ontology of difference, characteristic of these postmodern accounts, turns out to be nothing more 
than a mythology that is the “least self-deluded, self-description of the secular.”58 Since it is 
nothing more than a self-description of the secular, the same choice faces the theologian from the 
outset: Theology cannot “contest or learn from [secular ‘scientific’] understanding as such, but 
has either to accept or deny its object.”59 Chauvet, so Milbank would argue, has attempted in his 
own way to contest the conclusions of thinkers like Heidegger and Derrida, while accepting the 
legitimacy of the objects of their discourse. For Milbank this is already to contaminate theology 
with an ontology of violence and, thus, to render it heretical. Ontologies of difference and the 
theology of the Cross cannot possess a “homology of attitude.” The ontology of difference must 
be denied and countered with an ontology of peace. Theology, in order to be properly 
theological, must set its own course as a “metadiscourse,” a discourse that explicates the 
conditions for the possibility of discourse, a metadiscourse that no longer has to “take account” 
of the findings and perspectives of secularity in order to be counted as a legitimate academic 
inquiry.60 Thus, we now turn to Milbank’s criticism of the philosophical project of overcoming 
metaphysics that occupied a central role for Chauvet’s sacramental theology. 
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Heidegger Made Strange: Theology Beyond the Homology of Attitude 
 We began Chapter Two by examining the ways in which Chauvet’s foundational 
theology of sacramentality saw between itself and the Heideggerian project of overcoming 
metaphysics a “homology of attitude” and the implications this shared attitude had for a 
subsequent account of the ontological and political scandal of the Eucharist. Heidegger and 
Derrida (among others), with their insistence upon absence, difference, writing, and 
indispensability of language for thought, radically altered the ways in which a theologian could 
begin to think of the Eucharist. For Chauvet, their work did not pose a challenge so much as an 
opportunity to rescue theology from the dangers of modernity, the pinnacle of which was 
ontotheology. Under ontotheology, language came to be seen as nothing but a mere instrument, 
the gift came to be ignored in favored of market exchange, and sacramental grace, worst of all, 
came to be seen solely under the modality of causation.61 When faced with the challenges of 
postmodern philosophy, a theology so imbued with these ontotheological presuppositions can 
only but wilt as philosophy announces the death of the god of ontotheology, who served as such 
theologies’ foundation. In order to think properly the twofold scandal of the Eucharist, to which 
all theology must return, Chauvet draws on such postmodern critiques as the necessary remedy 
for the pastoral and theoretical challenges facing the Church today. 
 Not surprisingly, Milbank and Chauvet engage ontotheology quite differently. If there is 
a single argumentative move that sheds light on this vast difference it is that Chauvet thinks 
Christian theology, including Thomas Aquinas, had, prior to the postmodern turn, accepted 
ontotheological presuppositions as foundational for theology. Milbank flatly and trenchantly 
denies that this is the case, particularly for Aquinas but also for a broader current of theology that 
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runs up to the postmodern turn. The two thinkers agree that a theological critique of 
ontotheology opens out into a properly Christian vision of the universe as sacramental. 
However, Milbank’s project, though utterly critical of modernity, is also an apologetic on behalf 
of the Christian tradition against accusations like those that Chauvet embraces. Milbank insists, 
in other words, that Christian theology alone was uniquely able to resist ontotheology before, 
during, and after metaphysical thinking came to its apex in the period we now call modernity. 
Hence, his aim in Theology and Social Theory, as well as his subsequent volume of collected 
essays The Word Made Strange, is to show how it is that this strand of Christian thought 
maintained its hold as orthodox over against ontotheology. Even more importantly, Milbank 
aims to show how this current of theology free from ontotheology must be recovered as a mode 
of thinking that can truly earn the names post-modern and post-metaphysical. The essential 
claims from Milbank that we shall have to get hold of are the following: (1) that the project of 
overcoming metaphysics as Heidegger framed it is just another ontology of violence that 
Christian theology must reject and (2) rather than succumbing to ontotheological 
presuppositions, Christian theology sustained a current of thought that was uniquely able to resist 
such presuppositions so long as it remained properly orthodox. I shall treat these claims in turn. 
 Milbank’s entire engagement with ontologies of difference is meant to show that too 
much has been made of their critique of metaphysics. There is a great deal in their critiques that 
Milbank himself agrees with and, not only that, much that he believes theology should embrace. 
The important thing is to nuance the implications of those critiques for Christian theology, a 
discourse that inevitably must deal with matters beyond (meta) the physical.   
The strategy, therefore, which the theologian should adopt, is that of showing that 
the critique of presence, substance, the idea, the subject, causality, thought-
before-expression, and realist representation do not necessarily entail the critique 
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of transcendence, participation, analogy, hierarchy, teleology and the Platonic 
good, reinterpreted by Christianity as identical with Being.62 
 
The first series of topics we might call the purview of metaphysics under the conditions of the 
secular, but the latter series of topics fall under the purview of Christian metaphysics, where 
“metaphysics” no longer carries the pejorative connotation it does for Chauvet. Milbank can still 
recommend that metaphysics be overcome, but this overcoming will not occur in the way that it 
did for Heidegger and, consequently, for Chauvet, i.e. by viewing secular metaphysics as a 
necessary stage in the destiny of Being. Such metaphysics were a mistake and, even more 
importantly, the perspective that would see in metaphysics a step in a larger progression will be 
infected with untenable presuppositions from the very start. 
 Those presuppositions are that of what Milbank has been calling “ontological violence.” 
This, for him, is where the nihilist critique of theology which he identifies with the work of 
Heidegger and Derrida among others, ultimately founders. Milbank’s hermeneutic strategy, 
therefore, “far from just denying the nihilist critique, or leaving it altogether intact, points out an 
unexpected fissure traversing its blank face of refusal. This fissure is opened up precisely at the 
point where the nihilist critique passes over into a differential ontology, with its presupposition 
of transcendental violence.”63 There is an ironic reversal of argumentative moves here, in that 
where Chauvet used Heidegger to redefine what was most real about reality for the would-be 
partaker of the Eucharist, so Milbank attempts a similar move by denying the supposed merit of 
Heidegger’s phenomenological analysis. His reading of the Heideggerian project thus attempts to 
expose “the critical non-necessity of the reading of reality as conflictual,” and, even more 
importantly, he points out that even Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, as an ontology of 
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difference, is “hopelessly metaphysical.”64 The new vision of that which is most original to 
reality is no longer conflict, violence, or force. Rather, “an alternative possibility of reading 
reality as of itself peaceful is gradually opened to view, and the notions of transcendence, 
participation, analogy, hierarchy, teleology and the Platonic Good will be shown to belong 
inextricably to this reading.”65 Milbank will thus partially affirm “the postmodern reduction of 
substance to transition” (recall Heidegger’s notion of Being as “unconcealment,” explained in 
Chapter One) but will then radically question “the reading of transition as conflict.”66  
 Milbank begins by suggesting that Heidegger’s critique of ontotheology in favor of the 
“irreducible questionableness of the relation of beings to Being” presents a problem. The 
problem is that this particular reading of the ontological difference is not able to secure for itself 
the privileged status that Heidegger seems to suggest it possesses by default.67 In other words, 
the choice to read the ontological difference in the Heideggerian way seems just as much a 
positive choice as to read the difference in another way, regardless of how deleterious to thinking 
the truth of Being such an alternative might appear to Heidegger. An alternative reading of the 
ontological difference, Milbank contends, is not even undermined by Heidegger’s reading of 
Dasein as defined, existentially, by its historicity, mortality, linguistic nature. It seems “the 
necessity for commitment to some historical tradition, to some mode of linguistic ordering, 
suggests rather that we must always see our preferred finite stance, which otherwise would be 
sheerly arbitrary, as a particularly privileged key to Being itself.”68 In short, Milbank reads the 
early Heidegger in a “meta-critical” way to show that Heidegger has already given an “answer to 
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the question of Being which is as arbitrary, and as metaphysical, as any other cultural or 
philosophical reply.”69 
 The same applies to the later Heidegger. Indeed, Milbank reads Heidegger’s 
abandonment of the hermeneutical circle in favor of the turn to language as an attempt to 
alleviate some of the vulnerability of his original account. Here, however, we come to the vital 
aspect of Heidegger’s work that Milbank sees as joining the project of overcoming metaphysics 
with ontological violence. The earlier Heidegger thought that Dasein’s “care” was the “unique 
site of the opening of Being,” but now this is displaced in favor of the sheer happening of Being 
in and through our linguistic belonging together. Heidegger thus “pursues the near-impossible 
task of occupying the vantage point of the repetition of Being itself, its endless happenings as the 
‘difference’ of various historical epochs.”70 Hence, what comes to be central, not only to 
understanding the essence of Dasein but also of encountering the truth of Being in language, is 
an attempt to understand “what lets Being be in this difference.”71 What matters is not so much 
the happening of Being but the happening of Being as difference. Ultimately, for Milbank, this 
means that difference becomes “the sole ‘transcendental,” such that our a priori picture of the 
world assumes “that a radical heterogeneity, incompatibility, non-hierarchy and arbitrariness 
pertain amongst every knowable thing.”72 This is just another way of saying, as Heidegger often 
does, that our experience of everyday, ontic phenomena conceals the appearance of Being. Here 
Milbank pounces: 
There is therefore a kind of primordial violence at work here, which can only be 
countered by a mode of interpretation which is itself a ‘doing violence’ 
(gewaltsamkeit), and which follows the opposite course from the ‘falling tendency 
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of Being and of customary understanding’…Heidegger is, of course, right to insist 
that the ontological difference can never be held up for our inspection: if beings 
are entirely constituted by their relationship to Being, then this is not a 
relationship we can survey, and Being remains forever absent, forever concealed 
behind its presentation in the temporal series of beings. However, to give this 
concealment the overtones of dissimulation, of violence, of a necessary 
suppression, is an entirely different matter.73  
 
In other words, the account of reality that Heidegger seems to embrace in his turn to difference is 
one that views reality itself as agonistic. At the very root of Being itself is a deep conflict, hence 
Milbank’s term, “ontological violence.” 
 Milbank argues that the situation does not have to be this way. We do not have to read 
difference as conflict, and the decision to do so is ultimately arbitrary, not logically or 
existentially necessary. More importantly, Milbank claims that it is not difficult to see a clear 
link in our political history from ontologies of violence to political theories that endorse the use 
of force to settle interminable conflict. Hobbes is perhaps the most well known example of this. 
Without a sovereign power to compel human beings into peaceful collaboration through fear of 
punishment humankind would exist forever in the state of nature, constantly at war with one 
another, a “nasty, brutish, and short” existence.74 An account like this can only be taken as 
legitimate if it is first grounded in a vision of reality as itself interminable conflict. Hence, 
combating ontological violence is both a philosophical and a political work.  
 As I have already said, there can be no “homology of attitude” between the project of 
overcoming metaphysics and Christian theology. We might say that even overcoming 
metaphysics must be “overcome” by re-establishing theology’s place of authority as a 
metadiscourse, a discourse beyond the limitations and standards of a philosophy pre-determined 
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by ontological violence. The counter-ontology that asserts its legitimacy beyond the conditions 
of ontological violence is referred to by Milbank simply as theology. Hence, as the title of one of 
his seminal essays says, “Only Theology Overcomes Metaphysics.”75 Milbank attempts to 
establish the titular thesis via a critical dialogue with French phenomenologist (and arguably a 
theologian in his own right), Jean-Luc Marion.  
 Milbank finds that this position doesn’t go far enough, particularly, and this is where a 
comparison to Chauvet is quite telling, with regard to Marion’s reading of Aquinas. Indeed, 
where Chauvet read Aquinas as inadvertently playing into the hands of ontotheology, Milbank 
reads Aquinas as the very solution to ontotheology’s ills. Marion notably strikes up a 
conciliatory tone in the preface to the English edition of God Without Being with regards to his 
reading of Aquinas. For in saying that God must be without or beyond Being, Marion seems to 
run roughshod over one of Aquinas’ central theses—namely, that God is pure esse. Marion 
explicitly denies this and argues that Aquinas himself saw the difference between God’s pure 
esse and the Being of creation, or the ens commune. Milbank thus argues that Marion was right 
to take seriously “Heidegger’s diagnosis of modernity as the consummation of metaphysics 
which fulfills the will-to-know objects as the will-to-power over nature, including human 
beings.”76 He explicitly links this recognition to ontotheology since it follows that “metaphysics 
has a fundamental onto-theological constitution, such that the highest being, or first cause, is 
identified as a perfect instance of what is fundamentally knowable, namely a ‘being.’”77 But 
Milbank thinks that Marion shies away from the “obvious inference” that follows from this 
diagnosis of modernity’s ills. In particular, Milbank holds that Marion shies away from the 
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superior insights of Thomas Aquinas in that “if Christian theology prior to Scotus avoided onto-
theology (metaphysics), then this was because it was able to elucidate the hidden manifestness of 
God in terms of the hidden manifestness of Being in beings.”78 In other words, it was the power 
of analogy that allowed the Christian tradition to see that the hidden manifestness of Being in 
beings was only comprehensible in so far as Being participated as the ens commune in the pure 
esse of the Triune God as its source. Far from covering over the ontological difference between 
Being and beings, Christian theology (prior to Scotus, of course) managed to take stock of this 
difference with rigor. 
 In what sense then can only theology overcome metaphysics? Here we come upon one of 
Milbank’s most controversial claims, both as an interpreter of Thomas Aquinas and as a 
theological proposition, namely, that theology evacuates metaphysics. By “evacuates” Milbank 
means that theology enters into the conversation about philosophy’s supposed proper object and 
takes that object away such that nothing remains “inside” philosophy’s purview, so to speak. In 
other words, theology, if conceived of properly, abolishes the supposed independence of 
metaphysics. Nothing remains for metaphysics to analyze or to claim as subject to its standards 
of inquiry alone. Metaphysics is emptied, hence, “evacuated.” 
How does Milbank establish this thesis? Tellingly for our comparison, he does so 
primarily through the work of Thomas Aquinas.79 I want to briefly rehearse this reading here for 
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on the subject that opens: “In this short paper, I am going to be rude about John Milbank.” I take 
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several reasons. The first is that it reveals the significance that interpreting Aquinas’ theological-
philosophical framework has on both Chauvet’s and Milbank’s later accounts of the Eucharist. 
Second, it shows the vast importance of the break between Chauvet and Milbank for a 
theological ontology—an account of the real as real that is situated in theological rather than 
merely philosophical presuppositions. Both thinkers share this argumentative structure but reach 
dramatically opposed conclusions. Finally, it is vital to retell Milbank’s initial read of Thomas’ 
system because it establishes the framework through which Milbank will read the importance of 
the Incarnation for both the ontological and political scandals of the Eucharist.  
 In the “most usual” interpretation, Aquinas is often thought of as the champion for the 
value of philosophy as an independent inquiry into the truths of the world, while maintaining that 
the proper purview of theology was rational reflection on and through revelation.80 Philosophy 
could not learn the truth of revelation on its own—i.e., by the power of reason alone—but it 
could, so Aquinas argued, lead one up to the truth of God’s existence as creator of the world.81 
Aquinas seems, based on a relatively simple attempt at exegesis, to advocate just as strongly for 
the independence of philosophy as Scotus, despite Milbank’s harangue of the latter. Yet, 
Milbank has little trust in this “exegesis” and, instead, offers an “interpretation” of Aquinas that 
                                                                                                                                                       
the import of the following section to be much the same as my retelling of Milbank on Scotus—
one must understand how Milbank uses Thomas to accomplish his theoretical aims. Hence, my 
positive telling of Milbank’s interpretation of Aquinas should not be seen as an uncritical 
endorsing of his reading. See DeHart, Aquinas and Radical Orthodoxy; Lawrence Paul 
Hemming, “Quod Impossible Est! Aquinas and Radical Orthodoxy,” in Radical Orthodoxy: A 
Catholic Enquiry, ed. Lawrence Paul Hemming (London: Routledge, 2000) 76-98; and Nicholas 
Lash, “Where Does Holy Teaching Leave Us?: Questions on Milbank’s Aquinas” Modern 
Theology 15, no. 4 (1999): 433-44. 
80 John Milbank & Catherine Pickstock, Truth in Aquinas (London: Routledge, 2001), 19. This is 
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The Cambridge Companion to Thomas Aquinas, ed. Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 232-51. 
81 See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q. 2.  
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will attempt to show this reading of the Thomist system as false.82 Milbank’s alternative reading 
of Aquinas attempts to show just the opposite, namely, that Aquinas grants philosophy no 
independence as a science from the discourse of revealed theology, even that revealed theology 
evacuates metaphysics of any claim to truth without reference to the truth of theology.  
   Milbank’s strong reading of Aquinas begins with the metaphysical distinction I’ve 
already mentioned above. The proper object of metaphysics as a science is not the pure act of 
Being that God just is but rather the ens commune, or the common finite being that creatures 
share. Now, perhaps to offer a helpful contrast to what is about to come, several rival Cambridge 
theologians, most notably Nicolas Lash, held that what ontology and metaphysics now must 
mean, given Aquinas’s framework, is a sort of grammar that would keep theological predication 
from beginning in a state of absolute non-sense.83 Ontology, from this perspective, is something 
like the rules of what it means to make sense when speaking in the finite plane and of finite 
things.84 Milbank rejects this perspective for reasons we have already articulated above. Any sort 
of “grammar,” he argues, is just another prior schematization that usurps the true authority of 
theology to narrate both the conditions of finite meaning-making and the makeup of the social as 
such. To consent to such an arrangement is to cede authority to a neutral, univocal ontology from 
the outset. 
                                                
82 Milbank & Pickstock, Truth in Aquinas, 20. 
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 Hence, Thomas must mean something different. Milbank, thus, points out that creatures 
share the ens commune because it is “entirely secondary and created.”85 It does not, in other 
words, have to do with the natures and essences of creatures nor does it concern the causes of 
Being or the causes of creatures since those cannot adhere in matter. When this newly restricted 
metaphysics seeks to inquire, as any science would, into the cause of its object, however, it is left 
bereft of resources to answer this question apart from the higher science of sacra doctrina as 
Aquinas himself states in the opening question of the Summa Theologica. To make matters even 
more difficult, Milbank’s Aquinas holds that all sciences, apart from sacra doctrina, are limited 
solely to argumentation through genus and species. Revealed theology, however, is 
“transgeneric,” in that it transcends the typical categories of philosophical argumentation. Not 
only does it do this, however, it subsumes them under itself, in that it uniquely can “judge the 
conclusions of all subordinate sciences.”86 It occupies this “transgeneric” place of authority 
precisely because its object is beyond the ens commune, which is the purview of all other 
sciences. The object of the science of sacra doctrina is the divine esse, itself the ultimate 
“transgeneric,” that, through its transcending of typical categories of finitude, “can in principle 
further illuminate being in all its instantiations.”87  
 Put a bit more plainly, Milbank seems to read Aquinas as saying that there is no way of 
comprehending finite being without reference to that in which being participates, that through 
which it is. Our knowledge of finitude, gained solely as participants in the infinite Being of God, 
requires “an inchoate presupposition of the divine archetype of being” in order to get off the 
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ground in the first place.88 Hence, metaphysics possesses in itself the tendency to “evacuate” 
itself, almost as a structure of its own possibility as a science. This is not something theology 
imposes upon metaphysics by fiat. Rather, metaphysics functions as a discourse only by being 
first grasped by the infinite as the horizon for the comprehension of finitude, and knowledge of 
the infinite, as Aquinas would surely agree, requires divine initiative, since knowledge of the 
infinite is fundamentally a revealed knowledge. Metaphysics thus collapses in on itself, as it is 
incapable of getting its project going without recourse to something gained only through 
submission to theology, and, even once this is given, metaphysics can only operate properly by 
reference to a presupposition that undermines its independence from theology. To bring things 
back to Chauvet, the insistence that the theology of the Cross is homologous in attitude with 
overcoming metaphysics is to turn the theology of the Cross into something chimerical, Milbank 
would argue. To say that theology shares an attitude with a particular metaphysical project, even 
as anti-metaphysical as Heidegger’s project is, would be nonsensical for Milbank. There is no 
legitimate object for the project of overcoming metaphysics to claim that is not always already 
under theology’s purview to the extent that the former dissolves into the latter. Milbank’s project 
thus orients itself in a way utterly opposed to Chauvet’s initial vision for the relationship 
between theology and philosophy. 
   
Milbank on Language 
 What remains, therefore, is to apply Milbank’s conception of the relationship between 
theology and philosophy to the vital categories of language and gift so as to lay the foundation 
for Milbank’s later use of these categories in his theology of the Eucharist. We saw above the 
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way in which Chauvet’s homology of attitude between the project of overcoming metaphysic 
and Chauvet’s fundamental theology of sacramentality stemmed from a particular view of 
language and symbol. We also saw the way such homology of attitude helped Chauvet to link the 
particular gift-giving relation between God and human beings as communicating sacramental 
grace to the more general anthropological principle of symbolic exchange.  I turn now, therefore, 
to Milbank’s unique account of language and the gift, with an eye both to the ways in which such 
novelties will shape Milbank’s account of the Eucharist but also to the way in which such 
conceptions of language and gift differ strikingly from those we have already seen in Chauvet. 
 The reader will recall from Chapter One that postmodern critiques of theology centered 
on the linguistic nature of the human being. Heidegger’s turn to language as the house of Being 
and Derrida’s turn to writing as the inescapable mediation at the heart of all human meaning 
posed urgent questions with regards to fundamental claims of theology. Chauvet, the reader will 
also recall, saw these critiques as a grand opportunity for Christian theology to appropriate these 
critiques as unique resources for theology’s aid. If all truth is written truth, i.e. signs ever 
supplemented by embodied mediation that guards any access to the original “presence” behind 
them, then embracing that is the key not only to remaining relevant in a postmodern world but 
also to understanding the very truth of the Gospel. Christian theology, it turns out, does not 
collapse but thrive once it embraces the radically linguistic nature of human meaning-making.  
 Milbank’s account of language bears a striking similarity to Chauvet’s, and the two can 
be read as advocating the same basic understanding of the importance of language for Christian 
theology. In short, both believe, as Milbank puts it, that “Christianity can become ‘internally’ 
postmodern in a way that may not be possible for every religion or ideology.”89 Milbank might 
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agree with Chauvet, in other words, that there is a deep affinity between orthodoxy and the 
linguistic turn in philosophy. His thesis is not that these projects share an attitude but rather that 
the supposedly novel conclusions to which poststructuralists arrive through language were 
actually already to be found in currents of thought within Christian orthodoxy: “the post-modern 
embracing of a radical linguisticality, far from being a ‘problem’ for traditional Christianity, has 
always been secretly promoted by it.”90 Much like the evacuation of metaphysics, Milbank 
intends to show that the linguistic turn experiences something like an analogous evacuation—
when properly seen in the light of theology, the linguistic turn has very little to say that is not, in 
the end, something already proffered by theology and rightly under its purview. 
 Securing the legitimacy of the claim that Christian orthodoxy secretly promoted the 
linguistic turn since the Church Fathers requires, just as for Milbank’s Aquinas, subtle 
“interpretation” rather than full-bore exegesis. Milbank largely relies on reading certain 
argumentative moves as aligning with a later spirit of thought that would guide the linguistic turn 
to its apex. Christian thought moves, over a time, from “a ‘rationalist’ to a more and more 
‘mystical’ conception of language,” and these maneuvers “accompany the first ‘linguistic turn’ 
in modern thought.” For example, while the early Church Fathers seem to have embraced a 
purely instrumental view of the nature of language, Milbank notes that they used such a 
conception of language as a rebuff to pagan conceptions of language, which saw language as 
having divine rather than human origins. The Church Fathers may have mistakenly read 
language as instrumental, Milbank says, but they did succeed in reading language as a properly 
human phenomenon, a vital part of the factum to which, as we have already seen, Vico would 
devote considerable attention. 
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 Milbank’s short encyclopedia of this theological-linguistic turn runs from thinkers like 
Gregory of Nyssa to Augustine, Vico to Berkeley, Hamann to Herder, showing the ways in 
which Christian thought slowly inched closer and closer to an account of language as constitutive 
for thought and a disintegration of the res/signum distinction. Yet, even in its earliest beginnings, 
these theologians were haunted by the possibility of radical skepticism, in that their initial aim 
was to assert the human origin of language. For the motivation behind giving language a divine 
rather than human origin was the accompanying boon of a secure foundation for theological 
claims. If all language, at its root, was nothing other than human creation, then it could be argued 
(Hobbes, yet again, is Milbank’s favorite example of this) that religious language is nothing 
more than a catachresis of root words that express only the most basic sensory phenomena. 
Through the exponential increase of figures of speech, the purely sensory object of those root 
words is forgotten and spiritual excesses accrue that have no real grounding in language. One 
way to combat this, therefore, was to suppose that God gave to Adam language, thus securing the 
legitimacy of those spiritual excesses in language that a purely materialist perspective would see 
as defections.  
 Yet, Milbank begs us consider the merits of an alternative and, indeed, “impossible 
reflection,” namely, “is it somehow the case that polysemy, irreducible semiotic difference, the 
necessity of language for thought, which carry such “relativizing implications, are themselves 
relative to a particular, ultimately religious culture?”91 Milbank balks at claiming this fully—
these currents of thought are objective on their own, apart from Christian culture. But Milbank 
does note, vitally, that these cultural realities that now define our current moment as postmodern 
are not “accepted in a vacuum.” In other words, Christian thought irrevocably shaped the cultural 
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milieu in which the linguistic turn came to be possible in the first place. Here Chauvet and 
Milbank strike, yet again, a seemingly harmonious accord: Christian thought and the turn to 
language do, in fact, travel along adjacent if not “homologous” trajectories.  
 Yet, Milbank’s conciliatory tone does not last for long. For what this turn to language 
within theology reveals is a similarity to structuralism: “Just as, for structuralists, a novel is 
ultimately ‘about’ its self-constitution as a novel, so theology has only ever really been ‘about’ 
its own possibility as theology, as ‘divine language.’”92 The turn to language in theology, thus, is 
not an attempt to correlate questions unique to culture with theological answers. Rather, there is 
something inherent to theology that gives rise to these questions. “[I]f it is true that Trinitarian 
thought has intermittently found it possible to think the truth of polysemy and the original 
‘totemic’ apprehension of being, then this is only because it is also a ‘metasemiotic’ concerned to 
think the possibility of polysemy, and the real character of differential substitution.”93 Christian 
tradition reveals that far from begrudgingly admitting the validity of the suspicion of a 
metaphysics of substance, Trinitarian thought as a “metaphysics/metasemiotics of relation” 
forces theology to confront the necessity of language for thought and the differential flux 
inherent in an ontology oriented around a collapse of the distinction between sign and thing.94  
 The seeming adjacency, therefore, between Trinitarian thought and postmodern semiotics 
turn out to be the very terms of a conflict, not a homology. Rather than reading their side-by-side 
trajectories as complementary, Milbank reads them as indicating a fundamental separation 
between the terms upon which those trajectories travel. Their similarity is undeniable in that 
“Christian theology has been able, like skeptical postmodernism, to think unlimited semiosis,” 
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but their ultimate conflict lies at the level of meta-semiosis, or the conditions that make semiosis 
possible in the first place. As we saw above with regards to ontological violence, postmodern 
thought sees unlimited semiosis “in terms of a necessary suppression, betrayal, or subversion” 
inherent in the presence of “signified absence.”95 Christian thought, as we have seen, must, out 
of faithfulness to its own view of reality, flatly deny such a vision of semiosis.  
For theology, and theology alone, difference remains real difference since it is not 
subordinate to immanent univocal process or the fate of a necessary suppression. 
Instead, the very possibility of substitutive transference is here held to be a 
peaceful affirmation of the other, consummated in a transcendent infinity. And the 
seeming arbitrariness of the ‘next step’ in this process of referral is held to be 
governed by an aesthetic rule which transcends the polarity of the same-and-
determined over against the contingent-and-heterogeneous. Otherwise both 
chance and determination, or difference hypostasized, still present us with the 
antique aspect of substance, our always ‘understood’ futility.96 
 
Theology alone is able to think the social as a realm in which true harmony is possible because it 
brings to the table (no pun intended) ontological presuppositions that do not rule out such unity-
in-difference from the start. The same principle applies to semiosis, wherein theology alone is 
able to embrace the infinite play of signifiers, the dissemination of sense, and the deferral of the 
sign without giving away all possibility of meaning or transcendence. On this, both Chauvet and 
Milbank are in agreement.   
 Yet, a vital contrast has emerged here between Milbank and Chauvet. For Chauvet, the 
decision to embrace the alterity and absence of postmodern semiosis was rooted in what he saw 
as an inability to think adequately the theological implications of the Cross. Starting theology at 
the Pasch of Christ, with the divine life made actual in a human life subject to death, revealed the 
fundamental homology between postmodern theories of radical linguisticality and the Christian 
attempt to think the implications of Jesus’ cry of dereliction. God’s presence, as both postmodern 
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semiosis and a theology of the Cross would tell us, must be experienced as the presence of 
absence. In stark contrast to this, Milbank holds that the point of origin for Christian thought 
must be the primordially creative perichoresis that is the divine esse, in which all being 
participates and from which is derived the possibility of all truth.97 Postmodern theories of 
language are no threat to Christian thought because Christian thought, uniquely, is able to think 
an ontology of difference that is not subject to interminable conflict and inscrutable absence. 
Instead, the deferral of the sign into an infinite play that is itself transcendent is precisely what 
one should expect from a world that only exists by participating in the divine life that is itself the 
infinite deflection of desire, as Rowan Williams has put it.98 Postmodern theories of language, in 
other words, have only discovered that which Christian orthodoxy has already (though, in a 
seemingly secret sense) promoted through its first principles. Milbank and Chauvet both see 
Christianity as uniquely able to cope with the dramatic epistemic challenges of postmodernity, 
but only Milbank believes Christianity is able to think beyond them. 
 
Milbank on Gift 
 At this point, I might characterize the portion of Milbank’s position that I have thus far 
presented as follows: Secular politics are based in a problematic ontology that sees conflict as 
ontologically interminable and, thus, only manageable by force. This ontology also extends into 
accounts of language that would see the radically linguistic nature of human existence not as 
something that constitutes the subject but rather as something that renders the subject entirely 
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diffuse. Categories like the subject, meaning, or truth can subsequently only be thought in 
reference to the same interminable flux of conflict through which “the political” itself was 
conceived. Hence, postmodern theories of language also emphasize interminable semiotic 
conflict, but these same theories see the end result not as a sovereign management of force but 
rather as an inherent violence in all attempts at meaning making. Rather than granting such 
presuppositions from the start, the task of theology, and a task theology must undertake in order 
to gain its independence from such discourses, is to reject the legitimacy of this ontological 
outlook from the outset. Language and the political must be rethought in terms of participation 
and analogy such that the flux and difference that postmodern thought has rightly brought to the 
forefront are not conceived of as necessarily and absolutely violent, thereby rendering a theology 
of Creation, Incarnation, or Resurrection invalid before it can even be proffered. In short, a 
theological ontology of peace rather than a secular ontology of violence would not only 
scandalize secular conceptions of the political but also postmodern accounts of radical semiosis. 
 Milbank now adds a third object to the purview of theology, just as Chauvet did, by 
bringing forward the problem of the gift. As we will see below, the debate surrounding the 
possibility of gift is also beset by the same ontological and political morass as ontology and 
language were. The gift stands as both a way of viewing reality—reality as gift rather than as 
given—and as a way of transforming politics—an economics based in gift-exchange over an 
economics based in accumulation of capital, for example. Hence, Milbank will attempt a similar 
maneuver with regards to the problematic of gift as he has thus far with his genealogy of the 
secular and his riposte to postmodern accounts of language—namely, to show how Christian 
theology is able uniquely to think the problematic of the gift without its resting in the irresolution 
it seems to entail. Christian theology can not only think the aporia of the gift, but also think 
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beyond it. Christian theology, therefore, can offer a “purified” gift-exchange that allows for gift 
to once again come to the fore as an ontological and political category. Ultimately, this will 
render possible a reading of the Eucharist as both an ontological and political scandal (more on 
this in Chapter Five). 
 The reader will recall from Chapter One that the gift came to serve as a problematic for 
postmodern thought precisely because of the remarkable confluence between language, being, 
and the gift. This confluence was predominantly located around the notion of “the present” or 
“presence” which occupied the thought of Heidegger and Derrida to a great extent. Heidegger’s 
turn to language as that through which Being gives its truth to beings revealed the fundamental 
connection for later postmodern thought of language and donation (es gibt). The present moment 
turns out to be, if we would but turn our attention back to the “nearest of the nearest,” the place 
in which Being’s truth presents itself to us as gift.  
 Derrida, the reader will also recall, challenged the very coherence of gift-giving from a 
phenomenological perspective. The gift was the impossible, and it was the impossible precisely 
because the gift could not appear. Once the receiver recognized the gift as a gift, the purely dis-
interested nature of its reception was canceled. They now owed a debt to the giver. More 
importantly, this aporia imbued the intentions of the giver as well. Unless the giver was entirely 
disinterested and gave without reserve, then the gift was only a covert form of a contract. The 
gift, therefore, came to function as a site of unmeaning upon which all of our subsequent 
meaning was generated. The gift becomes, for Derrida, something like a Kantian limit on our 
knowledge—a limit that even in being thought as limit places us beyond the limit. The gift 
cannot appear as gift, but the structure of the gift as impossible is analogous to the structure of 
Being as differánce or arche-writing. In its very attempt to show itself it is covered over or 
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canceled, just as the present moment is irretrievably lost to the past as soon as it appears. The 
impossibility of the gift, therefore, is essential to Derrida’s deconstructive enterprise.99 
 We have already seen the reasons why such ontologies of difference are unsatisfactory 
for Milbank, and so his task at present will be to show how a Christian ontology alone can 
recover gift-exchange in the here and now as more than just an impossibility. For if the only gift 
actually given, as Derrida suggests, is the passage of time, then despite his constant appeals to 
infinite hospitality the only thing that can be given is nothing, since Being as present ultimately 
is not.100 Hence, Milbank can call Derrida’s account of the gift a “nihilistic agape.”101 Derrida 
might advocate for an infinite charity towards the Other, but, in the end, if nothing can be given 
to the other and no giver with a definitive intent to give can appear without eradicating the gift, 
then the ethical command to hospitality turns out to be based in nothing. Hence, Milbank wants 
to move beyond the quest for a “pure gift” defined by absolute disinterest or a unilateral gift that 
is entirely self-sacrificial.  
Milbank wants to find instead a way to purify gift-exchange, not the gift itself, since 
purified gift-exchange “and not ‘pure gift’ is what Christian agape claims to be.”102 Furthermore, 
“purified gift-exchange, unlike the pure gift, remains within the bounds of the ontological, which 
is to say the metaphysical.”103 Metaphysical here is used in the good sense, in an appropriately 
Christian sense, which is to say a metaphysics entirely dependent upon the sacra doctrina of 
theology as its foundation. Like Chauvet, therefore, Milbank focuses on the process of exchange, 
not the abstract nature of the gift itself, but unlike Chauvet, Milbank explicitly seeks to recover 
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the nature of gift in and through his recovery of a purified form of exchange. As we saw with 
metaphysics and semiosis above, the ontological challenges of the gift will not be answered by 
Christianity if it couches itself as a rival to an otherwise legitimate discourse. Rather, Christian 
theology “utterly appropriates to itself the ontological task” in its reclamation of the gift.104 This 
will mean, tellingly, ridding gift-exchange of its “archaic agonistic elements.”105 An account of 
purified gift-exchange is much like a Christian account of the political or of language—such an 
account relies upon a counter-ontology that expressly denies the ontological violence that will 
otherwise rule the day.  
 Milbank begins his recovery of gift-exchange by establishing the two unique qualities 
that distinguish the gift from the bare fulfillment of a contract. They are delay and non-identical 
repetition.106 Despite their seemingly abstract nature, both of these aspects are relatively 
intuitive. First, a gift seems to require a delay of some kind, particularly in the return-gift. If my 
wife and I make dinner for a friend, for example, the last thing we want is a return-gift without 
delay, for “to have people back to dinner the very same night implies a lack of gratitude, a desire 
to discharge a debt as soon as possible.”107 A gift also seems to require that the return-gift not be 
the same thing, i.e. that the gift is repeated but not identically—thus, non-identical repetition. 
The return-gift must not be the same thing; otherwise a clear insult is implied. The gift is not 
only canceled but seemingly denigrated if, for example, the friend invited for dinner invites the 
givers for dinner the next night and begrudgingly cooks the very same dish. There is thus implied 
in gift-exchange a “logos or measure of a necessary delay (whose term is indeterminate, though 
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not infinite) and of non-identical repetition between gift and counter-gift.”108 The gift is given 
back after a time and according to the logic of “non-exact mimesis” wherein the receiver 
performs a “more genuinely exact” mimicry of the first gesture (more genuinely exact on 
account of its inexactitude) in “unpredictably different circumstances, at unpredictable times and 
to unpredictably various recipients.”109 If Milbank is to purify gift-exchange it will be through a 
recovery of authentic delay and non-identical repetition.  
The task before Milbank, therefore, is to detail how it is that Christian agape 
accomplishes purified gift-exchange by displaying both authentic delay and non-identical 
repetition, rather than being a seemingly Pharisaic covering over of contractual obligation. 
Defending agape against the unilateral gift that Derrida (rightly) called impossible, means 
showing the ways in which agapic gift-exchange differs from the supposedly “pure” gift. This 
means explicating just what it is about purified gift-exchange—complete with its delay and non-
identical repetition—that would set it apart from the absolute and disinterested gift of self-
sacrifice. Milbank believes that there are two distinct aspects of purified gift-exchange that 
secures its legitimacy. True gift-giving, Milbank contends, involves, first, a certain “suitability,” 
and, second, “self-expression in generosity.” The presence of these characteristics in proper gift-
exchange, governed by delay and non-identical repetition, saves the gift by establishing the 
possibility of true gift-exchange in Christian agape. 
In establishing the necessity for these two aspects of the gift—suitability and self-
expression in generosity—a familiar opponent returns for Milbank, namely, Jean-Luc Marion. 
Marion’s arguments on the gift, found in God Without Being and elsewhere, are the foils through 
which Milbank establishes the need for the two aspects of gift-exchange already mentioned. As 
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with his attempt to think God beyond or without Being in response to the work of Heidegger, 
Marion attempts a similar rescue of the gift in response to the critiques of Derrida. What Marion 
pushed most forcefully in God Without Being was that for the gift to remain a gift the “distance” 
between the other and the one who receives the other must not be transgressed.110 One could not, 
obviously, claim ownership over the other and still expect the legitimacy of a gift given by the 
other to endure. The distance between giver and receiver has collapsed in this case and the gift is 
thus obliterated along with it. Marion, importantly, thus links the gift with the passage of time. 
For the gift, like time, can only be received, so to speak, in its passing. 
Yet, Milbank worries that despite Marion’s explicit linking of temporality, the gift, and 
the Eucharist, the same sort of abyss that renders Derrida’s account of the gift nihilistic will also 
consume Marion’s. His worry, so it seems, is that a gift cannot be a gift unless something is 
actually given. More importantly, a gift cannot be a gift unless it is received as such. While he 
speaks approvingly of Marion’s emphasis on distance, Milbank is adamant that limiting the gift 
simply to distance itself means that the gift will never be received and that the gift of distance 
alone is no gift at all. Hence, Marion has seemingly fallen into the traps of the unilateral gift 
already described above. If the gift can never arrive or be received, since an empty distance is all 
the gift actually is, then such a gift seems to cancel itself even in attempting to protect its status 
as gift. This shows that “reciprocity is as much a condition for the gift as gift is for reciprocity.”  
 By “suitability” I believe Milbank is linking his thought on the gift explicitly to some of 
his earlier work on Aquinas already discussed above. In particular, the suitability of the gift 
seems to fit well with the notion that judgment of truth is just as much a measure of accuracy as 
it is of the aesthetic fittingness of a proposition. That is, given the fact that we have our being 
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only by participating in the plenitude of the life of the Triune God, the true gift will not only 
display conformity with the principle of delay and non-identical repetition but, even in so doing, 
will display a suitability to the context, a proper and aesthetically pleasing “fit” within the 
intersubjective context that makes the gift possible in the first place. We need, in other words, far 
more than just the bare distance between subject and Other that Marion stresses in his unilateral 
conception of the pure gift. Rather, we need the intersubjective reciprocity that renders things 
into gifts based on their suitability, which means that true gift exchange must have an aesthetic 
component to it. In this case, however, the aesthetic judgment is not one of conformity with the 
beauty of the perichoresis but rather with the unique context of human relationships within 
which the gift is given in the first place. This is why Milbank is not shy about saying that gift-
exchange is not entirely devoid of self-interest. The suitability of gift exchange is truly 
intersubjective and equilateral meaning there is a pleasing quality of the gift for both the one 
who gives and the one who receives. In short, the ontological primacy of relationality, derived 
from the Trinitarian thought central to the counter-ontology of Christian orthodoxy, reveals that 
the true gift is suitable to the situation in which it is given and pleasing to both parties. Hence, 
the unilateral and disinterested gift is further eschewed. 
The latter aspect, of equilateral rather than unilateral giving, makes way for a defense of 
the second aspect of agape that Milbank finds critical to establishing the legitimacy of the gift. 
Self-expression in gratitude was, for Marion, something that violated the neutrality and distance 
between subject and other that the gift was meant to preserve. The two participating in the 
exchange cannot give themselves to each other, as even Chauvet would have it, because this 
would violate the critical distance that preserves the presence of the other as Other. Yet, under 
Milbank’s participatory ontology, the matter becomes more complicated, precisely because there 
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just is no neutral space that could separate the gift of God from the creatures to which God seeks 
to give it. What sort of space would that be, if all things only have their Being as beings by 
participating in the overflow of the divine esse? Hence, it must not only be the case that there is a 
suitable content to the gift but also that the true gift—the gift of God that might also make 
possible our gift-giving to one another—must involve some form of transformation of the giver 
and receiver. There must be some collapse of the distance between giver and receiver, some 
sense in which the gift is not only distance, but is rather an encounter with a gift that contains the 
self-expression of the giver and whose reception is also the self-expression of the receiver. 
The ground Milbank is hoping to gain in establishing these two unique aspects of true 
gift-exchange is the deep alignment between an ontology of Creation and Incarnation with the 
logic of gift-exchange. In short, a deep examination of true gift-exchange requires a certain way 
of understanding the basic conditions of Being, a certain vision of created reality as gift that 
makes possible gift-exchange amongst creatures. Yet, in the same way, it is only by encountering 
one another in and through gift-exchange that we come to see that gift is a transcendental 
convertible with Being. In other words, the experience of purified gift-exchange bolsters an 
account of finite reality as created, and vice versa. Thus, the need for a truly Christian ontology 
as a critical counter to the ontological violence of secularity is further confirmed in and 
supported by a Christian account of gift-exchange as agape. Furthermore, sacramentality as the 
basic hermeneutic principle of how Christians understand the world is established by this very 
ontology of gift. For without it, the world collapses, yet again, into the status of a mere given. 
Whereas a sacramental vision of the world, grounded in a theology that is unapologetically 
philosophical in that it is unapologetically theological, restores to the world its status as a sign 
that participates in that which it signifies.  
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Conclusion: A Trinitarian Ontology 
 What has emerged from our tracing of the place of gift and language is the need for an 
ontology and a polity that is inherently Trinitarian. In this way, Chauvet and Milbank share a 
central tendency but carry out such a tendency in divergent ways. Their tendency is to 
understand the constitutive role of language for thought and the centrality of gift-exchange in 
proper expressions of agape as rooted in the eternal relations that characterize the life of the 
Triune God. Strong readings of gift and language seem to support and be undergirded by 
Trinitarian dogma for both figures. Yet, Chauvet’s and Milbank’s understanding of the place of 
the Trinity within such an argument is utterly divergent. We see in them an echo of the divide 
between Schleiermacher and Barth over the proper place of the Trinity in Christian theology. For 
Chauvet, the doctrine of the Trinity is taken predominantly as that into which postmodern 
accounts of gift and language flow, and this is most forcefully seen in radical theologies of the 
Cross and their emphasis on the absence of God. Conversely, Christian theology can seemingly 
never start at all without the foundations of participation and analogy that Milbank holds are only 
established in the life of the Trinity, centrally in the esse that most appropriately names the 
Father. The verum-factum that allows for Christian orthodoxy to become more properly 
postmodern than even postmodernity itself—to embrace the infinite play of difference and flux 
without reserve—is established in the generation of the Son. The purity of gift-exchange as 
agape is revealed most fully in the donum that names the Holy Spirit. With Chauvet, therefore, 
we saw a Trinitarian meontology, an account of the Trinity that fundamentally undermined 
discourses of Being and presence. What the Trinity most fully reveals is the centrality of absence 
and alterity. With Milbank, what is revealed is a Trinitarian ontology, not a refusal of absence 
 203 
and alterity but rather an insistence that they properly occur solely within the purview of 
revealed theology.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
MILBANK ON THE EUCHARIST:  
SOCIALISM MADE STRANGE 
 
Introduction 
 My account of Chauvet on the Eucharist turned on Chauvet’s unique understanding of the 
doctrine of transubstantiation, or rather, his attempt at securing the fullness of Christ’s 
Eucharistic presence without invoking the traditional categories of substance and accident, thus, 
supposedly, going beyond the doctrine itself. With Milbank, however, it must be noted that there 
exists no engagement with the doctrine of transubstantiation or even with sacramental theology 
that matches the length and breadth of Chauvet’s. That is, an engagement of similar length does 
not exist that was written by Milbank himself. There does exist, however, a controversial account 
of transubstantiation written under Milbank and quoted regularly by him with approbation—
namely, Catherine Pickstock’s After Writing. This is not to say that Milbank himself does not 
stake out certain positions with regards to the nature of the sacraments, the nature of Eucharistic 
presence, or the political and ontological import of the practices most central to the maintenance 
of Christian identity. He certainly does contribute to these conversations. Yet, I begin this 
chapter in this manner only to say that it must be acknowledged that there is a lacuna in 
Milbank’s writing with regards to direct engagement with the doctrine of the Eucharist, 
particularly the doctrine of Eucharistic presence.  
 To compensate for this lacuna and complete my picture of Milbank’s project as an 
instantiation of the model of the Eucharist as the gift of political language, I shall draw in large 
part from Pickstock’s work on Derrida and transubstantiation. Yet, this chapter shall not be 
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limited entirely to that work. In fact, Pickstock will only serve as laying the groundwork for 
recognizing the pivotal link in Milbank’s work between the Eucharistic presence on the one hand 
and the contemporary political recommendations found in Milbank’s latest work on the other. 
All in all, what we will see is that Milbank’s account of the Eucharistic presence is, like 
Chauvet’s, an ontological scandal that secures the possibility of the political scandal of the 
Church. Put in Milbank’s terms, the gift-exchange within language that is the Eucharist 
necessitates a properly Christian ontology and a properly Christian politics. 
 Milbank and Pickstock, however, place a great deal of emphasis on a new thematic with 
regards to the ontological and political implications of the Eucharist—one that we saw take a 
peripheral role in the chapter previous, but one which takes center stage in Milbank and 
Pickstock’s work on the Eucharist. The two of them collectively emphasize the aesthetic when 
speaking of the link between the performance of the Eucharist and the political implications of 
that act for the community that it forms. Hence, the ontological scandal of the Eucharist will, I 
shall show, lead into the political scandal of the Eucharist as a politics of culture. The verum-
factum, it turns out, is still the skeleton key to systematizing Milbank’s often overlapping 
reflections on ontology and politics. The Eucharist, I shall show, further bolsters the verum-
factum and, consequently, compels a political scandal in the form of truthful making, i.e. a 
culture. This culture, however, Milbank never elaborated with absolute consistency, and so the 
chapter will conclude by tracing the lines of two perhaps conflicting attempts at articulating the 
political scandal of the Eucharist. As before, Chauvet will serve as a foil by which to understand 
better Milbank’s obtuse argumentation. 
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The Ontological Scandal of the Eucharist 
Introduction 
 We have already seen in Chapter Three how Chauvet gives an account of Eucharistic 
presence beyond the traditional notions of transubstantiation. What Chauvet offers is something 
like transubstantiation without substance, in keeping with his emphasis on the presence of God 
as the presence of absence. The impetus for this change was Chauvet’s prior theological 
commitments, namely, his commitment to a Trinitarian Christology grounded in a radical 
theology of the Cross and an unwavering insistence that primacy must be given to the Pasch of 
Christ in sacramental theology, not just to the Hypostatic Union. Such an emphasis on the Pasch 
of Christ—the whole of Jesus’ story, not just the Incarnation alone—leads Chauvet to 
characterize the Eucharist as an “anti-sacrifice” or a “sacrifice-in-sacrament” meant to turn the 
Girardian notion of sacrifice on its head. The ontological scandal of the Eucharist, in other 
words, was a kenotic presence “in the mode of being open” best seen in the figure of the broken 
bread. It is in the absence of the breach, symbolically presented to us in the embodied elements 
of the broken bread and poured wine, that the presence of Christ is communicated to us. 
Sacramental grace, he argues, is communicated to us through this very openness in an act of 
symbolic exchange—an exchange of gifts in and through language. 
 Milbank will turn every element of Chauvet’s system on its head. In what is to come, I 
shall show that Milbank attempts the following: first, Milbank relies solely upon the Hypostatic 
Union not only for the ontological but also for the political scandal of the Eucharist. The gift-
exchange that is the Eucharist is made possible by the first gift of the Incarnation, and this 
greatest gift of the Hypostatic Union gives to humanity the possibility of genuine forgiveness. 
Second, Milbank, through Pickstock, insists that transubstantiation is the only adequate way of 
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conceiving of the Eucharistic presence. Plus, through Pickstock’s work in particular, Milbank 
attaches a foundational importance to the moment of consecration. Transubstantiation establishes 
not only the possibility of the truth of the Church but also the possibility of any truth whatsoever. 
The ontological scandal of the transubstantiated elements is the hermeneutic key for the seeming 
impossibility of locating any meaning beyond the interminable flux of semiosis that characterizes 
several of Milbank’s poststructuralist interlocutors. Rather than teaching us to consent to the 
radical absence made present in the broken bread, the Eucharist is the sole path back to the 
recovery of the presence of truth. That truth, we shall see, will not be present via logical 
necessity but by aesthetic convenience. Rather than compelling a particular ethic, the beauty of 
truth is to be made present to the world via a culture, politically mediated to the world through a 
socialist system. Whereas Chauvet was reticent to give specific political pronouncements, 
Milbank is so bold as to proclaim with precision just how the political scandal of the Eucharist is 
to be enacted in the world.  
  
Transubstantiation & Signification: The Case of Catherine Pickstock 
 I begin my examination of the ontological scandal of the Eucharist with Pickstock’s 
doctoral dissertation, completed under the direction of John Milbank and which he often cites 
glowingly as well. In doing so, I shall establish the fundamental points on how, according to 
Pickstock, Christ is present in the bread and wine in the Eucharist. Critically, Pickstock offers a 
similar starting point to her account of the scandal as Chauvet did. Whatever impossibility faith 
reveals to us in the consecration of the elements, it is an impossibility that occurs in language. 
For Chauvet, this meant an introduction into the language-game of faith through symbolic 
exchange. For Pickstock, the liturgy of the Mass is the instantiation of a linguistic impossibility, 
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“For liturgy is at once a gift from God and a sacrifice to God, a reciprocal exchange which 
shatters all ordinary positions of agency and reception…”1 Now, by “liturgy” Pickstock, in 
keeping with Milbank’s pugilistic instincts towards modernity, means only the pre-Vatican II 
Mass. Indeed, this further makes sense of her emphasis on the scandal of the Eucharist being 
linguistic in character because she deems the grave error of the liturgical reformers of that time 
to have been an inability to see the way in which the culture of modernity had become “anti-
ritual” in nature. In short, the only way the Vatican-authorized reformers of the Mass could have 
succeeded was to overthrow modern culture itself. Admittedly, however, that was not a task they 
were able to manage. What they ought to have done then—and what I believe is ultimately at the 
heart of Pickstock and Milbank’s insistence on the scandalous nature of ritual language—was to 
force us to submit to a shockingly unfamiliar form of language and ritual. The point of the ritual 
is not its presenting Christ to us in a relevant context but in performing the conceptual and 
linguistic upheaval that an encounter with God ought to entail. A proper liturgical reform then 
would have had as its goals “to challenge us through the shock of a defamiliarizing language, to 
live only to worship, and to be in community only as recipients of the gift of the body of 
Christ.”2 
 Pickstock attempts to trace the similarities between the structures of liturgical language 
and the principle opponent of the linguistic encounter presented in the liturgy, none other than 
our familiar foe, Jacques Derrida. She compares the structures of the Roman Mass to the 
structures present within Derrida’s account of language, attempting to show the ways in which 
the Mass does not merely offer an apology against Derrida’s radical semiosis, but possesses 
                                                
1 Catherine Pickstock, After Writing: On the Liturgical Consummation of Philosophy (London: 
Blackwell Publishing, 1998), 176-177. Unless otherwise indicated, all italics are original to the 
texted quoted. 
2 Pickstock, After Writing, 176. 
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those very structures. The Mass, in other words, inhabits the structures of Derridean semiosis 
without succumbing to their tendency towards utter deconstruction. The “supplementations and 
deferrals” inherent in Derridean differánce are not eschewed by the Mass but embraced by it.3  
Yet, the critical difference, as we have already seen in the previous chapter, between 
Chauvet’s perspective and this one, is that the Mass exhibits these structures as a pedagogy 
against our will to know. The rite of the Eucharist, under such a paradigm, teaches us to submit 
to the presence of an absence without resentment. Yet, for Pickstock, the peculiar nature of 
liturgical language allows for the securing of presence beyond absence, in and through the very 
structures that were thought to force absence upon us. In this way, and as a critical harkening 
back to Milbank’s account of the gift, the supplementations and deferrals of meaning inherent in 
the Roman Rite “constitute the possibility of liturgy as simultaneously ‘impossible.’”4  
 Pickstock thus embarks upon a line-by-line reading of the (pre-Vatican II) Roman Rite to 
show the ways in which the language of the Mass displaces us in much the same way that 
Derridean grammatology does.5  What she seizes on, in particular, are what she calls “stammers” 
in the liturgy, that is, moments in which the language of the liturgy is suspended between 
passivity and activity—taking up what she calls a “middle voice.”6 This suspension between 
reception and action—the continual deferral of liturgical language away from either a true 
beginning or true ending—is not evidence of a void but rather of a plenitude. Thus, language 
“stammers” in its continual re-starting and re-expressing the same thing. Liturgical language, 
                                                
3 Ibid., 177 
4 Ibid., 178. 
5 See Ibid., 178-192. The reader ought to note here as well that this is a different Roman Rite 
than the Mass to which Chauvet devoted such considerable analysis in Symbol & Sacrament. 
6 Ibid., 178, 244-246. 
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importantly, exhibits non-identical repetition.7 Liturgy relies on repetition, but the time, place, 
and context of this repetition makes it such that each repetition of the rite is never the same as the 
previous one. Pickstock links, therefore, Milbank’s purified gift-exchange to the “stammer” 
inherent in liturgical language. 
Further, an emphasis on the stammer protects the liturgy from the Derridean charge of its 
embracing a metaphysics of presence. The invocation of the name of the “Father, Son, and Holy 
Spirit” and recitation of Psalm 42 does this by casting the liturgy itself as a narrated journey, 
immediately displacing the self-assured identity of the speaker and hearer.8 This displacement 
occurs, Pickstock argues, because the ultimate location of the goal of the journey is also 
ambiguous. We journey towards the altar of God but, after all, the altar of God is “ever-
receding” from us.9 The presence of the altar is never entirely fixed or graspable by us. This 
further means that the self is essentially located before it is identified. It is “thrown” as 
Heidegger would say, into a place prior to its being told who exactly it is.10 Where I am precedes 
who I am in liturgical space, which underscores, so Pickstock argues, the vital importance of 
embodiment in liturgical space.11 Invoking a notion very similar to Chauvet, Pickstock argues 
that these dynamics force upon us the ambiguity that the journey of the liturgy and our arrival in 
liturgical space are themselves the goal. We begin our journey by arriving and the ultimate 
destination of our journey is the quest itself.12 
                                                
7 Ibid., 247. 
8 Ibid., 185. 
9 Ibid., 184. 
10 One pertinent example: “Dasein has been thrown into existence. It exists as a being that has to 
be as it is and can be.” Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: 
SUNY Press, 2010), 265. 
11 Pickstock, After Writing, 184. 
12 Ibid., 185. 
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The displacement of identity is exacerbated even further by the liturgy because of an 
additional ambiguity: Who takes the initiative in the liturgy? Our journey to God, it seems, only 
occurs because God moves towards us. Yet, must we who participate in the liturgy not also move 
towards the altar?  
Whereas previously in the text, liturgical impossibility seemed to betoken a bad 
infinite according to which sinful man in time could never arrive because he could 
never start out, now it seems that to be in the time of sin is nonetheless to dwell in 
a kenotic space in which we have always already unknowingly arrived. Thus the 
prior inversions—arriving is beginning, the goal is the journey—are now 
themselves inverted: to begin is to arrive, the way is the goal. And one can only 
ever have begun; there is no other way to be than to be on the way.13 
  
Hence, we request purification in the moment of congregational confession, but in the request we 
realize that the eternal present in which Christ exists means we are already purified. Yet, we are 
faced with the perpetual task of putting on, in the here and now, this “garment” that we have 
already received.14 We must prepare ourselves to be purified even though we already are washed 
white as snow. The task before us is interminable, such that the goal is already accomplished but 
must be continually taken up anew. Such are the paradoxes that confront us, Pickstock avers, in 
the displacement we undergo as subjects in and through liturgical language. 
Yet, does this continual displacement of identity and meaning not risk the collapse of 
both into the flux of supplementation and difference? Pickstock avoids this by attempting, again, 
an argumentative move similar to one of Chauvet’s—namely, Pickstock puts forward an account 
of transubstantiation “beyond presence and absence.”15 Unlike Chauvet, however, she is intent 
upon dissolving the opposition between presence and absence, not urging the recognition of such 
alterity as a pedagogical tool. In direct contradiction to Chauvet, she argues that the Eucharist 
                                                
13 Ibid., 185. 
14 Ibid., 189 
15 Ibid., 253. 
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can “outwit” this distinction precisely because it is not a symbol.16 Indeed, Pickstock insists that 
the “mystical” and the “real” must coincide in the Eucharist, otherwise the rite succumbs to two 
problematic tendencies.17 First, without the coincidence of the mystical and the real the Eucharist 
can become nothing more than an extrinsic miracle with no actual attachment to the world of 
signs.18 This occurs, one imagines, if the Eucharist slips too far towards the mystical and away 
from the real. Based on what we saw from Chauvet in Chapter Two, I believe Chauvet would 
agree wholeheartedly with this claim. Yet, if we allow the Eucharist to slip too far towards the 
real and away from the mystical, then the Eucharist becomes nothing more than an illustrative 
symbol.19 Again, while the term “symbol” carries a great deal of weight for Chauvet, I think he 
would surely agree with Pickstock’s general sentiment, especially since Chauvet’s account of the 
symbol insists that a symbol is anything but merely illustrative. Hence, Pickstock proves to have 
a purpose homologous to Chauvet’s, namely, to stress that the Eucharist is more than just an 
extrinsic presence and that the Eucharist is an action that only has meaning in the ecclesial and 
relational context in which it occurs. 
However, Pickstock believes it is perfectly compatible to insist on these two prerequisites 
only to then go on and defend the Eucharistic presence through an account of 
transubstantiation.20 Pickstock centers her account of transubstantiation by asserting that the rite 
of the Eucharist is best described as an “action,” and that analyzing it under a more dynamic 
modality renders the full weight of transubstantiation more apparent. We call the Eucharist an 
action, she argues, because in doing so “the (mystical) unknown,” perhaps an analogue to 
                                                
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., 254. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid., 255. 
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Chauvet’s “presence of absence,” is not “reductively confined to a negative nothing.”21 Instead, 
when we privilege the status of the Eucharistic sign as an action we can then account for the 
Eucharist as a sign by which the mystical unknown is “traversed as a genuinely open mystery 
which, by being partially imparted through the sign, and therefore recognizable as mystery, has a 
positive—but not fetishizable—content.”22 Invoking a dynamic notion like traversal guards 
against an attempt to know the truth of the Eucharistic presence in which knowledge of that 
presence would mean “appropriation.”23 The particular nature of the mystery of the Eucharist 
prevents this form of knowing from being an accessible mode to those who are placed, so to 
speak, by the liturgical language of the Mass. Here, because of the echoes of Chauvet, Pickstock 
is worth quoting at length: 
This positive account of the mysterious—which implies also a positive account of 
the sign, as that which is not simply “left behind” but participates in the hidden 
mystery it signifies—accords with the patristic negotiations of the word musterion 
in terms of both mysterium and sacramentum…[T]hese terms assimilate a variety 
of related meanings in the Eucharistic context, which together communicate a 
coincidence of presence and absence…Even when the sacramental mystery is 
revealed, it remains obscure and hidden. But the latency of mystery in the sign 
does not make it equal to nothing, or incompatible with human understanding: 
plena mysterii, plena rationis. Thus, as regards the Eucharist, which realizes the 
maximum possible of mystery, sacrality, and signification, human rationality 
becomes less an attempt to make logically consistent, and more a recognition of 
                                                
21 Ibid., 253. 
22 Ibid. Adding further to the connections between Milbank/Pickstock and Chauvet is their 
shared affinity for de Lubac. Pickstock’s reference to “traversal” here is an allusion to a key 
passage from de Lubac’s Corpus Mysticum that reads: “Tout le sensible était pour elle un 
sacrament, il demandait moins à être organisé ou fondé qu’il ne s’offrait à être traversé.” Henri 
de Lubac, Corpus Mysticum: L’Euchariste et L’Eglise au Moyen-Age, (Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 
1949), 264. This passage is found in the previously cited English translation on de Lubac, 
Corpus Mysticum, 235. Strangely, the translators have chosen to translate “traversé” as “open to 
being transcended” rather than “to be traversed.” I believe Pickstock’s more literal interpretation 
of the passage captures better de Lubac’s emphasis on anagogy and the ascending path to the 
“invisible things of God” that proper contemplation of created reality might lead. For further 
analysis of Pickstock’s similarities to Chauvet see Glenn Ambrose, “Chauvet and Pickstock: 
Two Compatible Visions?” Questions Liturgiques 82 (2001): 69-79. 
23 Ibid., 254. 
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an intimation of secret intelligibility, or luminous invitation, stimulating a contact 
of desire, will, and memory, which casts the act of knowing as more a “traversal” 
than an appropriation. This traversal takes place within the community in which 
the utterance ‘This is my body’ is spoken, and which is founded by and as that 
utterance. For the Church is properly the essence and the repetition, as both sign 
and secret, of that body, both in its perpetual and temporally ecstatic realization of 
the historical sacrifice of the body of Jesus Christ, representing that ‘absent’ body 
in and though its consecrating ritual, and also in its own mystical and literal 
synactic configuration of the Body which it both receives and disperses as gift.24  
 
The core claims of this account of mystery and the Eucharist seem almost entirely in line with 
Chauvet. There is little in this passage that does not accord, in principle, with Chauvet’s 
Heideggerian analogy that the Eucharist is the way that sets the disciple on his or her way. The 
goal of the Eucharist is not the appropriation of the Eucharistic presence but rather the traversing 
of the mystical unknown. The Eucharist, as an action, is not an appropriation of a pure presence 
but is rather an encounter with the positive presence of a mystery that we traverse without 
making the unknown fully known.  
 Chauvet thought that the transitive nature of our encounter with the presence of the 
absence of God was precisely why we needed to move beyond the categories of substance and 
accident. Pickstock and Milbank break decisively with him, therefore, by insisting that 
transubstantiation is the only path forward, even given these epistemological changes. Pickstock 
defends the doctrine of transubstantiation not by insisting that an extra-linguistic event occurs, 
but rather by insisting that nothing of the event of the Eucharist “occurs without or outside of 
language.”25 Hence, rather than attempting to go beyond transubstantiation while also still 
holding to an account of Eucharistic presence as an extra-linguistic event (as Chauvet did), 
Pickstock attempts the opposite—a strong reading of transubstantiation as giving full account of 
the Eucharistic presence while remaining entirely within language.  
                                                
24 Ibid., 255. 
25 Ibid., 256. 
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 She attempts this bold maneuver by engaging in what she terms a “more positive account 
of the sign” that is itself “based on the structure of the secret.”26 Why the “secret”? Pickstock 
here is, yet again, quite Heideggerian. A secret, she argues, does not indicate something that is 
entirely unknown. For how could we even give a term to such a thing? An entirely unknown is 
something that is utterly and entirely absent to us. We cannot even begin to speak of something 
entirely unknown. So a secret must refer to something that is in some way known, just as, for 
Heidegger, we never ask a question without in some way knowing a bit about the answer.27  
 This notion of secrecy aids our understanding of transubstantiation in that it allows us to 
conceptualize a mode of presence in which presence and absence can coincide without presence 
ultimately succumbing to absence or vice versa. As she puts it, “Secrecy, therefore, as a 
particular mode of presence which is that of partial imparting, and this medial position between 
known and unknown, continuous and discontinuous, and present and absent, is where I should 
like to locate the sign in general, and the Eucharistic signs in particular.”28 One can, therefore, 
see the implication of what is to come in Pickstock’s account of transubstantiation, ultimately in 
keeping with the various “counters” that Milbank suggested were necessary at the conclusion of 
Theology and Social Theory. The implication is that whatsoever occurs in the event of 
transubstantiation will have a vast effect on the nature and potency of all signs since the event of 
transubstantiation occurs within the order of signs and, in a sense, for the order of signs. Since 
the sign in general is also located to a certain extent, for Pickstock, within the order of the secret 
between presence and absence, the central event of such presence and absence will seemingly 
define what can and cannot be said about signs in general thereafter.  
                                                
26 Ibid. 
27 See Heidegger, Being and Time, 1-13. 
28 Ibid., 257.
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 The particular moment to which Pickstock then points is Christ’s words of consecration 
at the Lord’s Supper. She argues that the seeming impossibility of these words implies that all 
signs, as language, possess a “doxological” quality.29 What she means by this is quite 
controversial. Pickstock is suggesting that the moment of consecration at the Lord’s Supper in 
which Christ truthfully says “This is my Body” when referring to bread and “This is my blood” 
when referring to wine reveals the true nature of language. It renders language, as in the Mass, 
almost at a loss to communicate declarative meaning and left only with the mode of praise or 
doxology. So to say that the words of consecration, as signs, reveal the doxological nature of all 
language is to say that signs most clearly communicate meaning not when they convey factual 
information but when they point ecstatically beyond themselves, towards the holy plenitude from 
which their meaning derives.30 Language, in other words, finds its truest meaning when it 
transcends itself, beyond either presence or absence, into a sort of holy askesis. The secrecy of 
the words of consecration, therefore, point back to a sort of “epistemological nihilism which 
approaches everything in an optative stance of open expectation, and which says that substance 
is what it is only through its participation in divine being.”31  
The Eucharistic signs efface themselves in order to point to something else, yet they do 
so without canceling themselves in the process. This ecstatic celebration is only made possible 
by the signs’ participation in eternity (their secret!), and yet they pull all other signs into this 
celebration.32 Thus, transubstantiation for Pickstock is more than just a novel occurrence in 
matter of bread and wine—something more than an ontological scandal with only private, 
spiritual implications for those who receive it. Transubstantiation is, in no uncertain terms, an 
                                                
29 Ibid., 257. 
30 Ibid., 262. 
31 Ibid., 258. 
32 Ibid. 
 217 
event that rescues the sign itself from the epistemic nihilism and political absolutism in which 
postmodernity, on her reading, appears to have ensnared it. The Eucharist, in other words, is the 
condition for the possibility of any meaning whatsoever.33  
 How can this be? How can the Eucharist, one rite among others, be the very foundation 
of the possibility of meaningful signification? Pickstock believes this claim to be feasible 
because the Eucharist is a sign that purports to flow from eternity but not give itself priority over 
eternity.34 It is, in other words, an accident that points back to a true substance but without ever 
canceling out its nature as accident. Hence, Pickstock’s notion of transubstantiation entails that 
the bread and wine remain bread and wine, even that transubstantiation depends upon a 
heightened intensity of their accidental status in order for Christ to be present therein. Much like 
Chauvet, we are dealing with an account of transubstantiation that sees the Eucharistic bread as 
becoming true bread, more bread than before, or essential bread. The materiality of bread 
intensifies in the moment of its becoming something more than material—an ecstatic moment of 
participating in that which it signifies.35  
The “sign” here, however, is not merely the bread on the altar and the wine in the chalice 
after the moment of consecration. The sign is, instead, the bread being eaten and the wine being 
drunk that is the sign, a more active rather than static notion of what encompasses the true 
Eucharistic signs. In this way, therefore, Pickstock will claim that in the moment of partaking of 
the elements, wherein the Eucharistic signs are participated in, the bread and wine become pure 
accidentals.36 The bread and wine, in other words, approach the status of “substance” only in and 
through their purely accidental status. Indeed, this approach to the pure accidental—a notion that 
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Pickstock admits pushes Thomistic categories to their breaking point—becomes the horizon for 
all material things. “And indeed, all bread is on its way to figuring the Body of Christ to this 
condition of ‘pure’ accidental. And yet the substantiality of the bread is not so much destroyed as 
more utterly constituted by being taken up into God, who is more truly ‘substance’ insofar as He 
is more truly self-sufficient.”37 In sum, rather than couching the enduring presence of the 
accidents of the bread as a pedagogical tool by which we submit to the presence of absence, the 
enduring presence of the accidents of the bread is an indicator of God’s participation as eternal 
substance in the pure accidents of true bread and true wine.  
 The Eucharist, thus, becomes the paragon of the inbreaking of substance into accidents 
via their ascent into the status of pure accidental. The separation of thing from sign collapses, 
such that bread as thing or wine as thing comes to be equivalent to bread as sign or wine as sign. 
In this way, “the Eucharist situates us more inside language than ever” since the bread is only 
“given in the mode of sign.”38 Materiality is changed for us by submitting to the linguistic 
displacement of this sign, for in partaking of the elements “we allow things to exceed their 
appearance, for things are never here in terms of an enclosed, exhaustive arrival.”39 All that 
Derrida claimed with regards to language—with its infinite play, its continual deferral, and 
constant supplementation—turns out to be true, indeed it is particularly true within the 
Eucharist. Yet, the Eucharist does not rest in this infinite postponement or allow it to endure. 
Instead, by “carrying the secrecy, uncertainty, and discontinuity which characterize every sign to 
an extreme (no body appears in the bread), [the Eucharist] also delivers a final disclosure, 
certainty, and continuity (the bread is the Body) which alone makes it possible now to trust every 
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sign.”40 The Eucharist secures the possibility of truth through the excess of secrecy. As Pickstock 
puts it, “The words of consecration ‘This is my body’ therefore, far from being problematic in 
their meaning, are the only words which certainly have meaning, and lend this meaning to all 
other words.”41 
 The accidents of transubstantiation are thus given greater ontological import since it is 
through an intensification of the accidental that substance comes into view, just as it is through 
an intensification of the sign that substantial meaning comes into view. In this way, Pickstock 
can make the claim for which we saw her, and to a certain extent Chauvet, criticized above: 
namely, that “all bread is on its way to figuring the Body of Christ.”42 Critically, Pickstock 
further bolsters this notion by turning to the ontological priority of the gift: “This [bread/Body] 
amalgam is a ‘thing” not a sign, yet becomes a sign in being given to us, given as a promise or 
sign of future givings, and so given as the turning of all things into gift, which means also into 
sign, since a gift is a gift only in its signifying promise of renewed gift to come.”43 Pickstock, 
ultimately, connects Milbank’s strongly Trinitarian readings of verbum and donum to the 
Eucharistic presence. The Eucharist situates us in language, reveals all material creation to be 
caught up in the Eucharistic arrival as gift, and carries profound practical consequences in its 
reception.  
   
Transubstantiated Touch 
 Milbank lends further credence to the notion that Pickstock’s account is very nearly a 
mirror of his own by co-authoring a book in which they take on together several of the questions 
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to which Pickstock was offering only her voice. That book, Truth in Aquinas, contains four 
essays—two written by Pickstock, one written by Milbank, and one jointly authored by the pair. 
The argument of the jointly authored essay is telling for two reasons: firstly, because it even 
more explicitly links Milbank’s work on the gift to Pickstock’s work on the Eucharist, and 
secondly, because it reveals a hidden connection between Milbank’s earlier work on the verum-
factum and the doctrine of transubstantiation. The Incarnation of the eternal Word that occurs 
according to the aesthetic necessity of convenience—the ultimate thesis of their argument on 
“touch”—ultimately follows the same logic as Pickstock’s account of transubstantiation. This 
shows that Milbank’s theological system and Pickstock’s account of transubstantiation are 
largely in sync, further clarifying what Milbank sees as the ontological scandal of the Eucharist.   
 In “Truth and Touch,” Milbank and Pickstock (hereafter, “M&P”) collectively argue that 
the Incarnation is for Aquinas the “sole ground for the restoration of our participation in the 
divine understanding.”44 Put more strongly, they argue that, for Thomas, our access to any truth 
at all is contingent upon the Incarnation. Now this can seem, on the surface, to undermine 
Pickstock’s earlier and grandiose claim that the moment of transubstantiation is the condition of 
the possibility of all truth. This modification is perhaps to be expected since After Writing was 
Pickstock’s doctoral dissertation. One would assume her thinking evolved since the completion 
and revision of that document. Yet, while the claim from Truth in Aquinas is perhaps a softening 
of Pickstock’s previous singular focus on the rite of the Eucharist, the claim is not a softening of 
the insistence that the moment of transubstantiation is constitutive of all future sign-making. In 
other words, M&P retain this strong reading of the ontological scandal of the Eucharist in and 
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through their interpretation of Aquinas’ doctrine of the Incarnation. The Incarnation strengthens 
rather than blunts the scandal of the Eucharist; for it is on the basis of the Incarnation that the 
sacramental grace of the Eucharist is able to be communicated to human beings through the 
Eucharistic signs. Ultimately, to say that the Incarnation is the sole guarantor of our access to 
truth is tantamount to saying the same for the Eucharist, since the Eucharist is, ultimately, the 
mediation of that access to the Church. 
  M&P note from the outset that an intriguing aspect of Aquinas’ account of the 
Incarnation is that Thomas holds that God could have canceled human sin via divine fiat. There 
is, in other words, no logically necessary relation between the nature of human sin and the salve 
for sin that was to be the Incarnation. Salvation could have been accomplished by another means. 
Yet, importantly, the Incarnation does possess a sense of fittingness, an aesthetic convenience 
that makes the Incarnation the “right” way and the “only” way to accomplish the salvation of 
human beings. The two place a great deal of ontological import on this notion of convenience, 
going so far as to call it convertible with being. All beings occur, they aver, in a fitting way as 
creation. Hence, the only proper way to save such fitting beings from sin was through the 
supreme instance of aesthetic convenience, by which a human hypostasis and the divine 
hypostasis were joined together. 
 Two things, then, remain to be shown: first, that the same logic from Pickstock’s account 
of transubstantiation attains in M&P’s account of the Incarnation and, second, that the 
Incarnation turns out simply to be the foundation for an account of transubstantiation practically 
identical to Pickstock’s laid out above. To the first, we can see the same logic at work in M&P’s 
interpretation of the Thomistic account of the Incarnation when they speak of the aesthetic 
compulsion that now makes plausible a sense of divine necessity. They note three implications of 
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the fact that for Thomas the Incarnation is sole source of our access to Truth. First, such a 
reading of the Incarnation means that it is appropriate to think of the Logos as “the eminent 
realization of beautiful proportio.”45 God is freely compelled by the fittingness of the Incarnation 
in keeping with a novel account of divine necessity as based in an aesthetic rather than logical or 
moral compulsion. Second, the truth displayed in the Incarnation is not merely displayed through 
a convenient means but is rather convenience itself. The Incarnation, thereby, can restore the 
analogical ascent of truth from creaturely truth to divine truth since the convenience that persists 
in creaturely truth is there solely because creaturely truth participates in divine truth and pure 
convenience. Third, and most importantly, the fact that the Incarnation absolutely coincides with 
divine convenientia means that an ontological reversal comes about—the very fusion of a 
creature’s hypostasis with the divine hypostasis—which causes a new mode of being in the 
world. The Incarnation makes possible, they argue, “a mode of divine self-sharing more absolute 
than the most absolute giving of the infinite to the finite according to its capacity for 
reception.”46 In other words, the Incarnation is the “utter fusion of the finite with the infinite 
(though not the other way around)” because the infinite, as infinite, cannot change.  
 These reflections thus lead to a claim that sounds quite similar to Chauvet’s continual 
emphasis on the humanity of God, namely, M&P insist that Christ’s humanity in its very 
humanity shows the entirety of Christ’s divine nature.  
“This includes his body, his physical actions, and especially his transmission of 
the substance of his body to the Eucharistic elements. Because, for Aquinas, all 
our knowledge is first in our senses, this means that we first encounter Christ in 
reported word and image concerning his physical manifestation, and yet more 
directly in our partaking of the sacraments, particularly the Eucharist.”47  
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This remarkable reversal of the typical emphasis of the hypostatic union also reverses the means 
by which our intellects are instructed in the truth. Rather than implying that the body needs to be 
instructed by the intellect, this ontological reversal dictates that the senses are now the avenue by 
which our intellects are instructed. In short, just as the intensification of the accidents of the 
bread and wine is the avenue for a revelation of substance, so M&P’s Aquinas seems to assert 
that our intellect’s ascent to the spiritual heights must occur through its descent into that which is 
most sensual. Divine kenosis then has an “unsuspected depth,” revealed only by the Incarnation, 
namely that, “God is able to suffuse with his presence the material depths, in order to instruct the 
spiritual heights.”48 The materially individuated, rather than being alienated from universal truth 
through its particularity, can now coincide with the absolute verum because a chain of singular 
events—the life of Jesus of Nazareth—has been elevated to “absolute coincidence with the 
eternal being as such.”49 Hence, “the ontological implication of the hypostatic union is that the 
equal presence of Being in each single being, or of the ontological in every ontic reality, is now 
absolutized to the degree that one being, while remaining one being, so inheres in, or discloses 
Being as such, as to coincide with it.”50 This inaugurates what M&P dub a new “sacramentality 
of the cosmos” whose “sole ground” is the hypostatic union.51 
 The Eucharist is said by M&P to accomplish a similar ontological reversal for us. 
“Normally food and drink are to nourish the body, which is to sustain the mind. But here the 
mind is not only to attend to what it eats and drinks, which can alone instruct it in truth; it is 
even—after Augustine—to become this food and drink, which makes present the truth 
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incarnate.”52 We ascend to the heights of truth by descending into utter materiality through one 
particular sense, namely, touch, here as the particular mode of taste. M&P are worth quoting at 
length here: 
Thus another ontological revision has been effected. In the Eucharist, touch as 
taste ceases to be restrictive in its exclusivity. Instead, from now on, if we wish to 
see the universal, to see God, we must aspire to touch and shape in truth, along 
with all other people, every last finite particular as included within and disclosing 
the body of Christ. Henceforward, the journey to God is equally the journey to the 
God-Man, and so equally to all creatures, and no longer away from them. Now, to 
see God is also to make the future.53 
 
The new “sacramentality of the cosmos” as inaugurated by the hypostatic union and 
communicated to human beings through the Eucharist is an ontological scandal, in language, that 
communicates a political vision. 
 M&P subsequently reject the notion that the sacraments are “pedagogic means” of 
restoring the rule of the mind over the body that was lost in the Fall. This sort of thinking betrays 
an “instrumentalist” view of the sacraments that is further based in an instrumentalist view of the 
Incarnation. Just as the Incarnation is not accidental to God—for it persists after the work of 
Redemption is accomplished—so also Christ’s becoming present in bread and wine persists after 
the act of the Eucharist. The elements, in other words, can serve no temporary use as pedagogical 
tools. They must, in their very materiality, be rather ontological reversals imbued into our bodies 
through our most intimate of senses in order to transform our highest modes of intellection. 
 The connection to the verum-factum as Vico’s first truth comes to light in M&P’s 
discussion of just how it is that such a hyper-finitude, hyper-concreteness, or pure accidental can 
be rationally attached to the divine life. How is it, in other words, that God can become the 
subject of some new ontological development? They appeal yet again to the aesthetic dimension 
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of the Incarnation’s necessity in order to get out of this conundrum. They claim that Logos is also 
Ars such that the assumption of a human nature belongs to the Logos in an “aesthetically 
convenient” way. The human nature of Jesus is added to the Logos in an existential way, but this 
is not the mere putting on of that human hypostasis as a temporal convenience. The existential 
“is” of the Eucharistic “This is my Body” also applies here, in that the existential link between 
the Logos and Jesus is the same as saying a true and substantial union persists between the 
human hypostasis and the divine hypostasis, only with the true change coming from the finite 
side of things. This doesn’t add anything to the Logos, however, since it is merely the fitting 
expression of what the Logos is.  
The important revelation here is that God is not primarily defined by a capacity for 
intellection but rather by touch. God, in other words, just is the molding and shaping relationship 
that God has with creation. As M&P put it, “God is disclosed in the Incarnation…as somehow, 
in his very intelligence, this eternal touch, he is also eminently that moulding or shaping through 
which subjects communicate with each other, and together modify their shared objective medium 
to produce history.”54 God is especially disclosed as touch through subjecting Godself to human 
death. Since human intelligence is only operable through its vulnerability to touch, so the divine 
truth of the Logos is properly revealed in time through its vulnerability to death. Finally,  
[S]ince God is now revealed as touch, the new ontological exaltation of the 
sensory over the intellectual is no mere pedagogic means, but an appropriate new 
disclosure of the ultimately real….Now in order to understand anything of divine 
truth (and so truth per se), we must touch divine physical manifestations, and we 
must elicit these through our crafting of liturgical enactments.55 
 
The ontological scandal of the Eucharist, in other words, is identical to the ontological exaltation 
of the sensory that is embedded within Trinitarian theology. The path to the truth of divine 
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intellection is nothing other than the liturgical enactments wherein God is encountered in and as 
touch, i.e. eating and drinking the material elements become the Body and Blood of Christ.  
This further links the ontological scandal of the Eucharist to two aspects of Milbank’s 
theology we have seen the in the previous chapter. First, the exaltation of the sensory through 
aesthetic fittingness means that the truth disclosed in the Incarnation, in the liturgical enactment 
of the Eucharist wherein the reality of the Incarnation is imbibed, and in the new sacramentality 
of the cosmos, is the very same truth of the verum-factum. God is in Godself eternally creative. 
God’s Logos is also Ars. God’s truth is the molding and shaping touch of the artisan that shapes 
the factum of the world into that which is fitting, aesthetically speaking, with the eternal Verum. 
The Incarnation and the moment of transubstantiation made possible by it, reveal the 
convertibility of the truth with the made. 
 The second link is to the ontology of the gift that Milbank argues is thoroughly and 
necessarily Trinitarian. We saw in the previous chapter that part of what secured the unique 
nature of proper gift-exchange was a sort of suitability or fittingness of the gift that was given. 
There was therein a sort of aesthetic judgment that allowed for genuine gift-exchange. 
Asymmetrical reciprocity and non-identical repetition required that true gift-exchange, as 
opposed to the impossible true gift, stemmed from a prior relationality that allowed for the gift 
given to be judged as proper or not. The aesthetic fittingness that secured the necessity of the 
Incarnation in other words, seems also to be present in any account of true gift-exchange. The 
gift can be obligatory and yet still generous based not in a sort of mercenary logic of fetishized 
sacrifice. Rather, the gift is compelled under the same logic that compelled God to become 
human, an aesthetic fittingness that is proper to the God who reveals Godself in the 
transubstantiated elements as touch. The ontological scandal of the Eucharist, in other words, lies 
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behind those theological innovations that are unique to Milbank’s oeuvre: a Trinitarian ontology, 
a radical critique of secular ontologies of violence, an account of language as constitutive for 
thought and subjectivity, and an account of reality that gives priority to the gift.  
Milbank’s entire body of work, therefore, seems to turn on the notion that ontology 
becomes praxis or, as he has recently put it, “Ideas about being coincide with ideas about human 
action.”56 The ontological scandal of the Eucharist thus necessarily opens into the political 
scandal of the Eucharist since a change in our ideas about Being, particularly those 
communicated through as intimate a venue as touch, irrevocably shape our ideas about human 
action. The introduction of aesthetic fittingness as the driving force behind the Incarnation and 
transubstantiation thus introduces a novel thematic that will come to define the parameters of 
Milbank’s Eucharistic politics. If the ontological scandal of the Eucharist is the convertibility of 
the true with the made, in accordance with the aesthetic convenientia of the Incarnation, then the 
political scandal will be a scandal beyond the quotidian matters we typically associate with “the 
political.” The political scandal of the Eucharist will not, in other words, be concerned simply 
with the proper arrangements of power. The ontological scandal of the Eucharist will open into 
something more than that—it will disclose the political scandal of a counter-politics that is itself 
a culture, a fitting and incarnational shaping of the world. How such a conception of politics 
stems from the notions of gift and language that we saw in the previous chapter must now be 
articulated.  
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The Political Scandal of the Eucharist 
Introduction 
 Of all the moments in which Milbank mentions the Eucharist, the vast majority of said 
instances are in regards to the political. Hence, while references to Milbank’s account of the 
ontological scandal of the Eucharist might have been scant, Milbank’s references to the political 
scandal of the Eucharist, though still often opaque, now become more numerous by comparison. 
The ontological scandal of the Eucharist, as we have just seen, occurs for Milbank and Pickstock 
entirely within language. Indeed, it was the event of encounter of the eternal Verbum made flesh 
in the person of Jesus Christ, whose Body was now joined with Bread as “thing” become “sign.” 
This event of the “pure accidental,” wherein Bread became that to which it was always on the 
way—namely, the Body of Christ—inaugurated a new sacramentality of the cosmos and is the 
condition for the possibility of truthful signification. Transubstantiation rescues meaningful 
signification not by an ascent into intellection but rather by a descent into materiality, an 
intensification of the experience of materiality such that intellection comes to the fore. Yet, the 
implication of these bold claims is that such a revolution in the conditions that govern the 
possibility of signification result in political changes. To participate in the rite of the Eucharist, 
in other words, is to participate in an effort to shape the world.  
 Thus, the question of the political scandal of the Eucharist now presents itself to us, front 
and center. In contrast to Chauvet’s reticence to comment on matters related to political 
specifics, Milbank here shows the fruits of the verum-factum yet again, particularly the vital 
aspect discussed in the previous chapter, that is, that the convertibility of the true with the made 
makes the Christian counter-polity an accomplishable project in the present political moment. 
Milbank is, therefore, driven well beyond Chauvet into recommending specific political 
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arrangements as in line with the purified gift-exchange of the agapic community. There exists 
within the history of these recommendations, however, a dramatic turn for Milbank. In what 
follows, we shall see that in attempting to articulate the political scandal of the Eucharist 
Milbank moves from a vision of Christian socialism towards a vision of mixed constitutional 
government that combines Christian socialism with a monarchist or papist tendency. The precise 
political “gift” that the Eucharist gives turns, in other words, from the true form of socialism in 
Milbank’s earlier work to the “gift of rule” in Milbank’s later work. I shall argue below that this 
trend can be explained only in reference to the Eucharist. Such changes are not, as I see it, 
merely in response to the current political moment but are, in fact, a result of the emphasis on the 
Incarnation that we have just chronicled.  
 This section, therefore, proceeds as follows. It begins with an examination of the “first 
iteration” of Milbank’s Eucharistic politics as articulated in the final chapter of Theology and 
Social Theory and, most importantly, in the whole of Being Reconciled. The latter of these two 
works will receive the bulk of our attention since Being Reconciled was, at the time, the fullest 
statement to date of the political consequences of Milbank’s anti-secular theology. The sequence 
on the political scandal of the Eucharist then turns, however, to Milbank’s later work. This 
“second iteration” of the political scandal of the Eucharist is very much like the first. The 
emphasis is still upon the political consequences of ontological upheavals, the necessity of gift-
exchange in any future politics, and the legacy of Christian socialism as an untapped resource for 
political theology. But something becomes markedly different in Milbank’s most recent works 
Beyond Secular Order and The Politics of Virtue. A full-throated endorsement of Christendom 
now comes to the fore and so it shall be the goal of this section to explain how Milbank’s 
theology of the Eucharist explains this turn. Chauvet thus returns as one who has already 
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sounded the alarm on precisely this tendency within Eucharistic theologies that over-emphasize 
the Incarnation. 
 
First Iteration: Sacramental Socialism 
 As we saw in the previous chapter, Milbank’s primary political concern in Theology and 
Social Theory is also an ontological one, namely, the ontological violence presumed in the 
secular invention of the “political” as a sphere of pure power. Ontologies that assume from the 
outset the interminability of conflict inevitably come to embrace notions of sovereignty by the 
exception and the management of such unending conflict by violent coercion. Hence, for secular 
ontologies, whether from the Enlightenment era or the Postmodern, there can be no ultimate 
political peace since all of reality itself is agonistic in nature. Changing this ontological 
imaginary, therefore, will necessarily have a political correlate. Milbank, as we saw in the 
previous chapter, devoted himself to precisely this critical project in his earliest and most famous 
work, articulating a Christian counter-ontology that both stemmed from and undergirded the 
sacred polis, the Other City.  
 That counter-ontology is, oddly enough, in the same spirit as Chauvet’s in that it is a 
Trinitarian ontology. For Chauvet, Trinitarian Christology inevitably led to a “symbolic 
meontology,” an ontology of absence. This ontology of absence was something to which we had 
to submit ourselves, little by little, through the sacraments as the “symbolic figures of God’s 
effacement.”57 For Milbank, however, the turn to the ontological ramification of Trinitarian 
doctrine will turn out quite differently. His turn to the counter-ontology of Christian orthodoxy 
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will see Trinitarian theology suggest not an ontology of absence but a true ontology of 
difference. In other words, Trinitarian ontology is the only ontological imaginary that can allow 
for the emergence of genuine difference without such difference leading to our placing violence 
and conflict as original to Being itself. A Trinitarian ontology is the only ontology that can 
undergird a politics not doomed both to interminable violence and the perpetual management of 
conflict by force.   
 This counter-ontology becomes a counter-politics in Milbank’s later work Being 
Reconciled: Ontology and Pardon. Milbank begins this work by articulating the ultimate 
political problem with which secular ontologies are inflicted, namely, that interminable violence 
is not only interminable but also precludes any sort of reconciliation within human communities. 
Cast in ontological terms, the political goal of communities based in an ontology of gift is the 
presence of forgiveness, a positive presence of reconciliation rather than the mere lack of bad 
blood.58 Yet, Milbank notes that the reality of forgiveness is haunted by five aporias that must be 
resolved in order for forgiveness to become possible. The systematic project that takes shape is 
thus an attempt to resolve these aporias through the gift of forgiveness (Incarnation & 
Atonement), to articulate the type of power present in the community formed by the gift of 
forgiveness (Ecclesiology), and to give shape to the relation of that community to the world 
(Culture). In short, the ontological scandal of the Eucharist—an ontological scandal of both 
language and gift—becomes a political scandal through the making possible of true 
reconciliation and its consequent effects. 
 Forgiveness brings to the fore questions that might have been floating about the edges of 
our earlier discussions. How, for instance, does the Being of God as Triune and primordially 
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creative affect the way in which we ought to form communities in the world? How can such 
ideas be relevant to such seemingly non-theological matters? Finally, if we proceed as if such 
ideas are in fact constitutive of modes of human belonging (i.e., political in nature), then how do 
we adjudicate the extent of their influence? Forgiveness is the beginning, for Milbank, of taking 
his “ideas about Being” and showing how they “coincide with ideas about human action.”59 
More importantly, for our purposes, an attempt to give an account of the possibility of 
forgiveness is, for reasons that will be made clear momentarily, an attempt to show just what sort 
of gift is given in the language made possible by the Eucharistic presence.  
 We must first, however, say just why forgiveness is such a torturous topic for Milbank. 
Forgiveness, according to Milbank, is riddled with five aporias, on top of the fact that there 
already exists a great deal of bad theology about what forgiveness is in the first place. 
Forgiveness is not, he says, a pure negative that blots out a present evil leaving behind only an 
empty neutrality. Forgiveness must instead be a positive reality, which, instead of de-creating the 
evil that is present rather creates out of evil something new.60 Yet, attempting to say just what 
sort of positive reality forgiveness would create brings to light five aporias that seem to make 
forgiveness impossible within the human milieu, not to mention making forgiveness very 
complicated on the divine level.61  
 The first aporia has to do with determining who is to forgive. The difficulty is with 
determining who the proper victim of evil really is, since the consequences of an evil deed 
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inevitably spread beyond the parties involved.62 More importantly, the difficulty of locating the 
victim seems to confine the problem only to evils in which the victims are still living and able to 
forgive. The dead cannot dictate the terms of reconciliation, and since the deed sprawls beyond 
even living victims, allowing the most immediate victim of the deed to possess the exclusive 
right to dictate the terms of reconciliation is problematic. This seems to call for a sovereign 
power to bear the burden of creating the terms of reconciliation, but the sovereign representative 
cannot adequately forgive because the offloading of responsibility onto the sovereign denies the 
victim the right to dictate their agreement with the terms.63 For how can a crime truly be forgiven 
if the victim still hates the perpetrator? Justice might have been done, but forgiveness has not 
occurred in that scenario. 
 The second aporia has to do with how time affects the possibility of forgiveness. The real 
horror of the wrong committed, Milbank argues, is that there is no way to reverse the contingent 
instance of that wrong within time.64 We all too often equate a problem in time with a problem in 
space. Like a barrier in our way, once we remove the spatial impediment then the way forward is 
restored. But wrongs committed in time do not work this way because there just is no removing 
that moment from time. There was some good from which we were kept in a single moment. The 
wrong done in time seems to take on an absolute status, and the victim becomes the one who 
threatens the possibility of reconciliation absolutely, since they will inevitably hate the 
perpetrator with cause due to the ineradicable nature of the particular and temporal wrong done 
to them.65 
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 Matters become more complicated in the third aporia when the question of forgiving and 
forgetting comes to the fore. On the one hand, a purely “immanentist” perspective seems to 
require that the memory of the wrong done be wiped away.66 After all, so long as I remember the 
wrong done I seem to still be trapped in the past hatred and cannot adequately forgive. Hence, I 
seem to need to forget the evil entirely. Once I have done that, however, there seems to be no 
need for forgiveness anymore. Under what Milbank pejoratively calls the immanentist 
perspective, there can be little more for forgiveness to require since such perspectives cannot 
give an account of forgiveness as anything more than a blotting out of past evils. If the wrong is 
forgotten then there is no more need of forgiveness, but this seems to cancel forgiveness from the 
outset since all that was required is forgetting not forgiving for a wrong to be erased.67 
 If forgiveness had not already called to mind the question of the pure gift, Milbank turns 
next to address that directly in the fourth aporia. Forgiveness, he notes, seems to be haunted by 
economic logics that turn forgiveness into something less than genuine reconciliation and more 
into self-interested contract. Are we not seeking forgiveness not for the sake of forgiveness itself 
but for our own sake? If this is the case, if we seek forgiveness because we want it and not 
because it is a moral obligation, then do we not annul forgiveness before it can even arrive?68 
Forgiveness is thereby struck by much the same difficulty that afflicted the notion of the pure 
gift: true forgiveness, as the negation of a past wrong, must be done solely for its own sake, 
otherwise it is not forgiveness. Yet, forgiveness, at least so long as it is seen as a pure negative, 
can only ever be done for our own sakes. A pure and univocal gesture of forgiveness is just as 
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impossible as the pure and univocal gift.69 The ultimate upshot of such a perspective is the false 
put-on that one has not actually been offended at all. This avoids the more difficult reality of 
taking responsibility for wrongs committed and enduring the emotional labor required by the 
process of genuine reconciliation. 
 Lastly, forgiveness seems beset by utter interminability. The problem, Milbank argues, is 
that a purely negative account of forgiveness presents us with the great difficulty of reaching any 
sense of final closure. For if the only way to reach absolute finality is to utterly forget the past 
wrong—since, again, forgiveness here is thought of as a removal of the wrong and the hatred that 
came along with it—then victims risk blinding themselves to the risk of future evil. Utterly 
forgetting the wrong done seems to require a chosen ignorance that only puts victims at further 
risk of wrong being done to them.70 More importantly, however, if the only thing victims need is 
to forget the wrong done to them then one can legitimately ask why we fret over the possibility 
of forgiveness at all.71 Thus, negative forgiveness seems to reveal the utter insecurity of human 
relationships. For on this account, forgiveness seems to be the only thing that can guarantee the 
unshakable depth of a relationship since the wrong is absolutely obliterated through forgetting it. 
Yet, this finality is ultimately chimerical since it is a consent to the absence of real 
reconciliation.72 A cursory investigation into the nature of forgiveness seems to reveal its 
impossibility. 
 I have been adding in bits of Milbank’s pejoratives on “immanentist” and “purely 
negative” visions of forgiveness and, as a result, one might imagine that the pivot to come here 
from Milbank is offering up ways in which the positive vision of forgiveness might resolve these 
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aporias. There are instances, admittedly, in his analysis where he does offer smatterings of this.73 
Yet, the aporias of forgiveness haunt even Milbank’s positive account of reconciliation, and 
these aporias become intensified when the question of forgiveness is raised to the divine level. 
The difficulties still lie in much the same location, namely, in identifying who can forgive and 
how. How is it that God can give forgiveness if the victim has never been adequately identified? 
How can God even be offended if God is beyond all temporality and victimhood? Reconciliation 
amongst humans remains just as intractable, but the added difficulties of enacting forgiveness on 
the divine level make the issue even more fraught. In short, the political scandal of the Eucharist 
as the gift of forgiveness appears impossible from the outset. 
 Just as the Incarnation was the means of securing the legitimacy of transubstantiation 
and, along with it, the possibility of all meaningful signification, so the Incarnation will now be 
Milbank’s avenue into resolving the aporia of pardon. The Incarnation does this by making 
possible what Milbank calls the “sovereign victim.”74 The God-Man alone is able to inaugurate 
genuine forgiveness “for here was not a single instantiation of human nature, victimized like all 
humans by other humans, but rather a human victim suffering the maximum possible victimage, 
by virtue of its personification by the divine Logos, all-wise and all-innocent and therefore able 
to let the human nature plumb the full depths and implications of suffering, capable of 
representing all suffering and of forgiving on behalf of all victims.”75 Jesus Christ, as sovereign 
victim, bridges the gap we saw above between allowing only victims to forgive and the need for 
a sovereign power to intercede on behalf of victims and offer a single universal forgiveness. The 
God-Man alone is able to occupy both roles—a representative of universal victimage that can 
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execute the forgiveness that seemed only possible for the sovereign while being justified in doing 
so on behalf of all victims, even those unknown or deceased.76  
Christ forgives at the original instance of hurt because the suffering undergone by him is 
“paradoxically undergone in a wholly accepting, actively receptive fashion, in such a way that 
this undergoing is itself offered as a gift.”77 But forgiveness offered to whom and by whom? This 
is an important question given the manner in which even Milbank’s positive vision of 
forgiveness ended in seeming aporia. Milbank claims that the gift offered in Christ’s suffering is 
not the offer of forgiveness for human beings from God. This is so because God cannot be 
offended by our refusal of the initial divine gift. God continues to give to us in an unbroken 
chain without resentment.78 Instead, Christ’s gift is not of forgiveness from God but is rather the 
gift of the possibility of forgiveness among human beings. This gift is the continuance of the 
“unbroken continued giving of the divine gift as also the offering of a suffering actively 
undergone,” passed to Christ from the Holy Trinity and then continued on earth through the 
presence of the Holy Spirit as “the very bond of exchange and mutual giving within the 
Trinity.”79 Such is the ultimate political scandal of Milbank’s Trinitarian ontology, a passage of 
the original gift-giving relations in the immanent trinity given as impossible possibilities 
amongst a human community formed and held together by the Holy Spirit, the Church.  
Yet, is this political scandal in any way related to the scandal of the Eucharist we have 
above been examining? Milbank’s answer is telling: “As participators through the Sacraments 
and membership of the body of Christ in the divine humanity, we now also begin to be capable 
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of forgiveness on sufficient authority and without taint of rancor.”80 The Sacraments, in other 
words, and chiefly the Eucharist, are the means by which God inculcates within us a mode of 
human belonging that, by rights, ought to be impossible. Forgiveness, riddled by aporias that 
seem to declare its impossibility, is fittingly inaugurated through the great gift of the Incarnation 
and the extension of that gift to a single human community through the Eucharist. The political 
scandal of the Eucharist is ultimately the gift of the “positive possibility of intrahuman 
reconciliation,” despite the ontological barriers that seem to portend an utter interminability of 
violence.81 This positive possibility is, more importantly, the perfection of gift-exchange and 
points to the ultimate melding together of gift and language that characterizes Milbank’s account 
of the Eucharist: 
Forgiveness, therefore, perfects gift-exchange as fusion. If gift exchange retains 
free gift as non-identical repetition and asymmetrical reciprocity, then forgiveness 
exceeds this to the measure that in perfected exchange every surprise is 
anticipated by the other, since the surprise she offers is also the surprise he arrives 
at in that very instant, as requiring a perfectly improvised and yet absolutely 
consensual dance. But since, as we have seen, forgiveness is only inaugurated by 
the sovereign victim, this perfection of exchange as fusion is first granted to us in 
the idiomatic characterizing a victim as sovereign, sovereign as victim. It is their 
relation, their dance, that first and alone reconciles.82 
 
 It might, however, still remain a question for the reader as to just how intrahuman 
reconciliation can be called a “political scandal.” In what sense does such a possibility 
restructure or scandalize the public sphere that variegated human communities forge and share 
with one another? In other words, the upshot of reconciliation for the makeup of a particular 
community is quite clear—conflict within such a community is no longer interminable and 
makes possible the governing of that community via the norms of forgiveness—but it is not clear 
                                                
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid., 70.  
 239 
what the result is (or even if there is one) for the public realm that forms things we would call 
states, nations, or even international communities when forgiveness is shown to be possible in 
and through the Eucharist. 
 Milbank addresses this topic by introducing a new aspect of forgiveness, what he calls 
“cruciformity.”83 It is not separate from forgiveness per se, rather it aims at supplementing the 
overcoming of evil via forgiveness with the overcoming of violence (which is always a public 
event) with the public aspect of forgiveness, namely atonement. In short, Milbank wants to know 
the public import of the gift of the particular life of Jesus—i.e., its public aspects and, most 
importantly, its publicly violent end. Supplementing forgiveness with a sense of “cruciformity,” 
is thus a means of defining the public and political aspect of the advent of the sovereign victim.84 
To say precisely what this political aspect of sovereign victimhood is, will be, for our purposes, 
precisely the same as stating the political scandal of the Eucharist. For, after all, the Eucharist is 
nothing more than the central point of access for human beings into the chain of giving that 
begins in the Incarnation and culminates in the ethical possibility of forgiveness and the political 
possibility of cruciformity. 
 What, then, is cruciformity? Milbank means by this term the manner in which Christ does 
more than merely overcome evil to restore the Good through forgiveness. Cruciformity is his 
attempt at stating how it is that Jesus restores peace via the overcoming of violence, both of 
which are, for Milbank, visible and thereby political realities.85 Milbank takes his inspiration 
from the work of Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben who sought to plumb the depths of the 
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contradictions and paradoxes that beset political sovereignty through an analysis of the ancient 
Roman practice of homo sacer.86 Much like the scapegoat of Rene Girard, homo sacer was a 
single person cast out of the community, and this person bore the community’s transgressions 
within their status as outcast. The difference between homo sacer and the scapegoat, of course, 
was that homo sacer was cast out or killed on the basis of popular vote. This, for Agamben and 
Milbank, reveals the “aporetic structure of sovereignty” in that, the entirety of Roman Law is 
founded upon a moment of exception to the rule of law, a moment in which a person can be 
killed without reprisal because he or she has been reduced to pure, bare life.87 Homo sacer 
becomes a type of sub-humanity despite their humanity, and it is this de-humanizing process 
upon which sovereign rule of law founds itself—i.e., sovereignty only functions by “including 
only what is simultaneously excluded.”88 
 Jesus Christ was not an instance of homo sacer, but the death Christ died, Milbank 
argues, was a death of pure sub-humanity. While he was not subject to the practice of homo 
sacer he died the death of homo sacer, and in so doing, Christ lends “divine height” to just this 
sort of death.89 Hence, “upon the basis of the rejected one, a new sort of community is built.”90 
This new sort of community, however, is not based entirely on a positive reading of 
abandonment. Importantly, Milbank argues that this cannot be the case because Jesus was not 
ontologically deserted by the Father on the Cross, contrary to an interpretation of the Crucifixion 
that was absolutely critical for Chauvet.91 For what the death of Jesus must do is scandalize the 
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problematic reading of Being inherent in logics of sovereignty. It must be that political 
government can no longer legitimize itself through inclusion-via-exclusion or legality-via-
exception. These are the politics characteristic of modernity and, therefore, the politics that the 
Eucharist must scandalize on Milbank’s reading. 
These aporias of sovereignty are overcome, fittingly, through gift-exchange. Christ is 
excluded in the moment of Crucifixion, but Christ seems to condemn violence in this moment by 
refusing it. He condemns violence, as Milbank argues, by a “counter-violent violence,” in which 
through “utter self-giving” the life of Christ is immediately returned as resurrection and, 
therefore, “also gift-exchange.”92 Thus, in the moment when humanity “most abandon[s] the 
divine donation, it surpasses itself, and appears more than ever, raising us up into the eternal gift-
exchange of the Trinity.”93 In this way, gift-exchange overcomes the aporetic nature of 
sovereignty, and creates the possibility of a community outside of the interminable violence such 
rule by the exception inevitably promotes. Christ’s life is returned, Christ is risen after the 
moment of most exclusion, which implies that the community formed on the basis of his death 
moves beyond the problem of an inclusion that excludes at the same time. 
Christ as purely excluded is risen: therefore the life he is risen to is the possibility 
of life after exclusion from life, of a life beyond inclusion versus exclusion. If 
Christ is supremely exceptional, this is because he is the exception even to the law 
of the exception: after Christ there is no more of that oscillation between norm 
and exception which paradoxically establishes the sphere of the norm.94 
 
Christ’s will is not alienated in an executive power that will inevitably betray it, but is rather 
emptied out in order that it be “non-identically repeated by another.”95 A community shaped by 
the “cruciformity” of Christ’s life, therefore, will be a community beyond the aporias of 
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sovereignty, beyond the rule of the exception, and beyond, most importantly, the interminability 
of violence. 
 In short, Christ’s blood makes peace, and the resonance with Vico’s verum-factum should 
not be missed here. For the public shape of Christ’s life accomplishes this making not via an 
arbitrary series of commandments delivered from on high, but rather through a sense of aesthetic 
necessity, such that Christ’s utterly exceptional nature just has to be the shape the Church takes. 
The cruciform shape of Christ’s life is aesthetically necessary in the same sense that the 
Incarnation was the most fitting means of saving human beings. This aesthetic necessity makes 
possible the harmony of difference that does not require the exceptional sacrifice of a scapegoat 
or a homo sacer in order to establish the conditions of the normalcy. “In Christ, there is no longer 
the inclusion/exclusion logic of race, nor of economics, nor of gender…But this inclusion of 
differences does not mean their exclusion! No, they remain, as pure relations, pure passage of 
harmonious will.”96 Hierarchy, perhaps counter-intuitively, remains as well. Not the “specific 
hierarchies of gender and slavery which Paul within his limited historical perspective” eventually 
endorsed, but rather “the necessary ‘educative’ and architectonic hierarchies of the transmission 
of harmonious life which no culture can ever truly dispense with.”97  
 The key to keeping arbitrary hierarchies of power or avarice from ruling the day is 
nothing other than the aesthetic example of Christ’s specificity. “For if there can be more to 
social life and hierarchy than arbitrariness, if there can indeed be ‘harmony’ or a passing of 
events in the ‘right’ way like music, then this suggests that there is a real ‘affinity’ to be 
constantly produced, discovered, and enacted” between Christ and the cruciform community.98 
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“[W]e are to imitate Christ and to live ecstatically through exchange, losing our lives in order to 
gain them,” knowing that in so doing we are ruled “not by a sovereign source which includes yet 
excludes us, but by blood flowing from the past which we imbibe, so that the outside is also the 
inside.”99 The cruciformity of Christ’s atoning life, therefore, overcomes the visibility of 
violence through a public community formed by the Eucharist or, as Milbank puts, through “the 
brotherhood and sisterhood of the Grail: of those ceaselessly questing for the Eucharist…”100 
 What Milbank has arrived at, thus far, is a political scandal that is rooted in ontological 
realities deeper than the Eucharist itself, but we encounter those realities most fully in the 
reception of the Eucharistic signs of the Body and Blood of Christ. Ontology here does not 
eschew embodiment, signification, and mediation, as Chauvet often pejoratively said it would, 
but rather embraces them in order to establish the theoria by which any praxis is made possible. 
Thus, Milbank can programmatically state: “The Incarnation and the hypostatic descent of the 
Spirit inaugurated on earth a counter-polity exercising a counter-sovereignty, nourished by 
sovereign victimhood.”101 The Church has a double foundation in the Triune Life of the Godhead 
in that the Church is “established both as the truth of the Logos, which is revealed by the good of 
the Holy Spirit, and as the gift of the Spirit which is peace, the intermingling and co-ordination 
of all the Spirit’s specific gifts, which are human talents.”102 It would appear, in so many words, 
that the Church has Verbum and Donum, Language and Gift, as its foundations, which lead to the 
Church’s corresponding political scandals of Truth and Peace. The founding moment of the 
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Church, the Eucharist, is therefore the gift of a particular type of language that is itself a 
community shaped by the truth of that language, or, as Milbank puts it, “if truth is peace and 
peace truth, then theoremata and pragmata are also convertible and co-incident aspects.”103 The 
quest of the Church is not only the quest for truth and peace but also a quest for its own identity 
as the community given the gift of truth and peace in the embodied ritual that founds it—the 
Eucharist. 
 Milbank, however, does not leave his account of the political scandal of the Eucharist 
here. Indeed, unlike Chauvet, who was content to speak in broad strokes about the genuine ethics 
that would define the members of the Eucharistic community, Milbank wants to ask specifically, 
“How is the peace of the Church mediated to and established in the entire human 
community?”104 Rather than name a sacrament or a specific ecclesial hierarchy, Milbank goes 
further and proffers that the answer to this question is socialism.105 Milbank thus endorses what I 
am here calling “sacramental socialism.” I say “socialism,” obviously, because Milbank is so 
bold as to name the specific political system through which the peace of the Church might be 
mediated to the public realm of human affairs. I say “sacramental” because it is precisely on the 
basis of the ontology mediated through the Eucharist and the “hierarchy of the Eucharistic and 
ecclesial corpus mysticum” that Milbank’s peculiar version of socialism justified.  
Milbank’s “first iteration” of the political scandal of the Eucharist—what I am calling, 
again, “sacramental socialism”—is one that flirts with but never fully endorses a sort of “mixed 
constitution” that would seek to blend together rule by the Many and rule by the Few or the One 
as the optimum arrangement for the public realm. This is the great controversy, so it seems to 
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me, of what I will later call the “second iteration” of the political scandal of the Eucharist. In the 
first iteration, however, Milbank does seek to give an apology for the worth of “educative” 
hierarchies within an ecclesial context. He turns to socialism as a means of showing how the 
democratic political impulse might be satisfied but in a counter-Enlightenment form, as the 
earliest articulations of socialism supposedly were.106 The Church, for its part, has a 
“simultaneous hierarchy and democracy,” and, “contrary to all the assumptions of secular 
sovereignty, [the Church] is all the more democratic the more it is genuinely hierarchical.”107 
The Church is the community wherein the aristocratic insight into Truth and the democratic 
impulse towards Peace can coincide. Yet, for Milbank, this union must in some way be mediated 
to the broader public realm through a political system. Milbank’s choice is socialism, and it is the 
goal of this final portion of my account of the “first iteration” of the political scandal of the 
Eucharist to say why. 
The goal of Milbank’s political ruminations is obviously a sort of genuine community, 
but here he points towards an important first principle that is in keeping with his earlier critiques 
of ontologies of difference. There is a false sense of community proffered in political theory that 
views community as an organic whole, utterly cohesive in its unity. But this form of community, 
Milbank argues, is secretly a totality, an erasure of genuine difference for the sake of the singular 
whole. To value community truly, however, “is to value encounter, and the meeting with the 
other and different” such that the cohesion involved is not an erasure of difference but rather a 
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“harmonious sharing and blending.”108 The postmodern political order, Milbank contends, is 
haunted by precisely this sort of false universality that seeks to establish a true pluralism but can 
only succeed in sowing the seeds of perpetual conflict unless difference is collapsed into identity. 
Both Capitalistic and Communitarian systems, therefore, will only collapse back into a bleak 
form of individualism that precludes community, particularly the genuine community that is 
founded on the gift of forgiveness and the gift-exchange of agape. 
Between capitalism and communitarianism, Milbank sees a system of free-association 
that is itself nothing more than the “universal gift.”109 In this mode of free-association, gift-
exchange is made possible not by an utter cohesion within society but by the presence of the 
stranger or the other. The relational communion that Milbank envisions within this mode of 
human being-with is remarkably similar to Chauvet’s. Such free-association would be “a 
universal practice of offering, a universal offering in the expectation or at least hope of receiving 
back not a price due us, but others themselves in their counter gifts, because we aim for 
reciprocity, for community, and not for a barren and sterile self sacrifice…”110 This gift-
exchange is itself a sort of mythos, a story that defines the common good of the social itself. The 
unique nature of this mythos is to be found in its correspondence to that which made gift-
exchange possible, namely, asymmetrical reciprocity and non-identical repetition. Capitalist and 
communitarian accounts of political order will “try and hold onto identity in spatial form, in 
order to define it and store it, thereby desacralizing it, subordinating it to a self-preservation 
which is ultimately self-canceling.”111 The universal mythos that is also the universal gift, 
however, implies “a different logos to the logos of reason.” There is, in other words, a different 
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language within which the manner of being-with of the community grounded by gift-exchange is 
formed. A language made possible by the gift of the possibility of reconciliation. 
At this point, Milbank makes an important assertion: namely, that what makes forms of 
political order that privilege the ontological primacy of the social over the individual (like 
socialism) better than those which do otherwise, is that the universal is reached not by a 
flattening out of difference and locality. Rather, the universal is disclosed in and through 
particular and local dispensations, which is not to say that there are many cultural pathways to 
one absolute and inscrutable transcendence, all of which are equally valid.112 Milbank instead 
envisions the goods revealed by free-associations to be a sort of pilgrimage through the logos 
established by the ontology of gift.  
[I]f one is to say that an open pathway, or many open pathways, are disclosive of 
transcendence in some degree, this implies that, constantly and dynamically, one 
is on pilgrimage from sacred site to sacred site, weaving them together along a 
coherent line or spiral, and thereby out of smaller sites constantly tracing the 
margins of greater sites, and then returning to locate within the greater realm each 
specific place once again.113 
 
The particular and the ineffable thus have a balance to each other, wherein the ineffable cannot 
proscribe any characterization of a good for all, while the particular cannot be overemphasized to 
the point of privileging one dispensation of the ineffable within a given locality over any other.  
 This theoretical excursus has a critical political payout. Such an account of the universal 
“holds more promise of a distributive justice enacted through consent, rather than through terror 
or forced purchase. Yet the precondition for such agreed distribution remains…some mode of 
universal religious attachment, some kind of collective totem.”114 Milbank then emphatically 
links his account of a socialism grounded in collective devotion to Pickstock’s account of 
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transubstantiation. The Eucharist, he argues, uniquely allows for precisely this sort of universal 
devotion coupled with local variation. Indeed, he joins Pickstock in claiming, perhaps 
problematically, that the foundation of all European collectivity was the citizen’s “sense of being 
literally part of the body of Christ, an extension of divine humanity.”115 Thus, the socialism for 
which Milbank is arguing relies explicitly on an account of the ontological scandal of the 
Eucharist, a transubstantiation through which difference can be integrated into the social in all of 
its local variances without violently being assimilated into a false universality. “Does this not 
suggest,” he argues, “that the notion of the ‘body of Christ’ involves something much more 
politically complex than the usual notions of ‘democracy,’ ‘civil society,’ ‘human rights,’ and so 
forth?”116  
 The reader will recall that the ontological import of prioritizing the arrival of reality as 
gift as opposed to a collection of bare givens that were just “there,” was a renewed sense of the 
significance of time and contingency. “Contingency,” as Milbank puts it, “now partakes of 
ultimate and not subordinated significance” since the temporal now “may disclose or remind us 
of more of that which is eternal beyond both time and space.”117 Milbank’s sacramental 
socialism thereby implies what he calls the “politics of time.”118 The politics of time creates a 
sort of “liturgical rule” grounded in the notion that only an orientation to transcendence or the 
eternal—i.e., an orientation that views reality as arriving gift—is able to interpret the “intrinsic 
nothingness of things in time as their existing by participation, as their subsisting always and 
primordially as gifts which declare to us ever-renewed and freely granted human 
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possibilities.”119 Hence, a collective devotion rooted in the ontological scandal of the Eucharist 
will necessarily empty out into a political scandal that is sacramental socialism, a form of 
political order that avoids the absolutization of pure autonomy. 
 I noted, however, at the outset of this section that the political scandal of the Eucharist 
will come to be seen as a culture, a sort of aesthetically fitting shape given to a particular mode 
of human belonging that will come to define the ecclesial makeup of the Church and, albeit 
imperfectly, the ordering of society at large. This culture is mediated by the liturgical order of the 
politics of time. There are three aspects to this mediation worth discussing as they stem from 
Milbank’s sacramental socialism as just articulated. First, the culture that is the political scandal 
of the Eucharist is rooted in festival. The social itself is seen as founded on an ontology of time 
that is “fully received from the outset” and yet “shared without restraint.” Doxology and charity, 
or in my terms “language” and “gift,” are consummated in the shared festival that holds society 
itself together. To split the two is either to “obliterate oneself as recipient,” which is just to 
“blaspheme the transcendent giver,” or it is to “refuse the return-gift of gratitude,” which is only 
an attempt to “celebrate one’s will to give rather than the miraculous and unpredictable arrival o 
achieved affinity and surprising reciprocity.”120 Importantly, this means that making and 
exchange are foundational for all of social life. Indeed, they share much the same ontological 
priority that gift-exchange does for Milbank, and this is not surprising considering Milbank’s 
unceasing devotion to the metaphysical first truth of the verum-factum. Something produced is 
produced so that it may be but then lost, expanded, and offered. Creation, making, and 
production thus exhibit the “specific lineaments of the benefit of participation, of further 
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received gift.”121 The social is, therefore, that which is made and in being made is celebrated, and 
this is nothing other than its truth.  
 The second aspect of the liturgical order is education. Here we see again Milbank’s 
emphasis on the educative nature of hierarchy coming to play a decisive role. For Milbank 
education lies “very much within a liturgical economy” because all of life is ultimately nothing 
other than education, in that it is a reception of the arriving gift and an attempt to learn from that 
reception.122 Education is thus coterminous with the political in that it is just one facet within a 
life seen as pedagogic reception. Yet, this further undermines the appeal of purely democratic 
politics since education requires submission to the wisdom of a tradition. Otherwise, education 
becomes, as it has under capitalistic systems, an instrumental mechanism for the creation of 
adequate workers. Education as a fundamental aspect of a sacramental socialism is thus 
hierarchical but not rigidly so. The vision of education here proffered is one of vertical ascent 
beyond the standing of a pupil. Education seeks to indicate the good life for those who submit to 
it, thus shaping the common good for which the society strives, but this common good is always 
open to revision via education and the vertical ascent of pupils into teachers in their own right. 
This revision makes that which education is attempting to inculcate semi-ineffable. Education, 
thus, obeys a “liturgical rhythm” since it seeks “almost impossibly” to “discover and transmit 
this semi-ineffability” to the community as a whole.123  
 The final aspect of the liturgical order is that of profession. The proper vision of 
profession according to Milbank is tied inextricably to the vision of gift that founds the 
ontological scandal of the Eucharist. The aim of a profession is not merely the accumulation of 
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wealth (or perhaps better, it was) but rather a certain mode of giving that society then makes 
possible through compensation.124 Those admitted into professions were taught a series of right 
patterns, shown in examples, and repeated (in non-identical ways, mind you) that turned to skills. 
Ultimately, this is what makes the polis liturgical for Milbank, that is, society’s good is to be 
found in a series of examples and repeatable patterns that are non-identically repeated through 
innovative skill yet still within a common tradition. This vision of profession therefore 
transforms the purpose of exchange for society. Instead of exchanging for the sake of 
accumulating capital, professionals would see the purpose of work as “inheriting, developing, 
and passing on a particular strange skill requiring certain ‘gifts’ for its best exercise; gifts 
themselves offered for the wider manifestation of human charisma.”125 Milbank, importantly, 
admits that this vision of work, exchange, and the market is ultimately idealistic, but he is 
unceasing in his assertion that even partial successes are successes for which we could rightly 
fight. Even more importantly, the impulse to fight for such partial successes is the collective 
devotion to the revealed truth of the Eucharist. It is the Eucharist, ultimately, that discloses the 
ontological priority of gift and imposes upon us the vision of reality as arriving gift. As such, the 
politics of time that follows upon this ontological scandal is nothing other than a politics of the 
Eucharist. Milbank’s sacramental socialism, therefore, is one attempt at articulating the 
necessary practical corollary to the ontological scandal of the Eucharist. 
 The ultimate result of such sacramental socialism is a “culture of affinity,” or what 
Milbank describes as “the absolutely non-theorizable…the almost ineffable…the mysterium.”126 
But what does Milbank mean by “affinity,” and why would the end result of such a well known 
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political system be anything verging on the ineffable? Milbank’s account of affinity is, I take it, 
an attempt to head off at the pass an oncoming objection to his appeal to Christian socialism. The 
objection, I think, is over the verum-factum and its compatibility with Milbank’s appeal to the 
orthodoxy of one political system over another. Essentially, the question one must ask of 
Milbank is how it is that the radically constructed nature of truth and the appeal to a single 
political choice among many others are reconcilable with one another? Milbank has already 
shown that the dynamism of the verum-factum leads to treating the political scandal of the 
Eucharist as a culture, a creative human endeavor to shape the world according to an 
aesthetically rather than logically necessary truth. Yet, why then endorse one particular political 
option? Milbank’s argument for “affinity” holds the answer to this objection. 
 The verum-factum and Milbank’s insistence on the aesthetic dimension of truth and gift-
exchange reveal an account of human nature as ever expanding through new, creative activity.127 
Human beings, in short, are meant to change up until the eschaton, with these changes being 
judged via analogy to the Good. Milbank is thus arguing for a sort of primordial poiesis at the 
root of the human being as human, but Milbank is also arguing that Christian must embrace the 
“revisability of the world” as such. This, as I see it, is the real import of Vico’s hylozoic 
metaphysical system for Milbank’s theological work. Christianity is the religion that bursts 
boundaries, but it is not the religion that reveals that boundaries do not exist. Again, the only way 
Milbank can seem to make sense of such a paradox is to speak in terms of gift-exchange. 
Categories like “nature” and “essence” are not immovable and fixed, but they remain tenable 
categories because they arrive as “valuable abiding gift with and through time, rather than 
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despite it.”128 More importantly, an essence can persist over time precisely because it is non-
identically repeated through time. The truth of such an essence—like, say, the essence of a 
political community—is thereby an ever-changing yet ever-abiding phenomenon. Art “further 
reveals natura.”129  
Communities are, thereby, just another instance of poesis, a creative work of human 
artifice that must be judged according to what Milbank calls “creative discrimination.”130 The 
goal of a politics that is based in the Eucharist, however, is to create a community that is united 
or identified with the Incarnate One. This means creating a community that is joined to Jesus 
through an affinity of character. So “affinity” comes to mean more than just a mere similarity, 
instead affinity suggests something like an analogical union of natures. Milbank’s favored 
analogy is, fittingly, the Incarnation. Jesus of Nazareth, according to Milbank, held such an 
affinity to the second person of the Trinity “as to constitute identity; but an identity between 
humanity and divinity, not of substantial nature, but of character, hypostasis, or persona.”131 
Jesus, therefore, communicates this character to the disciples “where they were to repeat 
differently, so constituting a community of affinity with Jesus.” The Eucharistic community is 
thus not a community of nature (a family, for instance) or a community founded by coercion (the 
State) but is rather “a community of difference in identity…an identity diffused through the non-
identical repetition of character, or of affinity.”132 
The difficulty, obviously, is to adjudicate the proper instantiations of this affinity within 
the time before the eschaton. How are we to practice “creative discrimination” such that we 
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choose the proper means of non-identically repeating the character of Christ, thereby gifting to 
the world a community of identity in difference? One can see why Milbank would call affinity 
“the absolutely non-theorizable,” for how can one theorize or delineate the way to repeat 
absolutely the character communicated by the life of Jesus? Despite the seeming specificity of 
Milbank’s proposal—a sacramental socialism, mind you—the notion of affinity seems to 
undermine the assuredness of any one political system’s supposed affinity with the character of 
Jesus.  
Milbank, thus, seems to end his appeal to socialism in a manner much like Chauvet ended 
his engagement with the project of overcoming metaphysics. While the two seem mostly 
compatible, what cannot be denied is that the way forward is neither a set of clearly definable 
theoretical principles nor a vapid appeal to the “messiness” of practice. Rather, the way forward 
is just that, a way. Whatever “affinity” is, it cannot be something discoverable in the order of 
things as “merely a given impersonal bond.”133 Again, the only language Milbank can find to 
speak of it is that of gift. Affinity, as expressed through a sort of Christian socialism, must rather 
be “the arriving gift of something that we must partially discover in patient quest, active shaping 
and faithful pursuing.”134 Milbank seems to end his appeal to sacramental socialism, therefore, in 
an ecstatic mode. Socialism, it would seem, is the closest thing we have got to an affinity with 
Christ, but even it must be transcended as we faithfully seek to non-identically repeat the 
character of the Incarnate One in our shaping of the world.  
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Second Iteration: A Return to Christendom? 
 I could have well stopped at the first iteration almost as an apologia on behalf of what I 
see as the core of Milbank’s theological work. However, Milbank himself did not stop there, and 
has couched his newest works Beyond Secular Order and The Politics of Virtue as advances 
upon his previous theological constructions. What is most notable about both of these works is 
an assured bent towards a return of Christendom. That is, Milbank seems to give a theological 
justification as to how it is that the Church is theologically justified to assert a sort of 
monarchical or aristocratic political authority within the world. The sacred polis of the Church, 
therefore, does not merely have Christ as its head or have need of an educative series of 
hierarchies. The Church, so Milbank argues, requires some form of sovereign rule within its 
political order in order to keep faith with the ontological scandal of the Eucharist. This, it seems 
to me, is the crux of Milbank’s arguments in the latter half of Beyond Secular Order, fittingly 
titled as the sequence on “Political Ontology.” I also take this move to be a radical departure 
from the apophatic discipline that Milbank’s appeal to affinity placed upon his prior work. 
Hence, I shall briefly detail how this new maneuver threatens to undermine much of what 
Milbank accomplished in his earlier works. 
 I have already written about the first half of Beyond Secular Order above, particularly the 
way that Milbank’s genealogy of the secular found in this work coincides with much of what 
Milbank wrote in Theology and Social Theory and Being Reconciled. Beyond these familiar 
themes, Milbank extends the argument of those two core works in Beyond Secular Order by 
putting forward the original notion of “trans-organicity.” I want to highlight this at the start 
because if there is a way in which the “second iteration,” as I’m calling it, is in keeping with the 
first it is through this concept of trans-organicity. In the second sequence of Beyond Secular 
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Order, Milbank avers that pre-modern politics was focused around a quadruple anthropology. 
This anthropology is best defined by four pillars—pillars that, one assumes, are meant to be 
antidotes to the four pillars of modern ontology we have already discussed above.135 These 
anthropological pillars are: 1.) humanity as the rational animal 2.) humanity as the social animal 
3.) humanity as the fabricating animal and 4.) humanity as naturally ordered to the 
supernatural.136 However, the way in which human beings inhabit these traditional concepts is 
where Milbank takes an original tack. Human beings are an “integral hybrid” in that none of 
these pillars can be taken away without the rest collapsing, but, more than that, the way in which 
human beings are rational, social, fabricating, and ordered to the supernatural is transgressive.137  
The rational animal’ is only animal as rational, and yet the mode taken by 
animality here is essential to reason. The social animal is only animal as social, 
yet this sociality is an entirely natural phenomenon. Homo Faber is only human 
through making things and ‘making things up’ yet this artificial character which 
belongs to the individual through artefacting is an aspect of that individuals 
integral nature. Finally, human nature paradoxically is that which exceeds itself in 
receiving the gift of the supernatural end; yet this ‘deification’ is only possible as 
the fulfillment of human created nature, and not as its destruction.138 
 
Each pillar seems to carry within it a sort of ecstatic fulfillment in that the human being is only 
one thing by being that thing’s other at the same time. Milbank thus describes human beings as 
“grotesque,” here referring more to the aesthetic sense of grotesque than the common usage of 
the word. Human beings are “oddly-ruptured” and yet held together.139 They are trans-organism, 
an instance of animality that can exceed itself as animal precisely in and through its organic 
nature. They are an organic unity that exceeds itself. Thus, trans-organicity seems to be a vital 
expansion of his prior emphasis on dynamism and poesis as fundamental to human beings. 
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 Trans-organicity also plays a vital role in further expanding Milbank’s insistence that the 
social and the ontological are inextricably linked, thus further linking the ontological scandal of 
the Eucharist with the political scandal of the Eucharist as well. The trans-organic character of 
human creatures means that there is an “architectonic dimension of human association.”140 It is a 
part of our very  nature as animals to be social. There just is no such thing as an asocial or 
apolitical human being. Again, this is not in spite of our animality but directly on account of it. 
For our animality, so Milbank argues, is “an animality inclined to social artifice from the very 
depths of its animality.”141 Milbank has thus applied his earlier work on the verum-factum to the 
biological nature of animal life—artifice, as it were, is part of what it means biologically to exists 
as a human being. 
 This new insistence on the primordial creative nature of human beings in their natural 
states as animals would be a notably helpful expansion on Milbank’s prior sacramental 
socialism. It would be helpful in that it shows the deeply sacramental structure essential to much 
of human association. Directly linking, in other words, the sacramentality of the cosmos with the 
ontological priority of the social would provide greater heft for Milbank’s insistence that 
socialism is the form that the sacramental community would take. Yet, Milbank’s work here 
takes an unexpected turn. He argues that pre-modern politics, the politics that centered around 
the four pillars of theological anthropology listed above, maintained a place for the rule of the 
One, the Few, and the Many, meaning that pre-modern politics had no difficulty reconciling the 
presence of some form of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy in its politics. It was able to do 
this, Milbank seems to imply, precisely because the contingent sort of truth natural to human art 
was held in higher regard. There was no need, in other words, to determine the single right form 
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of government that would grant full flourishing to any human association. Forms of government 
were treated as the result of contingent historical circumstances, exemplifying a form of 
pragmatism that Milbank seems not only to admire but to link to the theological corrective that 
pre-modern politics would offer us today.142 
 While an endorsement of rule by the Many shouldn’t shock us coming from a socialist, 
the appeal to the inherent need for a recovery of political rule by the One and the Few is a 
difficult thing to reconcile. Milbank’s point is, if I might coin a phrase, an onto-political one, 
meaning it is a point about the political correlate of a thoroughly modern ontological shift. 
Nominalist metaphysics calls into question universal essences, and this critical doubt then 
subsequently undermines the appeal to a universal common good. The only legitimate political 
justification becomes the claim of rights that then, consequently, does away with the use of the 
Few as proprietors of public virtue (the purpose for which Milbank thinks rule by the Few ought 
to be preserved). What Milbank wants to argue for, however, is not just the return of the One or 
the Few but rather that the place of sovereignty must be the interplay between the One, the Few, 
and the Many.143 This, he argues, is in keeping with traditional metaphysics and is surely 
somewhat analogous to Milbank’s Trinitarian ontology. The difference is that a stripping of 
power away from the sovereign state and returning it to intermediary associations that bind the 
many, are regulated by the Few, and are given dignity by the One seems a far cry from the 
socialism that sought to enact a culture of affinity within the public sphere.144 
 Milbank’s defense of the return of rule by the One and the Few is couched as 
fundamentally in keeping with his prior work on poesis and creativity. Furthermore, Milbank, 
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again, links the Eucharistic presence with primordial creativity in the section that he uses to 
begin his defense of some contemporary form of Christendom, a section fittingly titled 
“Eucharistic Creativity and Political Power.” Milbank’s argument stems from earlier reflections 
on the relationship between aesthetics and sovereignty. Following an essay by historian Ernst 
Kantorowicz, Milbank confirms his assent to something I only hinted at above, namely, that 
contingent political configurations must be looked at as “a process of creative fictioning.”145 Our 
ability to create social orders in this manner is not just an imitation of God “as creator” but also 
“God as Trinitarian—the implication being that human verbal art as an internally generated or 
‘made’ product is as indispensable to human cognition as is the generation of the Son/Word to 
divine cognition,” further confirming the continuing influence of the verum-factum on Milbank’s 
recent work.146  
The earthly power that Milbank sees as exercising this power of creating legal fictions is 
the Papacy, who inherits it from the first true creative artist, Jesus Christ, as the full instantiation 
of homo faber. The Pope inherits such power from Christ, according to Kantorowicz, and 
thereby shares in gifting of God’s power of creation ex nihilo to the human person of Jesus 
within the papal act of overriding existing law or inventing new law altogether. But since the 
power stems from Christ it is not merely something interesting or novel, rather the Papal decrees 
it would seem are an utterly new creation amongst human legal artifice. This is possible only in 
so far as the Pope participates in the gifting of divine creativity to humanity through Jesus, 
seemingly acting as the Vicar of the second person of the Trinity by operating on earth as the 
Logos does in the divine economy. The sort of creativity that the papacy rightly exercises is 
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analogous to the first act of creatio ex nihilo and, critically, to the moment of transubstantiation. 
Hence, Milbank writes, “It was the Pope, initially, who had the power of drastic creative 
innovation, because he mediated first of all liturgically, but then legislatively, the trans-creation 
of Christ himself, Christ’s deployment of fictions, Christ’s institution of the new birth at baptism, 
and finally Christ’s act of transubstantiation on Maundy Thursday.”147  
The seeming paradox of the “fictional” nature of legal artifice causes Milbank, yet again, 
to resort to talk of gift and language in order to explain it. Created fiction is, like language, 
“necessary for the adumbration of a certain truth,” and thus becomes “a paradoxically essential 
‘supplement’ in a somewhat Derridean sense.”148 Fiction “discloses a new universality,” but new 
only in a historic sense, for the universality here described is not new for Milbank. Indeed, it is 
the very same sense of Eucharistic universality that was first put forward in Pickstock’s account 
of transubstantiation. Fiction discloses a new universality, he argues, “only through the re-
narration of a concrete instance,” meaning, in other words, that the legal fictions we create can 
disclose universality in their concrete particulars without exhausting the breadth of the universal 
as such. “[U]niversal norms of equity are constructed by us through language, yet the 
‘artificiality of the universal need not mean that it does not disclose a true universality.”149 Yet, 
talk of language soon necessitates talk of the gift, for the sort of creativity we are speaking of 
here is just as much a discovery as it is a crafting of truth. Fiction seems, therefore to arrive as a 
gift even in our crafting it from prior givens. “[I]f fiction is inspired or discloses a truth to us,” 
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Milbank argues, “then it is as much received as produced, as much granted as engendered…”150 
Politics as legal fiction, therefore, is theurgic.  
A Trinitarian ontology that sees God as primordially creative prior to the act of Creation 
has the political correlate of a politics based on a vision of the human being as, among the three 
other pillars, homo faber. Politics are theurgic and, in being theurgic, they are also trans-organic 
or trans-natural—they exceed the natural sociality of human beings in and through the animality 
of human beings. Yet, Milbank insists that this creation of social orders as fundamental to human 
beings in their tran-organicism also necessitates a return of the Few and a justification of the One 
in any Christian politics of supernatural charity. Kingship and aristocracy are not done away with 
in the polis ordered by grace but are rather, so Milbank seems to argue, required for the proper 
dispersion of that grace on every level of such a society. More importantly, this is not merely a 
suggestion for the makeup of ecclesial hierarchy and a clear disavowal of such hierarchy’s 
application in the public sphere. Far from it, in fact. The politics of theurgy that Milbank is 
proffering leads to the bombastic claim that “the idea of Christianity without Christendom is a 
self-deluding and superficial illusion.”151  
 I should make clear here that what Milbank is arguing for is not necessarily a return to 
monarchy or aristocracy as the proper form of government. His claim is more that the One, the 
Few, and the Many are present in all human societies, regardless of whether or not we think of 
ourselves as having eliminated one of the three once and for all. This is not a claim, so it seems 
to me, that is all that controversial. The suggestion that Christendom and Christianity are not 
separable phenomena, however, is quite controversial. Importantly, Milbank’s attempt to defend 
this claim relies upon his prior work on gift-exchange. Milbank argues that charity is a 
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supernatural virtue that is “superadded” to us.152 Charity, in other words, is not something we 
grow within ourselves but something we receive as supernatural gift. Yet the addition of this gift 
is not something alien to us. Like other aspects of the trans-organicity for which Milbank argues, 
the addition of charity to us as gift is something added to us that somehow completes our 
nature—an analogue to Milbank’s prior work on aesthetic fittingness. 
 The Church’s relationship to society is a parallel to the gift of charity. Since “love occurs 
entirely as the gift of God” there cannot be any presence of this gift “outside the community of 
love,” i.e., the Church.153 The Church attempts to inaugurate something like a “trans-
community,” where the Church is something utterly alien to the natural state of human 
community in a fallen world, yet the Church is a “supplement” to that nature which fittingly 
completes it in a natural way.  
[T]his means that the thesis that human trans-organicism is only completed and 
sealed by the further supplement of charity is also the thesis that the society of the 
Church alone completes and seals the integration of natural familial and economic 
‘society’ with political law and government. The Church is emphatically not, on a 
theological conception, a kind of ‘extra’ religious organization which some 
people happen to belong to; it is, rather, the sine qua non for the existence of 
human society as such, and so for the existence of humanity as such: nulla 
humanitas extra ecclesiam.154 
 
The Church is to society what grace is to the human soul, a supernatural gift that seems to 
naturally complete the one who receives it. 
 The second iteration of the political scandal of the Eucharist is, for Milbank, best 
described as “a new ‘politics of integral trans-organicity’ which fuses Christian socialism with a 
new sense of what is valid in the ‘conservative’ critique of modernity.”155 The new politics of 
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integral trans-organicity is socialist because it imagines society as “the work of human 
personhood manifest as free labour” and because it believes that “the most important human 
goods are in principle achievable by all.”156 Yet, it seems decidedly not socialist in its insistence 
on recovering the role of the One and the Few as symbolic representatives of honor and virtue, 
particularly in the insistence that such public virtue is a necessary part of fusing natural justice 
and supernatural charity.157 Socialism of the materialist variety, Milbank avers, gave up on the 
persistence of genuine virtue and instead opted to achieve the most important human goods 
solely through redistribution. The politics of trans-organicity, however, cannot abide this due to 
the integral theological anthropology that is at its heart. The most important human goods to be 
achieved in this new politics are more than just economic equality. They are what Milbank calls 
the “democratization of exaltation,” the deification of society through the Church that mirrors 
our soul’s deification through Christ.158  
 Milbank’s sudden turn towards the good of monarchical rule and the direct endorsement 
of society’s need for a global Christendom is striking. Though I have not directly treated the 
arguments of Milbank’s most recent collaboration with political theorist Adrian Pabst, The 
Politics of Virtue, the fusion of Christian socialism with a particularly British conservatism 
continues in that work as well.159 There are many ways to explain such turns, but I believe 
Milbank’s theology of the Eucharist can offer at least one explanation as to why Milbank’s 
interpretation of the political scandal of the Eucharist has trended towards a socialism fused with 
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constitutional monarchy. The insight comes, in fact, from Chauvet. In his analysis of the 
Scholastics’ interpretation of Thomas, Chauvet noted what he thought was a pernicious 
overemphasis on the hypostatic union as the source of sacramental grace to the detriment of 
pneumatology. This creates, Chauvet believes, not a necessary fall into but more a logical 
tendency towards an ecclesiology of a “strongly institutional kind.”160 One cannot help but 
notice, Chauvet argues, in the Scholastic tradition “a transition from a strongly pneumatological 
and “sacramental” ecclesiology to a more institutional and juridical ecclesiology, a transition 
theologically fostered by the growing infringement on the Holy Spirit by the holy humanity of 
Christ and rendered, if not necessary, at least possible by the filioque.”161 An overemphasis on 
the hypostatic union within sacramental theology leads to a detriment of the Holy Spirit in 
ecclesiology such that a more stringent notion of Christendom can come to the fore with papal 
power occupying the role of Christ, endowed with sovereign power.  
 Milbank’s work bears, just as Chauvet says of later Scholastic theology, a “family 
resemblance” to this sort of theology. After all, even in Being Reconciled, the political scandal of 
the Eucharist is based in the continuation of a chain of gift-exchange that is only made possible 
by the Incarnation as the highest of all gifts. The Spirit plays a role, to be sure, but this seems to 
leave the Spirit as merely an instrument of a gift-exchange grounded in Christ alone. In the end, 
Milbank uses his account of gift-exchange as the justification to proffer ecclesial hierarchy as a 
necessary good, advocate on behalf of an increase in papal power, and, lastly, argue for the 
inseparability of ecclesiology and Christendom. This fact has the potential to call the integrity of 
his theological project into question. For if “ideas about being” truly coincide with “ideas about 
human action” then it would seem that the Spirit ought to be more than just the presence of 
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individual charismata within the broader community. The Spirit ought, so it seems to me, be the 
means by which the trans of the trans-community is secured.   
 At the very beginning of his career Milbank published a remarkable essay on 
pneumatology entitled “The Second Difference.” In the introduction to that essay he stated the 
following:  
If theology is properly the elucidation of the Godhead of the Son, then it is not 
surprising that pneumatology should find expression only as an echo, an after-
thought. Yet if we are to believe Origen it is precisely in the distinguished 
knowledge of the Pneuma, that the distinction of Christianity most lies. Perhaps 
theology still awaits its complementation by a 'theopneumatics'.162 
 
The second iteration of Milbank’s account of the political scandal of the Eucharist begs the 
question of whether or not his theological project still requires complementation by a 
theopneumatics. I have already noted the many places that Milbank sought to bring the Spirit to 
the fore in his prior work on the secular, on the ontological scandal of the Eucharist, and even on 
the political scandal of the Eucharist as well. It is possible to read his most recent political work 
as a sort of “Trinitarianism without reserve” when he calls for locating sovereign power within 
the interplay of the One, the Few, and the Many. Yet, it is also possible, and I think the more 
likely option, to read Milbank’s turn towards a recovery of monarchic and aristocratic forms of 
rule as a neglect of the Trinitarian logic that turned upon the place of the Spirit as the “second 
difference.” Ultimately, Milbank’s account of the political scandal of the Eucharist, particularly 
the second iteration I have just described, could have benefited from less of an allergy to the sort 
of absence that Chauvet sought to preserve in his sacramental theology, precisely for the sake of 
avoiding an overemphasis on the plenitudo potestatis of the Papacy and the necessity of 
Christendom. 
                                                
162 John Milbank, “The Second Difference: For a Trinitarianism Without Reserve,” Modern 
Theology 2, no. 3 (1986): 213. 
 266 
Conclusion 
 Milbank serves as a fitting complement to Chauvet because his work has helped to reveal 
several key horizons for any future attempt at giving account of the ontological and political 
scandal of the Eucharist. Both thinkers are intent upon preserving the necessity of both presence 
and absence in their account of Eucharistic change. Moreover, both seem to seek to go beyond 
the confines of presence and absence, either pushing the Eucharistic presence beyond the 
traditional doctrine of transubstantiation (Chauvet) or noting the ways that even the traditional 
doctrine itself pushes the dichotomy of presence and absence to the breaking point 
(Pickstock/Milbank). Chauvet seemed to use Heideggerian and Wittgensteinian resources to 
reconfigure notions of presence, whereas Milbank and Pickstock emphatically asserted that 
Christian ontology always already thwarted the supposed opposition between presence and 
absence in the first place.  
 Secondly, reading Milbank in light of Chauvet shows the ontological and political 
implications of differing accounts of gift-exchange. For Chauvet the near-mercenary obligation 
of Mauss’ account of the gift was transformed into the more language-centered notion of 
“symbolic exchange.” Gift and language fuse for Chauvet such that the gift of the Eucharistic 
presence is nothing less than the gift of a language-game to the Church. For Milbank the 
emphasis must also be on exchange rather than purely on gift, so as to avoid the univocal and 
unilateral pure gift of absolute disinterest, something that Derrida showed effectively to be self-
defeating. Gift-exchange, however, can be “purified” such that the gift may reappear in the 
genuine gift-exchange of agapic community. The Eucharistic presence on this account imitates 
the impossibility of the pure gift, it is a linguistic impossibility that comes to be the condition for 
the possibility of any truth whatsoever.  
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 Finally, however, the dialogue between Milbank and Chauvet begs the question of just 
how it is that the sacramentum that carries with it vast implications for a properly Christian 
ontology and a properly Christian politics is related to the category of mysterium, from which it 
originated. Put in more contemporary categories, how is it that the sacramentality that stems 
from accounts of the Eucharist transforms our vision of reality, and therefore compels a 
particular mode of being-with in the world that is inherently a political theology? How is such a 
vision of sacramentality to be disciplined by the apophaticism that has guided Christian theology 
since its inception? Chauvet takes a more decidedly Protestant tack, treating unknowability of the 
God made present in the Eucharist as a lasting vestige of ontotheology. The God of Scripture is 
not unknowable but is rather the deus absconditus, the God who is mystery through God’s 
sovereign choice to hide Godself.163 Milbank’s work on this relationship is arguably one that 
goes against the merits of the apophatic discipline as it is utilized in postmodern thought. 
Milbank will not abide, obviously, a postmodern apophatics like that of, say, John Caputo, which 
resists any claim to assured theological knowledge.164 The ontological scandal of the Eucharist is 
not a covering-over of ontology but rather the revelation of a Trinitarian ontology, a Trinitarian 
ontology that cannot abide by the politics of ontological violence inherent in most postmodern 
apophaticism. Yet, what exactly is left after Milbank’s stringent denial is difficult to tell, and his 
work is not an oeuvre that lends itself to moments of admitted inadequacy or indeterminacy. 
Milbank’s fleeting references to apophaticism in relation either to the Eucharistic presence or to 
a Eucharistic politics are often covered over by Milbank’s remarkably self-assured tone and 
overwhelming erudition. This final horizon, however, shows the greatest promise of charting a 
                                                
163 Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 75. 
164 See John D. Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion Without Religion 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997). 
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middle way between the two perspectives. For a stronger reading of apophaticism in relation to 
the Eucharist might help to transform Chauvet’s notion of absence into something more positive 
and, on the other hand, this stronger reading of apophaticism might also rein in Milbank’s 
political walkabouts.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
EUCHARIST AS THE GIFT OF POLITICAL LANGUAGE 
 
Introduction 
 My concern in this essay has been adumbrating the importance of sacramentality for 
postmodern theology. Sacramentality offers both a series of benefits and a series of dangers for 
theology in the wake of postmodernity. The primary benefit sacramentality can offer to theology, 
as I have sought to detail it through the works of Chauvet and Milbank, is as a node that brings 
together theories of gift-exchange, language, and post-ontotheological theology. Sacramentality 
is by no means a panacea for the problems facing theologians trying to serve the Church for the 
common good, but it does offer theology a vision of the cosmos, of the human person, of history, 
and of the Triune God that seems able to draw together the insights of postmodern theory with 
the Christian Tradition. In sum, sacramentality, when taken as the hermeneutic principle or the 
first-truth of theology, insists that theology can be neither purely theoretical nor purely practice, 
any theology done from the perspective of sacramentality is always already theoretical and 
practical, philosophical and political. The Eucharist could, thus, be thought of as the gift of 
political language—a fusion of embodied ritual that arrives as gift, and the gift that arrives to us 
is the gift of language as a mode of human being-with. 
 As we have seen, however, theologies rooted in sacramentality are beset by a series of 
dangers, and the rival visions of Chauvet and Milbank demonstrated dangers unique to their 
respective positions on sacramentality and its import for theology.  For Chauvet the danger was 
joining his fundamental theology of sacramentality to Maussian gift-exchange and Heidegger’s 
project of overcoming metaphysics. While Chauvet’s recovery of the anthropological as the site 
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of the theological through radical theologies of the Cross is an important insight, joining the 
Eucharist too closely to the anthropological principle of symbolic exchange risks 
instrumentalizing sacramentality along with the Eucharist. Milbank on the other hand is right to 
insist that sacramentality has a political correlate. Ideas about being do, in some way, coincide 
with ideas about human action and the proper shape that it ought to take. There is, in other 
words, something to the idea of a “sacramental imaginary” that ought to influence the Church’s 
public life. Yet, Milbank runs afoul of the apophatic discipline on Trinitarian discourse, and 
since his thoughts about Being are not adequately reined in by incomprehensibility, the political 
correlate of his Trinitarian ontology has of late veered dangerously close to idolatry. Thus, it 
seems that Chauvet needs more specific and specifically Christian content added to his 
fundamental theology of sacramentality, while Milbank seems to require a chastening of his 
ontology so as to limit the specificity of his political recommendations to the Church. 
I want now to defend the notion of the Eucharist as the gift of political language as a 
middle way between these rival visions of sacramentality. Before doing so, and as a vital 
preliminary for making my case, I want to assert something with regards to Chauvet’s and 
Milbank’s theological systems, something that has already been asserted by William Franke in a 
different context. I want to claim that behind both theologians’ distinctive systems is a “not fully 
acknowledged apophaticism.”1 In other words, despite both Chauvet and Milbank’s attempts to 
distance their theological systems from negative theology, their approaches are constituted by 
“implicit apophatic underpinnings.” I concur further with Franke that this intimacy with the 
apophatic is part of what makes their assertions so protean within the particular moment in which 
theology currently finds itself.  
                                                
1 William Franke, A Philosophy of the Unsayable (Notre Dame: Notre Dame Press, 2014), 274. 
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They share in common a radical insight into the structural negativity of human 
experience—and of all its expressions in language—as turned toward and 
dependent on an Other, on something that or someone who the human mind 
cannot comprehend or say. Apophasis, furthermore, lies at the source of their 
common concern with elucidating how religion is vitally relevant to our self-
understanding in a post-modern age. Religion is always deeply concerned with 
what cannot be adequately stated, and any discourse that attempts to speak for it 
or out of its concerns cannot but falter, unless it acknowledges and embraces a 
dimension of unsayability at its core.2 
 
In short, both theologians rely on a core intimacy with the unsayable that give their theologies 
much of their argumentative force. 
In what follows, I am arguing that making explicit and even intensifying their apophatic 
foundations could improve these productive aspects of Chauvet and Milbank’s theologies, 
productive both pastorally and philosophically. My account of the Eucharist as the gift of 
political language turns, therefore, on an insistence that apophasis must explicitly shape 
fundamental theologies of sacramentality, which will lead to a new way of conceiving the 
ontological and political scandals of the Eucharist. Rather than giving an inch to ontotheological 
presuppositions, apophatic theology will help to mitigate some of the difficulties of Chauvet’s 
account brought on by his attempt to correlate Eucharistic theology with the project of 
overcoming metaphysics. On the other hand, intensifying the apophatic discipline within my 
theology of the Eucharist will serve to temper some of the more extreme political suggestions of 
Milbank. A theology of the Eucharist subject to apophatic discipline places the unsayable at the 
center of accounts of sacramentality and transubstantiation, which consequently puts the 
unsayable at the heart of any political theology bound to the sacraments. 
                                                
2 Franke, Philosophy of the Unsayable, 274. Admittedly, the comparison Franke is making here 
is between radical orthodoxy and radically secular theologies (like the work of John Caputo or 
Mark C. Taylor, for example). Franke actually lumps Chauvet in with theologians influenced by 
nouvelle théologie, which in turn shapes Radical Orthodoxy particularly through the work of de 
Lubac. 
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 I would like then to discuss briefly this concept of the “unsayable,” why I take it to be 
essential for interpreting the Eucharist, and what this might mean for defending my titular thesis. 
Let me begin by speaking about the word “mystery.” The word “sacrament” has its etymological 
roots in the Greek mysterion. As Depoortere describes it, mysterion referred not just to a bland 
mysteriousness or hiddenness but specifically to the eternal plan of God for our salvation that 
was revealed at last in the person of Christ, and in which we participate via the sensible mysteria 
of Baptism, Eucharist, and other ritual acts.3 The mysteria certainly have an aspect of 
mysteriousness to them, but calling them by an etymological derivation of mysterion is first and 
foremost meant to secure their relationship to a particular economy of salvation rather than a 
particular notion of incomprehensibility. The translation of mysterion into the Latin 
sacramentum had the odd effect of equating such transcendentally oriented rites with the martial 
loyalty oaths of Roman soldiers. Yet, the equivalence also made a great deal of sense in that 
“common to both meanings is the idea of guaranteed engagement realized procedurally through a 
number of sensible acts.”4 Depoortere rightly wonders if this did not, however, lose the 
connection between the inscrutable workings of the Triune God and the sensible acts that 
guarantee our embodied engagement with the divine life.  
 I share that worry, and particularly so in this context, where two rival visions of 
sacramentality both seem to eschew any connection between negative theology, with its 
meticulously documented penchant for mystery, and the sacraments, whose roots lie in 
engagement with the inscrutable yet redemptive purposes of the Triune God. The anxiety over 
                                                
3 Kristaan Depoortere, “From Sacraments to Sacramentality and Vice-Versa” found in 
Contemporary Sacramental Contours of a God Incarnate, ed. Lieven Boeve and Lambert 
Leijssen (Leuven: Peeters, 2001), 52. See also Bruce T. Morrill, Encountering Christ in the 
Eucharist: The Paschal Mystery in People, Word, and Sacrament (New York: Paulist Press, 
2012).  
4 Depoortere, “From Sacraments to Sacramentality,” 53. 
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ontotheological presuppositions is what led Chauvet to eschew Thomas’s doctrine of divine 
simplicity with its implied incomprehensibility and to turn instead to a more Reformed doctrine 
of the deus absconditus. Franke has documented well Milbank’s similar anxiety about negative 
theology, given postmodern philosophy’s embrace of the category. In the darkness and negation 
and suspicion of negative theology Milbank worries that “God” all too easily elides into 
“nothing,” enabling subtle forms of nihilism to become wolves in sheep’s clothing.5 Both 
thinkers, in sum, share a suspicion of the influence of a certain strand of negative theology that 
either bolsters ontotheology or, in attempting to overcome ontotheology, only sneaks ontological 
violence in through the back door.  
 In the sections to follow I am going to elaborate just how I see Christian apophaticism as 
this unspoken mean between Chauvet and Milbank but, even more importantly, how it is that a 
properly apophatic, Trinitarian, and political theology can arise from an account of the Eucharist 
as the gift of political language. I should like to make clear my position first, however, with 
regards to apophaticism, so that the reader may have some idea of where exactly I am headed. I 
shall be elaborating in what follows the ways in which Chauvet and Milbank’s notions of gift 
and language, as these relate to the Eucharist need to be strongly disciplined by apophaticism. 
That will mean predominantly speaking of the ways in which uniquely Christian accounts of 
incomprehensibility or the unsayable impose themselves upon us when we try and speak of the 
Eucharist. More accurately, if I am going to argue that the Eucharist is the gift of political 
language in contradistinction to the manner in which Chauvet and Milbank have attempted to do 
so, then the way in which my account shall distinguish itself from theirs is in insisting that the 
                                                
5 See in particular Franke’s fifth chapter, “Radical Orthodoxy’s Critique of Transcendental 
Philosophy and its Mistaken Mistrust of Negative Theology,” in Philosophy of the Unsayable, 
203-270.  
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categories of gift and language, when elaborated from a Christian perspective, are both imbued 
with darkness and mystery. The apophatic discipline refines our speech of gift and language 
precisely through Trinitarian theology since Logos and donum themselves draw us into the 
saving plan of the economic Trinity. This will in turn reorient the ways in which the ontological 
and political scandals of the Eucharist can be spoken of by theologians since, as Chauvet shows 
us, such transformations in the doctrine of God must cause us to reconsider precisely how it is 
that God gives Godself to us in the Eucharist. Hence, in this final chapter I wish to challenge 
their conclusions (both ontological and political) through subjecting discussions of the Eucharist 
as Gift and the Eucharist as Language to the apophatic discipline.  
I thus deem it necessary to move piece-by-piece through the syntagm that forms this 
work’s title, elaborating for each section how this new emphasis on the apophatic discipline 
transforms the ontological and political scandal of the Eucharist. Therefore, I shall speak first 
about the Eucharist as gift. Second, I shall speak of the Eucharist as the gift of something, that is, 
the Eucharist as the gift of language. Finally, I shall examine the character of that particular gift 
by speaking of the Eucharist as the gift of political language. In so doing I hope to show that the 
Eucharist is indeed an ontological and political scandal simultaneously, as Chauvet and Milbank 
both argue. Yet, I want to argue emphatically that the ontology and the politics of the community 
formed by the Eucharist is not a definite set of applicable, ontological principles (Milbank) or a 
pedagogical means by which the will-to-know of the modern subject can be overcome (Chauvet).  
If any sort of practicable politics emerges from the bricolage of Chauvet and Milbank I am about 
to attempt it is a politics that stands in judgment of most forms of human belonging and a politics 
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oriented first to a vision of the Church as constituted by its share in the incomprehensibility of 
the Godhead.6 
 
Eucharist as the Gift 
What I have just argued with regards to the Eucharist and unsayability begs the question 
of how such a relationship bears upon the thesis I am seeking to defend, namely, that the 
Eucharist is the gift of political language. I am beginning my defense of that thesis by examining 
only the first major thematic of the syntagm—how is it that the Eucharist is a gift? Given what I 
have said about unsayability, another question necessarily arises: Rather than counter Derrida’s 
claim that the gift is the impossible, as Milbank does, ought we not to expect such an 
impossibility to underlie any account of the Eucharist as gift? In other words, rather than 
attempting to purify our conception of gift-exchange through either Milbank’s or Chauvet’s 
preferred methods, might we not rather clarify just what sort of impossibility the Eucharist 
possesses as a gift? I want to defend in this section the notion that the Eucharist is the impossible 
Gift, and that its impossibility appears when we examine the giver, the content of the gift, and 
the one who is to receive the gift. As Chauvet and Milbank have shown us, however, modifying 
the terms of gift will inevitably modify the terms upon which fundamental theologies of 
sacramentality function, since these theologies are based on the arrival of reality itself as gift. 
                                                
6 While I attempt this from a decidedly Anglican perspective, I should note here that Eastern 
Orthodox theologians have attempted to join the insights of a strong mystical or apophatic 
element present in most Orthodox theologians and the outcomes such insights ought to have for 
the makeup of human communities. While Vladimir Lossky and John Zizioulas are perhaps the 
most well-known, the most pertinent recent work is the recently translated work of Nikolaos 
Loudovikos. See Nikolaos Loudovikos, A Eucharistic Ontology: Maximus the Confessor’s 
Eschatological Ontology of Being as Dialogical Reciprocity, trans. Elizabeth Theokritoff 
(Brookline: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 2010); and Nikolaos Loudovikos, Church in the 
Making: An Apophatic Ecclesiology of Consubstantiality, trans. Norman Russell (Yonkers: St. 
Vladimir’s Press, 2015). 
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Thus, in clarifying the conception of the Eucharist as the impossible gift I establish a preliminary 
vision of sacramentality as undergirded by the same impossibility.  
 The question that haunted all gift-exchange for Derrida, as we saw in Chapter One, was 
how the gift could appear. For in appearing, the gift created an obligation of some kind, whether 
or reprisal or of gratitude, but hidden in that obligation was the economic logic of contract. 
Theologies of the Eucharist, however, are beset by an even more difficult question. The question 
of the Eucharist is not simply how a gift can appear but how the gift of God can appear. Now this 
is not the same as asking how God can be present in two different places at once—how Christ 
can be both present at God’s right hand and in the Eucharistic elements, for example. The onus 
of this question has little to do with the problems of transubstantiation at all and, indeed, the 
problems of transubstantiation are transformed by asking a more basic question of Eucharistic 
doctrine: How is it that the God who is utterly incomprehensible can be given to us in a gift that 
appears? In short, how must the apophatic discipline govern our speech on the Eucharist as Gift?  
Chauvet and Milbank are somewhat in agreement that the “marvelous exchange” that is 
the Eucharist is the gift of God’s very self in some form. It is either the gift of God’s self through 
symbolic exchange or it is the gift of entrance into the aesthetic shaping that is not a mere 
interpretation of the life of Jesus but is rather substantial entrance into the Triune life. For each, 
despite their differences, what is given in the Eucharist is some form of connection with the 
Triune God and the gift-giving patterns that find their origin within the divine perichoresis. One 
way to combine their respective insights is to say that the gift of the sacraments is the entrance 
into the giving relations that constitute the divine life.7 Since our identities are constituted, as 
                                                
7 Although I will take up part of her reading of the Gift below, I should note here that this is how 
Kimberly Hope Belcher characterizes the effect of baptism. See Kimberly Hope Belcher, 
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Chauvet and Milbank would agree, by the various “others” in our life, an entrance into a series of 
relations is the gift of an identity, and so the gift of the Eucharist must be not the gift of God as 
an object but the self gift of God as the entrance into the relations that just are what and who 
God is. This emphasis on the gift of identity grounded their respective moves toward and away 
from transubstantiation. Furthermore, this emphasis on self-gift in their respective theologies of 
the Eucharist also drove them to turn to language to try and get across how it is that a sign might 
be able to become a gift of self. In short, Chauvet’s and Milbank’s Trinitarian theologies, 
whether a Trinitarian Christology focused on the cry of dereliction or Milbank’s aesthetic 
Trinitarianism based in the verum-factum, drove them to conceive of the Eucharist as gift in the 
form of a sign.  
Given our reflections on Franke’s notion of the unsayable above, I think a temptation 
facing the believer is to assume that, while a practice like contemplative prayer might be an 
encounter with the darkness or hiddenness of the incomprehensible God, practices like the 
Eucharist and Baptism are a more “kataphatic” sort of practice, precisely because they involve 
entrance into specifically narrated relations within the economy of salvation. In other words, I 
might be tempted to assume that we all “know what we’re doing,” so to speak, when we witness 
a baptism or partake of the Eucharist.  
Yet, here I am going to engage two theologians who cut against that sort of thinking. 
First, Rowan Williams, who has shown that it is precisely those intra-divine relations revealed in 
the economy of salvation that are themselves the mystery, not solely the hidden being of the 
Father. So to encounter those relations in the sacraments and, what is more, to enter into them 
through the sacraments, is just as riddled with the darkness and hiddenness of God as, say, the 
                                                                                                                                                       
Efficacious Engagement: Sacramental Participation in Trinitarian Mystery (Collegeville: 
Liturgical Press, 2011), particularly 128-181. 
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mystic experience of the contemplative. As I have put it elsewhere, Williams bids us to change 
the presumed target of an apophatic grammar, to redefine just what it is that apophaticism is for 
in the first place.8 What Williams found in the apophatic yet thoroughly Trinitarian theology of 
St. John of the Cross was “a negative theology of the Trinitarian life that derives its negative 
character not from general and programmatic principles about the ineffability of the divine 
nature, but from the character of the relations enacted in the story of Jesus and thus also in the 
lives and life-patterns of believers.”9 Such a paradigm does not rule out, obviously, the apophatic 
as a sort of grammatical consideration about “the impossibility of specifying what it is that 
makes God to be God.”10 Indeed what St. John of the Cross’s theology most imposed upon 
Williams was the need for a Trinitarian consideration to modify our speech of divine difference 
and desire so as to avoid it becoming nothing more than a means of making more vast the abyss 
between the finite and the infinite. “Trinitarian difference is both the difference of the 
uncontainable divine as such and the difference of the infinite ‘circulation’ of divine life between 
and among the three hypostases.”11 I take this to mean that even in moments of assured 
encounter with the divine life through the sacraments, even in our encounter with the Great 
Sacrament of the Eucharist, an apophatic grammar of what cannot be said must ever discipline 
our speech about what occurs. For the “relations enacted in the story of Jesus” into which we are 
offered entrance by the sacraments are just as inscrutable a mystery as the nature of the being of 
the Father.  
                                                
8 See Jason M. Smith, “Must We Say Anything of the ‘Immanent’ Trinity?: Friedrich 
Schleiermacher and Rowan Williams on an ‘Abstruse’ and ‘Fruitless’ Doctrine,” Anglican 
Theological Review 98, no. 3 (2016): 495-512. 
9 Rowan Williams, “The Deflections of Desire: Negative Theology in Trinitarian Discourse” in 
Silence and Word: Negative Theology and Incarnation, ed. Oliver Davies and Denys Turner 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 133. 
10 Williams, “Deflections of Desire,” 134. 
11 Ibid. 
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Second, Kimberly Hope Belcher has recently offered a reading of infant baptism in terms 
of the gift. Belcher intensifies the problem of treating the Eucharist as Gift in that the Eucharist is 
not only the self-gift of God to the Church but also the recipient’s self-gift back to God. The 
difficulty here, however, is that “self-giving uniquely and irreversibly changes (not to say risks) 
the one being given, the giver never possesses the self he or she offers.”12 The gift of self only 
comes to be through the recognition of the one who receives it. However, this moment of 
recognition “can never quite exist in history but rather in the future.” Hence, I offer to you 
something I do not, strictly speaking, possess. “[T]he self that the Other is (in the process of) 
making will be gift for me; the self that I am trying to become is hereby offered to you.”13 To say 
that the Eucharist is a gift is, then, not to say that no sense whatsoever can be made of the 
Eucharist—just as we can make some sense of what we mean by God and the “relations enacted 
in the life of Jesus.” It is rather to say that all that we may say of the Eucharist and its effects are 
as provisional as our affirmations about the divine life. “Gift is, then, an interpretation of a 
process that always escapes certainty because it is never finalized.”14 
I find myself faced, therefore, with a sort of impossibility before the gift of the Eucharist 
even appears, before the question of debt or contract come into play at all. The Triune life that is 
constituted by the perfect exchange of love between Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is complete in 
itself, yet this completeness seems unavoidably to spill over into the creation and redemption of 
creatures. God cannot give because what God is—those relations enacted in the story of Jesus 
                                                
12 Belcher, Efficacious Engagement, 175. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. Belcher is also right to note the absolutely critical insight that this process of gift-
exchange, especially when it is intra-human self-giving is not free from the forces of oppression. 
“The self who offered has been transformed into the self who was accepted. This transformation 
may be manipulative, coercive, or abusive; in fact, perhaps there is never a human relationship 
free of the economic cycle.”  
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about which nothing comprehensive can be said—cannot, strictly speaking, be given. Perhaps 
put better, there is no truly defensible sense in which we can speak of a self-gift of God since 
God is not any thing that is givable. The gift of the Eucharist seems impossible not only in terms 
of its content (how can a gift appear at all?), but also in terms of its giver (how can God ever 
make a self-gift at all?). Furthermore, how might finite human beings receive the self-gift of the 
One who is infinite? Even more importantly, how could such a self-gift ever be truly reciprocal? 
The gift seems to be impossible even in terms of its recipient, not in terms of our ability to avoid 
the pull of debt or contract in gift-exchange, but in terms of our ability to receive the self that is 
offered in the gift. The gift seems to exceed not only our capacity to offer a return-gift but also 
our very nature as finite beings.  
Yet, we begin by the impossible. For God gives Godself in spite of, or in keeping with, 
this impossibility. Subsequently, such impossibility must also be placed at the heart of our 
speech about the sociality and creativity that Milbank rightly claims belong originally to the 
immanent Trinity. It is not only the being of the Triune God and the “relations enacted in the 
story of Jesus” about which our speech must be disciplined by the apophatic but also the “lives 
and life-patterns of believers” that must be disciplined by that which cannot be said. The 
Eucharist is the self-gift of God to us, the gift of the entrance into the relations that constitute the 
Godhead. The ontological scandal of the Eucharist, therefore, is irrevocably cast as something 
about which very little can be said with certainty precisely because I can say with certainty that it 
is a gift.    
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 Hence, I think Marion is correct that the Eucharist must become the “test of every 
theological systematization” because it “poses the greatest challenge to thought.”15 That 
challenge is that one must not impose a prior epistemic frame upon the Eucharist but rather have 
ourselves framed by the rite as the sacrament which “accomplishes what all the others aim at,” 
namely, “corporally assimilating us to Christ.”16 The Eucharist, therefore, bids us ask, “Can the 
Eucharistic presence of Christ as consecrated bread and wine determine, starting from itself and 
its self alone, the conditions of its reality, the dimensions of it temporality and the dispositions of 
its approach?”17 But to take Marion further, must not the gathered community as the corpus 
mysticum also demand such ontological primacy as the truth of the sacrament? This puts further 
pressure on Marion’s insistence that the gift given in the Eucharistic presence is the “gift of 
distance,” a distance that prevents us from turning the God without Being into “an available, 
permanent, handy, and delimited thing.”18 I have argued above that there should indeed be a 
grave sense of distance—distance in terms of our ability to explain or even speak of the mystery 
enacted—in our speech about the gift of the Eucharist. However, if the mystery of the Eucharist 
is both the consecrated elements and the transformation of the gathered community into the 
Body of Christ, then I think the gift must assert on its own terms a greater sense of content than 
sheer distance and withdrawal.  
Thus, it strikes me that Milbank is quite right to assert that the gift of distance does not go 
far enough, though charging Marion with an incipient nihilism might be a bridge too far as well. 
I take Marion to be right, however, that notions of gift help to rethink transubstantiation afresh, 
                                                
15 Jean-Luc Marion, God Without Being: Hors-Texte, trans. Thomas A. Carlson (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1991), 161. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., 171. 
18 Ibid., 164 
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while I also take him to be correct that notions of the gift push a stronger reading of the 
Eucharistic presence upon us than those typically proffered by transignification. It may be far too 
bold to coin yet another neologism with regards to the Eucharistic presence, but I would propose 
we consider something like transdonation. Transdonation because the emphasis remains on the 
gift rather than on a category like substance or meaning which, when applied to God who is 
beyond all such categories, tends to lead into theoretical quandaries. Placing the emphasis solely 
on the gift allows for two helpful dynamics to emerge from our speech about the Eucharist: First, 
it preserves the intensely apophatic nature of our speech on the holy mysteries. What is made 
present—if the category of “presence” can even still apply—is the gift-giving relations, the 
entrance into which defines what it means to be made holy or to be redeemed. These relations 
are, as Williams has instructed us, shrouded in holy darkness, despite their specific narrations in 
Scripture and Tradition. I do not believe, in other words, that Christian theology has much of a 
need to get “beyond” substance and accident or presence and absence. I think, instead, that 
Christian theology has need to speak of the ways in which the ontological priority of gift, as 
shown forth in the Trinitarian yet sacramental theologies I have been examining in this work, 
join with the apophatic tradition in calling the applicability of these categories into question in 
the first place.  
 The second benefit of thinking of the Eucharistic presence as something like 
transdonation is that it recovers a better sense of God’s relation to things. I am much in 
agreement with Hemming that the wrong implication to draw from the change undergone by the 
Eucharistic elements is something like Pickstock’s declaration that “all bread is on the way to 
becoming the Body of Christ.” What is more, I think Chauvet’s claim that the bread-become-
Body beyond transubstantiation is now essential or true bread is also the wrong implication to 
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draw. Placing the emphasis utterly upon the gift, I would argue, forces us to think of the moment 
of consecration as a radical inbreaking of the impossible—God’s gift of self appears, somehow, 
via bread and wine and the gathered community. So what changes in the bread and wine is not 
their status as gift—for all of the material order, as Milbank and Marion would argue, in some 
sense arrives as gift to our perception. Instead what changes in the Eucharist is the nature of 
bread and wine as gift. They change from the gift that they always already are as part of the 
created order into God’s self gift of Christ’s body and blood and God’s self gift as the social and 
creative reality of the Church.  
Thinking of the bread and wine this way means that it is decidedly not the case that all 
bread and wine are on their way to becoming the Body of Christ. What changes of the bread and 
wine is something like a substantial change, if by “substantial” we mean a change to the very 
stuff that makes bread and wine to be bread and wine in the first place. Nor is there revealed in 
the Eucharist some sort of “sacramental principle” such that God’s presence is now seen to be 
lying in wait behind all materiality in light of the Eucharistic change. This change does indeed, I 
think, recast how it is that we think about materiality itself, but it is not to think of the 
Eucharistic elements as somehow true bread as opposed to bread that is just bread or to think of 
all materiality as now in some sense “sacramental.” I think Williams is again instructive here: 
There is, then, in sacramental practice, something that does indeed reflect on how 
we see matter in general; but it is not, I think, a ‘sacramental principle’ enabling 
us to recognize divine presence in all things. It is more that the divine presence is 
apprehended by seeing in all things their difference, their particularity, their ‘not-
God-ness,’ since we have learned what the divine action is in the renunciation of 
Christ, his giving himself into inanimate form….The Eucharist hints at the 
paradox that material things carry their fullest meaning for human minds and 
bodies—the meaning of God’s grace and of the common life thus formed—when 
they are the medium of gift, not instruments of control or objects for 
accumulation.19 
                                                
19 Williams, On Christian Theology, 217. 
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Admittedly, what changes for the bread and wine in the Eucharist is a change in their “not-God-
ness,” since they are the very self-gift of God to the Church. Asserting that the implication of this 
change, however, is to see all things as on their way to becoming sacraments is to miss the point. 
Furthermore, I am even leery of a Chauvetian reading of materiality that might see the purpose 
of creation as testifying to the “presence of the absence of God” in its materiality. For this is 
again to read things solely in terms of God, whether of God’s secret presence or the lack thereof. 
Reading the nature of things entirely in relation to God’s presence or absence, so I think 
Williams instructs us, is always a mistake that will occlude the truth that materiality attempts to 
tell. Things condition our social imaginary against modes of power that operate by force and 
dominance precisely in their witness as things, as decidedly not-God. The presence of the 
absence, in other words, still understands materiality in far too weak a way. While it might 
sounds a bit sacrilegious, reading the essence of bread as abiding in the elements given during 
the Eucharist is far too meager a reading of the essence of bread. I worry, therefore, that a similar 
weakness follows onto our reading of all materiality if we embrace a notion of sacramentality 
like the one I have been describing. Reading the Eucharist as gift thus acknowledges the value 
and independence of materiality while also chastening our attempts to say too much of the gift by 
imposing the unfinished character of gift-exchange on our theology of the Eucharist.  
 
Eucharist as the Gift of Language 
 If such is what it means for the Eucharist to be spoken of as gift, then what exactly can it 
mean to speak of the Eucharist as the gift of language? I have attempted to show in the chapters 
previous how thinking of the Eucharist under the paradigm of gift is a great help to theology, 
particularly theology determined to avoid the quagmire of ontotheology. Yet, the two thinkers I 
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have been examining above push us to say that what is given in the Eucharist is a particular sort 
of gift. What is given in the Eucharist is a sign. It is a material sign, a thing in other words that is 
given as a sign and, hence, meant to communicate something to us. This is not to say, mind you, 
that the thing given is “more than” a thing. For this would be to forget what Chauvet and others 
continually remind us—that all things are always already “more than” their materiality. Material 
reality arrives as imbued with human signification, and even if it did not, Milbank would rightly 
insist that material reality arrives not as a mere given but as gift. In this sense, to give any 
material sign at all is already to have entered into language in some way. Yet, faith teaches us 
that this particular material sign is different. It is different in that it does not just participate in 
language but rather that it gives language, it gives the conditions for the possibility of language, 
it gives a particular vision of the world and of creatures, all as an irresistible outcome of its 
reception. The Eucharist thus seems to reveal a fundamental sacramentality at the heart of both 
materiality and signification.  
Hence, I believe an insight to which Chauvet perhaps arrived too late is that insisting on 
the Eucharist as symbolic exchange while at the same time noting that symbolic exchange is an 
anthropological phenomenon that characterizes our basic experience of human subjectivity 
means that the material order can now be read “eucharistically.” What I mean by this is that the 
possibility and, depending on one’s tradition, the inevitability of Christ’s presence in the 
Eucharist—Christ’s presence in a thing given as a symbol or sign—seems to imply that the way 
in which we speak about things must change. The ontological scandal of the Eucharist, as I am 
calling it, sets out a vision of sacramentality, a vision of the entire cosmos to be understood 
through God’s coming to us as grace in and through material things. I have been articulating 
above how this is required by speaking of the Eucharist as a gift, but here the sacramental vision 
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becomes intensified and, perhaps, reaches an impasse. For, on the one hand, seeing the Eucharist 
as a gift implies that the arrival of all reality as gift can be read as analogous to the Eucharist. 
What occurs in the Eucharist is something like a creatio ex nihilo wherein a gift breaks into the 
fallen order of things that would preclude the presence of a true gift from the start. The 
sacramental vision revealed by seeing the Eucharist purely as gift would be a vision of 
sacramentality analogous to the ontology of the gift—God is sacramentally present in things as 
the giver of Godself. 
Yet, the difficulty we come to now is that gift-exchange is also a pattern of symbolic 
exchange or human signification. Indeed, language is in many ways just another pattern of gift-
exchange. Think, for example, of the sheer lack of true communication but plethora of normed 
exchanges that occur in small talk. To think of the Eucharist as the gift of language, therefore, 
alters our vision of sacramentality. The Eucharist does indeed begin to occupy a space like that 
of the radical thesis of Milbank and Pickstock as the basis for any true human signification, but 
note that I say only something “like” this position. To name the Eucharist as the sole point in 
which the truth made flesh in the Incarnation is accessible to the Church is, I would argue, a clear 
indication of Milbank’s overemphasis on the Incarnation. The power of the sacraments must be 
that they are, as Belcher has argued, material signs that give entrance into the relations that 
define the Godhead. Hence, as Williams has put it, what we are gifted through sanctifying grace 
is not just a standing in the place of the Word within the Trinitarian relations but “the desire for 
the desire of the Word.”20 Milbank, however, is quite helpful in clarifying just how this gift of 
the desire of the Word is connected with language. For when we are gifted the desire for the 
desire of the Word we are being gifted a substantial joining to the primordially communicative 
                                                
20 Williams, “Deflections of Desire,” 119.  
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generation that constitutes the essence of the Godhead. Hence, speaking of the Eucharist as the 
gift of language is not antithetical to what I have claimed above. A gift of language is nothing 
less than the gift of an identity, a manner of being-with that shapes our relation to the material 
and cultural order of the world.  
Yet, reflecting on the nature of language also presses upon us the fact that language is, in 
essence, an “unfinishable business.”21 I bring up the unfinished nature of language to avoid a 
danger I have already mentioned in the previous section. It would seem, I think, that claiming the 
Eucharist is the gift of language makes the Eucharist a bit more comprehensible. Language, after 
all, is something with which we are more familiar than, say, a self-gift of God. So to say, as 
Herbert McCabe does, that Jesus Christ is present in the bread and wine like meaning is present 
in a word, feels a bit less off-putting than saying that bread has become Jesus Christ’s body.22 
We are, in other words, more familiar with saying that a word has meaning in it than that bread 
has a body in it. Yet, it strikes me (and McCabe was surely aware of this as well) that equating 
the Eucharist with language places the presence and/or absence of God in the rite into a great 
deal more uncertainty. For language, encompasses both the sayable and the unsayable, signs 
made and silence where signs fail. Language, as an unfinishable business, always implies that 
there is more to be said and that what has been said invites saying more. In short, to say that the 
Eucharist is the gift of language is to further bolster its status as a mystery, beyond the mystery 
implied when speaking of the Eucharist as gift alone.  
In what way, then, does taking the Eucharist as the gift of language cast the rite into 
further mystery? Though he is not alone in these insights, I believe the work of Williams on 
                                                
21 Rowan Williams, The Edge of Words: God and the Habits of Language (London: Bloomsbury, 
2014), 66. 
22 See Herbert McCabe, “The Eucharist as Language,” in God Still Matters, ed. Brian Davies 
(New York: Continuum, 2002), 123-138. 
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language and the sacraments is helpful here. Williams notes that it is quite simply a “brute fact” 
that “human being is irreducibly bound up with language and culture, and so with 
‘transformative action,’ changing the environment.”23 Perhaps the broadest way of naming the 
implications of this fact is something like this:  
Each effort to make the world ‘belong’ to us, to make sense, puts a fresh question; each 
organizing or explanatory strategy becomes itself a new puzzle or code, in need of 
imaginative ‘reading’ and re-ordering. In a paradoxical yet quite familiar way, human 
beings are, in one and the same activity, looking for and creating meaning: patterns of 
order, schemes of communication in which the confusing experience of life in the world 
to which we belong (and to which we did not choose to belong) is drawn into language, 
into the ever extending web of sharing perception, experience, selfhood itself, that 
constitutes human being as human.24 
 
In The Edge of Words Williams extends those insights about the nature of language to their 
import for theology, particularly “natural theology.” Williams’s analysis here is worth engaging 
for two reasons: First, talk of “natural theology” for Anglicans is always to speak somehow of 
sacramentality ever since William Temple’s Gifford Lectures on the subject.25 Second, because 
Williams extends his own insights beyond the general picture of language cited above into two 
specific areas—excessive language and silence. These two additional themes will help clarify 
precisely how the gift can be thought of as excessive as language, and, even more importantly, 
Williams’s reflections on silence help clarify how the apophaticism must discipline our speech 
about the ontological scandal of the Eucharist.  
                                                
23 Williams, On Christian Theology, 197. 
24 Ibid., 198. 
25 Temple is credited with coining the phrase the “sacramental universe,” that set many 
proponents of a broader “sacramental principle,” like John Macquarrie on their way. For 
Temple’s lectures see William Temple, Nature, Man, and God (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1964). For a discussion of Temple’s influence on notions of sacramentality see Lizette Larson-
Miller Sacramentality Renewed: Contemporary Conversations in Sacramental Theology 
(Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 2016), 25-29. 
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 Themes familiar to both Chauvet and Milbank emerge in Williams’s plumbing of the 
depths of language for theological insights. First, at the fore of Williams’s exegesis of the facets 
of language is the immersion of both the subject and the material world that the subject 
encounters within language: “The world we inhabit is already a symbolized world, a world that 
has been and is being taken up into a process of speaking and making sense together.”26 Second, 
and even more importantly, that language is fundamentally conditioned by the embodied and 
material nature of the subject who speaks and of the other whom the subject encounters as fellow 
speaker:  
To accept the notion of the body as the centre of a ‘situation’ and a set of possible 
situations…and to understand the body’s life as continuous with the intelligible 
input of the environment implies that in any encounter we begin from the trust 
that we are engaged with another perspective that is part of a whole intelligible 
environment, and thus something I am likely to need in my own developing 
intelligent life. It is also to accept that the other remains irreducibly other because 
I can never simply be where the other is, and because the other’s relations cannot 
be mapped exhaustively on to mine. Every imagineable human encounter has 
these characteristics; and the foundation of an ethical response to the world we 
inhabit is bound up with this acknowledgement of the other’s body as 
meaningful—meaningful because it is the point of intersection for a specific set of 
symbolic transactions.27 
 
Human beings are inherently linguistic creatures who encounter the material order as always 
already symbolized or imbued with signification, and, even more importantly, such beings come 
to be in and through their encounters with an irreducible other. 
Yet, Williams also allows us to lend further clarity to precisely what we mean by 
language in the first place so as to render less opaque the idea of the Eucharist as the gift of 
language. Perhaps the starkest example of an “irreducible other” that Williams takes up is an 
                                                
26 Williams, Edge of Words, 69. 
27 Ibid., 116. 
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anecdote from Phoebe Caldwell’s accounts of communicating with those with Autism Spectrum 
Disorder (ASD).  
Suppose that I have ASD and severe learning disabilities. I cannot make sense of 
the kaleidoscopic world I live in. My environment swirls round me and noises 
boom in my ears … Sometimes I am swept by painful surges from my own 
nervous system. When these are more than I can bear I try banging my head or 
lashing out at people/things that overload my senses, to stop the over-stimulation. 
I retreat to my own world and focus on particular sensory stimulation.”28 
 
Therapists working with subjects who struggle in this manner work through the coping 
mechanism their patients have developed in order to establish a means of communicating: “a 
person expresses their distress by banging the helper’s arm, and [the therapist] in response bangs 
the arm of her chair.” This opens the way out of the vicious circle of distress because it says, in 
effect, “what you are doing is not just yours; it is heard and can be followed.”29 This mirrors, so 
Williams argues, the formation of language—an utterance is received and responded to, and after 
reciprocity has been established the utterances can be expanded. This implies, ultimately, that 
language by nature is not solely “passing on information,” but more so an attempt at 
“establishing a world in common.”30  
 This notion of language as the establishment of a shared world makes the occurrences of 
excessive speech and silence all the more curious. What is the purpose of speech that breaches 
the boundaries of our shared world or of the failing of language itself in the creation of a shared 
                                                
28 Phoebe Caldwell, Finding You Finding Me: Using Intensive Interaction to Get in Touch with 
People Whose Severe Learning Disabilities are Combined with Autistic Spectrum Disorder 
(London: Jessica Kingsley, 2006), 117 as quoted in Williams, Edge of Words, 95. It is important 
to note that this example is pertinent only in so far as it is a possible objection against the most 
general considerations of what it means to have language. This portion of the argument is not 
meant to, as my colleague Peter Capretto has argued, “operationalize” or make useful disability 
for theology. This only succeeds in marginalizing disability even further. For that argument see 
Peter Capretto, “On Not Operationalizing Disability in Theology,” Journal of the American 
Academy of Religion 85, no. 4 (2017): 889-919. 
29 Caldwell, Finding You Finding Me, 115; as quoted in Williams, Edge of Words, 96. 
30 Williams, Edge of Words, 99. 
 291 
world amongst subjects? Williams suggests that the excesses of language are fourfold and help 
us understand how it is that language always seems to put itself under pressure via its own 
tendency to expand the boundaries of the shared world that it creates. The enforced patterns of 
poetry, the “carefully calculated shocks” of paradox, the undermining of surface level meanings 
in irony, and the unlearning or deconstruction of previous meaning via chaotic language delivers 
us from the easy or complacent mode of self-knowledge that is ultimately not true.  Much like 
what Pickstock insisted was the great benefit of the Latin Roman Rite, language itself seems to 
bear the same tendency towards displacing our self-assured identity through defamiliarizing 
speech. It is language itself in its most general use that suggests this penchant for extreme speech 
is actually part and parcel of constituting our identities.  
 Yet, what of silence? Is silence the failure of language such that our shared worlds are 
shown to be nothing more than castles in the air, or is it something else entirely? Williams 
suggests that it is something else, and his insight here is a vital qualification on my talk of the 
Eucharist as in some way “mysterious.” The main insight to glean from Williams’ in-depth 
treatment of the value of silence for understanding language is that silence does not indicate 
language’s utter failure. Language itself is not made inadequate by the interminable difficulty 
facing it, which silence represents here. The example of speech about God is particularly 
pertinent: “Language is not a screen which hides God from us. On the contrary, the idea of God 
in language…is the idea of a hidden God.” Or as Williams puts it, “it is language that presents 
mystery, language is where mystery occurs.”31 So to say that something is ever haunted by the 
unsayable is not the same as saying that there is an irruption of the incomprehensible that renders 
all attempts at making sense impossible. Silence in this context is rather the attempt to name the 
                                                
31 Williams, Edge of Words, 163. 
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unnameable and in gesturing towards that which cannot be said language “moves the ball down 
the field,” so to speak, by clarifying just what it is that escapes its grasp. So to say that the 
Eucharist is plunged further into mystery by naming it as the gift of language is not to say that all 
attempts at making sense must cease in favor of a silent unknowing or encounter, but rather that 
the sort of speech that will make sense when speaking of the Eucharist is the sort that attempts to 
name the unnameable so as to gesture, however incompletely, at the not-fully-articulable 
relations enacted by such a gift.  
Let me resume, then, our discussion of the Eucharist by making a direct theological 
claim: The Eucharist is the gift of language because it is the gift of the Word through the Holy 
Spirit—the gift of a sharing in that primordial creativity and perfect sociality that defines the life 
of the Triune God. This highly Trinitarian statement distills an insight I have been tracing circles 
around since we began, that is: if we say that the Eucharist is the gift of language then this is to 
claim that we do, as Chauvet would say, encounter God in the most human of places—our 
continual creation and “going on” of human selfhood through language. Yet, to name the 
language of the Eucharist as a gift is also to claim, perhaps contra Williams, that what we are 
describing here is a fundamental alteration to that capacity, or that what makes this particular 
language unique is a gift that arrives outside of language, though its content is mediated to us 
through language, as everything else is. The gift is both a particular story in which the relations 
between Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—Word and Gift—are enacted in and through the life of 
Jesus of Nazareth and the community such relations created.  
Hence, there is a sense in which what I am describing can be named as transignification, 
but the transformation taking place is not what the Eucharistic elements themselves signify but 
rather the way in which the Eucharist is a gift of a new form of signification or a fundamental 
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alteration to the capacity for signification. Such an alteration is ultimately a gift, and while that 
gift arrives in language, it is impossible to say that its origin or root is dependent upon language. 
Rather, this gift must be something “extra-linguistic,” as Chauvet would claim, simply because 
the life presented in and through this story exceeds the bounds of language. In other words, what 
is being described in the life of Jesus is a manner of belonging now proleptically made possible 
but which exceeds the nature and limitations of finitude itself. This is certainly not all that they 
mean, but it is surely part of what the Gospel writers mean to say when they speak of Jesus’ life 
as divine. Hence, what arrives to us in the gift of language that is the Eucharist is something that 
fundamentally displaces, even calls into absolute question, all possible manners of belonging 
made available through the human symbolic capacity.32 The gift, in other words, is not 
impossible in itself. The gift is impossible for language—for the manner of belonging 
characteristic of human sociality.  
Thus, we should expect there to be a need to “go on” even after the Eucharist, since the 
gift that is at the heart of the Eucharist cannot be captured by language, even after the radical 
alteration to language made by the gift’s being given. We should furthermore expect the 
Eucharist to fail, not utterly but significantly, at achieving the true nature of the gift as a manner 
of human belonging. For the new manner of belonging that the Eucharist gives to us in and as 
language is, I would argue, a manner of being-with that is coincident with the Trinitarian 
relations from which the gift stems. I think, then, we are bound to say that if the Eucharist is the 
gift of language then the Eucharist is the gift of a new manner of sharing the world together. For 
                                                
32 Plumbing the implications of this claim for specific matters of liberation, such as racial and 
economic oppression was beyond the scope of this essay. However, for a specific engagement 
with the implications of dispossession for racial and economic injustice see Amaryah Jones-
Armstrong, “The Spirit and the Subprime: Race, Risk, and our Common Disposition,” Anglican 
Theological Review 98, no. 1 (2016): 51-69. 
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since language is more than mere speech and is in fact the fundamental human way of belonging 
together in our shared world, then the ontological scandal of the Eucharist as a scandal in and for 
language must mean that the gift of the Eucharist is the possibility of a new manner of creating a 
shared world together. This is just to say that the ontological scandal of the Eucharist must also 
be a political scandal. Therefore, it is to the final aspect of the syntagm in question—the 
Eucharist as the gift of political language—to which I now turn.  
 
Eucharist as the Gift of Political Language 
 If the gift of the Eucharist is the inbreaking of a new manner of human belonging, a new 
way of sharing the world together in and through language, then in what sense can the Eucharist 
be applied to the political life of the Church? Just how applicable, in other words, is the gift of 
the Eucharist to questions of human belonging in ordinary time, in the saeculum? What sorts of 
actions or political stances may be deduced as “Christian” from it? I am going to argue that in 
constituting the means by which the Church comes to a shared world in which meaningful 
communication is possible that the Eucharist is an utterly political scandal. What I am going to 
claim that might be frustrating to the reader is that the Eucharist actually circumvents what we 
typically mean by “political” questions and opens up the horizon of the authentically political. 
This will come to mean that the Eucharist, in revealing the authentically political, is 
eschatologically oriented.  
Still, I would like to preface all of this by saying as emphatically as I can what I am not 
arguing. I am not proposing that within a proper reading of the Eucharist, or even within a proper 
reading of the resurrected life for which the Eucharist is a sign, there is a stable set of political 
tenets by which the Church might inform itself of how God wills it to act in the various publics 
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to which it is now bound. The sacraments are not, as much as we might like them to be, the 
foundations of a “social programme.”33 This is not to say that the Eucharist has nothing to say 
whatsoever about politics, mind you. Recent works on the Eucharist suggest that it is a vital 
resource in the prophetic voice of the Church seeking to make present in the world the dangerous 
memory of Jesus Christ.34 And yet what even those profoundly influential works suggest is that 
the Eucharist is more evocative of political ideals than it is descriptive of political positions. 
How, then, can the Eucharist serve as the proverbial north star of the Church’s public life without 
losing sight of the indeterminate nature of what and how much the Eucharist can “say?”  
I believe it will help to say precisely how the term “political” is functioning here. I mean 
by “political” more than merely the negotiations and skirmishes involved in the particular 
arrangement of power in a particular community. I mean also more than merely the particular 
policies enacted in a given community, the goings-on of a polis. It may come as no surprise that I 
mean something having to do with the shared world created by language, in particular its status 
as establishing what Hannah Arendt called the “public realm.”35 To summarize Arendt’s thought 
in the terms I have already established, the public realm is “what provides us with an identity in 
terms of language; it is the possibility of securing what I have been and done and said as an 
individual by locating it in a tradition of speech and recollection.”36 To engage in public life is to 
“accept that I am finite and time-bound, born into a continuum of language and interaction I did 
not choose or invent, and yet also to transcend my finitude in the only way I can, by striving to 
                                                
33 Rowan Williams, On Christian Theology, 220. 
34 I am thinking in particular here of Bruce T. Morrill, Anamnesis and Dangerous Memory: 
Political and Liturgical Theology in Dialogue (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 2000), William 
Cavanaugh’s Torture and Eucharist: Theology, Politics, and the Body of Christ (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1998), and M. Shawn Copeland’s Enfleshing Freedom: Body, Race, and Being 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2010).  
35 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 50. 
36 Rowan Williams, On Augustine (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), 107 
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contribute to the language and interaction of the group some new qualification or nuance that can 
reasonably and properly become part of a tradition, a heritage.”37 The public realm might be 
described as that common life born of the shared world we create in and through language, and 
to engage in public life is to seek to build that common life by “knowing what to do or say next” 
within that realm.38 
Yet, does the Church not undermine or even scuttle this notion of a public life, in that it 
separates itself off into a private language with no interest in becoming translatable into the 
public realm’s terms? In a reading of Augustine’s City of God, Williams suggests that while 
Augustine does have stark criticism for the public realm of his time—the Roman Empire’s 
particular brand of social virtue—Augustine does value something like Arendt’s public realm. 
However, what Augustine seems to suggest is that the problem with the public realm is not that 
the Church must separate itself from it, but rather that the public realm cannot be truly public. 
Augustine, in other words, is “engaged in a redefinition of the public itself, designed to show that 
it is life outside the Christian community which fails to be truly public, authentically political.”39 
The Eucharist, I am arguing, accomplishes precisely this redefinition—as the gift of an 
unfinished identity in and through the gift of language the true sense of public and political life 
shows itself to the Church.  
 In what sense then is the Eucharist political language? Just what sort of political bond 
within the Church am I proposing the rite creates? In many ways the answer to these questions is 
the same. Just as the human subject arrives to a material world always already imbued with 
signification, so also the Eucharist is that language of the Church which always already there for 
                                                
37 Williams, On Augustine, 107. 
38 Williams, Edge of Words, 68. 
39 Williams, On Augustine, 111. 
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the Christian. The Eucharist is the “what has been said” of the Church that sets the conditions for 
the possibility of any “going on” or meaningful expansion of Christian witness. I would argue 
that the Eucharist comes to function as the “thrownness” of the Church.40 The Eucharist, in other 
words, throws the Church into an identity that is not, as Williams again instructs us, of our own 
making or choosing. Or perhaps better, the Church finds itself thrown by the Eucharist as that 
which establishes its facticity as a community. The Eucharist, in this way, does not cause the 
Church to be something, to think something, or even do something specific. The Eucharist 
reveals to the Church what it always already is.41  
 To say that the Eucharist reveals what the Church always already is, however, is not to 
claim that the Eucharist does nothing more than show the matter-of-factness of the Church’s 
identity. The Eucharist is still involved in a fundamental change, both in the way that we 
understand things qua things and in the being of a particular community. As the thrownness of 
the Church, the change we are speaking about occurs in the most human of places, that is, in our 
creation of a shared world together through language. How precisely this becomes something 
“political” might be better explained by reconsidering a notion from Chauvet: his notion of the 
“triple body” of “culture, tradition, and nature.” Chauvet is involved here in a redefinition of 
what we mean by “body” at all. The notion of the triple body tries to articulate how it is that our 
bodies are speaking (i.e., the body an individual site of speech) and how they are always-already 
spoken (i.e., we are born into a series of subject-defining relations without our consent). In terms 
                                                
40 See Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: SUNY Press, 
2010), 131-133. 
41 This claim is by no means new. It is an echo, albeit from an entirely different starting point, of 
ressourcement theology and of prominent Eastern Orthodox theologians. The claim echoes, in 
short, claims made by theologians who have advocated for the position that, as de Lubac put it, 
the Eucharist makes the Church. For a helpful account of this tradition see Paul McPartlan, 
Sacrament of Salvation: An Introduction to Eucharistic Ecclesiology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
1995). 
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of culture, tradition, and nature, a person’s body is “spoken” by the culture of the group to which 
the person belongs, the “historic tradition” of that cultural group, and, finally, the confines of the 
physical universe. These three embodied realities are symbolically joined together in each person 
such that “the I-body exists only as woven, inhabited, spoken by this triple body of culture, 
tradition, and nature.”42 
Chauvet helps us, therefore, in understanding precisely how an embodied change might 
come to have its effect at the most general level of what it means to be human. The sort of 
change I am speaking about in describing the Eucharist as the gift of political language is thus a 
change in the triple body of culture, tradition, and nature that Chauvet holds as constituting our 
being as human subjects in the first place. Perhaps, then, the sort of change we are speaking 
about in the Eucharist is something like transcorporation. For the nature of the change is the 
transformation of two bodies—one, a pair of things and, two, a gathered body of people—into 
the Body of Christ. The locus of the mystery is not in the elements alone but also in the Church. 
The prickliest mystery of the Eucharist, I would argue, is not how it is that the bread and wine 
become the body and blood of Christ but how it is that the body of believers gathered together is 
changed into the mystical body of Christ. That is the true mystery of the Eucharist—not how it is 
that bread becomes something different, but how it is that an entire people come to share in a 
manner of being-with-one-another that is decidedly impossible given the limitations of the finite 
and fallen order. The way in which the Eucharist is a political scandal, therefore, is also an 
ontological question, i.e. just how it is that a body of people is changed into something else at the 
level of their status as a “body” of gathered people. The Eucharist is political in the sense that a 
                                                
42 Louis-Marie Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament: A Sacramental Reinterpretation of Christian 
Existence, trans. Patrick Madigan, S.J. and Madeleine Beaumont (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 
1997), 150. 
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body of fallen people become the sacramental presence of the polis to which all manners of 
human communities are “on the way” towards. It is the gift of a new “triple body,” the gift of a 
new culture, tradition, and even a renewed vision of the cosmos that reconstitutes the very 
matters of fact that determine the possibilities for belonging together.  
 In what sense then does the gift of the Eucharist obligate us to any particular actions 
within imperfectly public life? The difficulty for Chauvet’s account of gift-exchange in light of 
Derrida’s concerns about the utter gratuitousness of the gift was that Chauvet’s embrace of 
obligatory generosity canceled the gift from the outset. Even if we take the gift to the level of the 
gift-of-self those concerns remain, perhaps become even more extreme because then we are 
exchanging derelict and paltry versions of our self to the other and receiving the same in return. 
Is there a sense, then, in which the self-gift of God obligates a return gift? And what can the 
content of that gift be? Belcher is, again, quite helpful here: 
There is one point at which this presentation of the gift becomes truly helpful, and 
that is with respect to theologies for women, children, and other historically 
marginalized groups. These peoples have historically been ‘obliged’ to many 
things that actively harmed them and their brothers and sisters, in order to enrich 
the already powerful. In the light of the discovery of the gift, it is clear that the 
only obligation are those that lead to liberation—not to oppression—and the only 
purpose of obligations is to authorize and motivate the practices that allow one to 
discover joy in the obligation itself—life, abundantly. In this authentic mediations 
of the gospel can, in theory, be distinguished from inauthentic ones.43  
 
In a strong sense, there is no obligation imposed upon the Church to a certain conventionally 
political perspective. The only obligation inherent in the political scandal of the Eucharist is the 
obligation that exists to authorize and motivate practices of liberation. Yet, what I would also 
claim is that this is not even for the sake of liberation. In other words, the political scandal of the 
Eucharist is not something like the “preferential option for the poor,” i.e. a principle that is 
                                                
43 Belcher, Efficacious Engagement, 177. 
 300 
deeper than one particular practice but is fundamentally rooted in something like liberation. 
Rather, I think that the political scandal of the Eucharist is something deeper, precisely because it 
is a change at the level of the triple body. The political scandal of the Eucharist that I have been 
describing as a new manner of sharing the world together must be thought of as something like 
joy, and it is from this joy that true obligation springs. As Belcher puts it in an earlier passage: 
“[T]his amnesia [that forgets the gift transferred by becoming the gift] is itself another phase of 
discovery: the discovery that obligation has, all along, been an illusion; obligations are 
entertained only to point toward joy—and joy is the participation in the thing, the discovery that 
the obligation was given only to discover in the law, spirit, and in the spirit, freedom.”44 Thus, 
far from imposing any conventional political position on the gathered community who is 
transcorporated into the Body of Christ, the Eucharist imposes the freedom from obligation via 
the entrance into those gift-giving relations that constitute the divine life—relations whose nature 
cannot be explained, only named as joy.45 Furthermore, when such joy occurs in the world bound 
to interminable conflict, such joy can only be spoken of as mystery.  
Naming the political scandal of the Eucharist as joy implies two further principles. The 
first has to do with how the Church must negotiate its relationship with power. The second 
returns us back to the question of materiality and the joyful community’s relationship to things. 
As to the first, if the ontological scandal of the Eucharist is the gift of entrance into the 
Trinitarian life—relations whose nature cannot be adequately exposited—then it seems that 
Milbank’s second iteration of the political scandal of the Eucharist has gone quite wrong. To 
                                                
44 Ibid. 
45 Beyond Belcher’s invocation of joy it should be noted that Alexander Schmemann made joy 
an integral category of his sacramental and Eucharistic theology. For a treatment of the political 
implications of Schmemann’s work in this regard see, Morrill, Anamnesis as Dangerous 
Memory, 115-132. 
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claim, as he does, that Christianity without Christendom is somehow delusional seems far too 
bold a claim based in a participatory metaphysic that has lost the key discipline of apophaticism 
on its speech. Even more importantly, however, if the political scandal of the Eucharist is a joy-
filled manner of being-with, then the unfinished character of such a community cannot be 
identified with any finite political institution. Christianity implies Christendom only in so far as 
Christendom is wrongly identified with the eschaton.  
A further reflection emerges, however, that a polity bound by joy is one that does not take 
up the power of the conventional political order so as to protect itself or secure for itself a 
freedom from the ills of the world. Williams notes this by reflecting upon one particular aspect 
of the life-patterns enacted in the story of Jesus, that is, Jesus’ betrayal by Judas Iscariot and his 
being given over to crucifixion. Jesus’ passive giving himself over to the passive stuff of bread 
and wine preempts the aggressive betrayal to come.  
Thus, those who are at table with him, who include those who will betray, desert 
and repudiate him, are, if you like, frustrated as betrayers, their job is done for 
them by their victim. By his surrender ‘into’ the passive forms of food and drink 
he makes void and powerless the impending betrayal, and, more, makes the 
betrayers his guests and debtors, making with them the promise of divine fidelity, 
the covenant, that cannot be negated by their unfaithfulness.46 
 
The community that is bound to this pattern of surrender is thus a community made defenseless 
even in light of Jesus’ eventual triumph in the Resurrection. There is thus no conventionally 
political form of power that the Church can seize in order to secure its own defense: 
God’s promise to be faithful, even in advance of betrayal, and which thus can 
have no place for reprisal, for violent response to betrayal and breakage, or for 
pre-emptive action to secure against betrayal. There is no promise that people will 
not be unfaithful and untrustful towards each other, but there is an assurance that 
the new humanity does not depend on constant goodwill and successful effort to 
survive: its roots are deeper. If it is, properly, defenceless, that is because it does 
                                                
46 Williams, On Christian Theology, 216. 
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not need defending and cannot be defended by means that deny its basic 
assurances.47 
 
An attempt to secure its standing in the world through political power or even withdrawing from 
the world in order to secure the purity of its cultural identity is to take up an instrument of 
defending itself by a means that denies its basic assurance. Christendom as anything other than 
an eschatological principle is ultimately self-defeating, for that would be to try to assert that the 
Church is something other than what the Eucharist most fundamentally declares that it is: a 
community that cannot be defended. To say that this community cannot be defended is to say 
that this community is one bound to joy, a community that is Spirit-filled, a community that is 
free. 
As Williams further notes, from this pattern of defenselessness made powerful there 
comes an insight about the second principle I mentioned above, that is, an insight about 
materiality. There is first that when “seen in the perspective of the eucharist, cannot be proper 
material for the defence of one ego or group-ego against another, cannot properly be tools of 
power, because they are signs of a creativity working by the renunciation of control, and signs of 
the possibility of communion, covenanted trust and the recognition of shared need and shared 
hope.”48 As I have already noted, Williams is adamant that what the sacraments reveal about 
materiality is not a “sacramental principle” that might see a hidden sacredness imbuing all 
materiality. Rather, “the divine presence is apprehended by seeing in all things their difference, 
their particularity, their ‘not-God-ness,’ since we have learned what the divine action is in the 
renunciation of Christ, his giving himself into inanimate form.”49 The Eucharist as the gift of 
political language is, I have been arguing, a change in the triple body of culture, tradition, and 
                                                
47 Ibid., 217. 
48 Ibid,, 218. 
49 Ibid., 217. 
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nature. This final change in nature is, I would posit, the gift of things as things. Sacramentality is 
thus no longer a vision of the entire universe as “sacramental,” i.e. as always “on the way” to 
becoming the Body and Blood of Christ. Rather, sacramentality refers to the particular capacity 
of sign-making to “open to us the sense already made by God as creator and redeemer.”50 In 
other words, the Eucharist is not just an epiphany of the sacred, or if it is revelatory of anything 
sacred it is by its “re-ordering of the words and images used to think or experience social life.”51 
Materiality and signification are granted their worth as processes with their own integrity apart 
from the economy of salvation, but they can be thought of as caught up in a sacramental vision 
of the cosmos because of the arrival of a gift that radically alters just what it is both things and 
signs can make present to us. 
 I am sure there are quite a few questions that could be asked of this account, but I want to 
be sure to answer one in particular. In an essay already referenced in this text, Ambrose posed a 
question to both Chauvet and Pickstock’s theological systems, namely, of what use is all this to 
people in the pews?52 Ambrose’s conclusion was that Pickstock’s reading of the Mass, while 
admirably rigorous, posed significant problems to the minister trying to implement her insights 
in their parish ministry. Chauvet, on the other hand, also posed deep theoretical hurdles for the 
minister to clear, but Ambrose was rightly appreciative that Chauvet’s project is ultimately 
motivated by pastoral rather than theoretical concerns. This orientation made his system the 
easier of the two to “preach,” if you will. Yet, it is a question worth asking again: in what sense 
do Chauvet’s and Milbank/Pickstock’s visions of the Eucharist as the gift of political language 
actually have any effect on the people in the pews? In other words, the reader might have been 
                                                
50 Ibid., 207. 
51 Ibid., 209. 
52 Glenn Ambrose, “Chauvet and Pickstock: Two Compatible Visions?” Questions Liturgiques 
82, no. 1 (2001): 69-79. 
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harboring an objection all along to my argument that while what I have been arguing is a novel 
way of thinking of the Eucharist it is not ultimately how most of those who receive the Eucharist 
think of the rite. If the Eucharist is the gift of political language, then why does it have so little 
effect on those who partake of it? Why is the Church still beset by the same collapse of shared 
language and common value as the world? This is a vital objection to answer. 
 I want to make an observation, therefore, that might sound a bit extreme. That 
observation is this: because the Eucharist is the gift of language every Eucharist fails. But fails in 
what sense? Thomas Aquinas rightly reminds us that the Eucharist does not fail in 
communicating grace to us. The Eucharist communicates grace regardless of the piety of the 
priest and, in different ways, without regards to the faith of the recipient. This is precisely what 
we should expect if we encounter in the Eucharist the God who continually gives of Godself 
without reserve and without account. Yet, when the community goes out from this encounter—
an encounter even in which I have suggested that the community is transfigured into the 
sacramental presence of the perfected and authentically political community—that community 
leaves and immediately falls back into the deformed patterns of belonging that characterize what 
we call “the world.”  
 I would argue that this means, as Denys Turner has put it, that the Eucharist, like speech 
about God, fails “not of truth, but of God.”53 The particular sort of unknowing characteristic of 
Christian apophaticism—in which God is beyond not only our affirmations but our denials, 
without there being a subsequent despair over ever speaking truthfully of God—is very much 
present in our speech about how the Eucharist makes us holy as a gathered community. Our 
                                                
53 Denys Turner, “Apophaticism, Idolatry and the Claims of Reason,” in Silence and Word: 
Negative Theology and Incarnation, ed. Oliver Davies and Denys Turner (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 16. 
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speech about the Eucharist is, like all other speech about God, “tainted with ultimate failure.”54 
Even more importantly, however, is the fact that the Eucharist as language is imbued with the 
life-pattern of Jesus’ renunciation and giving himself over to those who would betray him. This 
means that the sort of triumphant permanence of the joyful community one might expect from 
the transcorporation that is given in the Eucharist is the wrong expectation.  
 Yet, as theologians from communities that have been historically marginalized remind us, 
such an endorsement of renunciation and powerlessness can lead a tacit endorsement of the 
stifling and silencing of voices whose cry would alert the Church to one of the “true obligations” 
of liberation. There are ways in which even the Eucharist, without any explicit emphasis on 
renunciation, can pose quite troubling dynamics for victims of sexual trauma.55 Here, in 
particular, is where I believe it is of the utmost importance to keep the failure of the Eucharist as 
an apophatic principle in sight. An insight from Milbank’s first iteration is quite helpful: If we 
admit that the truth is disclosed not in one single disclosure of the universal but in “many open 
pathways” that are “disclosive of transcendence in some degree,” then the way upon which the 
Eucharist sets us is a “pilgrimage from sacred site to sacred site.”56 This is what we should 
expect, after all, from a rite best described by reference to the unfinished processes of gift-
exchange and language. So if, in the service of a true obligation of liberation, something about 
the rite of the Eucharist needs to be changed for the sake of those who receive the elements, then 
such changes ought to be undertaken. More importantly, such changes do not cancel the gift of 
political language that is the Eucharist. In fact, such changes reinforce the gift of the Eucharist as 
                                                
54 Turner, “Apophaticism, Idolatry, and the Claims of Reason,” 16. 
55 See especially the essay by my colleague Hillary Jerome Scarsella, “Victimization via 
Ritualization: Relationships of Christian Communion to Sexualized Violence,” forthcoming in 
Trauma and Lived Religion, ed. Srdjan Sremac (London: Palgrave Macmillan). 
56 John Milbank, Being Reconciled: Ontology and Pardon (London: Routledge, 2003), 173. 
 306 
a non-identical repetition of the gift. The gift of political language that is the Eucharist, 
therefore, will move back and forth from ritual enactments of empowerment and defenselessness 
for the individual, but for the community at large the rite will always be a means of discovering 
the power of belonging together as the Body of Christ.  
 
Conclusion: An Apophatic, Sacramental, Political Theology? 
 The sacramental is inherently political. In fact, the sacramental is the access point to the 
political, to that manner of human belonging that is constituted by the relations enacted in the 
story of Jesus and best named (albeit imperfectly) as joy. Such is the case because the 
sacramental discloses a particular vision of the cosmos as gift, of the human person as shaped by 
gift (and linguistic exchanges) and of the Christian community as eschatologically oriented to an 
identity that it proleptically possesses each time it gathers to repeat non-identically the moment 
in the particular story that threw the Church into existence. There is, therefore, no theology of 
sacramentality, no vision of the cosmos as gift or vision of the Christian as identified by the 
embodied rites of the Christian Sacraments, that does not also have a political correlate. Yet, the 
nature of the political itself is redefined in the fundamental theology of sacramentality that the 
Eucharist (among all the other sacraments) reveals to us. The conventionally political that we 
identify with the various strivings for and redistribution of power between left and right, liberal 
and conservative, bourgeois and revolutionary, are nothing more than an aspect of that 
conglomerate that the Gospel of John calls “the world.” As worldly and thereby fallen, such 
negotiations of various arrangements of power are by nature a privation of the positive modes of 
human belonging disclosed in the sacraments. Perhaps better, these interminable conflicts belong 
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to “the world,” and, as Herbert McCabe puts it, “The world here is past praying for. It can only 
be smashed.”57 
 There is a sense, then, in which what I have been arguing identifies the sacramental with 
the eschatological, and works on the nature of anamnesis confirm the merits of such an 
identification.58 If anything, such an identification of the sacramental with the truly political, and 
therefore the eschatological, lends further credence to insisting that the politics of the Eucharist 
must be forever chastened by the apophatic discipline. The public life of the Church, as the 
inbreaking of the gift of authentic political language, is incomprehensible in our very bodies, as 
the site in which the triple body of culture, tradition, and nature that imposes itself upon those of 
us who traverse the world undermines the intelligibility of the political language gifted to us in 
the Eucharist. That triple body impedes the gift even to the point of making it impossible. Yet, 
we begin by the impossible. “No eye has seen, no ear has heard,” after all. Hence, the Eucharist 
as the gift of political language reveals to us a new horizon for a theology that refuses the 
distinction between thought and practice, between materiality and signification, between the 
apophatic and a rigorously Christian ontology. The Eucharist shows that even mystery must take 
a body, and that naming bodies as fundamentally sharing in the mystery that is the relations of 
the Triune life is nothing less than a political act of judgment. The Eucharist bids us begin, in 
other words, the politics of mystery.  
                                                
57 McCabe, God Still Matters, 170. 
58 See in particular Morrill, Anamnesis as Dangerous Memory, 189-213. 
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